UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICE

+ + + + +

RESPONSE SYSTEMS TO ADULT SEXUAL
ASSAULT CRIMES PANEL
+ + + + +
COMPARING SYSTEMS FOR INVESTIGATION,
PROSECUTION, AND DEFENSE OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES
+ + + + +
WEDNESDAY
DECEMBER 11, 2013

+ + + + +

The panel convened in the Multipurpose Room in San Jacinto Residence Hall at the University of Texas at Austin, 309 East 21st Street, Austin, Texas, at 8:00 a.m., The Honorable Barbara Jones, Panel Chair, presiding.

PANEL MEMBERS PRESENT

THE HONORABLE BARBARA JONES, Chair
THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN
VICE ADMIRAL (RETIRED) JAMES HOUCK
BRIGADIER GENERAL (RETIRED) COLLEEN McGUIRE
BRIGADIER GENERAL (RETIRED) MALINDA DUNN
COLONEL (RETIRED) HOLLY COOK
PROFESSOR ELIZABETH HILLMAN
HARVEY BRYANT
MAI FERNANDEZ

STAFF PRESENT
WILLIAM SPRANCE, Designated Federal Officer
COLONEL PATRICIA HAM, Staff Director

SPEAKERS

DEPUTY CHIEF KIRK ALBANESE, Chief of Detectives, Detective Bureau, Los Angeles Police
JOANNE ARCHAMBAULT, Executive Director, End Violence Against Women International, President and Training Director, Sexual Assault Training and Investigations
CAPTAIN JASON BROWN, Military Justice Officer, Military Justice Branch(JAM), Judge Advocate Division, Marine Corps Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
DR. NO L BUSCH-ARMENDARIZ, Professor and Associate Dean of Research, School of Social Work at The University of Texas at Austin
CAPTAIN ROBERT CROW, Director, Criminal Law Division (Code 20), U.S. Navy
SERGEANT LIZ DONEGAN, Sex Offender Apprehension and Registration Unit, Austin Police Department
DEPUTY CHIEF COREY FALLS, Deputy Chief of Police, Ashland (OR) Police Department
DARRELL GILLIARD, Deputy Assistant Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service
DR. CARA J. KRULEWITCH, Director, Women's Health, Medical Ethics and Patient Advocacy Clinical and Policy Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
LIEUTENANT COLONEL MIKE LEWIS, Chief, Military Justice Division, U.S. Air Force
DR. KIM LONSWAY, Director of Research, End Violence Against Women International

NEAL MARZLOFF, Special Agent in Charge, Central Region, U.S. Coast Guard Criminal Investigative Service

COLONEL MICHAEL MULLIGAN, Chief, Criminal Law Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army

MAJOR RYAN OAKLEY, Deputy Director, Office of Legal Policy, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness), U.S. Air Force

KEVIN POORMAN, Associate Director for Criminal Investigations, Office of Special Investigation, U.S. Air Force

RUSS STRAND, Chief, Behavioral Sciences Education and Training Division, U.S. Army Military Police School

GUY SURIAN, Deputy G-3, Investigative Operations and Intelligence, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opening Comments - Panel Chair 7
Overview - The Problem of Sexual Assault in the
Military and Civilian Society. 14

Special Victim Capability - Section 573, NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2013 120
Military Criminal Investigative
Organizations. 183

Civilian Police Departments and
Investigators. 257
Academic Discussion - Civilian Police Response
and Handling of Sexual Assault Reports 354

Public Comments. 495

Discussion/Deliberation. 515

1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2 (8:49 a.m.)
3 MR. SPRANCE: Good morning. I'm
4 Bill Sprance, the Designated Federal Officer
5 for the Response Systems Panel, and I'd like
6 to open this meeting of the Panel. At this
7 moment, I'd like to turn the meeting over to
8 Colonel Patricia Ham, Staff Director for the
9 Response Systems Panel. Colonel?
10 COL. HAM: Thank you, Mr. Sprance.
11 Good morning and welcome to this public
12 meeting of the Response Systems to Adult
13 Sexual Assault Crimes Panel. I'm Colonel
14 Patricia Ham, and I am the Staff Director for
15 the Panel.
16 First, on behalf of the staff of the
17 Panel, I want to thank the University of Texas
18 for your hospitality and warm welcome here to
19 Austin. Congress directed the Secretary of
20 Defense to establish this Panel in the
21 National Defense Authorization Act of 2013.
22 Secretary Hagel selected five

1 members of this nine-member Panel, and he
2 designated the chair Honorable Barbara Jones;
3 the House and Senate Armed Services
4 Committee's ranking and minority members
5 selected four additional members. So, the
6 Panel has nine standing members.
7 This committee is a federal advisory
8 committee, operating under the Federal
9 Advisory Committee Act, known as FACA, which
10 is a government in the sunshine law, that
11 requires open public meetings and
12 deliberations on the issues Congress has
13 directed the Panel to examine.
14 Under FACA, members of the public
15 have the right to submit public comments to
16 the Panel and to request to address the Panel
17 at these meetings. All the public comments
18 and all the materials provided to the Panel,
19 both in meetings and in preparation for the
20 meetings is accessible to the public as well.
21 We received five public comments
22 related to this meeting, and two of those who

1 submitted comments have requested to appear
2 before the Panel, and address them. Those
3 folks are Daniel B. Ross, who also requested
4 to address the Panel today; Major Melissa
5 Brown, who requested to address the Panel
6 today as well, and written comments from Ms.
7 Paula Bushon, Mr. William Finn and the
8 Innocent Warrior Fund.
9 All five public comments are posted
10 on the Panel's website, which is
11 ResponseSystemsPanel.whs.mil. And the Panel
12 members have also been provided hard copies of
13 those public comments today. Without further
14 delay, Madam Chair, are you ready to proceed?
15 CHAIR JONES: Yes, thank you. Good
16 morning, everybody. Let me echo Colonel Ham's
17 words and say thank you very much to the
18 University of Texas for hosting us. I have to
19 say that I've never been to Austin, and it's
20 a truly beautiful city. So, this is a
21 wonderful venue for us.
22 On behalf of the entire Panel, I

1 would also like to extend our appreciation to
2 William Powers, Junior, the President of the
3 University of Texas here at Austin, and for
4 the great welcome that we've received and all
5 the help that we've gotten from university
6 personnel.
7 In particular, I'd like to thank
8 Nancy Brazzil, who is Deputy to the President,
9 Susan Lamborghini, who is assistant to Ms.
10 Brazzil, Dr. Luis Zayas, the Dean of the
11 School of Social Work, and Dr. Noel Bush-
12 Armendariz -- excuse me if I've butchered your
13 name -- who is the Associate Dean for Research
14 at the School of Social Work and also the
15 Director of the Institute on Domestic Violence
16 and Sexual Assault, and her assistant Linda
17 Solomon.
18 I also want to thank up front the --
19 all of the many presenters who will be here
20 today from civilian police departments,
21 district attorneys offices and public defender
22 organizations.

1 The Panel knows the time you are
2 taking from your very busy lives to give us
3 this information that we need. It is an
4 extremely valuable contribution to our work.
5 This is our fourth public meeting,
6 and as Colonel Ham mentioned, we have been
7 given a lot of tasks by the Congress in the
8 National Defense Authorization Act of 2013
9 that created us. Among them is the task to
10 review and assess the systems used to
11 investigate, prosecute and adjudicate crimes
12 involving adult sexual assault.
13 A big part of that job is also to
14 compare the military systems with our civilian
15 systems. So, today, we embark on that
16 undertaking.
17 In the National Defense
18 Authorization Act, Congress specifically
19 directed the Department of Defense to
20 establish what are called special victim
21 capabilities for the purposes of investigating
22 and prosecuting certain criminal offenses,

1 including, of course, sexual assault and
2 victim capabilities -- special victim
3 capabilities that would provide support for
4 victims of those offenses.
5 Now, because of that requirement,
6 today we explore the special victim
7 capabilities and in particular any specialized
8 training of law enforcement personnel in
9 sexual assault cases. And in this regard, we
10 will hear from civilian investigators and
11 police departments including from Los Angeles,
12 Oregon and here in Austin, Texas.
13 This will be followed by military
14 investigators who will also describe their
15 activities and capacities and will permit us
16 to make some comparisons.
17 Lastly, we will have an academic
18 panel discussion today, and that will deal
19 with the police response to sexual assault
20 reports, and the handling of those reports.
21 This particular panel will include Dr. Noel
22 Bush-Armendariz and Dr. Kim Lonsway, both from

1 the University of Texas.
2 Tomorrow's session, just to give you
3 an idea, will begin with an overview of
4 Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military
5 Justice, and that's the main statutory
6 provision addressing sexual assault. We will
7 also have an overview of some civilian sexual
8 assault statutes again for the purpose of
9 comparison.
10 Let me talk a little bit more
11 specifically. We have learned that every
12 unrestricted report of sexual assault in the
13 military is required to be reported to the
14 military criminal investigative organizations,
15 which must in turn investigate every one of
16 those reports.
17 Each of the military services in
18 turn is required to track every report from
19 its inception to its disposition. And
20 tomorrow, we will hear what happens to those
21 reported offenses: How many are prosecuted
22 and the conviction rate.

1 Again, that fits into our efforts to
2 analyze and compare the differences between
3 our military justice efforts and those of our
4 civilian system.
5 In this regard, we're very lucky
6 tomorrow to have Dr. Cassia Spohn, who is an
7 expert, an academic who specializes in
8 analyzing the disposition of sexual assault
9 cases in civilian jurisdictions.
10 She is going to be able to compare
11 and contrast the military's disposition of
12 offenses to the civilian jurisdictions that
13 she has researched.
14 As I earlier mentioned, tomorrow
15 afternoon is also dedicated to a comparison
16 for the training and experience of military
17 and civilian prosecutors, as well as defense
18 counsel. In addition, we're going to examine
19 the particular challenges that are common to
20 prosecuting and defending sexual assault
21 cases.
22 As we continue to do our analyses

1 and obtain our information, we're also looking
2 for any best practices that have been
3 developed in the civilian system, in the
4 context of being able to make reports and
5 recommendations.
6 Interestingly, there is one
7 practice, which has already been instituted by
8 the Department of Defense, and that is victims
9 counsel. That is something that I think the
10 -- many victims advocates in our civilian
11 world would love to see happen universally for
12 sexual assault victims in our civilian
13 society.
14 The military has a pilot program
15 going on that already, and in fact, I think it
16 has actually been authorized as a permanent
17 program. So, we're interested to continue to
18 look at best practices in the military as
19 well.
20 So, as you can tell, this is a very
21 busy day for our Panel. The one thing that we
22 are going to try to do after we get out of

here is go for a good steak. So, we hear it is pretty good down here. Thank you very, very much.

I think we'll now hear from our first presenter. You're looking very lonely there, Mr. Strand. Russell Strand, who is the Chief of the Behavioral Sciences Education and Training Division for the US Army Military Police School. Okay, doctor. Thanks.

MR. STRAND: Thank you. I do feel lonely so I'm going to stand up. Because the way I present, I have a hard time sitting down. So, with your indulgence --

CHAIR JONES: Good enough.

MR. STRAND: Well, it is a pleasure and honor to be here. Thank you Panel Members for taking your time also out of our busy schedules to take on this -- this task of helping us get better, not only in the military but the civilian world.

I'd like to take some time this morning to talk about some difficulties and

1 some challenges that we have investigating and
2 prosecuting sexual assaults, both in the
3 military and the civilian world.
4 I'll talk about some of the most
5 research that we're starting to understand a
6 little bit better, and some of the promising
7 best practices that we're looking to apply.
8 The first slide is for the lawyers.
9 I work for the Department of Defense, but my
10 opinions aren't necessarily those always in
11 line with the Department of Defense. So,
12 those are my own opinions. Plus, for the fair
13 use doctrine, I do use some materials from the
14 creative work of others. Blah, blah, blah.
15 So, the first thing I'd like to
16 start out with is talking about the sex
17 offenders. We see them as an insider threat.
18 Just like we see an insider threat in
19 Afghanistan or Iraq, those are threats that
20 hurt our formations. Those are threats that
21 hurt us.
22 In every community, organization,

1 school, neighborhood, sometimes families, that
2 insider threat is devastating. So, we need to
3 look at the insider threat because that is
4 really what we're talking about.
5 We wouldn't be here if somebody
6 wasn't hurting us. And so, we're going to
7 talk about the insider threat. Insider
8 threats are our enemies.
9 They are sometimes predators. Not
10 always predators. But they often hurt others.
11 So, pick out the one in this picture that
12 might hurt others. The first thing we look at
13 is the wolf, right? Because they're
14 predators.
15 We know they're going to hurt the
16 sheep. The other -- the other animal we might
17 look to is the sheepdog in the back. The
18 sheepdog is trained to protect the sheep.
19 Very specially trained. Lot of trust that the
20 shepherd gives the sheep dog, but that
21 sheepdog sometimes actually harms the sheep.
22 And so, even though we have well-

1 trained sheepdogs, they sometimes harm the
2 sheep. But the people -- not the people, but
3 the animals in this picture that I most
4 concern myself with are really the sheep that
5 look and act just like all the other sheep
6 because they're bound to do more damage than
7 the wolf or the sheepdog.
8 So, that's what we're going to start
9 talking about. So, pick out the sex offender
10 in this picture. It is very difficult.
11 It doesn't matter what gender
12 because we have female offenders as well. We
13 have male offenders. Doesn't matter what
14 profession; whether they're in sports or not
15 in sports. What age? Doesn't really matter.
16 The difficulty we have to begin with
17 - the largest challenge that we have is
18 understanding sex offenders and who they are
19 and picking them out of our society and
20 identifying them.
21 Now, many of us have been to a bar.
22 I admit I've been to a bar before. And when

we go to a bar, there's a lot of people in the bar, and we make judgments on people whether in a bar or in church or in school.

Now, this particular bar is a special bar. So, we're going to enter this bar, and we're going to kind of look to see what is going on. So, everybody is going out to have a good time in this bar.

They're entering it. They're going to have a wonderful evening. So, the first person we meet, to check their judgment or character, is the bartender. It says right on his forehead, "No danger."

So, he's okay. We don't have to worry about him. The second person we meet is this guy drinking here. He is actually bankrupt but it doesn't look like it. His friend is very insecure, but he doesn't act like it.

Now, this guy here looks like an alcoholic, but it says, "Workaholic" on his forehead. So, he's a drama queen. We got to

1 be careful of him.
2 These two ladies; they're really
3 good friends and they're straight. This guy
4 here is from England. He's a boy racer. He
5 races little cars and things like that. Now,
6 the problem in this bar I'm most concerned
7 with is there's a young lady and a young man.
8 They meet each other, and she's making
9 judgments. She's making credibility
10 judgments.
11 It says, "Rapist" on his forehead.
12 She doesn't see it because this bar doesn't
13 exist. This bar does not exist at all. It's
14 a fake bar. Most people don't have "sex
15 offender" or anything on their forehead.
16 So, the good news is 95 percent of
17 any given male population will not commit a
18 sexual assault. That's really good news. The
19 vast majority of men are good people. And I
20 think we really need to understand that: being
21 a man is not a bad thing. The vast majority
22 of men are really good people.

1 The problem is that five percent of
2 men in any given male population will commit
3 a sexual assault either one time or many
4 times. But who are they?
5 I'm going to walk you through a
6 couple of things, but the first thing I'm
7 going to walk you through is probably one of
8 the biggest problems that we begin with to
9 understanding sex offenders, and that's
10 through the eyes of the victim.
11 So, if you're a sex offender, who
12 would you select? A nun or a drug user, or a
13 well respected college professor, or a student
14 who got in trouble for cheating, or a sober
15 woman or a drunk woman? Or, a service member
16 everyone respects, or a service member
17 everyone picks on?
18 The problem with this is that most
19 sex offenders will pick the person on the
20 right. Most sex offenders will pick the
21 vulnerable ones. Most sex offenders will pick
22 the ones they can easily exploit and work on

1 those vulnerabilities.
2 The biggest problem with that is
3 which one of the victims are more believable?
4 Generally, the victims that offenders select
5 are the ones that in our society appear to be
6 less credible.
7 That's a real, real problem; a very
8 big issue that we're looking at. So, the
9 first thing we're going to start off with,
10 understanding there's more that we don't know
11 than we do know. We're going to hear from
12 academics. You've already heard from a lot of
13 experts.
14 You're hearing from me right now,
15 but there's still a lot of things we don't
16 know. We're experts in a few things and --
17 and ignorant about most. And that's my
18 research this year, it's up there and I'll
19 change it next year.
20 Will Rogers puts it this way, "We're
21 all ignorant, just about different stuff."
22 So, there's only so much blame to go around.

1 When an offense is reported, we as a society
2 look to find out who is to blame, whether it's
3 really an offense or whether it is not.
4 And so, we have -- often times we
5 start out with a victim or a suspect.
6 Generally in almost every crime, we in the
7 criminal justice system investigate and
8 prosecute. We focus in homicides, attempted
9 homicides, robberies, thefts. We focus on the
10 behavior, responsibility, character, social
11 expectations, morals and biases of who? The
12 offender or the alleged offender.
13 We focus on those things in the
14 investigation. We do offender-focused
15 investigations. But what happens in a sexual
16 assault case? Is that standard the same in
17 our society? Is that standard the same often
18 times in our criminal justice system?
19 I would say it is not. We often
20 times start by focusing on the behavior and
21 responsibility, character, social
22 expectations, morals and biases of victims.

1 Often times, that then turns into victim
2 blaming.
3 How does that look? Here is a video
4 that kind of explains that.
5 (Video playing.)
6 I really like this commercial
7 because it really does bring out some of the
8 core issues. How do we view women who like to
9 go out and dress nice? How do we view women
10 who like to go out and have a good time? And
11 then because somebody takes advantage of
12 either their vulnerability or even no
13 vulnerability, then we turn around and say,
14 "Well, what did you expect to happen?" "What
15 did you think was going to happen?" "Well,
16 you were showing a little cleavage."
17 Well, if that's the case, we would
18 have an epidemic of plumber rapes because they
19 show their cleavage a lot, but they're not
20 bending over and doing that because they want
21 to be raped; that's just the way plumbers are
22 sometimes.

1 I know the plumber's union is not
2 going to like that.
3 The problem is we focus immediately
4 on the behavior and the character of the
5 victim, which is important, but we
6 overemphasize it often times in sexual assault
7 cases.
8 What we should do is have different
9 expectations of the reported -- of the
10 reported offender. This is our expectation.
11 Should be our expectation of everyone.
12 (Video playing.)
13 That is the message we need to be
14 sending, but I'm not sure that's the message
15 that creeps into our criminal justice system
16 or our world view of this.
17 So, I'm going to walk really
18 quickly, very quickly, through a bunch of
19 research, and I know the academics are going
20 to kind of tease this out a little bit later,
21 but I just want to walk through the history of
22 what we know about prevalence, about sex

1 offenders.
2 Gene Abel started back in the '80s
3 about looking at sex offenders, and he did
4 research on convicted sex offenders, and found
5 that by their own admissions the chances of
6 being caught is about three percent.
7 Then we have Russell who did this
8 survey in '84 and again in 2000. It showed a
9 vast majority of women, in fact almost half
10 the women, have either been victims of rape or
11 attempted rape by these surveys.
12 And then we have Abel doing -- on
13 the sex offenders, he found that 561 sex
14 offenders had 195,000 victims, which is
15 tremendous. How does that look? 561 sex
16 offenders according to self admitted acts by
17 the offenders; that's what it looks like, 2.5
18 Superdomes. But most of them don't report it.
19 Then we have some information from
20 Van Wyk on 23 offenders in an incarcerated
21 treatment program admitted to about three
22 victims each. Following polygraph, they had

1 about 175 victims each.
2 Now, this is the far end of the big
3 scale. There's some other research that has
4 come out. Anna Saulter says there's only
5 about a five percent chance of rapists ever
6 spending a day in jail.
7 Then there's other research that is
8 actually newer that breaks it down. So, only
9 22 percent of women have been victims of
10 sexual assault, and only 3.8 percent of men.
11 That's still a tremendous problem.
12 On the other end, again, we look to
13 see that some of the research shows that 1.3
14 forcible rapes occur every minute in the
15 United States; 78 per hour, 1871 per day,
16 683,000 forcible rapes a year of women and
17 97,000 forcible rapes of men.
18 Now, that's on the far end of the
19 scale. But what's really happening? There
20 was a really good report that just came out in
21 November, 19th of November. It was released
22 by the National Research Council. They

1 basically said when you look at the numbers
2 from just one year, 2010, the FBI and all the
3 police agencies around the United States
4 reported 85,593 rapes.
5 But the CDC's estimate that very
6 year was 1.3 million, and the National Victims
7 Crime Study found 188,380. So, why is there
8 such a difference.
9 Well, often times it is the types of
10 questions being asked. It is what you're
11 looking at. There's a difference between
12 prevalence and reports. So, what we know from
13 a lot of the research is there's a huge
14 problem.
15 We'll never know the actual
16 incidence of sexual assault. Never. I don't
17 believe. But we do know from Gelb in
18 Australia, where they looked at their
19 Australia statistics, which is very similar to
20 ours, that in this particular survey he found
21 143,900 victims that met the criteria for
22 hands-on completed sexual acts.

1 So, taking that number, only 18.9
2 percent reported it to the police. The police
3 only recorded 12.6. They called some out
4 because they didn't believe the victims for a
5 variety of reasons. They didn't believe a
6 crime occurred for a variety of reasons. 1.3
7 percent were adjudicated; 0.9 percent were
8 proven guilty and 0.7 went to prison.
9 Now, let's come back to the United
10 States, and we're going to look at Lonsway and
11 Archambault, and they're going to explain this
12 a little later this afternoon. They're going
13 to break it down.
14 The big problem in our society is we
15 view the problem of rape and sexual assault in
16 our society as how many people do we have as
17 registered sex offenders. Almost everybody
18 looks at the register of sex offenders to see
19 if there's any registered sex offenders in
20 their neighborhood or our schools, things like
21 that.
22 That's not the problem though. The

1 problem that Archambault and Lonsway found is
2 that of 100 rapes committed, and this is just
3 rapes in the United States, 5 to 20 are
4 reported to the police; 0.4 to 5.0 are
5 prosecuted; 0.2 to 0.52 result in a conviction
6 and 0.2 to 2.8 result in incarceration.
7 They'll explain this research and
8 their data a little bit later. What I'd like
9 to picture here is that people are worried
10 about the registered sex offenders. The
11 problem that we see with almost all the
12 research is the problem with unregistered sex
13 offenders.
14 The problem is those people who
15 never get caught. Now, working here almost
16 four decades I'm frustrated because the
17 prevalence rates for domestic violence/child
18 abuse/sexual assault that I've been engaged in
19 my entire career have not gone down.
20 So, for almost four decades we've
21 been doing things, and we've been trying the
22 same things over and over again. I went to a

1 Chinese restaurant one day, and I was just
2 really frustrated about this, and I got this
3 fortune cookie.
4 It was in the fortune cookie that
5 said, "If we do not change our direction,
6 we're likely to end up where we're headed."
7 I am so driven, and there are tens of
8 thousands of people inside the military and
9 outside the military that have the same belief
10 that we've got to look for different things
11 because what we're doing -- there's a vast
12 portion of our society that's not being caught
13 doing a great deal of damage.
14 Going back to Gene Abel there's a
15 lot of crossover as well. We tend to look at
16 adult sexual assault in one frame but it is
17 not just adult sexual assault. It is also
18 intimate partner sexual assault. It's also
19 child sexual assault.
20 So, what Gene Abel did with
21 incarcerated offenders is he found that 44
22 percent of these men who were convicted of

1 rape also had hands on little girls that they
2 molested. 14 percent molested little boys.
3 24 percent molested their own daughters. Six
4 percent their own sons. 28 percent committed
5 exhibitionism and 18 percent were voyeurs, and
6 11 percent were for the purpose of sexual
7 gratification.
8 Let's look at another segment of sex
9 offenders. These are voyeurs in this
10 particular study. 52 percent of the voyeurs
11 said they had hands on victims of little girls
12 not their own, sexual assault. 26 percent
13 said they sexually assaulted little boys. 18
14 percent said they molested their own
15 daughters. 10 percent their own sons.
16 37 percent raped adult women. This
17 is significant because we're not hearing it
18 from some anonymous survey. We're hearing it
19 from the offenders themselves. So, what do we
20 do with that?
21 We have to understand that
22 perpetrators of interpersonal violence

1 typically do not specialize. It is kind of
2 like the difference between a river and a
3 swamp. A river has boundaries and it goes
4 along. And you take away those boundaries and
5 that becomes a swamp eventually. Often times,
6 when people commit these crimes, and most
7 offenders start when they're adolescents with
8 bestiality. They start with incest. They
9 start with some other acts and it just kind of
10 ingrains in them some of these things that
11 they do.
12 So, the crossover in research is
13 significant for us to understand as we're
14 looking at adult sexual assault. Multiple
15 studies have shown that 33 percent to 66
16 percent of rapists also have sexual attacked
17 children.
18 So, the ones we're looking at for
19 these rapes or these sexual assaults are also
20 the same ones, and Dr. David Lisak has also
21 found this in his undetected research,
22 undetected offender research, that 82 percent

1 of child molesters have also attacked adults.
2 50 to 66 percent of incest offenders
3 have also sexually attacked children outside
4 their homes. So, we have tried to
5 compartmentalize and put people in little
6 boxes. The problem is these boxes don't fit.
7 The problem is that's making us more
8 dangerous when we look at all these profiles
9 because what we've done typically is study the
10 incarcerated offenders. But the vast majority
11 of people are never caught and not
12 incarcerated.
13 So, what Voller and Long and several
14 other people are doing is they are starting to
15 study the ones that aren't caught and the big
16 problem, and that's what we want to do. We
17 want to know why is there such a disparity
18 between all those victims that said they were
19 sexual assaulted and the small number of
20 people we actually catch.
21 So, one of the studies that was done
22 by Voller and Long in 2010, and this is a

1 college study where they found that 7.29
2 percent of the men in this particular study
3 reported self reported behaviors that met the
4 criteria for rape. 5.95 percent reported
5 behaviors that met the criteria for sexual
6 assault.
7 Then the vast majority of men did
8 not report anything at all. So, then they
9 look at the five big personality traits with
10 these men, and they found some really
11 important things.
12 CHAIR JONES: Let me understand what
13 you're saying. Are these people reporting
14 that they are victims or that they are
15 perpetrators?
16 MR. STRAND: Great question, ma'am.
17 Perpetrators. Well, actually, they're not
18 seeing themselves as perpetrators. They're
19 taking a survey and asked behaviors about -
20 "Have you forcibly done this? Have you done
21 this to another person?"
22 CHAIR JONES: Okay.

1 MR. STRAND: So, these are self
2 reports.
3 CHAIR JONES: Okay, but not -- these
4 are not victims?
5 MR. STRAND: Correct, ma'am. Right.
6 So, these are perpetrators, and what they
7 found is that sexual assault perpetrators,
8 which is actually the vast majority of
9 offenders we have in the military and outside
10 the military. Not rapists, but the vast
11 majority of sexual assault perpetrators were
12 more similar to us non-perpetrators than the
13 rapists.
14 Rape perpetrators endure
15 significantly lower levels of excitement
16 seeking. This was important and I added this.
17 Say what? Because I have been trained my
18 entire career that rapists are into it because
19 of excitement seeking, but the researchers are
20 finding the ones that got caught are, but the
21 ones that aren't caught aren't. The ones that
22 are into excitement seeking, that is

1 oftentimes the reason they get caught because
2 they make mistakes.
3 Perpetrators with sexual aggression,
4 both the rapists and the sex offenders, did
5 not reveal higher scores for hostility or
6 impuslivity. Again, that breaks the paradigm
7 that we think about that they are hostile
8 people, they're impulsive.
9 Most of them are actually very nice
10 and compulsive. Then the only difference
11 found in the personality traits, the only
12 difference found between sexual assault
13 perpetrators and non-perpetrators was
14 depression. Perpetrators had higher levels of
15 depression than non-perpetrators.
16 Some additional differences: Craig
17 Browne, Beech and Stringer in 2006 found that
18 sex offenders presented significantly less
19 hostility, depression, tension, psychopathy,
20 impuslivity and aggression than non-sexual
21 violent offenders.
22 Then individuals convicted for rape

1 and child sexual assault presented
2 significantly more neuroticism than non-
3 convicted sex offenders. So, they're also
4 finding a significant difference between
5 convicted sex offenders, those that were
6 caught, and those that have either not been
7 caught or not been convicted.
8 What does this boil down to? The
9 researchers say sexual assault is a complex
10 interaction with many individual factors.
11 What I say is that sex offenders are
12 individual.
13 Let me explain this through a
14 demonstration. Many people -- well, let me
15 ask you this. How many people like mint
16 chocolate chip ice cream? Okay, good people.
17 Good people. How many people don't like mint
18 chocolate chip ice cream?
19 Okay, not as good people in my
20 opinion because I happen to like mint
21 chocolate chip ice cream. Now, let's just say
22 those of us that like mint chocolate chip ice

1 cream, we really like it.
2 So, there's a law that says we're
3 not going to eat mint chocolate chip ice cream
4 for whatever reason. Maybe the haters, the
5 mint chocolate chip ice cream haters don't
6 like it. So, there's a law now.
7 How are we going to find those of us
8 who like mint chocolate chip ice cream? Well,
9 we have to wait until they catch us. But does
10 that mean we're not going to eat mint
11 chocolate chip ice cream? No, it doesn't
12 mean. It might mean we will, but then how are
13 we going to profile all of us that like mint
14 chocolate chip ice cream and try to find this
15 profile?
16 It's not possible because we're all
17 individual, and I think that's the biggest
18 mistake we've made is that we viewed sex
19 offenders as a group, a homogenous group of
20 people. But they're not. They're as
21 individual as everybody else and they offend
22 for a variety of reasons.

1 I think that's what we need to think
2 through in a more sophisticated manner. Why
3 do they do what they do? This is one
4 wonderful representation. I'm not going to
5 walk you through the whole thing, but bottom
6 line is it is based on core issues.
7 The one on the left is common core
8 issues for social beliefs and needs and things
9 like that. On the other stuff, psychosocial
10 on the left, psychosexual on the right.
11 Meaning deviant sexual views, like
12 paraphilias.
13 Paraphilias are things like golden
14 showers, brown showers. There's some benign
15 ones like being attracted to the touch of skin
16 is a paraphilia. But another paraphilia is
17 having sex with non-consenting persons. It is
18 just meeting needs.
19 So, what needs are being met? When
20 we ask why do they do what they do, what we're
21 finding out after decades of research is it
22 depends. It really depends. All behavior is

1 functional. All behavior meets a need. We do
2 everything to meet needs.
3 So, what we're trying to do now in
4 our investigations is instead of, "Well, you
5 did it." "No, you didn't." "Yes, you did."
6 We're trying to find out what needs are being
7 met from their behaviors, and we're trying to
8 find out their behaviors first before we start
9 the accusations. This is really, really
10 helpful.
11 Then we get into the thing about
12 deception. You know we -- there's a couple of
13 lies that hurt us in criminal justice. One is
14 that we can believe -- that we can tell if
15 somebody is lying. That is a huge lie because
16 the vast majority of people are lied to on a
17 regular basis, and the vast majority of people
18 lie on a regular basis.
19 So, when we look at the research on
20 deception, and we look at the size of
21 deception detection, there really is very
22 little science to that and here is an example.

1 (Video playing.)
2 Let me expound on that a little bit.
3 Sex offenders thrive in an environment where
4 they are trusted. Sex offenders thrive in an
5 environment they build. They have
6 interpersonal skills far better than many
7 people do.
8 And they develop -- well, we all
9 develop the theory of what I call the third
10 persona. We all have three personas. The
11 first persona is who we are right now; who we
12 are in the public, who we are around other
13 general people. Whether at the bowling alley,
14 at church, at work or whatever, we have this
15 first persona that we want everybody to know
16 us as. Our biographies are all in the first
17 persona.
18 Then we have the second persona: who
19 we are when we're around people that accept
20 us, people that know us better, people -- or
21 when we're by ourselves we might yell more or
22 might scream more. We might cuss more.

1 That's a second persona.
2 Then there's that third persona.
3 That hidden persona. The persona every single
4 person has. All of us has these personas.
5 Now, some personas, the first persona, might
6 be right here next to the second persona, next
7 to the third persona.
8 But some people, their third persona
9 is way off in the yonder lands in the
10 hinterlands, and the first persona is on the
11 other end. It depends on the degree of where
12 your personas are at. I call this the theory
13 of the public, the uninhibited and the
14 private. Let me give you an example of that,
15 ma'am.
16 (Video playing.)
17 This is a chilling idea, that his
18 wife has no idea what he is capable of. The
19 neighbor has no idea of what he is capable of.
20 He might've seen her through in window, gone
21 to the door, knocked on the door, and said,
22 "Hey, Sally, this is John. Can I talk to you

1 for a minute. My wife's birthday is coming
2 up. Our anniversary is coming up. I just
3 want to get your insights on what you think
4 she might like."
5 Is she going to let him in? Of
6 course she is. And when she does, something
7 is going to happen, and she has no idea. We
8 talk about stranger, non-stranger, sexual
9 assaults. I believe every sexual assault,
10 with few exceptions, is a stranger sexual
11 assault. They're acquaintance sexual
12 assaults. They're the person we think we
13 know, but we really don't know anybody.
14 Here's the example. The person that
15 was talking in the first video on deception
16 was my best friend. He was my adult Sunday
17 School teacher in Ft. Campbell Kentucky. He
18 was an ear, nose and throat doctor. He was a
19 full bird colonel on the general's list. He
20 was my best friend. At that point in my life,
21 he was the man in my life that I trusted the
22 most, ever. That I respected the most, ever.

1 And he fooled me. He had 17 victims, and it
2 blew me over because I thought -- because I
3 was already an agent specializing in sexual
4 assault. I was already an agent specializing
5 in the things that he did, and I was already
6 believing I could pick out one, and I could
7 understand one. Totally blown over.
8 I was going to quit law enforcement
9 because I thought that I had completely
10 failed, as a law enforcement official because
11 I couldn't keep up with any of the rules. I
12 was totally fooled.
13 But then I realized it was he who
14 fooled me, and he was the one that helped me
15 understand this theory of the third persona.
16 Actually created it, because of him. So, let
17 me give you an example, ma'am, or Panel. I
18 dress for success. I dress for respect, as
19 you all do, and you look very nice today. But
20 we dress this way because it brings respect.
21 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Only today?
22 MR. STRAND: We're only focused on

1 now, ma'am. But no, everyday. But I don't
2 see you everyday. So, we do that because it
3 brings some credibility, because it brings
4 something to the table. If you were up there
5 in flip flops and shorts and t-shirts and
6 things like that, it would have a different
7 flavor. We would have a different opinion.
8 And so, what he did is, he dressed
9 in the uniform. He dressed in his occupation.
10 He dressed in his love for the bible. He
11 dressed for all those things. But then what
12 I didn't see, and what you don't see, is I've
13 got something -- let me just take my -- I'm
14 going to go from the first persona to the
15 third persona.
16 I'm wearing a shirt that actually
17 demonstrates this, probably better than
18 anything else. I've got holes on my shirt.
19 It's not ironed. It is only ironed on the
20 parts you can see. I love wearing this shirt
21 because it takes me less time to get ready.
22 I've got holes. It says "rapist,"

1 here. It says, "sex offender," here. It has,
2 "Alcoholic," here. It says, "liar," here. On
3 the back, it has "self blame, fear, broken
4 heart." That's the third persona of the
5 victim, because often times the embarrassing
6 things that happen during sexual assault go
7 into that third persona as well. It is not
8 just the bad stuff.
9 Everyone has this shirt on.
10 Everyone here in this room and outside this
11 room has a shirt like this. We have holes in
12 our shirt. We have things we don't want
13 anybody to see. And the problem is, we think
14 we can see the shirt. The victim think you
15 can see this shirt. The biggest problem is
16 this: when the victim sees this shirt for the
17 first time, it is too late. Then before the
18 offender leaves the room, they're going to put
19 their jacket back on. Going to make sure
20 their sleeves are turned down and make sure
21 nothing is showing, and they're going to walk
22 out of that room.

1 That's what we're left with. That's
2 what society is left with to try to figure out
3 and judge. That's what the victim is left to
4 try to explain, and nobody understands. When
5 is the last time anybody has seen the news
6 where a serial rapist or a murderer or
7 somebody else, that there wasn't people that
8 said, "My goodness. That's the last person I
9 would've ever expected. I can't believe they
10 did it."
11 Almost every case I've ever been
12 involved with, I've had people come to me and
13 say, "I can't believe that person is capable
14 of doing that." The problem is we can't judge
15 character, and that's the biggest challenge
16 that we have is because we believe we can.
17 Now, I understand it is very scary, because if
18 we can't judge character, what do we have
19 left? Well, we can judge character, but we
20 can only judge what we're given to see.
21 In my case, my ego was preventing me
22 from seeing some of the other things in

1 retrospect, and that happens also with us.
2 Let me go ahead. Sex offenders know what they
3 do is offensive. They know what they do is
4 offensive, and they're very good at hiding it.
5 (Video playing.)
6 Now, that is very offensive. Should
7 be very offensive to everyone. But who is
8 that person in our community? Who is that
9 person in our presence? Who is that person in
10 our church and our schools and our
11 organizations? Are they letting anything on
12 that they are that person? Of course not.
13 They're going to hide it very well and they're
14 going to do everything they can to completely
15 hide it when they are caught.
16 So, what we know is that they come
17 from all walks of life. They commit other
18 types of sex offenses. Many of them commit
19 other crimes and never get caught. They
20 offend for numerous reasons. Most are nice,
21 kind, empathetic and caring. In fact, I will
22 say that of the hundreds of sex offenders that

1 I personally talk to, they are some of the
2 nicest people I've ever met, and I mean that
3 sincerely.
4 They are genuinely nice people, and
5 that's what allows them often times to not
6 only get away with what they are doing, and
7 take advantage of vulnerabilities, but also to
8 escape it if they are reported. They're
9 masters of deceit. Most of them will never be
10 caught; most of them will reoffend again, and
11 they're 99 percent just like you and I.
12 So, now I'm going to quickly focus
13 on some other challenges. There's a lack of
14 physical resistance in most of these cases,
15 and we expect them to fight back. There's
16 tonic immobility that I'll explain in just a
17 moment. There's delayed reporting. The vast
18 majority of our cases are delayed, because
19 they don't know what to do. They don't know
20 how to explain it, and I'll explain that in
21 one moment as well.
22 We have this mantra that we believe

1 that inconsistent statements equals a lie, but
2 with trauma, it doesn't. In fact, with
3 trauma, if I have a trauma victim that is
4 consistent with everything, it is really a
5 problem, because why would they be consistent
6 about everything? I'm going to talk about
7 that in a moment as well.
8 Lack of victim cooperation: maybe
9 they don't trust the system. Maybe somebody
10 has hurt them in the system. Maybe they've
11 been ridiculed. Maybe they've been offended
12 against by somebody else that they trust.
13 Feelings of doubt or blame, tension reduction
14 behaviors, just like we see after traumatic
15 incidents, whether it be combat, whether it be
16 a traffic accident, whether it be a head
17 injury or whatever. People do things like
18 drink, use drugs, go shopping a lot, do other
19 things to reduce that tension.
20 Sexual assault victims do the same
21 and it puts them in a bad light, but if we
22 understand the meaning of that and where that

1 comes from, it helps us to understand them
2 better. Past and present conduct, sexual or
3 otherwise, and that whole he said-she said
4 stuff. There has really never been a he said-
5 she said case. These are all isolated crimes.
6 There is information. There is
7 evidence before. There is evidence during,
8 and there's certainly evidence after that we
9 need to look after, and we're going to talk
10 more about that in just a moment as well. But
11 these are all the desired outcomes of the
12 offender. This is what they want us to focus
13 on, and we've done that for decades.
14 So, we also know that sexual assault
15 is actually a stronger predictor of PTSD than
16 combat trauma. This is significant, because
17 of the personal nature of sexual assault, not
18 to say that combat trauma -- and I'm not
19 saying one is worse than the other. The
20 personal nature, the intimate nature of sexual
21 assault is so degrading and so inside.
22 We also know that students with a,

1 female students with a history of sexual
2 assault are five times more likely to have
3 attempted suicide in the past year. Male
4 students ten times more likely in the past
5 year.
6 So, we know this is a significant
7 thing. We also know, and I want to be very
8 clear on this, this is not a women's issue.
9 It never has been. This is a men's issue as
10 well. This is a human issue, because the vast
11 majority of perpetrators are men, and the vast
12 majority of -- so that makes it our issue, but
13 also, there are so many male victims in the
14 United States and in our military.
15 In fact, in the military we know
16 from some of the research, that there are more
17 male victims number-wise than there are female
18 victims. Percentage wise there's more female
19 victims but numbers-wise, this is a huge
20 problem for all of us that we really need to
21 understand.
22 We also need to understand that men

1 are gender socialized different than women.
2 Women generally express a variety of emotions.
3 Men are gender socialized to express generally
4 one emotion, and that is anger. And often
5 times, that anger turns inward because they
6 can't express it outward because it is not
7 acceptable, and often times men who are
8 sexually assaulted either as boys, adolescents
9 or men, seldom report it. Only about one
10 percent ever report it, and that's really sad,
11 because that's another untapped area that
12 we're just now starting to look at and deal
13 with in a constructive way.
14 We also know that when sexual
15 assault occurs, for most it is either a highly
16 stressful or traumatic event. We know that
17 there's some really great neuroscience. I'm
18 going to walk you through very quickly.
19 Over the last five to ten years, there has
20 been an explosion in neuroscience, and the
21 neurobiology of trauma. Dr. Rebecca Campbell
22 from Michigan State University, Dr. David

1 Lisak, formerly professor at Massachusetts
2 University of Boston; Dr. Tim Hopper, I'm
3 going to use a lot of his stuff from Harvard
4 University, had looked at the neurobiology of
5 trauma, and it has really helped us understand
6 some things we didn't understand.
7 The first one is: we all have a
8 prefrontal cortex, and that is a higher level
9 of thinking. So, when an offender is
10 committing their crimes, they've got their
11 full prefrontal cortex intact without any
12 exception. They're thinking things, and the
13 questions we ask to who, what, where, why,
14 when and how? Offenders can answer that
15 really well. They can answer that extremely
16 well.
17 But the problem with the victims is
18 that when an assault occurs, whether it is
19 wrongful sexual touching, whether it is
20 penetration, that victim's brain, literally,
21 the stress hormones in the brain, turn
22 generally the prefrontal cortex off. It takes

1 it away, which leaves the victim with their
2 primitive parts of the brain, and they have
3 what's called an amygdala controlled response.
4 The amygdala is a little thing in our
5 brains. It is about the size of an almond,
6 and in fact it is Greek for almond-shaped.
7 That controls our thoughts, our attentions and
8 our memory. So, victims' memories of sexual
9 assault are vastly different than the
10 offenders' memories. We've been traditionally
11 training on how to get the offender type
12 memories of who, what, where, why, when and
13 how, and we've been failing to understand that
14 victims of trauma don't have those same
15 memories in the same way.
16 Here is an example. If you don't
17 like snakes, this is going to be a bad time
18 for you. This is a huge boa constrictor.
19 This is large. It is huge. Look really
20 closely at this boa constrictor. See if that
21 is wiggling around, because I'd like to see if
22 maybe they ate something, and it is wiggling

around and maybe moving around, but this snake goes on and on and on forever.

It just goes on and on and on. Now, what I demonstrated was your amygdala. You had an amygdala controlled response. Many people had an amygdala controlled response. It doesn't make any sense. It can't hurt you. It can't do anything to you. It is a vision. It is a sound, but your amygdala doesn't know that. Your amygdala made you do something that now doesn't make any sense.

So, often times sexual assault victims respond and do things that don't make sense to us, and they certainly don't make sense to them. The Fort Hood shooting. Many people in that room during the Fort Hood shooting, and any other shooting, they often freeze. They often don't do the things they thought they would do, even combat veterans don't, given certain circumstances.

Why? The amygdala takes over, and they remember differently. They react

1 differently. They behave differently because
2 of that. So, who had memories of the assault
3 to make more sense? Generally the suspect.
4 But inconsistent statements don't always equal
5 a lie. I'm going to walk through that really
6 quickly.
7 So, this is our concept of memory.
8 From the time I was a little boy, all the way
9 up through agent school and all those other
10 things, I was taught that this is what memory
11 is: that we have an original experience. We
12 encode it in our brain, and it becomes a
13 memory. And then there's a queue to get that
14 out of our brain; that retrieval becomes a
15 particular remembrance.
16 According to Dr. Hopper and the
17 neuroscience that we now have, that's not what
18 memory is. It is much more complicated than
19 that, but actually much more simple. So,
20 what we have is we have a bottom up trigger.
21 Bottom up means from the primitive brain, or
22 a top down effort, the prefrontal cortex, and

1 it activates images, sounds, body sensations,
2 behaviors, thoughts.
3 When you remember the conference
4 today, when you remember this Panel today, you
5 will not remember a lot of the words. You'll
6 not remember a lot of the text. But you're
7 going to remember a lot of the feelings.
8 You're going to remember a lot of those
9 things. You might remember the snake because
10 that's what is encoded more strongly. Now,
11 some smells are coded more strongly than
12 others. Some more weakly than others. Some
13 sounds, same thing.
14 So, what we have done with this
15 knowledge is we've understood that parts of
16 the memory are experienced, are deeply burned
17 into the memory. These are what we call
18 traumatic emotions. They're sensations that
19 also are processed as central details.
20 Now, the term central details is very
21 important on the next slide. The problem is
22 that most victims of sexual assault, or other

1 violent crimes do not have a sequence of
2 events. They don't remember from start to
3 finish. My brother-in-law was robbed in
4 Rochester, New York. Two people attacked him
5 with hammers, beat him really, really bad.
6 And when he went to the hospital, this well-
7 meaning police officer started asking him a
8 series of questions.
9 "Well, what time was it? Where were
10 you at? What did they look like? What were
11 they wearing? How many times did they hit you
12 with the hammers?" These are all questions
13 that, "start from the beginning," my brother-
14 in-law didn't have these answers. He only had
15 one answer, and I'm going to explain that in
16 just a moment.
17 They don't have a sequence of events.
18 So, we need to stop asking them to start from
19 the beginning and go because that's not the
20 way memory works. That's not the way trauma
21 memory works. There's generally no words, or
22 narrative right away.

1 Again, we expect people to have a
2 narrative right away. Then when they don't,
3 or they do, and we take that narrative and
4 that becomes the case the rest of the way, but
5 the problem is that's not the way memory
6 works. We also need to look at what seems
7 most important to survival to that person, and
8 that's the central details. Most of our
9 police questions, and even in our direct
10 examinations, are based on the peripheral
11 information.
12 Central details are things most
13 important to the victim. Central details we
14 might think are, "What did they look like?
15 How tall were they?" And things like that.
16 But that's not central details to the victims.
17 They don't have that information very well
18 because those are peripheral. They have
19 weapon focus, just like you focus on the
20 snake, and it can depend on the nature of the
21 assault, the victim's brain interpretation,
22 and everything else.

1 So, the consequences are that central
2 details are deeply encoded. They're more
3 likely to be remembered accurately and over
4 time. Many of our trials, many of our
5 investigations, focus on some of the
6 peripheral details. "Well, the victim said
7 the car was dark blue and it was really
8 black." Or, "The victim said it was this
9 time, and it was really that time." Or, "The
10 victim said it lasted this amount of time and
11 it really didn't, because we've got the video
12 when they entered the room and when they
13 left."
14 These are things that that part of
15 the brain, the primitive part of the brain is
16 not capable of collecting, but when asked,
17 victims will often give those answers, which,
18 we're actually creating bad information that
19 way.
20 There is also, and I'll get back to
21 that in a moment, there's also what we call
22 tonic immobility. It is pronounced by verbal

1 immobility, trembling, muscular rigidity. So,
2 why didn't she scream? Why didn't he scream?
3 Why didn't they run? Why didn't they yell?
4 Why did they do that? If we ask those
5 questions to the victims, it is going to close
6 them down because they don't know those
7 answers either. Tonic immobility is the
8 perception of the inability to escape.
9 I have rarely seen a case where the
10 victim, with the prefrontal cortex, probably
11 should've left but they didn't leave. And the
12 vast majority of cases if they did leave, they
13 wouldn't have, they wouldn't have been a
14 victim of the sexual assault.
15 But that is not the part of the brain
16 that tells them this. It is the amygdala
17 controlled part that goes into that tonic
18 immobility, and it happens in 44 percent of
19 sexual assault cases.
20 So, that is another thing that we
21 have now started to understand. So, what
22 we're after in criminal investigations is not

1 to just believe every single victim that comes
2 in and just railroad people through the
3 system, because we're after the truth
4 regardless of where it lies, and regardless of
5 whether what the victims said happened
6 happened, or whether it didn't happen or
7 might've happened a different way.
8 What we're after is the truth, and
9 the truth is often locked in by the trauma.
10 So, we look at the sights, the sounds, the
11 smells, the feelings, the thoughts, the
12 impact. That then is in combination of
13 understanding the experience, which is
14 different than what happened. So, we have
15 also identified the vast majority of elements
16 of proof and sexual assault are really about
17 fear, force, non-consent. Well, what is
18 evidence of fear? What is evidence of force?
19 What is evidence of non-consent?
20 What we're finding is these things,
21 if they have terror or flashbacks,
22 incapacitation, feelings, sounds, experience,

1 trembling, that is giving us better
2 information in trying to help understand these
3 cases.
4 So, what we've done, and largely
5 because of Fort Hood: When I was at Fort Hood,
6 I was asked to debrief a lot of our agents and
7 first responders who responded to that
8 horrible tragedy. While I was there, I was
9 asked to interview some of the victims who had
10 already been interviewed using traditional
11 techniques - who, what, why, when and how -
12 and I was asked to interview them, because
13 they weren't able to provide much information.
14 So, my first thought is, "Well, what
15 am I going to do? What am I going to do
16 differently?" Then it hit me, well, you know
17 the debrief is working really well. I'm
18 getting impact. I'm getting all kinds of
19 information from the agents and other people.
20 So, basically I visited the first victim here
21 in Austin, Texas. I drove up to interview one
22 of our victims in Austin, Texas, in a hospital

1 and this is the first time I used what we now
2 call the FETI technique.
3 I started out by asking a series of
4 questions. I'm going to get to those in a
5 minute, but it is really a combination of the
6 best of child forensic interview techniques,
7 as far as open ended questions, making sure
8 they're in an environment where they feel
9 comfortable, where they're trusted, or where
10 they trust, tied with the impact stuff that we
11 get out of debriefings, tied with what we now
12 know about memory and trauma memory, and how
13 they really do remember.
14 So, what we've then done is, we've
15 traditionally we've taken a three-dimensional
16 experience, boiled it down to a one-
17 dimensional investigation, a one-dimensional
18 prosecution on who, what, where, why, when and
19 how, and then presented it to a three-
20 dimensional panel and expected them to get it.
21 What we're now doing is we're taking
22 that three-dimensional experience, collecting

1 that three-dimensional experience, presenting
2 it as a three-dimensional experience in front
3 of a panel or jury, and they seem to be
4 getting it a little better. Here is a little
5 thing on the FETI.
6 (Video playing.)
7 Now, we have trained this at many
8 civilian police departments, district
9 attorneys associations, colleges and
10 universities across the country. It is really
11 being understood. And I go back after
12 conferences and I do another conference, and
13 people are just really -- it is a very simple
14 process and very easy to understand, and it is
15 working in tremendous efforts and in
16 tremendous ways.
17 It seems to be creating a culture in
18 helping victims come forward. So, here are
19 some recommendations. Take all reports of
20 sexual assault behaviors seriously, regardless
21 of the perceived reputation or credibility of
22 either the victim or the accused, or the

1 suspect.

2 Investigate all reports of sexual

3 assault as potential serial crimes. Now, let

4 me tease that out a little bit. Not all sex

5 offenders are serial sex offenders. And

6 depending on the research you look at, most of

7 them are, some of them are. But in all the

8 research, a good part of sex offenders are

9 serial. We have a mantra in criminal justice

10 to approach every unattended death as a

11 homicide until proven otherwise. We do that

12 because if we approach it as an accident or a

13 natural death, we're likely to miss important

14 information, important evidence.

15 And by doing that, though it doesn't

16 mean that every death we work is a homicide.

17 It is not. It doesn't bias us that way. What

18 it does is, it forces us to collect the

19 evidence, and then decide at the end whether

20 it is an accident, suicide, natural death or

21 whatever.

22 The same thing is this: we know

there's a small group of people, primarily men, who are creating a vast victim pool in our society, both in the military and outside the military. We're not catching them. And most of them have other victims, and we're finding this because we're interviewing them in a far different way then we have traditionally, as well.

We're also never asking a victim why. We're not asking victims why. Why? Because that closes them down. There's better ways to get there. So, with my brother-in-law. When the police officer kept asking him, "Well, why didn't you do this? Why didn't you do that?" That just made him even more frustrated. When we ask sexual assault victims, "Why did you do this and why didn't you do that?" They are already frustrated because they've already asked that question themselves, and they don't know the answers. By us asking them actually really makes it worse for them. That's what we call re-victimizing. So, we're training

1 our folks never to ask a victim why.
2 Here is the question we need to ask
3 instead: what were you thinking? What was
4 your thought process? What was going through
5 your mind then? That is far better
6 information, far better evidence. We're
7 training our investigators and prosecutors to
8 use the FETI, even in direct examination from
9 the prosecutors. "Help me understand what
10 you're able to remember about your experience.
11 Tell me more about that. Tell me more about
12 that."
13 "What did it smell like at this
14 particular time? What did it feel like at
15 that particular time?" That's getting that
16 three-dimensional experience out which is
17 giving us better evidence for better elements
18 of proof. Let me give you one example. We
19 had a case in Germany where a young agent who
20 hadn't been trained in these techniques was
21 interviewing a sexual assault victim in the
22 traditional way.

1 This was a woman who was a wife of a
2 special forces NCO in Germany. They had a
3 party at their house. They went -- one of the
4 attendees at the party was too drunk to go
5 home. So, they put him on the couch
6 downstairs and they went upstairs to go to
7 bed.
8 Well, some time during the middle of
9 the night, this woman woke up and she realized
10 that this man from downstairs was assaulting
11 her vaginally with his finger. And she kind
12 of didn't do anything. Then she didn't say
13 anything for a couple days. Then she finally
14 told a friend who told her, "You need to tell
15 the police about this."
16 Well, then the agent, who was a very
17 good agent, was interviewing her and said,
18 "Well, tell me what happened who, what, where,
19 why, when and how." And when it got to the
20 point where, "I woke up and he started to do
21 this," "Well, how long was he doing that?"
22 And she said, "I don't know." She said,

1 "Well, you were there." And she said, "Well,
2 I don't know, 5 -- 20 minutes. I don't know."
3 That became the defense case. So, we
4 had a prosecutor that was specially trained in
5 the technique that was just talking about, and
6 on the stand -- of course doing preparatory
7 work on the stand, but on the stand, "Help me
8 understand everything you are able to
9 remember."
10 In front of the panel, in front of
11 the jury, this woman said, "Well, I remember
12 waking up and he was doing this." And, "So,
13 tell me more about what you were thinking when
14 you realized that he was doing this." She
15 said, "Oh, my goodness. I hope my husband
16 doesn't wake up." "Well, tell me more about
17 your husband not waking up." Instead of
18 saying, "Why didn't your husband wake up?" or
19 "Why didn't you want him to?" "Well, I
20 thought if he woke up, he was going to kill
21 the guy, and it would ruin my four-year-old
22 son's life, in the next room, and his career

1 and my life." "Well, tell me more about
2 that." Then she said, "Well, then I realized
3 I couldn't scream. I couldn't move. I
4 couldn't do anything."
5 "Well, tell me more about that." She
6 said, "Once I realized that, I started doing
7 algebra in my head." She said, "Well, tell me
8 more about the algebra." "Well, I was taking
9 a college course and I just zoned out, and I
10 couldn't think of anything, so I started
11 thinking about algebra problems." What she
12 described were three pieces of evidence that
13 helped with the elements of proof.
14 The first one is fear. She was in
15 fear because her husband was going to wake up.
16 Two, she went into tonic immobility, which in
17 some sense is incapacitation. Then the third
18 one she disassociated. She went in and zoned
19 out, and things like that, which helped the
20 finders of fact understand, maybe in a
21 different way, what her experience was as
22 opposed to, "Well, it doesn't make any sense.

1 You're laying next to your special forces
2 husband and you didn't wake him up."
3 Well, she was incapable at that time,
4 and we understand that more now with the
5 neuroscience. All professionals have to
6 recognize their own limitations in detecting
7 deceit and judging character. We need to
8 understand the principles of neuroscience and
9 sexual trauma.
10 We need to require training and
11 utilization of trauma, informed interviews in
12 cross-examination techniques, or direct
13 examination techniques, because this is really
14 helping, not only victims come forward, but
15 helping us understand the reality of the
16 situation, and to take a closer look at what
17 we're doing.
18 Not pet rocks. Not things that --
19 you know, traditional. I am not a
20 traditionalist. I've taught a lot of the
21 techniques now I'm teaching against. I've
22 taught a lot of the things throughout my

1 years. Now that I don't believe them, because
2 of the neuroscience research and some of the
3 new information evidence that we have.
4 We need to do that to change
5 ourselves and change the world. And what
6 we're really talking about is culture change.
7 What we're really talking about is looking at
8 this totally differently. Not totally, but
9 significantly different. When we do, and we
10 follow maybe these and other recommendations
11 you're going to get, we're not going to look
12 the same way we do now in our society or in
13 the military. But culture change has to be
14 personal to everyone all the time.
15 I'm going to close with one example.
16 This is my daughter. This is personal to me.
17 It has always been personal to me, but my
18 daughter made it even more personal. I have
19 four children. She is my youngest. She is my
20 only girl, and she called me up one day and
21 said, "Dad." The way she said, "Dad," shook
22 my whole world, because I never heard her say

1 it like that, because not only are the victims
2 impacted, but their friends and loved ones and
3 family are impacted as well.
4 She said, "Dad, I have something to
5 tell you and I've never told anyone, but I
6 need help." And she really pleaded for help.
7 She said, "Several years ago, I was at a
8 party. I was in high school, and I was
9 invited to a party, and I thought I'd go
10 because it was with some of my friends and it
11 was in a college area." She said, "I knew a
12 lot of the people and I trusted them, and I
13 drank some of the punch." She said, "I don't
14 drink, Dad, and I didn't drink that night, but
15 I started feeling funny. I started feeling
16 nauseous."
17 "So, I went up to one of my other
18 friends, and I asked them what I should do.
19 You know, 'I don't feel well. Can I lay
20 down?' He took me to a back room. He took me
21 into that room and he closed the door, and he
22 locked it."

1 "After he laid me down, he went and
2 locked the door, and then he raped me." She
3 didn't go into many details, and she had a
4 hard time getting this out, because this was
5 her first time disclosing it, years later.
6 She said, "He raped me. Then after he got up,
7 he left." She said, "I just laid there and
8 cried, Dad."
9 I said, "Well, tell me more about
10 that." She said, "I just didn't know what to
11 do. So, I finally went out to the party, and
12 I got my best friend who brought me to the
13 party, and I told her." "Well, she looked at
14 me. She could see I was crying, and she said,
15 'What's wrong?" And she said, "I was just
16 raped." "By who?" "By him." And her best
17 friend looked at him, and looked back at her,
18 and said, "No. He would never do that. Stop
19 lying."
20 From that moment on, she pushed it
21 inside, and she felt she could deal with it,
22 but she couldn't. The emotional impact and

1 the psychological impact really did affect her
2 in a very adverse way. In another very
3 adverse way, she told me, and I've been in the
4 military since 1975. I joined in '74, delayed
5 entry. Came in in 1975. I believe in the
6 military. I believe in what the military is
7 all about, and I believe we're not a bunch of
8 rampant rapists running around, and allowing
9 it to happen.
10 I believe we're part of our society,
11 and we have the same problem everybody else
12 does. But we have to deal with it, and we've
13 been dealing with it in ways far different
14 than I think anybody has ever attacked. She
15 said, "I want to tell you now about something
16 I'm really disappointed in." She wanted to
17 join the military and she wanted to join the
18 Air Force. I was excited. She was excited.
19 She went up to the military
20 processing station, military entrance
21 processing station. She called me from the
22 floor. She was going to join the military.

She got a good contract with the Air Force. They were going to give her a good career in the medical field. This was what she wanted to do. They were going to give her training. She was excited.

I called her back that night, and I said, "So, when are you leaving? What's going on?" She said, "I'm not going, Dad." I said, "What happened?" She said, "Well, I was about to sign the contract. I put the pen on the table and I ran out of the station." I said, "You ran out? Why?"

She said, "I don't know. Maybe I'm stupid, Dad." She couldn't tell me, because she wasn't ready to disclose. It is not because she didn't trust me. It isn't because she didn't believe in me. It's because she didn't think her peers, she didn't think her friends, she didn't think the police or anybody would believe her. But she said, "Dad, now I can tell you why I didn't join the Air Force. Why I ran out." She said,

1 "Because all I heard up until that time was
2 rape, rape, rape. And I couldn't do that,
3 Dad."
4 That hurt me more than anything
5 because the way the military has been looked
6 at, the way the military has been demonized,
7 and I understand we have standards and we
8 should be different than our society. You
9 know, Congresswoman Sanchez spoke to a group
10 of senior leaders in June, and she looked at
11 every single one of them and pointed, and
12 said, "When people see you, they see a
13 uniform, and they see a hero." She said,
14 "Heroes don't rape."
15 I absolutely believe that. Heroes
16 don't rape. And it is offensive when our
17 American people see time after time that
18 another alleged hero raped. But the fact of
19 the matter is that most of the people that
20 wear that uniform are in fact heroes in every
21 sense of the word. Heroes don't let other
22 heroes rape, and heroes don't allow that to

1 happen, and that's part of the culture that
2 we're trying to inculcate: that we're
3 different. We have to be different.
4 We have to set a standard, and we do
5 have a standard. We're all value based
6 organizations. The number one value that I
7 think all of us share, either in stated or
8 unstated values, is respect. That is what the
9 military is about. We build fences around
10 people, about different racial groups of
11 people, or different ethnic groups of people,
12 and we don't allow them -- we don't allow
13 anybody to say anything bad about them.
14 If a racial slur comes out in the
15 military, I can guarantee, in any formation
16 somebody would say something about that. Or
17 sexual orientation, another fence. We're not
18 allowing that. But where is the fence about
19 women's sexuality? Where is the fence around
20 how we perceive women who have sex, who have
21 consensual sex? What is our offense around
22 women who report rape, and come back and

1 sometimes are ostracized by their peers?
2 That's what we're working really hard
3 at getting down that bystander intervention
4 that begins long before the bar. Long before
5 the incident. It begins in the conversation.
6 So, we're working really hard, and making sure
7 that everyone in the military understands that
8 this is personal, because everyone in this
9 room, everyone in the military knows somebody,
10 loves somebody, is very close to somebody who
11 is a victim of sexual assault.
12 Everyone. You may not know that
13 person is a victim of sexual assault and you
14 may not understand some of their behaviors, or
15 some of their challenges, but every one of us
16 knows a victim, or is a victim themselves, and
17 every one of us knows a sex offender or at
18 least one or two or three. We just don't know
19 who they are.
20 So, this is a big problem for all of
21 us. All of us. Our motto in the MP Corps is,
22 "Assist, protect, defend." Many other police

1 departments have assist and protect, and
2 things like that. That's what we're all
3 about. The military has done so much. Our
4 report rates have significantly gone up, just
5 in the last year. Who has done that? Who has
6 raised reporting rates that high in such a
7 short period of time?
8 We've got a lot of work to do, but
9 we're already doing things that have never
10 happened in the history of the world. We are
11 set to do things that we need to do to make
12 sure that we continue, to make sure that every
13 single sexual assault victim that reports is
14 encouraged to report, and reports are taken,
15 not just by the systems but by their peers as
16 well.
17 We are doing that, and we're doing
18 that as fast and fierce as we can. We just
19 need the opportunity to continue on. The good
20 ideas from our civilian partners and military
21 partners, because we're all in this together
22 because every single person that comes in the

1 military, every single sex offender we have in
2 the military, for the most part, started their
3 offending before they came in.
4 So, it is a problem that we all
5 share. We don't create or train sex
6 offenders. They take advantage of us. They
7 take advantage of our values-based
8 organizations. So, those are some of the
9 things I posit to consider, some promising
10 best practices. If we understood the theory
11 of the third persona, it helps victims
12 tremendously to her that and understand,
13 "Okay, I'm not going to blame myself for not
14 being able to see it."
15 Sometimes they can; sometimes they
16 can't. But most of the time it is too late.
17 To look at how we interview victims, how we
18 interview suspects, how we do everything, how
19 we look for other offenses; we're using
20 different interview techniques with our
21 suspects than we have traditionally, and many
22 of them are telling us about other offenses

1 before they are military, other victims and
2 other offenses. That's a really good way to
3 get offender accountability and help -- help
4 define the problem. So, I'll get to your
5 questions. That's all I have. Thank you.
6 CHAIR JONES: Thank you very much,
7 Mr. Strand. Questions? I would like to know
8 is there any -- are there any programs or --
9 is there any thought being given right now to
10 the problem of sexual assaults of males? We
11 tend to hear tremendous amounts about sexual
12 assault of females, but this Panel is
13 responding to adult sexual assault. We have
14 precious little about male sexual assault.
15 MR. STRAND: Yes, ma'am. In our
16 investigative training, where we train our
17 criminal investigators and our lawyers, we are
18 addressing same-sex sexual assault, including
19 male and male and female and female, because
20 we have a few of those as well.
21 We're addressing that significantly
22 in our investigative training, with all the

1 services. We're also addressing that in our
2 training: I think it has been late, but we're
3 starting to do it in our massive formation --
4 not massive formation training, but in our
5 training of the troops of all the services.
6 We're talking about it in senior
7 leader conferences more and more now. We're
8 having specific sets now on male on male
9 sexual assault and the differences on gender
10 socialization and the impact, and how few
11 males actually report it, but what their
12 reactions are.
13 We believe, we can't prove this
14 because a lot of people that commit suicide
15 don't write, "I was a sexual assault victim."
16 But we know from some of the other anecdotal
17 cases that we look at, where they were sexual
18 assault victims that committed suicide and the
19 research on that.
20 So, this is a problem that I think is
21 just now -- I think it has always been a
22 problem, but it is an emerging problem for us

1 because as we recognize that as a problem.
2 And since June of this year, I have talked to
3 almost 25,000 folks across our Army, and this
4 is a significant portion of what we talked
5 about.
6 The feedback that I get from the
7 males in the audience, after every single one,
8 there's never an exception, that several come
9 up to me, just with tears in their eyes and
10 say, "Thank you." They may not be ready to
11 disclose yet, but I think this is something we
12 really need to understand, because especially
13 in our all-male formations they think that
14 sexual assault is not their problem. It is a
15 significant problem that we're helping them to
16 understand now. So, we've done some. We need
17 to do more.
18 CHAIR JONES: Well, thank you. If
19 you have any additional information you can
20 send us in writing, we'd appreciate it.
21 MR. STRAND: All right.
22 CHAIR JONES: Yes, Mr. Bryant?

1 MEMBER COOK: Thank you for coming
2 today. Your presentation was informing. It
3 was timely. Can you clarify for me briefly?
4 You're doing this training. This is what
5 you're going out and telling people.
6 Can you tell me, for how long have
7 you been doing this training? You've already
8 said you had increased reporting over the past
9 year. And to whom are your audiences right
10 now? Is it just the investigators? I got the
11 sense it is the investigators. It's some of
12 the prosecutors. Who else have you trained,
13 and what else are you planning to train to get
14 it out there?
15 You said 25,000 since June, but I
16 don't know how long you've been doing this.
17 If it's making a difference, that's great.
18 Has it had a long opportunity to make that
19 difference, or is it just something that's
20 brand new and needs more time to develop?
21 MR. STRAND: Great question, ma'am.
22 We've been, with a concerted effort, training

1 our agents. We started training our agents in
2 the Army and then expanded to the other
3 services in 2005, 2006, 2007. We created a
4 two-week course in 2009. Then we started
5 inviting prosecutors and training alongside
6 our agents around 2009 or 2010. So, that has
7 been a tremendously successful effort.
8 We've also been involved, from the MP
9 Schools, working with all the services
10 teaching at simulator conferences, teaching at
11 their SARC and SHARP conferences, working with
12 victim advocates, chaplains, commanders,
13 senior NCOs in all the services for the last
14 five years. Made a significant effort.
15 All the services have done a great
16 job in their victim advocate training, their
17 SHARP training, depending on the service. I
18 think what we're learning from the training is
19 we're now starting to get feedback because
20 they want different kinds of training. They
21 want more impactful training.
22 They want more in your face

1 discussions. So, we're morphing more into
2 that. And so, we're having input in all the
3 services in trying to make sure that people
4 are, the victim advocates, and the chaplains
5 and the lawyers, and everyone else on the same
6 sheet of music. So, we've had an extended
7 effort on that for five years.
8 What has happened since June, is at
9 the Army SARC conference, the Chief of Staff
10 of the Army saw a portion of this presentation
11 with some other things and decided that's what
12 he wanted for all his two star commanders or
13 above. So, that's what has kept us really
14 busy since then. We intend to do that for the
15 next several years. But we're also trying to
16 build a bigger, better cadre and build more
17 videos and train more people to do this the
18 same way.
19 MEMBER COOK: Are you adequately
20 resourced to continue to do this, or is this
21 just a responsive technique right now? And I
22 mean in terms of both money and personnel

1 going towards it.
2 MR. STRAND: We currently have
3 sufficient funding. I'm not speaking for
4 Department of Defense. I'm speaking for me.
5 I've seen funding wane. When something is
6 important, funding is there. Then as soon as
7 the eye is off the ball, it kind of slips into
8 something else. So, we have a significant
9 challenge there as the military grapples with
10 reductions, and significant reductions in
11 funding. So, we have sufficient funding now.
12 It would be, in my opinion, better if
13 it was centralized, as far as it comes down,
14 what we call fenced funds, where other people
15 can't touch it because some of the money we're
16 getting right now is not fenced. It is not
17 appropriate specifically for sexual assaults.
18 It is appropriate into the operating budgets.
19 And so, that is a concern because it
20 is more difficult to move it if it is fenced,
21 if it is protected along the way. Then the
22 other part is personnel. We're seeing drastic

1 reductions in civilian authorizations, drastic
2 reductions, and this is going to impact sexual
3 assault.
4 I mean, we can try to protect it as
5 long as we can, and we've got some really good
6 people fighting at it at very high levels, but
7 as the rest of the military is significantly
8 getting cut, how do we sit there and continue
9 to justify that we've actually got increased
10 positions? The other problem, is sometimes
11 we're only allowed to hire temporary or term
12 employees as opposed to permanent employees,
13 and that becomes a real challenge, especially
14 during those reductions.
15 MEMBER COOK: Thanks.
16 MR. STRAND: You're welcome.
17 MEMBER BRYANT: Did you say, Mr.
18 Strand, that you have brought the FETI
19 interviews to the defense side of the JAG
20 Corps also? Are they hearing this? Because
21 it seems to me, that this interview process is
22 a major sea change in prosecution, whether it

1 is civilian or military. And it is going to
2 require an educational process, it seems to
3 me, for the judges, for the Panels, that this
4 is now the accepted and proper way to
5 interview.
6 Otherwise, you've got defense counsel
7 saying, "Well, when did you first tell the
8 investigators that?" "I never did." "Why is
9 that?" "They never asked the question." And
10 suddenly, the investigators look like idiots,
11 unless everybody understands this is a new
12 process. So, I guess my first question is is
13 this being conveyed throughout the JAG Corps
14 so that also the defense counsel are now
15 getting some understanding of this?
16 MR. STRAND: That's a great question,
17 sir. We've been training the trial counsels
18 in all the services, and often times the
19 prosecutors that we train go into defense and
20 vice versa.
21 I have had opportunities in the past
22 couple of years to train at least most of the

1 services defense counsel in the DCAP, Defense
2 Counsel Assistance Programs. I've had some
3 great opportunities with defense counsels to
4 go over this stuff, and been received very
5 well.
6 In fact, I think at least the defense
7 counsels that have come up to me following the
8 training. They've said, "This is better than
9 what we traditionally get. And you're getting
10 different information which helps us
11 understand the experience better. It helps us
12 understand our client better, and the
13 behaviors that occurred. It helps us prepare
14 our cases better."
15 So, we haven't had any significant
16 pushback that I'm aware of from the legal
17 community. Interestingly enough, there has
18 been a lot of discussion in court about child
19 forensic interviews.
20 Some states have a required, "You can
21 only use this technique," that has been vetted
22 and researched and everything else. We're at

1 the beginning phase of that research. So, a
2 lot of it is anecdotal and everything else.
3 It is built on good solid research on
4 neuroscience and child interviews and some of
5 those other things in the techniques and what
6 we do. Interestingly enough though, when we
7 generally interview adult victims, if we use
8 a traditional technique -- nobody ever
9 questions us on our techniques.
10 Nobody has ever questioned us on the
11 stand, "Well, why did you ask her who, what,
12 where, why, when and how?" Nobody ever asked
13 that. When we have something new,
14 understandably, "Why are you using this? Why
15 are you doing that?"
16 Well, because what we found from
17 neuroscience and what we found from this, this
18 works better. But really it is the quality of
19 the information we're getting that speaks for
20 itself, and it is the amount and type of
21 information that we're getting to help examine
22 those elements that are proving a far better

1 way.

2 In fact, in the MP Corps, two years

3 ago we changed our doctrine. Traditionally,

4 we've had physical evidence and testimonial

5 evidence from long-standing things. But in

6 sexual assault cases, there are very few

7 instances of where physical evidence can

8 actually come in handy.

9 So, we've actually added another

10 class of evidence called psycho physiological

11 evidence. So, we're training attorneys on

12 both sides as much as we can on what that is,

13 what that means, and what that means to you,

14 and what that means to the prosecution and

15 defense.

16 MEMBER BRYANT: Obviously some

17 specifics have to be asked, especially where

18 it is a stranger assault because the goal of

19 law enforcement is to identify the perpetrator

20 and establish enough probable cause through

21 the victims to make an arrest or a charging

22 decision.

1 So, some of those you agree the
2 victims have to be asked some questions,
3 especially in a stranger rape --
4 MR. STRAND: Oh, absolutely. Even in
5 a non-stranger. So, we use the technique
6 initially, and then after we believe we've got
7 as much of the experience as we can, we go
8 back and get some of those specific questions.
9 So, we're not banning the questions. We're
10 just doing it in a reverse order.
11 So, we still need to get that
12 information as best we can, but in the
13 meantime, we've already gained the trust of
14 the victim. We've gained the victim's memory
15 in I believe a far superior way when you look
16 at the neuroscience.
17 So, by the time we get to that part,
18 it is going to be much better. One of the
19 questions I added to the FETI was after I
20 interviewed my brother-in-law on the phone.
21 He was so upset about that police interview.
22 He was so frustrated because, "He

1 kept asking me questions I couldn't remember.
2 I didn't know. I didn't know." Well, what is
3 it that you do remember? What is it that you
4 can't forget about your experience?
5 That's not one of the FETI questions.
6 And he just started hitting himself on the
7 head. He said, "I can't forget the sound of
8 the hammers hitting my skull. I can't sleep.
9 I can't."
10 That is such powerful evidence, far
11 superior to other things. Now, they
12 eventually caught the two men, but he was so
13 afraid to testify that he didn't want it to go
14 to trial. And they pled, and the plea was
15 accepted. But even after that time, he was so
16 afraid of them because that's an amygdala
17 controlled response as well.
18 So, we do have to get those other
19 answers. I don't see any reason, in any way,
20 shape or form, to ask a victim why on anything
21 because that question about, "Well, what were
22 you thinking at this time," or, "What was

1 going through your mind?" is far superior to
2 those answers.
3 MEMBER BRYANT: Interestingly, police
4 officer involved shootings, law enforcement
5 has come to the same conclusion, and that is
6 the statement should be taken from the officer
7 maybe as much as 48 hours afterward because of
8 the same focus that you mentioned about the
9 victim. The focus is on the weapon.
10 Whether the general public
11 understands it or not, every time a police
12 officer has to shoot somebody, it is a
13 traumatic event for that police officer. And
14 they have tunnel vision.
15 It is usually a response to, "If I
16 don't shoot, I'm going to be shot, or somebody
17 else is." So, I just -- it was interesting
18 that FETI is now being used for victims of
19 sexual assault and child abuse because law
20 enforcement just very recently has come to the
21 same conclusion with officer involved
22 shootings.

1 MR. STRAND: We also use it for
2 domestic violence and other traumatic events.
3 We even had one of our folks who is in a
4 hostage situation. That worked very well with
5 not the hostage taker or not the person that
6 was barricaded but the -- but his wife who was
7 outside, who was frantic and upset.
8 He used this technique, and he got
9 much more information in a ten-minute time
10 frame then the other detectives at the scene
11 had gotten in 20 minutes prior.
12 MEMBER BRYANT: Thank you very much.
13 MR. STRAND: Welcome, sir.
14 CHAIR JONES: Final question
15 Professor Hillman?
16 DR. HILLMAN: Two questions, but
17 first I have to thank you for the energy and
18 insight that you've brought to this. Your
19 work on this, just the brief presentation you
20 did for us is compelling, and to think about
21 the impact that you're having with the broad
22 swath that you're cutting through and all the

1 folks out there that you're talking to gives
2 me some hope for all these tough questions
3 that face us.
4 Two questions. First, you cited many
5 recent studies out there, and it makes me
6 aware of, in an even brighter sense than I was
7 in the past, of how much information is
8 changing. Truisms and beliefs that we held in
9 the past, and techniques as the one that you
10 outlined today, are changing in response to
11 that.
12 It makes me wonder about how dynamic
13 our training has to be in order to take
14 account of that, and somewhat -- the
15 conclusions we draw about the best ways to
16 approach this.
17 It makes me doubtful that we really
18 have the right information on which to base
19 these, and even going -- you have a really
20 holistic sense of how we need to approach this
21 ending on culture change. On your last slide
22 there, right down to the details of individual

1 interactions and what you just said in
2 response to Mr. Bryant how you're getting
3 better results immediately applying some of
4 these techniques.
5 But I wonder if it is too early for
6 us to make global conclusions about some of
7 the ways to approach this problem, given how
8 little we understand. Even about the
9 neuroscience related to it compared to in the
10 past.
11 My second question is just also about
12 the holistic piece. Your investigators are
13 now acting as counselors in some respects if
14 they're asking these kinds of questions of the
15 -- of the individuals who have had these
16 experiences.
17 That's -- it strikes me that that
18 compression, that blurring of roles, poses
19 some additional challenges for the folks we're
20 putting on the front line here too, and I
21 wondered how you are managing that piece of it
22 in your training.

1 MR. STRAND: Two great questions.
2 The first one is we are using -- as far as
3 introducing these promising best practices,
4 that's what we're calling them. We're calling
5 them promising best practices because we do
6 need to do some more research, and I think
7 they have to go longer.
8 But what we're learning is it causes
9 less harm, and we don't see any harm
10 currently. We know that the traditional
11 technique cause harm. I mean there's been
12 vast research under traditional techniques
13 that we're continuing to use.
14 So, I would say stop using those
15 because we know through good, solid research
16 they cause harm. Re-victimizing comes from
17 the types of questions we ask, the interview
18 questions. So, we know that it is harmful.
19 Is this the end-all be-all? I don't
20 think it is. It might be part of the
21 solution, and we're happy with the initial
22 results over the last couple years. But we

1 still have a lot more work to do to see.
2 The other point on as far as
3 counselors, we're very direct and we're very
4 clear. There's a difference between
5 counseling and investigating.
6 These questions, I mean we've had
7 police officers ask the vast majority of these
8 questions in forensic interviews for a long
9 time, child forensic interviews.
10 So, they're really not that much
11 different, and we've got police officers
12 trained to do that. So, through a lot of good
13 national organizations.
14 We're very clear there is a
15 difference. Some people will say, "Well,
16 isn't that therapeutic? Isn't what you're
17 doing therapy?"
18 I think that is kind of the real
19 point here. Is it therapy? No. Is it
20 therapeutic? Yes. Because what is the
21 opposite of therapeutic? Causing harm.
22 So, the difference between what we're

1 doing and therapy is what a therapist would
2 do, in my understanding. I'm not a therapist.
3 My mom is a social worker and some of my best
4 friends are social workers. But what we're
5 not doing is the therapy bridge.
6 We tell them, "Never cross that
7 bridge when they're sharing this information
8 with you." Don't say, "Well, do you think
9 there's something else you could do about
10 that? Or, "How do you think you'd feel better
11 about this? What can we do with this?"
12 That draws into that therapy part.
13 All we're doing is collecting information.
14 We're also training our folks to understand
15 that as people are disclosing that we are very
16 aware of how they are dealing with it, that we
17 provide. We're usually doing this with
18 victims' advocates, and we have victims'
19 advocates close by, or social workers that we
20 refer often times to make sure they get the
21 help they need, and we do the warm hand off if
22 we really feel there is a need.

1 We didn't do that with traditional
2 techniques. I mean they could leave our
3 office crying, weeping, upset. Some of them
4 killed themselves because we asked them,
5 "Well, why did you do this? Why did you do
6 that?" And they feel so devastated that they
7 leave and we never concerned ourselves with
8 that.
9 I mean I'm not saying we never did,
10 but traditionally we didn't. We've also
11 convinced them then to do recantations later
12 on because now, "I'm not being believed, and
13 I missed up here," and they recant.
14 We are also training our folks to
15 investigate recantations because that's
16 another highly specific skill that we need to
17 look at, because not all recantations are
18 true. Some of them are. Some of them aren't.
19 So, we're very cognizant of that, and
20 they're some great points, but we're really
21 trying to be careful on not crossing that
22 bridge from therapeutic to therapy.

1 CHAIR JONES: Thank you. Ms.
2 Holtzman?
3 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Thank you very
4 much, sir, for your testimony and for your
5 work. I have a question specifically about
6 the extent to which these techniques are being
7 adopted in the military.
8 How many people -- is the objective
9 -- has the military made an objective to
10 utilize your system in all sexual assault
11 investigations or not?
12 MR. STRAND: Well, I can't speak for
13 the whole military. We're working with the
14 other services, and I think when you get a
15 briefing from the military criminal
16 investigative organizations, they'll kind of
17 address that what they're using and what they
18 prefer to use.
19 Not all of them are using it, but as
20 far as the Army, we have literally changed our
21 interview doctrine. So, our doctrine drives
22 the training. The training drives that.

1 The policy is still being worked. It
2 is right now an option. It is a technique
3 that we encourage but for CID, the policy is
4 that if you haven't been trained in this
5 technique you are not going to videotape your
6 interviews.
7 We want to videotape our interviews,
8 so --
9 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: This raises too
10 many questions. Let's just look at some
11 statistics, and let me see if I can understand
12 it. So, there's a policy in the Army now.
13 We're not talking about the other services.
14 That this technique should be used.
15 MR. STRAND: We're talking sexual
16 assault victims.
17 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Right. But it is
18 not mandatory? Is it mandatory or
19 discretionary?
20 MR. STRAND: Well, not all of our
21 agents have been trained in it.
22 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Okay. Those who

1 have been trained, is it mandatory?
2 MR. STRAND: No, not specifically.
3 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: How many people
4 have been trained? What is the percentage?
5 If you don't know the numbers, what is the
6 percentage? It could be an estimate, rough.
7 MR. STRAND: We've been training
8 since 2009. We've been working with this
9 technique probably since 2010. We train about
10 400 a year from 2010. So, I'd say about 1,200
11 people plus we've gone out on civilian
12 conferences --
13 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: I'm just focusing
14 on military. I just want to focus on
15 military.
16 MR. STRAND: I'd say 800 people.
17 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Of the universe of?
18 MR. STRAND: Mostly CID, some JAGS --
19 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: No, no, no. What's
20 the total number of people in the universe to
21 be trained who do the questioning? What are
22 we talking about?

1 MR. STRAND: My best estimate would
2 be in the neighborhood of about 4,000, maybe
3 5,000. Maybe higher, but not more than 10.
4 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: So, 20 percent at
5 this point?
6 MR. STRAND: Right.
7 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Is your program
8 being evaluated for effectiveness?
9 MR. STRAND: We're working with some
10 partners to collaborate to do that.
11 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: But that hasn't
12 happened?
13 MR. STRAND: That has not happened.
14 All we --
15 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Do you have a time
16 table for that?
17 MR. STRAND: Well, depending on
18 funding. If we can find funding. We need
19 research. It costs. We need partners.
20 We have worked with International
21 Association of Chiefs of Police and they are
22 incorporating part of the FETI into --

1 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Let's focus on the
2 military. Just have a laser beam for the
3 moment. I like to think big thoughts, but I'm
4 thinking really narrow right now. So, help me
5 out. Okay, so, you don't have evaluation --
6 that has not yet been -- you don't actually
7 have a time table? Maybe you don't actually
8 have a proposal? Maybe you don't even have a
9 plan.
10 I don't mean this to be critical. I
11 just want to know where we stand because we
12 have to make recommendations. If we think
13 this is a good program, when we walk out of
14 here we can't say, "Oh, gee, they have this
15 great program." Only 20 percent of the people
16 involved in investigations have been trained,
17 and there is no program to evaluate.
18 What is your time table for training
19 the total number? Do you have a time table?
20 Is there a plan of action here?
21 MR. STRAND: Well, we're training
22 about 500 a year, and we're stuck with our

1 resources at that right now.
2 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: So, there's no
3 money for additional training?
4 MR. STRAND: Not currently.
5 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: So, it's going to
6 be 500 people and that's it? The door is
7 shut?
8 MR. STRAND: That's what we're
9 currently tapped out on, ma'am. Yes, with the
10 funding we currently receive.
11 As far as evaluation, we do
12 evaluations in our training. We evaluate the
13 training and how well it took. We evaluate
14 them in the techniques during the courses. We
15 have them do the interviews, and we have the
16 facilitators reviewing the videos and
17 reviewing what's going on.
18 As far as the long-term research on
19 the effectiveness versus the traditional
20 techniques or these techniques, we currently
21 don't have a proposal. We're looking for
22 collaborators. We've got a couple

1 possibilities in some of the universities to
2 help us with that.
3 We have also looked towards West
4 Point and we're working with them on
5 possibility of they've got a research part
6 there.
7 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Do you have any
8 idea how much money it would cost to train the
9 balance of the people in CID? The
10 investigators?
11 MR. STRAND: Currently, we get 1.8
12 million a year to train 500. If we want to
13 train 1,000 to 2,000 a year, we would just --
14 it would take that much more.
15 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Got it. And by the
16 way, the total will shift, won't it? Because
17 some of the people leave the military who have
18 been trained.
19 MR. STRAND: We've always got new
20 people coming in.
21 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Right. So, the
22 universe actually is growing or changing.

1 MR. STRAND: Right. Now, the money
2 is one thing, but then having the people to do
3 it is another thing as well.
4 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: The trainers, the
5 people who can sufficiently train. Is there
6 anything else I'm not asking you about in
7 terms of the extent to which this new
8 technique can be adopted or should be adopted
9 in the Army? Just focus on the Army.
10 MR. STRAND: Well, we're also working
11 with our SANE nurses and training some of them
12 up on it. Some of our other first responders
13 in using the FETI to help design better
14 questions instead of that.
15 I am cognizant of the need for
16 research to make sure it is -- we've been
17 working with Dr. Hopper specifically on this,
18 and from Harvard. He talks about the
19 neuroscience and he believes it is a settled
20 science as far as the parts that we're using.
21 It is the hard science as opposed to
22 a soft science because they can in the lab

1 recreate how these memories work, and what
2 parts of the brain are shut down and working.
3 So, we've been working very heavily
4 with him and so we feel that we built it on a
5 solid research foundation. It is just taking
6 that and comparing that with traditional
7 techniques, which by the way the only research
8 that's been done on that is to find that it is
9 faulty and harmful to victims.
10 So, we are thinking we know the
11 research says that some of these other
12 techniques are harmful. So, we're embarking
13 on using this, and in the meantime we do need
14 to get that research done but it is going to
15 take a while.
16 MEMBER BRYANT: Were you finished,
17 Ms. Holtzman?
18 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: I was going to ask
19 a totally other subject.
20 MEMBER BRYANT: I'm following up on
21 yours because you have trained agents from
22 other services, such as the NCIS. It is not

1 exclusively Army.
2 MR. STRAND: Correct.
3 MEMBER BRYANT: I have actually
4 talked to NCIS agents who have been through
5 your training. So, I know that it includes
6 more than just the Army.
7 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: We're very far from
8 the whole universe of the military. That is
9 I think the important point that I wasn't
10 clear about before.
11 I just want to ask kind of another
12 question that has intrigued me since I've
13 started focusing on this, which is whether
14 there's any way to identify the sex offender
15 before. We talked about prevention. What can
16 you say about that subject?
17 MR. STRAND: That's a great question.
18 There's no test. There's no psychological
19 test. So, it is really difficult to screen in
20 any screening.
21 The way I think we need to become
22 more sophisticated in identifying it is

1 identifying those preparatory behaviors such
2 as sexual harassment.
3 Sexual harassment is grooming
4 behavior. Sexual harassment is prepping.
5 It's what we call in the military probing the
6 enemy, trying to probe to find out where the
7 weakness is and the -- and the vulnerabilities
8 are.
9 And so, when we have to take those
10 lower levels of sexual acts or sexual
11 innuendos and sexual harassment more seriously
12 and hold them accountable for that to hope to
13 -- if we can hold them able for that, it may
14 not prevent it but it may at least put the
15 light on them that that's what's happening.
16 The problem is most sexual
17 harassment, like most sexual assault, is never
18 reported. But if it is reported we need to
19 take that just as seriously because I think it
20 is just like walking into a bank with a gun
21 and a mask. I may not actually rob the bank
22 at that point in time, or may not get the

1 opportunity.
2 If somebody sees me walk into a bank
3 with a gun and a mask, somebody is going to do
4 something to try to prevent it. Maybe a
5 security guard. The same thing goes with the
6 sexual assault behaviors and sex offender
7 behaviors.
8 There are things they do to prepare
9 almost in every case. So, if we look at those
10 with a different eye instead of saying, "Well,
11 a guy will be a guy, or a gal will be a gal,"
12 and dismiss it, I think we can take those
13 behaviors more seriously as what I call pre-
14 criminal acts; then we can hope to get ahead
15 of them assaulting in some cases.
16 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: From the point of
17 view of the victim, one of the statistics I
18 heard, and I don't know if -- is that -- I
19 think it is probably true, is that a
20 substantial number of the victims have been
21 victimized before.
22 MR. STRAND: Yes.

1 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: What kinds of
2 programs -- what does that tell us in terms of
3 ways of helping then to protect themselves in
4 the future to reduce the likelihood of re-
5 victimization?
6 MR. STRAND: That's a great question,
7 a little bit outside of my league although I
8 understand the question and I have seen the
9 research and believe that it is a huge risk
10 factor to be a previous victim, which creates
11 additional vulnerabilities.
12 Either they are overcompensating, or
13 under-compensating for some of their
14 protective behaviors or protective things that
15 they do or don't do. And it overwhelms them.
16 I'm not sure we know what to -- I
17 don't know what the answer to that is. I know
18 it is a problem, and I know we have to be
19 compassionate whenever they report a sexual
20 assault, and I know we also in some cases
21 helping understand what happened to them
22 before in their behaviors and that context

1 vice the behaviors that occurred during the
2 context we're talking about like maybe
3 childhood sexual assault.
4 Maybe they reacted in a particular
5 way, where they had to clean up afterwards or
6 they had to apologize afterwards or something
7 like that, and that happened as an adult case;
8 that helps us understand it a little bit
9 better if we find that out.
10 But as far as protective factors, I
11 think it is understanding that the previous
12 assault creates those tension reductive
13 behaviors in some cases. It creates
14 depression. It creates other vulnerabilities,
15 and if we help them deal with some of those
16 other vulnerabilities either through
17 counseling or just somebody saying something,
18 or saying, "Hey, let's talk about this," I'm
19 not sure what the whole answer is, but the
20 impact is great in previous victimization.
21 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Okay, thank you.
22 CHAIR JONES: Thank you very much,

1 Mr. Strand. We really appreciate your
2 discussion and presentation. I'm going to
3 take a ten minute break, and then we'll return
4 for our panel on special victim capability.
5 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
6 went off the record at 10:28 a.m. and resumed
7 at 10:40 a.m.)
8 COLONEL HAM: If everyone could
9 please take your seats. We're about to get
10 started again.
11 CHAIR JONES: All right, good
12 afternoon, or no, I guess it's still morning.
13 It seems later.
14 We'll now have our Panel on Special
15 Victim Capability, and Major Ryan Oakley, who
16 will be our first presenter, is Air Force
17 Deputy Director, Office of Legal Policy,
18 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, and
19 our second presenter, Dr. Cara J. Krulewitch
20 is the Director of Women's Health, Medical
21 Ethics and Patient Advocacy, Clinical and
22 Policy Programs, Office of the Assistant

1 Secretary of Defense.
2 I am expecting that each of those
3 presenters will give us an overview from the
4 perspective of the Department of Defense, and
5 then we have Captain Jason Brown from the
6 Marine Corps, Captain Robert Crow, U.S. Navy,
7 Lieutenant Colonel Mike Lewis from the Air
8 Force and Colonel Michael Mulligan from the
9 U.S. Army, to whom we would like to put some
10 additional questions, after we've heard from
11 Major Oakley and Dr. Krulewitch.
12 Major Oakley, and I want to thank
13 everybody for your patience too. I know we're
14 running behind this morning.
15 MAJOR OAKLEY: Well, good morning,
16 Madam Chair and distinguished Members of the
17 Panel. It's an honor to appear before you
18 today, to discuss the Department's development
19 of policy for establishing a Special Victim
20 Capability or SVC, in order to enhance the
21 overall quality and cumulative effect of our
22 investigative, legal and victim support

1 programs in combating sexual assault and
2 family violence.
3 Today I will provide the Panel with
4 an overview of the Department's approach to
5 SVC and how SVC builds upon best practices in
6 the fields of criminal investigation and
7 Military justice, and also, to provide a
8 greater unity of effort, skillful
9 collaboration and expert oversight in the
10 handling of special victim cases.
11 At the outset, I will cover the
12 essential legal requirements for SVC under the
13 National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013
14 and explain how we developed this policy and
15 through team work to meet these requirements,
16 our plans and time lines for organizing and
17 fielding the SVC in each Military service, and
18 our methodology for evaluating the
19 effectiveness of SVC across our department,
20 and in addition to providing this overview, I
21 will also be talking on the substance of our
22 SVC policy for legal personnel.

1 To start, on October 29, 2012, the
2 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
3 Readiness tasked the DoD Sexual Assault
4 Prevention and Response Office or SAPRO to
5 convene a working group to develop plans for
6 the implementation of a department-wide SVC.
7 This working group included
8 representatives of each Military department,
9 the National Guard Bureau, the Office of
10 General Counsel, the DoD Inspector General and
11 other components within the Office of U.S.
12 DPR, to include Health Affairs, Reserve
13 Affairs and the Office of Legal Policy, as
14 well the Family Advocacy Program.
15 Shortly after our working group
16 convened under the FY2013 NDA was enacted,
17 which required the establishment of SVC.
18 Under Section 573 of the Act, the SVC
19 is defined as a distinct, recognizable group
20 of appropriately skilled personnel who will
21 work collaboratively to investigate and
22 prosecute allegations of child abuse, serious

1 domestic violence and sexual assault.
2 At a minimum, this capability must be
3 established at each Military department and
4 provide timely, effective and worldwide
5 support.
6 The SVC is not, however, required to
7 be a separate Military unit or a chain of
8 command.
9 Since each Military currently has
10 regionally based senior prosecutors who are
11 capable of handling complex criminal cases,
12 including sexual assault, this enables us to
13 move rapidly forward with a consistent
14 implementation plan.
15 Furthermore, the law also requires
16 the Department to prescribe investigative and
17 legal policies to implement SVC.
18 The Department of Defense Inspector
19 General has developed policy to establish SVC
20 within the Military Criminal Investigative
21 Organizations, which should be released
22 shortly in a directive-type memorandum or DTM.

1 My office, the Office of Legal
2 Policy, working with the services, has drafted
3 the companion policy for prosecutorial and
4 legal support. These policies are in the
5 final stages of coordination and we will
6 provide them to the Panel as soon as they are
7 formally approved.
8 I will, of course, cover the
9 substance here today.
10 Based on the specific requirements
11 under the NDAA and reflected in our
12 implementing policies, the Department's SVC
13 plan is grounded on four key principles.
14 First, the SVC will be defined as a
15 capability, not a team, to provide each of the
16 Military services with flexibility and
17 implementation based on their unique mission
18 requirements.
19 There will, however, be
20 standardization and consistency across the
21 board in the delivery of SVC across the
22 Department.

1 Secondly, SVC will be available
2 globally. It will exist everywhere, where our
3 men and women serve and in all places where
4 incidents will be investigated and prosecuted
5 at all times.
6 Third, the SVC qualifying offenses
7 are defined as child abuse involving sexual
8 assault or grievous bodily harm, domestic
9 violence involving sexual assault or
10 aggravated assault with grievant's bodily harm
11 and adult sexual assault offenses, providing
12 clear standards for local investigators and
13 Staff Judge Advocates.
14 Fourth, personnel detailed to the SVC
15 will be Military criminal investigative
16 organization investigators, Judge Advocates,
17 victim witness assistance or VWAP personnel
18 and paralegal support personnel, all who will
19 receive specialized training for their roles
20 in the SVC.
21 SVC personnel will also continue to
22 work closely with existing service provided

1 victim support services, as well as local law
2 enforcement agencies, medical, mental health
3 care providers, Chaplains, Unit Commanding
4 Officers and other organizations, as necessary
5 to provide a continuum of care.
6 This collaboration is geared towards
7 providing seamless support in every stage of
8 the Military justice process, from
9 investigation to post-trial.
10 The SVC will be activated upon an
11 unrestricted report for a qualifying offense
12 and during the initial investigative response,
13 Military criminal investigative organizations
14 will notify SVC legal representatives within
15 24 hours after determining that an allegation
16 meets the criteria of a special victim
17 offense.
18 The SVC legal representative will
19 promptly meet or consult with the
20 investigators within 48 hours after this
21 designation.
22 SVC legal personnel will subsequently

1 meet at least monthly or as often as necessary
2 with investigators for periodic case reviews
3 to ensure victim needs are met.
4 Now, I would like to provide a brief
5 overview of how we plan to implement this
6 policy specifically for legal and
7 prosecutorial support.
8 Working with criminal law experts, we
9 crafted an overarching policy and the hallmark
10 of our legal support programs will be the
11 establishment of teams of experienced Judge
12 Advocates to prosecute special victim cases
13 supported by paralegal case managers and
14 certified victim witness liaisons, resulting
15 in enhanced and dedicated support for
16 investigators, Commanders and victims.
17 Legal personnel comprise three of the
18 four required elements of SVC, and we will
19 work collaboratively with specially trained
20 MCO investigators to provide timely advice,
21 expert guidance and enduring support in all
22 identified SVC cases.

1 Each Military service will ensure
2 that qualified personnel receive comprehensive
3 training on victims' rights, issues unique to
4 sexual assault, some that were discussed
5 earlier with the Panel, aggravated domestic
6 violence and child abuse cases and best
7 practices for navigating victims through the
8 Military justice system.
9 As far as our policy for personnel,
10 the minimum selection certification and
11 training standards have been identified and
12 will include common criteria for measuring the
13 effectiveness and impact of SVC, particularly
14 from the victim's perspective.
15 The Judge Advocate General or TJAGS
16 of the Military services and the SJA to the
17 Commandant on the Marine Corps will establish
18 and maintain these standards, which are
19 focused on five key areas.
20 First, the Military services are
21 responsible for ensuring the selection of SVC
22 trial counsel to competently prosecute SVC

1 cases and victim witness assistance program
2 coordinators, to effectively shepard these
3 cases to trial, while supporting victims every
4 step of the way.
5 Selected SVC prosecutors will be
6 capable of supervising and administering
7 training to junior trial counsel, while
8 providing expert prosecutorial support to
9 responsible legal offices, and this will
10 include both direct litigation support in the
11 Courtroom, as well as advisory assistance to
12 local investigators and trial counsel at all
13 stages of the Military justice process.
14 Second, SVC will support Staff Judge
15 Advocates in the provision of candid legal
16 advice and independent advice to Commanders
17 and convening authorities in special victim
18 cases.
19 Third, each service will establish
20 and require training for all SVC legal
21 personnel, to provide victims with a
22 comprehensive understanding of their rights

1 and notification of key decisions in the
2 Military justice process, and they will answer
3 victims' questions in a competent and
4 sensitive manner.
5 These comprehensive training programs
6 and integrated training programs will include
7 both in-residence distance learning, trial
8 advocacy courses and workshops, as well as on
9 the job training and periodic refresher
10 training.
11 In particular, training programs for
12 SVC prosecutors will focus on the unique
13 dynamics of sexual assault, domestic violence
14 and child abuse cases. This advanced training
15 at a minimum will cover the elements of proof
16 for SVC offenses, effective interviewing
17 techniques, the impact of trauma on memory and
18 legal issues and sensitivities associated with
19 these cases.
20 All training initiatives will promote
21 methods of interacting with and supporting
22 victims, to ensure their rights are respected,

1 preserved and build on advanced litigation
2 case management and technical skills.
3 Fourth, the services will ensure SVC
4 legal personnel continue to collaborate
5 effectively with their sexual assault response
6 coordinators and victim advocates to
7 facilitate a victim's welfare, security and
8 recovery from these crimes, as well as our
9 family advocacy program managers and domestic
10 abuse victim advocates in cases involving
11 domestic violence and child abuse.
12 Fifth, the services will provide
13 dedicated, investigative and trial support
14 resources, such as civilian highly qualified
15 experts to further augment consultation
16 resources on SVC cases.
17 Based on these consistent standards,
18 the Military justice TJAGS and the SJA to the
19 CMC or Commandant to the Marine Corps, will be
20 responsible for providing and selecting and
21 certifying that all trial counsel under SVC
22 possess the skills, professionalism and

leadership to provide the highest quality of legal representation.

SVC is intended to build and strengthen our -- upon our legacy victim support services, and for example, legal representatives will collaborate with victim advocacy personnel in case reviews of child abuse and domestic violence cases, and SVC prosecution teams will continue to work with all appropriate support organizations.

I would like to last discuss the measures of performance and effectiveness or metrics, which will be used as common criteria for measuring the effectiveness and impact of SVC, particularly from a victim's perspective.

In accordance with the NDAA for FY2013, the Secretaries of the Military departments will collect and report on this data.

These metrics are intended to be meaningful and not simply duplicative of service information collection requirements

1 that are already in place.
2 Our overarching goal through these
3 measures is to ensure that SVC cases are
4 prosecuted and that all victims have a clear
5 voice in the process, that they are treated
6 with dignity and respect at all times and have
7 their specific needs addressed in a competent,
8 sensitive and timely manner by SVC personnel.
9 To accomplish this, we are selecting
10 our very best people to serve as SVC legal
11 personnel and we will further verify that they
12 are well trained, fully prepared and readily
13 available to support -- provide support
14 whenever needed.
15 Most of all, we want to be sure that
16 SVC is having a positive impact on making this
17 process more collaborative, cohesive and
18 responsive and also identifying what
19 additional improvements can continue to be
20 made.
21 In closing, we recognize that our
22 investigators, Judge Advocates, paralegals,

1 victim witness liaisons and other key
2 personnel involved in special victim cases
3 play critical and interconnected roles in the
4 pursuit of justice, offender accountability
5 and ensuring the rights of victims are
6 protected.
7 Therefore, we believe this policy
8 advances our shared goal of providing a
9 distinct, recognizable group of skilled
10 personnel to expertly address the most
11 challenging of cases in our Military justice
12 system, while ensuring that all victims
13 receive the care they need. Thank you.
14 CHAIR JONES: Thank you. Dr.
15 Krulewitch.
16 DR. KRULEWITCH: Good morning. I am
17 Dr. Cara Krulewitch and part of my portfolio
18 includes all of the DoD-wide health policy for
19 sexual assault.
20 I am going to discuss the role the
21 healthcare provider in the SVC -- the
22 department-wide SVC and the policies that

1 guide this collaboration.
2 Prior to the 28th of March in 2013,
3 there -- healthcare was guided by the DoD
4 instruction that is titled 'Sexual Assault
5 Prevention and Response Program Procedures'.
6 On the 28th of March, it was updated
7 and it includes procedures for medical
8 treatment for sexual assault and the sexual
9 assault forensic examinations and training for
10 healthcare providers.
11 These updates were developed by a
12 multi-disciplinary team that included both DoD
13 and service members.
14 The services have been working to
15 implement the updates and they are making
16 policy changes and enhancements, both to their
17 training program and the care provided is
18 ongoing, but there -- they're doing many of
19 the same things they have been doing.
20 Victims have received and will
21 continue to receive comprehensive gender-
22 responsive emergency care and follow up.

1 Trained sexual assault forensic examiners who
2 collect evidence and also provide testimony in
3 part of their training is how to testify in
4 Court when needed, and are connected with
5 sexual assault response coordinators or SAPRO
6 victim advocates, who then will keep them
7 linked in to the legal system.
8 The medical portion of the SVC
9 response assures that the victims receive a
10 sexual assault forensic examiner-safe examine
11 from a trained provider.
12 Sometimes these providers are
13 Military within the medical system or there
14 are contracts with civilian providers in areas
15 where there are not. They're working more to
16 get higher numbers of them within the Military
17 treatment facilities.
18 Really, that is about all that I had
19 to include, is a very important part, but has
20 a very small piece of information for you.
21 CHAIR JONES: All right, thank you
22 very much. I wonder if I could go back to

1 you, Major Oakley, and just ask this.
2 Where does the providing of counsel
3 to each victim come in to your program or is
4 it a totally separate piece of DoD policy?
5 MAJOR OAKLEY: That is a separate
6 piece, ma'am, through the victim counsel
7 program, first through, of course, the pilot
8 program that was established by the Air Force
9 and that the other services are moving
10 forward.
11 So, that is a separate piece and of
12 course, victims counsel will certainly be
13 working through our specially trained
14 prosecutors and our victim witness assistance
15 personnel, to provide that overall continuum
16 of care.
17 But it is a separate program with a
18 specific purpose of providing confidential and
19 independent assistance to a victim of sexual
20 assault.
21 CHAIR JONES: All right, so, you
22 wouldn't have any knowledge about necessary

resources for that program?

MAJOR OAKLEY: Correct, ma'am. I would defer to the -- our Military service partners.

CHAIR JONES: Okay, I have another question and that relates to the Defense function. That is also not a part of your program, is that right? You're only talking about investigation and prosecution?

MAJOR OAKLEY: Correct, ma'am.

CHAIR JONES: Even within investigation and prosecution, do you have the -- have you done some examinations, with respect to what it's going to cost and whether you have the resources?

Are you increasing personnel? You're increasing training, certainly.

MAJOR OAKLEY: Well, ma'am, as far as Defense counsel, it is correct that they are not part of the SVC.

Our working group, at the very initial stages, did discuss the role of the

Defense counsel, but ultimately, since Defense counsel were not one of the listed elements under the NDAA for FY2013, they are not included in our policy.

We, of course, want to be sure that Defense counsel are fully equipped and have access to similar training, to go forward.

I would defer to the services, as far as on personnel because really, where this policy is being executed is with the Military -- within each Military service, in particular, that's overseen by their leadership.

CHAIR JONES: Do you happen to know if anyone is looking at the needs for the Defense counsel component?

MAJOR OAKLEY: I can certainly take that for the record. I know that is a -- it is an issue, ma'am, and I certainly can take that for the record, to get the -- to get fuller information for the Panel on that.

CHAIR JONES: All right, thanks.

1 Yes, go ahead, Colonel.
2 MEMBER COOK: Just to follow up on a
3 question, Major Oakley.
4 So, just to be clear, at the OSD
5 level, for the special victims prosecutors,
6 there has been no additional manpower or
7 structure given to any of the individual
8 services and no additional money?
9 They're supposed to execute this
10 program and implement it within existing
11 resources of their service and they, across
12 the board, get to decide how best to do that?
13 MAJOR OAKLEY: That is correct,
14 ma'am.
15 MEMBER COOK: So, you may have some
16 services that may put more effort into it than
17 others, but there is nothing that is mandated
18 from OSD, even though you're writing the
19 policy that just says, "You will have a
20 program."
21 MAJOR OAKLEY: Correct, ma'am. The
22 services again, as I mentioned for -- have had

1 long-standing programs of a centralized
2 specially trained prosecutors to process
3 complex cases.
4 The goal of the policy is to make
5 sure that there is consistent policy across
6 the board for ensuring that cases that are --
7 involve sexual assault, serious domestic
8 violence and serious child abuse, that those
9 receive the advice and assistance of a
10 specially trained prosecutor.
11 So, the services will be executing
12 that through their programs for their best
13 counsel.
14 CHAIR JONES: One of the problems
15 with training and growing special victims
16 counsel or special -- for these cases, these
17 particular types of cases is keeping the trial
18 lawyer there, the prosecutor there long enough
19 at one station, if you will.
20 Are there any policies to try to stop
21 switching trial counsel around as much as they
22 have been in the past?

1 MAJOR OAKLEY: Not at all -- not at
2 the OSD level, ma'am.
3 CHAIR JONES: Okay.
4 MEMBER FERNANDEZ: Judge Jones?
5 CHAIR JONES: Yes.
6 MEMBER FERNANDEZ: I have a question
7 for the Doctor, I'm going to not be able to
8 say your name.
9 We were in Fort Hood yesterday and we
10 talked to several of the SARRT's that were
11 there, and they said that they didn't have a
12 SANE nurse located on the facility and so,
13 that they would regularly have to travel with
14 a victim 40 minutes, in order to get a SANE
15 test done, and often, there was no vehicles
16 available and they would have to travel in
17 their own vehicles if they had one.
18 Do you know of what kinds of policies
19 there are to have a SANE nurse present on
20 particularly major facilities like Fort Hood
21 and what resources are being made, to make
22 sure that happens, so that there is greater

1 availability and there does not need to be,
2 you know -- having to take somebody 40 minutes
3 away from where they are stationed is really
4 adding to their trauma.
5 DR. KRULEWITCH: I personally don't
6 have information on that.
7 Just to clarify too, not all Military
8 facilities are using the SANE nurses. They're
9 using sexual assault medical forensic
10 examiners, and they're training them. They're
11 not going to be certified by the International
12 Forensic Nurses Association.
13 However, they are doing
14 certifications that meet that standard, which
15 is the national protocol, or even more.
16 As far as the availability, I think
17 they're working. That is being implemented
18 within the services, and my understanding is
19 they are working to try and increase the
20 availability throughout the whole service.
21 But I don't know the exact numbers or
22 the exact implementation of that at this time.

1 I can try and find out and get more
2 information for you.
3 MEMBER FERNANDEZ: Thank you. That
4 would be terrific.
5 CHAIR JONES: Well, I guess an
6 overall concern that I have is that, and as
7 someone mentioned earlier, reporting rates
8 from sexual assault victims are going up, as
9 we're all aware, which is a good thing because
10 victim advocates clearly, have the goal of
11 encouraging victims to feel safe, to report,
12 to have confidence to report.
13 That's going to mean that whatever
14 programs are ongoing, are in pilot, are being
15 thought of, are going to have quite a demand,
16 if that rate continues.
17 So, I just wonder, and maybe we'll go
18 to each of the services, what your experience
19 has been, how you see it. Tell us a little
20 bit about your programs and how you see them
21 going and about the demand, and whether you
22 have the resources necessary.

1 Captain Brown?
2 CPT. BROWN: Yes, ma'am. The
3 Commandant of the Marine Corps has been
4 thinking about this problem for --
5 CHAIR JONES: You want to move that
6 microphone a little closer? Thanks.
7 CPT. BROWN: Yes, ma'am. The
8 Commandant of the Marine Corps has been
9 thinking about this problem for a long time.
10 About 18 months ago, he published his
11 2012 cyber-campaign plan, and within the
12 campaign plan, he directed a complete
13 reorganization of the Marine Corps legal
14 community.
15 The centerpiece of that
16 reorganization was the Marine Corps complex
17 trial teams, which are located regionally and
18 contain an 05 experience Lieutenant Colonel
19 litigator, two other Military prosecutors,
20 CID, Marine CID agent who had a tour as an
21 NCIS investigator, a Chief Warrant Officer to
22 handle administrative matters and some

1 paralegal personnel.
2 So, while we haven't increased the
3 numbers of people who are prosecuting these
4 cases, we've definitely improved the way that
5 we do business.
6 So, within this regional construct
7 these personnel can reach down, prosecute
8 cases, mentor, counsel who are prosecuting
9 these cases and just provide better support
10 for these extremely important complex cases.
11 CHAIR JONES: And any provision for
12 additional support or a reorganization for the
13 Defense counsel?
14 CPT. BROWN: The Defense counsel
15 actually did it about a year before the
16 prosecutors did.
17 So, they have a centralized office,
18 as well. They're organized under the Chief
19 Defense Counsel of the Marine Corps and are
20 organized very similarly, and I believe you'll
21 hear from our DCAP tomorrow, who can provide
22 some better insight into that, how the defense

1 is organized and funded.
2 CHAIR JONES: Captain Crow?
3 CPT. CROW: Yes, ma'am. Ma'am, for
4 the Navy, we also do it geographically. We
5 have nine region legal service officers that
6 are prosecution shops. They're managed by 06
7 CO's, 05 XO's and then senior trial counsel
8 are our core special victim capability
9 prosecutors, and those range in different pay
10 grades.
11 One thing we are doing is for our
12 three biggest, Norfolk, San Diego,
13 Jacksonville, looking to increase the level
14 from 04 to 05 of the senior trial counsel
15 there, for that has not historically been the
16 case.
17 But within the -- that realm, so that
18 geographic construct, the core capability of
19 both prosecution and defense for the Navy,
20 comes from our Military justice career
21 litigation track.
22 This is something that was

1 implemented in the Navy back in 2007, and so,
2 it's a -- just kind of historically, we didn't
3 do as many tours in litigation. You'd go in,
4 go out on occasion. So, a couple here and
5 there over a course of a career.
6 We changed that with now, if you
7 apply for this board and you're selected for
8 it, it's a selection process.
9 There is three different tiers within
10 it, specialist one, specialist two and expert
11 qualifications.
12 If you go into the track, then you're
13 going to spend the majority of your career in
14 litigation, where in the past, we would go
15 operational, administrative law and others.
16 So, that is really where all of our
17 senior trial counsel are in JLQ, military
18 justice litigation qualified. Most of our
19 defense counsel are the same way.
20 So, we very much -- what we do on the
21 prosecution side, we do the same thing on the
22 defense side, and then the other component --

1 and then within that, for example on training
2 on the prosecution side, for the last several
3 years, we've done a course called 'Prosecuting
4 Alcohol Facilitated Sexual Assault Cases'. We
5 actually contract that out with AEquitas.
6 So, some civilian prosecutors come
7 in. We do the same thing on the defense side.
8 It's a defending sexual assault cases.
9 Most recently in the last year or so,
10 we've sent all of our senior trial counsel and
11 most, if not all of our trial counsel, to the
12 course that Mr. Strand was discussing earlier,
13 with investigators.
14 We also have a separate NCIS course
15 that does the same thing.
16 So, I think a lot more -- we've been
17 moving in this collaboration mode lately, to
18 do what really, this capability is now
19 specifying and defining.
20 CHAIR JONES: Could I ask you a
21 little bit more about your military justice
22 career litigation track?

1 CPT. CROW: Yes, ma'am.
2 CHAIR JONES: So, who is -- these are
3 lawyers and obviously, there is certainly most
4 staff, which they require there.
5 But these are lawyers who are trial
6 counsel, as well as defenders, is that right?
7 CPT. CROW: Within the litigation
8 track, it's trial counsel, defense counsel,
9 Judges. We have Judges that are in it mostly
10 06, but some 05.
11 CHAIR JONES: Right.
12 CPT. CROW: So, appellate judges and
13 trial judges, as well as, for example, I'm in
14 the litigation track. I'm in a policy role
15 right now.
16 So, it's not exclusive to the
17 Courtroom, and we do still have personnel do
18 what we call a -- within this community, a
19 disassociated tour.
20 For example, go onboard a carrier for
21 the professional development --
22 CHAIR JONES: Is it all criminal?

1 CPT. CROW: It is, yes, ma'am.
2 CHAIR JONES: Okay, and I assume that
3 what happens with these officers is that they
4 would generally not go out and become a staff
5 advocate, if that is the correct way to
6 describe it.
7 CPT. CROW: Well, with the exception
8 of, we do -- the way we've kind of got it
9 mapped out, and there is no actual, you know,
10 this is the only way that it will work.
11 But we do encourage what we call a
12 disassociated tour, to be a Staff Judge
13 Advocate, for example, onboard a carrier as
14 the legal officer onboard.
15 You know, for me, I did a carrier
16 strike route tour, an operational tour, also
17 did a year in Iraq, as a Staff Judge Advocate.
18 So, you can go in and out, but the
19 majority of your career is going to be in
20 litigation, including back to back litigation
21 tours, which is -- over time, we've really not
22 kept people in that back to back tour.

1 CHAIR JONES: When you say back to
2 back, what do you mean?
3 CPT. CROW: Three years prosecuting
4 cases, for example. Usually, that person
5 would then maybe go out and be a Staff Judge
6 Advocate or go to headquarters.
7 Now, within -- if you're in this
8 track, chances are for most of the people,
9 you're going to do three years litigation and
10 then you may still move geographically, so, go
11 from like Norfolk to San Diego and go from
12 trial to defense, but you're going back in to
13 a litigation billet.
14 That could be as a Military Judge,
15 when you become -- for us, we don't have --
16 our Judges are 05's and 06's, but it is more
17 of these litigation billets.
18 CHAIR JONES: And what benefits have
19 you seen from that in the Navy?
20 CPT. CROW: I think because in the
21 past, it just was not career-enhancing to
22 stick in Military justice and promote, is the

best way to put it.

So, for those of us that really love litigation, it took some risk, if you wanted to do that and keep asking to go back in to Court.

So, with that now, a lot of attention is focused on this. It's no longer a negative to be able to go be a Military Judge or to go into litigation.

So, I think our training is much better. Our experience levels are increased, because we've got fewer people doing it and so, that experience over time, because it is a perishable skill. If you go out for, you know, several years and then come back in.

So, I think it's been a great improvement and we focus on those personnel and put them in the right spots, to continue developing that experience.

CHAIR JONES: Colonel Cook?

MEMBER COOK: Just a clarification, because not everyone here is from a Military

1 background.
2 When you say put somebody at risk, if
3 you stay in the criminal arena, at risk meant
4 you may not be selected for promotion in your
5 career.
6 I mean, ultimately, you try to come
7 in for a career. If you don't get selected
8 for promotion at some point, you can be let go
9 and not have a job, not have a pension.
10 By changing this, you've allowed them
11 to progress and to get promoted and your
12 promotion rates back it up.
13 CPT. CROW: Yes, yes, ma'am, and we
14 actually have what we call pre-set language
15 within our promotion boards, our statutory
16 promotion boards, that specify that we do need
17 to have this capability of military justice
18 practitioners.
19 So, not going to do what may be
20 characterized as the operational law jobs
21 that, you know, where you're working for the
22 senior Commanders, Three Stars, Four Star

1 Admirals, that is not a limitation. Thank
2 you.
3 CHAIR JONES: Yes.
4 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: You mentioned
5 something, Captain, about training your
6 investigators in accordance with what Mr.
7 Strand had been talking about.
8 Could you elaborate on that? Would
9 you mind elaborating on that and telling me
10 how many people have been trained, what your
11 objective is in completing the training, any
12 evaluation you've done of that program?
13 CPT. CROW: We, and Your Honor, I
14 think we can -- tomorrow, we can probably give
15 a little bit more of that detail when TCAP
16 comes.
17 But we -- the prosecutors have -- all
18 of our senior prosecutors, senior trial
19 counsel have gone through Russ Strand's two-
20 week course up at Fort Leonard Wood, and then
21 along with many agents, and then NCIS built
22 their own course where Mr. Strand comes down

1 to Glynco, as well.
2 So, from the prosecution perspective,
3 all of our senior trial counsel, and I want to
4 say many, if not most of our actual trial
5 counsel, we just started doing that over the
6 last year, year and a half, but putting them
7 in that same course, which is more
8 investigator oriented, but actually is a
9 benefit for prosecutors and investigators, and
10 that is separate from the other lawyer-
11 specific course, like prosecuting alcohol
12 facilitated sexual assault and other courses
13 that we teach at the Naval Justice School.
14 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: I was asking about
15 investigators too, not counsel.
16 CPT. CROW: And I'll have to get that
17 from NCIS.
18 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Okay, thank you.
19 CHAIR JONES: All right, Colonel
20 Lewis?
21 LT. COLONEL LEWIS: Thank you, Judge
22 Jones.

1 The Air Force has had a program to
2 have its most complex cases tried by senior
3 prosecutors for more than 40 years. The
4 program started in 1971.
5 What is new for us is designating
6 this group of folks who we call senior trial
7 counsel, and setting a group of them aside to
8 be senior trial counsel special victims unit
9 prosecutors.
10 So, we have 16 senior trial counsel
11 in the Air Force now, set up -- set across the
12 world, and 10 of those are designated as STC-
13 SVU's.
14 Those are the folks who are going to
15 be bringing the special victims capability
16 into the Courtroom and working with
17 investigators, in making sure that the
18 investigations up front are done in an
19 appropriate manner.
20 What is really new about this is
21 making sure that those individuals are trained
22 specially, attending a number of courses.

1 You've heard some about already, and the Air
2 Force has some courses that are unique to just
3 our service.
4 But also, making sure that they come
5 into the Courtroom as a senior trial counsel,
6 typically for about a year, before they
7 receive an STC-SVU designation.
8 So, we get to watch them in the
9 Courtroom going out and doing those cases in
10 a centrally managed organization within the
11 Air Force legal operations agency, and then
12 make sure we're only picking the best and
13 brightest of our senior trial counsel to
14 perform this role.
15 I want to highlight one other point,
16 and we -- one of our senior trial counsel
17 SVU's, she is actually set up to perform a
18 reach-back capability for the field, and her
19 official title is Special Victims Unit Chief
20 of Policy and Coordination.
21 Her role is to be paired up with an
22 Air Force OSI agent who provides the same

1 reach-back capability for the investigators,
2 and so, the two of them --
3 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Could you explain
4 what reach-back means?
5 LT. COLONEL LEWIS: Sure. Reach-back
6 would just be if you are at a base in Germany,
7 for instance, and you didn't have the
8 particular capability right there in your
9 office, you could call back to Washington,
10 D.C., and these two folks would help you with
11 your investigation.
12 What they're really there to do is
13 monitor all of the reports that are coming in
14 for the Air Force, providing that initial
15 advice to investigators, to more junior Judge
16 Advocates, who might be out there at that
17 particular location, and making sure that they
18 understand all of the nuances of
19 investigating, and perhaps prosecuting, this
20 type of cases.
21 CHAIR JONES: Any questions? All
22 right, Colonel Mulligan?

1 COLONEL MULLIGAN: Good morning,
2 ma'am.
3 CHAIR JONES: Good morning.
4 COLONEL MULLIGAN: I want to
5 succinctly, I think, address two questions
6 that you asked. One was on special victim
7 capability.
8 The Army, in 2009, adopted special
9 victim prosecutors. What we did is internally
10 selected. We were authorized to have 18. We
11 did an internal scrub. We identified 15 of
12 our most talented litigators across a spectrum
13 of ranks, that would then allow for people to
14 do multiple tours and not be ranked out,
15 because you had been promoted.
16 They were fenced off for three years.
17 They were specially trained. It was a pilot
18 program. It was originally approved by Mr.
19 Garin, when he was the Secretary, that proved
20 highly effective, and from that we then went
21 back and have now expanded that to 23.
22 They're regionally based. It is based

on the volume of court-martial to a specific base. For example, you would have two at a base like Fort Hood, two at a base like Fort Bragg, large troop units, a larger volume of courts-martial.

You'd have two for all of Europe, right now, based on the troop levels in Europe.

So, that is how we implemented and will continue to implement the special victim capability. We had it already, starting in 2009. We have expanded it, to ensure we can meet the capability we have now.

On your specific question regarding the defense, also in 2009, we were funded for seven highly qualified experts, and they were divided five and two. Those were civilians we hired or retired Judges we hired, to augment our expertise and give us some synergy with civilian populations.

Two were specifically allocated to the defense function. Three went to the

1 Army's trial function. One went to policy and
2 one went to the school.
3 So, when you did the division, three
4 went to the prosecutors, who carried the
5 burden, and in my opinion, should be a little
6 better funded. Two went to the defense. One
7 went to the school and one went to policy, and
8 that's how we've continued to do it.
9 Those jobs have just been re-
10 validated and we're in the process of hiring
11 some of the vacancies. They were four-year
12 terms to generate, intentionally, some
13 turnover and new ideas coming in to those, so
14 you didn't stagnate and you could attract new
15 people into them.
16 The Army, since 1981 has had
17 something called the Trial Counsel Assistance
18 Program.
19 I was lucky enough to have that
20 assignment as the Chief of that, from 2005 to
21 2000 -- excuse me, 2003 to 2005, and the Army
22 always had a training -- a trial counsel

training function out of TCAP and was by regulation, the unit you would go to for special high profile cases, special victim cases or capital cases, and we would then be allowed, again, using the Air Force model reach-backs.

So, if a Staff Judge Advocate at a particular base had a complete -- particularly difficult case, Fort Hood would come to mind, that trial -- that Staff Judge Advocate could ask for additional resources that would then be pushed to him. It was a pull capability and not a push.

In other words, that Staff Judge Advocate would ask for assistance, it would be granted and then it would go to him. It would not be pushed to him from higher headquarters.

Ma'am, does that address your question?

CHAIR JONES: It does, and I gather, when you said they are fenced for three years, you mean your special victims -- I'm sorry,

1 cases, prosecutors can't be touched for three
2 years, in terms of being moved around?
3 COLONEL MULLIGAN: Yes, ma'am, and to
4 address one of -- with the fencing, now, there
5 are exceptions for career opportunities.
6 For example, we had one special
7 victims counsel was selected for promotion.
8 Her next job would be to attend the grad
9 course. She was an exception to the policy
10 and moved.
11 But with each of those movements, we
12 ensure that the cases that they are currently
13 working, they can either be brought back to
14 finish those cases or that the transition --
15 there was some -- another prosecutor involved
16 in that case from the inception, so those
17 cases don't get dropped.
18 CHAIR JONES: Do any of the other
19 services do anything like that, you know, just
20 basically, protect transfer for special
21 victims counsel or anything of that sort?
22 CPT. BROWN: Yes, ma'am.

1 CHAIR JONES: Captain Brown.
2 CPT. BROWN: The Marine Corps does,
3 especially in our senior litigation billets.
4 The senior trial counsel, especially the
5 complex trial team, trial counsel, they're
6 fenced off for a period of 18 to 24 months.
7 CHAIR JONES: Eighteen to 24?
8 CPT. BROWN: Yes, ma'am.
9 CPT. CROW: Ma'am?
10 CHAIR JONES: Captain Crow, if you
11 know.
12 CPT. CROW: For the Navy, we've moved
13 to -- used to probably to a two-year term and
14 then move.
15 We're now moving that. It's not a
16 hard and fast rule, but more of three years
17 within a given tour.
18 So, I think that will --
19 CHAIR JONES: It's a trend?
20 CPT. CROW: Yes, ma'am.
21 CHAIR JONES: Colonel?
22 LT. COLONEL LEWIS: For the Air

1 Force, subject to the Judge Advocate General
2 having assignment authority to move somebody
3 for professional development reasons, we ask
4 for a commitment of up to three years for our
5 senior trial counsel SVU prosecutors.
6 CHAIR JONES: Go ahead, Colonel.
7 MEMBER COOK: Colonel Mulligan,
8 Captain Crow had mentioned in the Navy, that
9 the Navy has taken steps to ensure career
10 advancement and minimize the risk of being a
11 specialist within the service.
12 You know, if you become a criminal
13 law specialist in each of the services, at
14 some point it would say you're not destined
15 for leadership at the top, and it became a
16 risk.
17 Did the Army take any steps to help
18 minimize that risk as well, so that all this
19 effort, in terms of training that we've done
20 to invest into these officers, what efforts to
21 retain them? What efforts to make it still
22 career advancement possible? Can you talk

1 about that?
2 COLONEL MULLIGAN: We have -- the
3 Army implemented something we call the ASI,
4 the Additional Skill Identifier, that based on
5 your level of experience, you can apply for an
6 additional skill identifier as a litigator.
7 It then is added to your resume, your
8 ORB, and we track you through that.
9 The Army by size, we're a little
10 different than my colleagues sitting at the
11 table. We try more cases. We're a bigger JAG
12 Corps.
13 I smile, and I hope you didn't think
14 it was disrespectful. When Captain Crow talks
15 about career risk, I sit before you, a Judge
16 Advocate who has tried a case at every rank
17 from Lieutenant to Colonel.
18 So, if risk is retiring as a Colonel,
19 then I've accepted that risk.
20 I think we have a large enough
21 population in the Army to identify our
22 litigators and continue to have them go into

1 litigation tracks.
2 I left litigation, to address one of
3 your earlier comments. I left criminal
4 litigation after two years as an Assistant
5 District Attorney, before I came on active
6 duty. My first five years in the JAG Corps,
7 I was either a prosecutor or defense counsel.
8 Then I left criminal litigation to go
9 be an environmental litigator for two years,
10 which rounded out my litigation skills.
11 I have also been a Staff Judge
12 Advocate. I've been a Deputy Staff Judge
13 Advocate.
14 So, I floated in and out of the
15 criminal justice world, and yet, twice as a
16 Lieutenant Colonel and once as a Colonel, I
17 was asked to come back and prosecute some
18 fairly high profile cases.
19 So, I think the Army is a little
20 different, based on our size, but specifically
21 to answer Colonel Cook's question, we
22 developed a program to track and identify our

1 talented litigators. To advance through the
2 levels requires more experience, more training
3 that can be validated, and then we have a list
4 now of the 1,800+ Judge Advocates in the Army.
5 We have a list of those people we consider our
6 most experienced litigators.
7 MEMBER COOK: When we had a skill --
8 when the Army had a skill identifier in the
9 past for acquisition, to help keep contractors
10 in the military, it was something that could
11 be considered during promotion boards, and it
12 was up to the officer, to elect whether they
13 wanted it considered or not.
14 Has the skill identifier in the
15 criminal law arena been used for that purpose?
16 COLONEL MULLIGAN: I can't answer
17 that question. We didn't develop it for --
18 MEMBER COOK: For that purpose,
19 right.
20 COLONEL MULLIGAN: -- promotions. We
21 developed it to track training and identify
22 talented officers, and I'm not prepared to

answer your question, although I can try and get back to you.

I think as of right now, the additional skill identifier has not been either a specific instruction to the Board or a negative, as it was with the contract law.

MEMBER COOK: And if you did --

MEMBER HOUCK: This is Jim Houck.

I've been listening to all of this, but I wanted to add a comment on the issue of identifying skills and the issue of risk and promotion.

I was involved in the creation of the military justice career track six or seven years ago in the Navy, and we went through a long and pretty robust debate about this within the Navy, about what specialities would be required.

We finally decided it was, and that risk meant that people weren't getting promoted beyond the rank of Lieutenant and Lieutenant Commander, in some cases, and that

we've made it a distinct part of our system, which is admittedly, all the services are a little bit different.

But in our case, we felt that we needed to be explicit about it and that we needed to make sure that the selection board had objective evidence that a person was qualified for the program and that, as Captain Crow mentioned, we tied that to guidance in the selection, about how many of these -- with the need to be sensitive to pick people with expertise, you know, in this area.

So, in the service, I speak with a lot of experience as being the identification and special assistance for the system.

CHAIR JONES: Professor?

MEMBER HILLMAN: I have a question for all of you.

The special victims capability is an effort to try to put into really, many small -- although the Army is not a small system. None of you -- you're not -- but small

1 compared to many civilian jurisdictions, that
2 also work, some of the civilian jurisdictions
3 are quite large that manage this.
4 We heard from some prosecutors from
5 some larger jurisdictions in our last set of
6 hearings, and one of the recommendations of
7 very senior folks who are prosecutors is that,
8 it should have specially trained prosecutors
9 do this, because of the complexities that Mr.
10 Stand's presentation, which was not only
11 compelling, but dense. I was struggling to
12 keep up at times, because of the number of
13 different factors that affect this type of
14 investigation and prosecution.
15 So, in the Military, because of the
16 transiency, and because of the movement and
17 because of the emphasis, not withstanding
18 efforts that Admiral Houck just pointed out in
19 the Navy and that Captain Crow talked about
20 and that Colonel Mulligan talked about, and
21 the rest of you are aware of, to make sure we
22 value our litigators with experience.

1 Three years does not sound like very
2 long to get experience in these very
3 complicated sorts of investigations and
4 prosecutions, and even the career track with
5 at 20 years, the prosecutors we talked to had
6 done this for upwards of 30 years, at least
7 some of them had, and they recommended that
8 this should be a specialized -- this should be
9 a specialized capability, that maybe the
10 Military is actually not the right place to
11 try to build and perhaps tenuously fund the
12 creation of this very thing that you described
13 the policies for system-wide, that special
14 victims capability.
15 So, I wondered if you could just
16 respond to that, that this is a singularly
17 complex and -- if this is correct, if it's a
18 singularly complex arena in which to
19 prosecute, is it -- is it reasonable to think
20 that in a time of scarce resources, right on
21 the horizon in front of us now, that we can
22 actually maintain this kind of capability in

1 each of the different services and the -- with
2 the global and standardization process that
3 the SVC capability and the NDAA is trying to
4 find? Could you just speak to that?
5 CPT. BROWN: Sure. In the Marine
6 Corps, of course, it's a little more difficult
7 because we're the only service who has
8 unrestricted officers who are Judge Advocates.
9 So, you know, we do have Judge
10 Advocates who are identified and they go to
11 school. We have increased a lot of this for
12 criminal law, master of law, education.
13 But you know, if you're good in the
14 Marine Corps, you're probably going to get
15 command selection at some point, and you're
16 going to have to go to something else.
17 But we do have the organization with
18 the reach-back capability, where we can draw
19 on experience and if there is a junior
20 prosecutor who needs help, he can reach back
21 to their highly qualified expert, who is that
22 20 or 30 year civilian prosecutor.

1 In fact, before any prosecutor tries
2 a sexual assault case, they have to confer
3 with their HQE, do case strategy and analysis,
4 before they can even step in the Courtroom.
5 As well, trial counsel in the Marine
6 Corps can't even prosecute a sexual assault
7 case until they have second-chaired a sexual
8 assault case and until they've gotten the
9 requisite training to do that.
10 So, where in the Marine Corps system
11 it would be difficult to have 10 year, 20 year
12 prosecutors, we have the structure and the
13 capability to provide expertise for sexual
14 assault cases.
15 CPT. CROW: Ma'am, speaking from my
16 own personal experience, I am -- I was a much
17 better prosecutor, having been a defense
18 counsel and I was a much better defense
19 counsel, having been a prosecutor.
20 I've gone across both sides and done
21 the operational jobs, as well.
22 So, I think it works well. I

1 personally do. I am not a fan of just
2 building a straight-up career prosecutor track
3 or a straight-up defense track, kind of like
4 the public defenders and District Attorney's
5 Offices.
6 I love going back and forth and I've
7 actually prosecuted cases -- prosecuted and
8 defended cases in all the different services,
9 as well.
10 So, with that, I think we do have the
11 capability. I know three years doesn't sound
12 like a long time to like a 20 or 30 year
13 prosecutor, but we also have that reach-back
14 expertise.
15 We also have hired HQE's. We have
16 civilian former prosecutors --
17 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: What is an HQE,
18 please?
19 CPT. CROW: Highly qualified expert,
20 ma'am.
21 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Okay.
22 CPT. CROW: So, similar to what

1 Colonel Mulligan spoke to.
2 We just created a trial counsel
3 assistance program stood up in 2010, with that
4 reach-back capability.
5 So, I don't see -- and I've done
6 state cases and special assistant U.S.
7 Attorney work. I just -- I think we have it
8 right.
9 LT. COLONEL LEWIS: I am going to
10 echo Captain Crow's comments and just add a
11 little bit, that I think I was a better
12 Military Judge for having been a Staff Judge
13 Advocate overseeing the process of selection
14 of Court members, working with convening
15 authorities directly on cases, and working
16 with overseeing the Military justice process
17 at my installation.
18 So, there is value to seeing
19 different pieces and parts of the Military
20 justice system, regardless of whether you are
21 just a prosecutor or a defense counsel.
22 The additional comment. We are

1 obviously very cognizant of the tracks that
2 civilian prosecutors take.
3 The Air Force recently just went out
4 to Boulder, Colorado, to take a look and spend
5 some time with the civilian prosecutors there,
6 watch how they were doing business.
7 So we are studying that and those
8 recommendations have been presented to the
9 Judge Advocate General, so that we can look at
10 what options would work within the Military.
11 But having observed civilian defense
12 counsel, military defense counsel in Court, as
13 two years as a trial judge, and I would match
14 the Air Force litigators and the members of
15 the civilian Bar with experience in the
16 military justice system defending cases
17 against anyone that is out there.
18 CHAIR JONES: Thank you. Colonel?
19 COLONEL MULLIGAN: Ma'am, my
20 experience is a little different. I spent two
21 years as a civilian prosecutor before I came
22 on active duty.

1 I know in the civilian office in
2 Tulsa, Oklahoma where I was, you started in
3 misdemeanor or traffic. You worked your way
4 up to felony.
5 So, we have a similar process in the
6 Army, in that they're not taking your special
7 victim prosecutors out of the basic course.
8 These are people that have already done a tour
9 as either a defense counsel or a prosecutor.
10 They're at the three to five year mark, where
11 we then send them for special training and
12 fence them off.
13 I would assume in most District
14 Attorney's offices, based on my experience,
15 there is a lot of turnover, between the three
16 and five year mark.
17 People come, get trial experience and
18 leave, and then you have the career hard-
19 liners. I see Mr. Bryant smiling and nodding
20 his head, and then have the career hard-liners
21 who stay, and they are your team chiefs.
22 Those are the people that taught me,

1 when I first went to the district attorney's
2 office.
3 We have a similar structure in the
4 Army, and we use TCAP, the Trial Counsel
5 Assistance Program, I think Lieutenant Colonel
6 Morris has appeared in front of this Panel.
7 He'll appear in front of this Panel again.
8 I held that position in 2003 to 2005.
9 Those are your hard-liners, your team chiefs
10 that are similar in District Attorney's
11 offices, that you go to for experience.
12 You're not alone and unafraid, out
13 there on your own. You know, you're not
14 trying a sex assault case as your first case.
15 And the Army, with its size and ability to
16 flow resources, to reinforce what needs to be
17 reinforced, has the ability to do that.
18 I think our current system allows us
19 to do that, and I think we're certainly funded
20 for it. If we're going to expand the
21 capability, we would require additional
22 funding, but I hope that answers your

1 question.
2 CHAIR JONES: It does. Thanks. Ms.
3 Holtzman?
4 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: I just had a
5 question for Colonel Lewis about -- I think
6 you mentioned it, if I heard correctly, that
7 you contract out alcoholism related -- or was
8 it -- you weren't the right person or it was
9 Captain Crow?
10 Who contracts out the prosecution of
11 alcohol related --
12 CPT. CROW: It is --
13 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: -- prosecutions?
14 CPT. CROW: -- the Navy, through the
15 Naval Justice School. We -- and we do a lot
16 of different courses, not just that, but that
17 one is one. It's a week long course that
18 we've been doing --
19 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: It's just a course?
20 You don't prosecute -- you don't contract out
21 the prosecution of these cases?
22 CPT. CROW: No, no, prosecution is

1 all --

2 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: I misunderstood.

3 CPT. CROW: -- officer driven.

4 CHAIR JONES: Any other questions?

5 Thank you very, very much. Dr. Krulewitch,

6 gentlemen, thank you.

7 All right, I think we'd like to move

8 right on to our next Panel then, Military

9 Criminal Investigative Organizations.

10 Is Mr. Poorman -- all right, we now

11 have representatives from the Naval Criminal

12 Investigative Service, the U.S. Coast Guard

13 Criminal Investigative Service, U.S. Air Force

14 Office of Special Investigation and U.S. Army

15 Criminal Investigation Command.

16 So, I'd like to start with you. Is

17 it Mr. Gilliard?

18 MR. GILLIARD: Yes, ma'am.

19 CHAIR JONES: Great, and to hear from

20 you. You're the Assistant Director Naval

21 Criminal Investigative Service?

22 MR. GILLIARD: Yes, ma'am. I'm the

1 Deputy Assistant Director. Good morning,
2 Madam Chair.
3 CHAIR JONES: Good morning.
4 MR. GILLIARD: Panel Members. My
5 name is Darrell Gilliard. I am the Deputy
6 Assistant Director for Criminal Investigations
7 and Operations for NCIS.
8 My duties include overseeing the
9 quality of our criminal investigations and
10 operations and providing oversight on
11 investigations we deem director special
12 interest.
13 Additionally, I review investigative
14 policy and ensure NCIS policy is aligned with
15 any major changes from the Department of
16 Defense or the Department of the Navy.
17 There are three divisions under my
18 charge, Family Sexual Violence, Violent Crimes
19 Cold Case and Special Operations Trans-
20 National Crime.
21 SECNAV instruction 5430.107, the
22 missions and functions of the Naval Criminal

1 Investigative Service, sets forth NCIS's
2 authority and responsibilities. It
3 establishes NCIS's responsibility to
4 investigate major criminal offenses within the
5 Department of the Navy.
6 Major criminal offenses are defined
7 as those punishable under the UCMJ or
8 similarly framed Federal, State or local
9 statute by confinement of a term of more than
10 one year, commonly referred to as felonies.
11 NCIS has a cadre of approximately
12 1,000 trained special agents spread across 140
13 offices in 60 countries.
14 These agents are located in areas of
15 fleet concentration and in areas where Marine
16 and Navy forces transit.
17 All NCIS special agents go through 56
18 days of basic criminal investigations training
19 and another 46 days of NCIS specific training.
20 Once completed, NCIS agents are
21 subject to a 24 month probationary period,
22 that includes a 90 day observation or

1 mentoring period by certified field special
2 agents -- training agent, excuse me.
3 Since the mid to late 1990's, NCIS
4 has devoted special teams to investigate
5 sexual assaults. As of the summer of 2013,
6 NCIS had 65 family and sexual assault billets,
7 or FNSV, as we call them, dedicated to
8 addressing adult sexual assault, child assault
9 and physical abuse and domestic violence.
10 Since then, NCIS has re-programmed
11 over 50 additional billets to the FNSV program
12 to meet our demand signal. So, right now, we
13 have a cadre of about 120 special agents in
14 FNSV.
15 These billets came from reactive
16 general crimes, special operations, and port
17 visit support.
18 To better address the quality and
19 timeliness of sexual assault investigations,
20 NCIS established adult sexual assault program
21 teams, otherwise known as ASAP.
22 ASAP team members are dedicated

1 solely to adult sexual assault investigations.
2 Each member is required to attend U.S. Army
3 sponsored training in advanced adult sexual
4 violence, advanced family and sexual violence
5 and trial component training.
6 The ASAP team concept is to provide
7 a surge response to complete investigative
8 activity expeditiously, as well as provide a
9 thorough, high quality investigation to the
10 convening authority, early engagement with
11 legal and victim advocacy personnel central to
12 our concept.
13 Currently, ASAP teams -- excuse me,
14 currently ASAP teams are located in areas of
15 large fleet concentration. Right now, we have
16 teams in Norfolk, Virginia, Camp Lejeune,
17 North Carolina, Camp Pendleton in California,
18 San Diego, California, Bangor, Washington,
19 Yokosuka, Japan, Okinawa, Japan and the
20 national capital region.
21 However, NCIS maintains a surge
22 capability in our smaller, more remote

1 offices. As a result of this team approach,
2 NCIS field offices have experienced a
3 significant increase in the timeliness of
4 investigative actions under NCIS control.
5 NCIS will continue to monitor the
6 timeliness of our investigations as a measure
7 of effectiveness in combating sexual assaults
8 in the Department of the Navy.
9 Some of our -- just real quick, some
10 of our innovations, the text tip hotline.
11 NCIS has initiated what we call the
12 text tip hotline. Text tip allows persons to
13 report crime to NCIS anonymously without fear
14 of reprisal. A tipster can use a cell phone
15 to text NCIS by addressing their text to
16 274637 and type NCIS prior to entering the
17 tip.
18 There is also a smartphone app called
19 Tip Submit, in which a tipster can download on
20 their smart-phone, and send information to
21 NCIS.
22 Finally, tipsters can use our web-

1 based form on the NCIS website to forward
2 information.
3 Upon receipt of a tip, the
4 appropriate field office is contacted, to
5 address the issue. Agents at the field office
6 then can correspond with the tipster to glean
7 more information on the alleged offense.
8 To date, we have received about 84
9 tips on sexual assault or pertaining to sexual
10 assault in about the last 24 months.
11 We have our crime reduction programs.
12 In 2008, NCIS introduced the crime reduction
13 campaign, a community outreach initiative
14 designed to address criminal threats effecting
15 the Department of the Navy.
16 On a quarterly basis, the CRP, crime
17 reduction program, dedicates its efforts to
18 increase education and awareness of Military
19 members and their dependents, to deter
20 precursors of crime and victimization.
21 The CRP is led by NCIS and includes
22 both law enforcement and community service

1 partners within the Navy and the Marine Corps,
2 specifically Commander Naval Installations
3 Command and Marine Corps community services.
4 Beginning in January through March of
5 2014, NCIS representatives will visit commands
6 to provide sexual assault awareness briefings.
7 Some of our challenges. The
8 combination of the changes to Article 120
9 which elevated formerly misdemeanor offenses
10 such as groping over clothes to felony level,
11 in the DoD instruction 5505.18, which requires
12 NCIS to investigate all instances of sexual
13 assault have increased NCIS case load,
14 approximately 50 percent since 2012.
15 These factors force NCIS to reassign
16 criminal investigations billets from other
17 areas, such as reactive general crimes,
18 special operations support and business
19 support, to FNSV units.
20 We have reached -- we have received
21 some billet enhancements from the USN to place
22 towards FNSV; however, budgetary issues and

1 increased case loads jeopardize our ability to
2 respond to criminal threats posed by
3 narcotics, property crime, procurement fraud,
4 and violent crime.
5 We're still capable of meeting our
6 mission requirements. However, the DoD
7 instruction does not allow us the flexibility
8 to leverage all the capabilities of our law
9 enforcement partners, as we did in the past.
10 Another area of concern is training.
11 The availability of funds for advanced FNSV
12 training is limited. Our U.S. Army partners
13 were awarded funding for that training through
14 2017; however, the course is taught once a
15 month with a certain amount of seats available
16 per service, which makes it very difficult to
17 train our field agent corp.
18 Attrition, PCS cycles, manning levels
19 and other important investigations add to this
20 difficulty.
21 This concludes my comments and I
22 thank you for your time.

1 CHAIR JONES: Thank you very much,
2 Mr. Gilliard.
3 Mr. Marzloff?
4 MR. MARZLOFF: Yes, good morning,
5 Judge Jones, and distinguished members on the
6 Panel.
7 I am Neal Marzloff, Special Agent in
8 Charge of the Coast Guard Investigative
9 Services Central Region based on Cleveland,
10 Ohio.
11 I served in this position since
12 November 2007, and have been a credentialed
13 CGI special agent for 20 years, serving in
14 both as an active duty Military member and
15 now, as a civilian employee.
16 I thank you for allowing me to -- the
17 opportunity to speak before this Panel today,
18 regarding Coast Guard investigative services,
19 while in responding to reports of sexual
20 assault.
21 Coast Guard investigative services is
22 the criminal investigative arm of the Coast

1 Guard and is organized as an independent
2 centralized investigative agency under Coast
3 Guard Headquarters. CGIS is led and managed
4 by an OPM Series 1811 senior executive service
5 director.
6 CGIS supports Coast Guard commanders
7 by providing investigative support to
8 operations, force protection, intelligence
9 collection and the maintenance of good order
10 and discipline.
11 CGIS special agents are neutral fact
12 finders, committed to providing fair and
13 impartial investigative products for use by
14 the appropriate command and legal office.
15 CGIS special agents are prohibited
16 from offering recommendations or opinions on
17 matters concerning guilt, innocence or
18 punishment, in order to preserve the
19 objectivity of the criminal investigative
20 process to the maximum extent possible.
21 CGIS currently has 105 active duty,
22 148 reserve and 106 civilian special agents,

1 serving in seven regional offices, three field
2 offices and 39 resident agent offices.
3 Most reserve special agents are
4 active law enforcement officers or Federal
5 agents in their civilian capacities, and are
6 fully integrated into operations at their
7 respective CGIS offices.
8 CGIS is committed to aggressively
9 investigating all unrestricted reports of
10 sexual assault involving Coast Guard
11 personnel.
12 To accomplish this, we work in close
13 collaboration with Coast Guard sexual assault
14 response coordinators, victim advocates,
15 special victim counsels, the Coast Guard Staff
16 Judge Advocates, the commands of both the
17 victim and the accused and state and local law
18 enforcement agencies.
19 Every CGIS agent -- special agent
20 possesses the skills necessary to investigate
21 a reported sexual assault.
22 Upon entering into CGIS, special

1 agents receive eight weeks of entry level
2 training followed by eight weeks of agency
3 specific training, or that equivalent at the
4 Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in
5 Glynco, Georgia.
6 In terms of sexual assault
7 investigation, 15 CGIS special agents have
8 been qualified as FSVI investigators, who act
9 as specialists for those reports involving
10 family and sexual violence received in their
11 areas of responsibility.
12 Additionally, to date 50 CGIS special
13 agents have completed the Army's special
14 victim unit investigator course at Fort
15 Leonard Wood, Missouri, and an additional six
16 are currently attending SVUIC training and an
17 additional 56 are scheduled to attend in
18 fiscal year 2014.
19 Special agents for this advanced
20 training are available for consultation or as
21 an additional resource when needed during an
22 investigation.

1 Because the above-mentioned
2 initiatives incur significant training costs,
3 for example, FSVI training costs about
4 $105,000 to send 22 agents through the
5 recurring training, CGIS is also pursuing
6 lower cost training initiatives, focusing on
7 victim centric approach, such as enacting --
8 interactive web-based training and victim
9 interviewing and embedding special agents with
10 special victim units of the Boston,
11 Philadelphia, Phoenix and very appropriate to
12 today's venue, Austin Police Department.
13 This affords additional practical
14 experience in an emerging style setting and
15 the ability to collaborate with seasoned
16 investigators, victim advocates and
17 prosecutors in a high volume of sensitive
18 crime investigations.
19 CGIS agents are also regularly
20 participating in sexual assault prevention
21 response workshops, along with sexual assault
22 response coordinators, victim advocates and

1 Staff Judge Advocates.
2 These four-hour presentations are
3 presented in two distinct phases, the full
4 crew and then a gender-specific session.
5 The primary goals for each session
6 are to enable the members to be able to
7 identify sexual assault, be able to intervene
8 and be able to report.
9 This candid all-hands engagement with
10 attendees provides a unique opportunity for
11 CGIS special agents to describe common
12 misconceptions, as well as the realities for
13 sexual assault to the attendees.
14 These workshops have been received
15 very well by attendees and have also resulted
16 in the victims coming forward during and after
17 the training, to report incidents of sexual
18 assault.
19 Because state-side Coast Guard units
20 are widely dispersed and sometimes located in
21 isolated areas, expediting CGIS resources to
22 a victim or crime scene is sometimes hindered

1 by distance or weather.
2 In those cases, CGIS agents seek
3 assistance from local law enforcement agencies
4 to provide an initial response.
5 In the last year, CGIS has also begun
6 surging teams to the agency in response to
7 reports of sexual assault involving underway
8 cutters, other deployed units, incidents of
9 foreign ports and other situations where there
10 is expected high volume of investigative leads
11 or special circumstances.
12 I hope I was able to provide the
13 Panel a brief description of the Coast Guard
14 Investigative Service, our agents and the work
15 we do. I will do my best to answer any
16 questions you have for me.
17 CHAIR JONES: Thank you, Mr.
18 Marzloff. Mr. Poorman?
19 MR. POORMAN: Yes, Madame Chair and
20 distinguished Panel. My name is Kevin
21 Poorman. I am the Associate Director of
22 Criminal Investigations for Air Force OSI and

in that capacity, I oversee our policy, our training and the resources needed to conduct our criminal investigative mission.

Mindful of the limited time we have in the session, I've provided the Panel with materials that give a wider overview of OSI policy, agent strength, missions, organizational structure, as well as some of the additional case statistics that pertain to sexual assault.

In these comments, I'll briefly highlight some of more significant policy, discuss agent resources dedicated to developing Air Force special victim capabilities and provide an overview of our basic advanced training for investigating adult victim sex offenses.

To handle the sex offense case load, for some of our busiest locations, the Secretary of the Air Force approved the hiring of 24 additional civilian special agents, 23 to work sexual assault investigations and

1 receive additional training and to the core,
2 if you will, of our special victim capability,
3 and one agent assigned to our training academy
4 to oversee the development and the delivery of
5 our sexual assault training to our students.
6 This special victim capability, we
7 work closely with our Air Force JAG
8 colleagues. In fact, through an OSI and JAG
9 working group, the Air Force, OSI and the
10 Judge Advocates codified in respective
11 policies the requirement for investigators and
12 Judge Advocates to meet early after initial
13 allegations, and then periodically, in most
14 instances, on a weekly basis throughout the
15 course of the investigation, to assess not
16 only what the violation may be, or may be for
17 a particular matter, but then to discuss and
18 assess and develop proof analyses, as the case
19 moves forward, so that that process can best
20 prepare a decision on weighing the evidence
21 versus the elements, in deciding whether a
22 case is appropriate for prosecution.

1 As you heard earlier, we do partner
2 at our senior special victim capability lead.
3 It's stationed at Andrews Air Force Base and
4 this agent, who has 17 years of experience,
5 works on a regular basis with the JAG Corps
6 special victim unit chief of policy and
7 coordination.
8 So, they serve as the reach-back
9 capability for the folks in the field, who are
10 trained and prepared to handle most instances,
11 but where they need some additional
12 deliberation discussion about cases, they have
13 the reach-back to these two individuals, who
14 then can collaborate quickly and regularly to
15 assist them in working through any additional
16 difficulties they're having.
17 Turning to training, our basic
18 academy, like NCIS, is at the Federal Law
19 Enforcement Training Center. The initial 11
20 week course is called CITP. That's a criminal
21 investigations training program.
22 This is the training that all Federal

1811 criminal investigators go through, and so, it's a baseline. It's largely Title 18 centric criminal code, in which they obtain information on how to work criminal policies and procedures in the Federal law enforcement arena.

In addition to that though, we have an eight week follow on course, and that follow on course is geared to provide in addition to what they obtain from Title 18, if you will, the processes and the procedures associated with the use of the Manual for Courts-Martial, the punitive articles, the UCMJ.

That is, we have a Military criminal justice system that we have to teach our investigators on top of the Federal Criminal Code.

In addition, we provide a lot of additional training on the working of violent crimes, and many Federal agencies do not work so many violent crimes, in that many of the

1 violent crimes, that is inter-personal crime
2 in our communities is handled by your state
3 and local police agencies.
4 But at Air Force and Military
5 installations, we have populations where there
6 are commissions of rapes and robberies and
7 sexual assaults, and we have to train
8 investigators in greater depth and
9 understanding how to handle the evidence, how
10 to conduct the interviews, what the violation
11 sets to these types of violations are.
12 So, that is why we have an eight week
13 follow on training to the regular 11 week
14 basic training.
15 In discussing sexual assault training
16 at our -- from an advanced standpoint, we, in
17 2012, in the August of 2012, established our
18 pilot training program. It's called the Sex
19 Crimes Investigations Training Program at
20 FLETC, and to date, we have run five classes
21 of sexual assault training academy, or sex
22 crimes investigative program, 24 students

1 each, and this -- the complement of our course
2 consists of 18 investigators and six Air Force
3 attorneys.
4 They work collaboratively together on
5 case examples, case studies, but they also
6 train on a variety of techniques that frankly,
7 we've been informed as a result of going
8 through Russ Strand's course and learning from
9 much of what they've learned, to provide
10 agents training on cognitive biases, for
11 example.
12 Agents filter information when they
13 start hearing information from victims, and
14 so, we have to sensitize them to what those
15 biases are and how they need to set those
16 aside in the interest of just hearing what a
17 victim has to offer.
18 We do cognitive interviewing, which
19 again, is an open-ended questioning that
20 you've heard about FETI. We use cognitive
21 interview, very similar at the core of what
22 these techniques involve.

1 But this has to do with a more open-
2 ended questioning style.
3 We've been working with cognitive
4 interviewing for some time. We integrated it
5 into child interviewing many, many years ago,
6 mostly to try to avoid suggest-ability to
7 victims, young folks who would otherwise
8 perhaps be influenced by the kinds of
9 questions that are asked.
10 But it's a much more open-ended
11 interviewing style, and it's kind of counter-
12 intuitive to what law enforcement
13 investigators are trained to do.
14 But we think it's very important and
15 we've moved forward in making it the technique
16 utilized to conduct interviews of not just
17 sexual assault victims, but victims of violent
18 crime.
19 That's a very brief overview. I
20 appreciate the opportunity to provide it and
21 I look forward to answering more questions in
22 depth regarding any of these topics.

1 CHAIR JONES: Thanks, Mr. Poorman.
2 Mr. Surian?
3 MR. SURIAN: Thank you, ma'am. Guy
4 Surian, the Army criminal investigation
5 command, commonly known as CID. If it pleases
6 the Chair, I've provided a copy of my
7 statement and slides to Ms. Chayt. I'm sure
8 they're available to you all.
9 I spent yesterday fighting my way out
10 of D.C., down here. Apparently, one of the
11 hundreds of close friends I made yesterday,
12 gave me a cold. So, if it's okay, with you,
13 I'll just cut to the bottom line here, and I
14 won't read the statement. I'm prepared to
15 read it, if you want, ma'am, Madame Chair,
16 into the record, but I'll just cut to the
17 bottom line and give you some brief thoughts
18 of what we do.
19 CID, from like last year and the
20 fiscal year, we did over 12,500 felony
21 criminal investigations for the Army. Out of
22 that total number, 2,500-some-odd were sexual

1 assaults.
2 Out of that number, DoD determined
3 that 1,830-some-odd are reportable to
4 Congress. They don't want to hear about the
5 other 700-some-odd for whatever reasons.
6 In any case, I've got about 747 field
7 agents, to answer somebody else's previous
8 question given to Russ, I've got about 747
9 field agents authorized on the books to handle
10 felony crime.
11 They're spread out in 71 field
12 offices across the world, from Korea, Japan,
13 Okinawa, across the United States, Germany,
14 Italy, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Iraq, when we were
15 there and other home places of interest.
16 We run our agents, basically, we get
17 them in. They're usually Military police
18 officers or Military policemen that come to
19 us. We train them through a 15 week school at
20 the United States Army Military Police School,
21 USAMPS.
22 They get 16 hours specific in the

1 basic course to sexual assault. They get
2 another 120-some-odd hours of crime scene
3 processing training. They get another 200
4 hours in criminalistics and death
5 investigations, and that all ties into how you
6 can process a sexual assault crime scene very
7 well.
8 In about 2009, actually earlier than
9 that, well, yes, about 2008, we looked at our
10 cases. We had some highly qualified experts
11 come in. They reviewed our cases. We
12 realized we were missing a lot of things.
13 We were bringing in cultural biases,
14 like Mr. Poorman was saying. The agents were
15 filtering the stuff. We needed -- we knew we
16 needed to do a better job at training the
17 agents.
18 So, we got together with USAMPS,
19 specifically Russ Strand out there, and we
20 designed a two week course on sexual assault,
21 special victim unit training on that thing,
22 and we've been sending our agents to that ever

1 since, to get them up there, to change the
2 cultural bias.
3 We found that a five week -- a five
4 day course, rather, was too short. It didn't
5 affect them. We found that it needed at least
6 two weeks, in order to train the agents and
7 have them recognize what their biases were,
8 and have them recognize what the things --
9 what they were bringing to the table and what
10 they were dragging with them, as baggage
11 behind them.
12 Obviously, the key -- the landmark,
13 the hallmark of the two week course is the
14 FETI and investigative interview technique
15 that Russ teaches. It's great. I've had tons
16 of agents give me anecdotal stories about how
17 they got more information from the victims
18 than the ever had before, how the victims are
19 more responsive to them, how everybody is able
20 to get along a lot better, to gel and become
21 a team on it.
22 We think it's very good. We

1 encourage the use of it. No, we don't have it
2 in policy that mandates you have to use FETI
3 on every base, but the only people I've got
4 generally doing sexual assaults are the ones
5 that have been trained by Russ Strand.
6 So, generally speaking, I've got a
7 FETI trained agent doing it.
8 The Commanding General has determined
9 that we're going to have 100 percent. We've
10 made this -- the SVU course a core competency
11 course.
12 The idea is to have 100 percent of
13 our agents trained at Russ Stand's course.
14 Right now, I've got, out of the 747 authorized
15 I've got, I've got about 300 that have been
16 through Russ Stand's course. So, I've got
17 about half the force trained.
18 I can't -- as Colonel Mulligan
19 pointed out, the Army is a little bit
20 different than the other services, to some
21 degree, is I'm spread out around the world too
22 far, and so, to wait for somebody to surge

1 agents in to me or to reach -- or to do reach-
2 back capability for a sexual assault victim is
3 not going to cut it, when she shows up at two
4 o'clock in the morning.
5 I've got to have an agent there on
6 the site, who has been trained and knows how
7 to do it.
8 So, what we've taken is Russ Strand's
9 course and we've made that a basic course for
10 our SVU agents, and we give them an ASI, and
11 additional skill identifier, so I can manage
12 them and make sure that I've got one at every
13 place that I have a CID office.
14 In addition to that, we've added some
15 more courses to that basic course and made it
16 another ASI for a senior SVU agent, and those
17 additional courses would be another two week
18 course in advanced crime scene processing,
19 about a one week course, 60-some-odd hours on
20 child abuse, another course about 60 hours on
21 domestic violence.
22 Once an agent goes through all four

1 courses, he then gets an ASI that makes him a
2 senior SVU agent, and the goal is to have
3 those agents, ideally, combined with the 22 or
4 30, if I get any money, the 22 or 30 civilian
5 sexual assault investigators that we've hired
6 from -- under Mr. Garin's rule, as the
7 Secretary of the Army, to be the senior guys
8 to run SVU teams at every CID office, at every
9 place that we've got a CID office.
10 So, we're moving down that path.
11 We're -- we'll get there. We're not there
12 today, but we will be there soon, I believe,
13 as we continue on the training.
14 Some of our challenges, I have to
15 tell you, some of the challenges are internal,
16 having to do with the Army, you know, pre-text
17 phone call approval is one of the examples
18 that is a challenge every day.
19 Some are legal issue challenges,
20 where we have to advise victims of their
21 rights for collateral misconduct, which tends
22 to chill a relationship between the

1 investigator and the victim, and others are --
2 others are new challenges where victims are
3 able to move relatively quickly after
4 reporting a sexual assault, which then,
5 whatever relationship was established
6 initially between the investigator and victim,
7 now has to be re-established between another
8 investigator and a victim at some other
9 location.
10 Some of the promising things we've
11 tried in the last year, I think you went to
12 Fort Hood here this week. You probably saw
13 that we have both the SVU team and the
14 prosecutors in the same location. That
15 obviously helps a lot for coordination and
16 expertise and passing back and forth, to make
17 sure the cases gather all the evidence needed
18 for prosecution.
19 I think you may be going to Joint
20 Base Lewis-McChord in the near future, where
21 we've established like a multi-discipline team
22 up there at one location, where you'll have

1 lawyers, investigators, victim advocates,
2 medical and legal folks, all there to help the
3 victim make sure that if she wants it
4 unrestricted, it comes over to the
5 investigators. If she wants it restricted, it
6 just stays on the other side of the aisle, and
7 they're all working together, all to help out
8 with the victims and do things like that.
9 Then on Germany, we've got -- we've
10 been helping the medics. We've got our agents
11 -- our civilian sexual assault investigators
12 over there. They've been teaching the medical
13 folks over there forensic evidence and what to
14 look for, when they do sexual assault
15 examinations and things like that.
16 I'm sorry it took so long. I thank
17 you for your time, ma'am.
18 CHAIR JONES: Thank you very much.
19 Questions? Sorry, Colonel, go ahead.
20 MEMBER COOK: Mr. Surian, can you
21 elaborate, you just -- first, clarify for me,
22 at what point -- you just talked about the

1 victims and in some cases, it complicates the
2 process if you have to read the victim their
3 rights for collateral offenses that might be
4 there, for people that are not within the
5 Military.
6 You can correct me if I am wrong, but
7 in the Military, you read somebody their
8 rights when they are suspected of an offense,
9 as opposed to under Miranda, where there is a
10 custodial interrogation. Is that --
11 MR. SURIAN: Yes, ma'am --
12 MEMBER COOK: So, we read more rights
13 as --
14 MR. SURIAN: -- I'm sure there is
15 several lawyers behind me, the services that
16 could tell you but --
17 MEMBER COOK: But the facilities that
18 --
19 MR. SURIAN: But Article -- as I
20 understand it, Article 31 of the UCMJ requires
21 me to advise a service member of his or her
22 rights, whenever I suspect that they may have

1 committed a crime, whether they're in custody
2 or not.
3 MEMBER COOK: Okay.
4 MR. SURIAN: And that is a big
5 difference from the civilian side of the
6 house, where I only have to advise a person of
7 his rights when they're in custody --
8 MEMBER COOK: And --
9 MR. SURIAN: -- and so, if you're
10 under age and you've been drinking, and now,
11 you've been -- and then you were sexually
12 assaulted, I have to do a -- or my
13 investigators, have to do a fine tap dance
14 around getting information about the sexual
15 assault, but not asking any incriminating
16 questions about drinking or how drunk were
17 you, or anything else that would prove -- make
18 the elements of proof, because as soon as we
19 start doing that, I have to advise the victim
20 of her rights.
21 MEMBER COOK: Okay, and I understand
22 that, for the investigation, you've got no

1 latitude on that.
2 We're now hearing testimony that
3 we've heard over several of the public
4 hearings for the Panel, we've heard about the
5 special victims counsel.
6 At what point are they being
7 appointed? Would it be before the potential
8 interview by CID, so that at least there is
9 somebody there to help the victims understand
10 why that is out there or -- you know, you
11 listen to Mr. Strand this morning and what he
12 is saying, tell me about your experiences,
13 tell me this. It seems like a very -- you're
14 not re-victimizing a victim.
15 MR. SURIAN: Correct.
16 MEMBER COOK: They walk in there and
17 you're reading them their rights. It sounds
18 like you are, but not out of choice.
19 Is there a special victim -- when
20 does the special victim counsel come into the
21 process?
22 MR. SURIAN: As I understand it the

1 -- of course, the Army is a little bit late on
2 this. The Air Force led the way.
3 So, as I understand it, the sexual
4 assault response coordinator, the victim
5 advocate is supposed to advise the victim that
6 she has the right to request a special victim
7 counsel.
8 So, if the -- if the victim at that
9 time says she wants a special victim counsel,
10 then of course, she'll get one before we
11 interview her.
12 MEMBER COOK: Have you seen that?
13 That started about November 1st, which is
14 pretty new. You're only talking about a
15 month. Have you seen that in the field yet or
16 not really?
17 MR. SURIAN: It's in the field yet.
18 As I under -- and I could be -- Colonel
19 Mulligan or one of the others may be able to
20 correct this.
21 The implementing instructions for the
22 Army of the -- if they've been published, they

1 were just published.
2 So, there has been a little bit of a
3 lag between what they were doing in the field
4 and what -- and what they were supposed to do.
5 So, we had maybe 71 or 100 different
6 interpretations of what a special victim
7 counsel is supposed to do for a victim.
8 I have one case at Fort Leavenworth,
9 where an inmate was allegedly sexually
10 assaulted. The closest special victim counsel
11 was at Fort Riley, which is about halfway
12 across the state, and he was using the legal
13 assistance view of whether the victim was
14 authorized a special victim counsel or not,
15 because there was some question about whether
16 he had a 214, a discharge paper or not, at the
17 time that he was sexually assaulted.
18 We had to work through that, and so,
19 there was a delay between the time that it was
20 reported and between the time an investigator
21 could actually get to the victim to say, "What
22 happened?"

1 But we're working through it. It's
2 a -- it's a work in progress, like you say,
3 ma'am, it just got initiated on 1 November for
4 the Army, so, there is always bumps on the
5 first start of a drive.
6 MEMBER COOK: And as you say, the Air
7 Force has had this for a little while. Are
8 you facing the same issue or -- and if so, how
9 are you handling it, or for all of you, if
10 there some suggestion on how getting around,
11 how do you not re-victimize a victim, and
12 continue to balance that sensitive balance
13 between not wanting to re-victimize somebody,
14 but having to investigate an allegation and a
15 presumption of innocence on the opposite, and
16 you know, from the outside, your job is to
17 find out what happened, with some constraints
18 imposed on you legally?
19 MR. POORMAN: Well, it is a balance.
20 We've had the special victim counsel now,
21 since early 2013, and it's worked remarkably
22 well for us.

1 We do. We have codified in our
2 policies for investigators, how they'll
3 integrate that availability of counsel and it
4 includes SARRT's, the first contact, advising
5 the victim of the availability of this
6 service, and if they elect the service, then
7 we integrate that as quickly as we can into
8 the process.
9 There are some exceptions, where say
10 a sexual assault happened last night, and the
11 victim is at the hospital and we have to have
12 kind of an emergency situation, where we're
13 trying to obtain initial information.
14 But as soon as we can integrate the
15 special victim counsel into the process, we
16 think that is the right thing to do. We think
17 it's helping victims and it's -- in some
18 instances, in many instances, I think
19 relieving investigators of what before, they
20 felt compelled to do, and as explained, the
21 larger process, it goes on in the Military
22 justice system.

1 We have someone there now that can
2 explain how this is going to all unfold from
3 their perspective. Investigators can take
4 that and concentrate more on what they need to
5 do as investigators.
6 The balance is always going to be --
7 is always going to be part of what we do, and
8 investigators are comfortable with the need to
9 obtain information, and sometimes that
10 information is beneficial to one party and
11 sometimes it's beneficial to another party,
12 and if they do their job, they merely collect
13 the evidence and they report it and it sorts
14 itself out at some point in the future.
15 MR. GILLIARD: As far as the Navy is
16 concerned, it's new to us, as well.
17 I believe we published direction in
18 October of this year. However, we're still
19 getting questions on it.
20 I don't have any information on how
21 it's working at this time, but it's still --
22 we're still working through the process of

1 that.
2 As far as -- however, when we -- when
3 we talk to victims, as far as whether or not
4 we need to read them their rights on certain
5 issues, on certain collateral issues, we don't
6 -- we actually don't deal with that.
7 We're looking at the felony level
8 offense. We investigate that and we let it --
9 we let it go from there.
10 If there is under-age drinking or
11 what not, all of that will be documented in
12 the report of the interview, or in her
13 statement, and command will have that to deal
14 with.
15 CHAIR JONES: So, as a practical
16 matter, if I could ask you this, all of you or
17 each of you.
18 What happens when a victim does
19 discuss the collateral conduct? Is it usually
20 deferred? Is it -- is there an immunity
21 agreement, once counsel gets involved, because
22 I mean, it's usually the prosecutor who has to

1 make that decision. You guys are stuck. You
2 can't promise them that.
3 But as a practical matter, could you
4 give us some idea of how it actually is
5 working? Since like you're interviewing your
6 victims, Mr. Gilliard, and getting the
7 information and then as things go forward, it
8 just gets worked out.
9 MR. GILLIARD: Yes.
10 CHAIR JONES: But do you have a sense
11 of how it's getting worked out?
12 MR. GILLIARD: No, ma'am, I can't
13 address that.
14 CHAIR JONES: Okay, anybody else?
15 Mr. Poorman?
16 MR. POORMAN: Well, for us, I think
17 it's one of the benefits of special victims
18 counsel.
19 Now, when we know that we're going to
20 have to address the issue of drinking, and if
21 they're under-age, which in a sexual assault
22 with the issue of impairment, we're going to

1 get very quickly to the need to discuss the
2 level of alcohol consumption.
3 If we know that, then this is when
4 we're engaging with the special victim
5 counsel, to explain the fact that the
6 investigators are going to need to deal with
7 this issue, very soon in the investigation,
8 and then once it's established and frequently
9 is, that others who were witnesses to the act
10 or witnesses to the drinking at least, are
11 aware of that, that the -- that their counsel
12 can explain it, investigators are compelled to
13 ask questions about this, that they may have
14 to do and advisement on it, that this
15 information is probably going to come out
16 anyway, quite aside from what you have to
17 offer, and give them some input as to whether
18 they want to proceed when those questions are
19 asked of the -- by the investigators, in
20 conjunction with the case.
21 So, I think that has been very
22 helpful, otherwise we leave to investigators,

1 the need to explain why the advisement is
2 necessary and then try to move beyond that as
3 quickly as possible.
4 We have had discussions with our JAG
5 community and others on the immunity issues,
6 just trying to get that in a timely way, early
7 in the -- at the front end of an -- is very
8 difficult, it would be almost impossible to
9 do, because usually we're going to want to do
10 that, the interview --
11 MEMBER COOK: You don't have one
12 assigned at that point do you, or do you, a
13 trial counsel who is going to be working with
14 you?
15 MR. POORMAN: We are going to -- our
16 policy and our procedures are to work with the
17 trial counsel very soon, usually within 24 to
18 48 hours, we're going to have that kind of a
19 discussion.
20 So, while the discussion could begin,
21 trying to actually get the immunity --
22 CHAIR JONES: Right.

1 MR. POORMAN: -- in a timely fashion
2 would be very difficult.
3 MR. POORMAN: You would have to --
4 MEMBER COOK: Just to clarify too,
5 for people not familiar with the system, the
6 -- even if you got involved with the
7 prosecutors in any of your services, it's not
8 the prosecutor who has got the authority to
9 provide the immunity. That would be something
10 that you, working with the prosecutor, they'd
11 put up a request and go back to the commander
12 to make that decision.
13 MR. SURIAN: Yes, it goes to the
14 convening authority, you're right, ma'am.
15 MEMBER COOK: The convening
16 authority.
17 MR. SURIAN: Yes, I'd like to echo
18 Kevin's comments, is normally, we try to work
19 with the prosecutors as early as possible.
20 There is usually a Duty SJA roster floating
21 around, immediately, so if it comes up, we can
22 do it that way.

1 The special victim counsel, I believe
2 will, in fact, help us a lot to explain to the
3 victim, what is going on and why things are
4 happening and what the process works out as.
5 Then eventually, if immunity is
6 needed, then a -- the request will go up to
7 the convening authority to see if we can -- a
8 grant can be given to get more testimony.
9 CHAIR JONES: Have you lost a lot of
10 victims' willingness to cooperate because of
11 the collateral conduct issue? Any sense of
12 that? Half of them? A few of them?
13 MR. POORMAN: I have no -- we don't
14 have any data on that, but anecdotally, we've
15 heard it has complicated some of the
16 interviews. There were poor building process
17 largely, in working with them.
18 I have not heard where we've actually
19 lost a victim's participation because of that
20 specific issue.
21 MR. SURIAN: It's sometimes delayed
22 it.

1 MR. POORMAN: Probably has
2 complicated it.
3 CHAIR JONES: Delayed, yes.
4 MR. SURIAN: Complicated and the --
5 MR. POORMAN: Until they obtain
6 counsel and all that.
7 CHAIR JONES: Mr. Bryant?
8 MEMBER BRYANT: Thank you. Is there
9 a time frame between when that information is
10 revealed or the questions are asked and the
11 advice is given, and when the victim finds out
12 whether or not there is going to be a non-
13 judicial or judicial punishment that you can
14 relate --
15 MR. SURIAN: Army policy --
16 MEMBER BRYANT: -- and the correlate
17 to that is, is it -- isn't there -- is there
18 some discretion involved there, because
19 obviously, there is relative amounts of
20 conduct.
21 They're drinking alcohol, where it
22 all started out, if we lit up a joint, or it

1 all started after we snorted a line of
2 cocaine, or it all started right after the
3 bank robbery, which is a -- you know, a whole
4 different story.
5 MR. SURIAN: There would be policy to
6 defer any action against the victim until the
7 action has been taken against the offender
8 first.
9 MEMBER BRYANT: So, she goes through
10 -- he or she goes through the entire
11 potentially court-martial process, not knowing
12 whether or not he or she is going to be
13 prosecuted at the end of all of that?
14 MR. SURIAN: Well, I guess their
15 Commander could make a decision before that,
16 if he's not going to prosecute or not bring
17 any charges against her.
18 But if he is going to do it, then he
19 has to defer it until the end.
20 CHAIR JONES: Professor Hillman?
21 MEMBER HILLMAN: Just small questions
22 here, nothing grandiose.

1 I don't know if you have -- know
2 this, but do you know the -- related to gender
3 demographics and then gender specific
4 training, in which some of you gestured that
5 and it's mentioned in the materials you
6 submitted.
7 Do you what the number of agents, the
8 percentage of agents who are women in your
9 force?
10 MR. POORMAN: Ours is about 15 to 20
11 percent. It fluctuates, but about 15 to 20.
12 MEMBER HILLMAN: Okay.
13 MR. SURIAN: I can get it for you,
14 and get it back to you, ma'am. I used to
15 know it. I don't know what it is today
16 though.
17 MEMBER HILLMAN: Thank you. So, it
18 is --
19 MR. SURIAN: I can't remember.
20 MEMBER HILLMAN: Does it -- it
21 roughly echoes the larger force structure or
22 is it lower? I mean --

1 MR. POORMAN: Yes, roughly.
2 MEMBER HILLMAN: Roughly?
3 MR. MARZLOFF: Maybe lower for the
4 Coast Guard.
5 MEMBER HILLMAN: Okay.
6 MR. SURIAN: I'd have to get back to
7 you on that.
8 MEMBER HILLMAN: Okay, and then
9 second, I think you do know this, the gender
10 specific elements of training and the way that
11 you manage this, especially with respect to
12 the issue of male sexual assault, which we're
13 recognizing is yet more under-reported and
14 which may require additional specialized
15 resources and we've had some victims come to
16 us and say they struggled with the report --
17 the response to their report.
18 I just wondered, do you -- do you
19 take -- are there opportunities -- how do you
20 reckon with that challenge in the
21 investigative process? Do specialize
22 training?

1 MR. GILLIARD: You mean male on male?
2 MEMBER HILLMAN: Yes.
3 MR. GILLIARD: Use the same processes
4 that we use for any other sexual assault.
5 Nothing different.
6 MEMBER HILLMAN: If a victim wanted
7 to talk to -- you have a procedure where a
8 victim could talk to a man, if he wanted to
9 rather than talk to a woman?
10 MR. GILLIARD: Sure, yes.
11 MEMBER HILLMAN: Is that -- that is
12 one example that a victim brought before us,
13 at some point.
14 MR. GILLIARD: Yes.
15 MR. POORMAN: Yes, we -- for Air
16 Force, we have a policy to offer, at this
17 point, is gender to the female -- to offer
18 female victims. We've not expanded that to
19 offering male victims, in most instances, from
20 a sheer probability standpoint, it's probably
21 going to be a male, but we have that.
22 We do do additional training on that

1 topic, because it is -- and it's a relatively
2 -- I think, a relatively recently realizing
3 the extent to which that problem may exist out
4 there, and we're still developing a way ahead
5 for how we work that.
6 MR. SURIAN: Russ teaches males on
7 male with sexual assault. One of his blocks
8 of instruction is an SVU course.
9 MR. MARZLOFF: We have not
10 encountered that, but it would be a hardship
11 for us to try to assign a female investigator,
12 if one was specifically asked for, because we
13 just don't have that many.
14 MR. POORMAN: And I will have to say
15 that sometimes, even making a female available
16 to do an interview of a female victim, that's
17 going to get a little complicated sometimes.
18 Some of the training -- some of our
19 -- what our clinical psychologists are telling
20 us and those that understand victimization,
21 some victims -- some female victims may feel
22 more comfortable explaining the circumstances

1 to a male victim, may encounter a little less
2 judgmental kinds of behavior on the part of
3 the interviewer.
4 Some of our female investigators, in
5 working through our training that we're doing,
6 we're finding are a little tougher sometimes
7 and have more cognitive biases in place than
8 some of the male investigators do.
9 So, it's a complicate dynamic to try
10 to work through, yes.
11 MR. GILLIARD: Outside of the
12 training and -- when we talked about with
13 Russ, it's up to the discretion of the SSA, if
14 the victim asks for a gender specific
15 investigator, we could try to accommodate
16 that.
17 There is nothing codified in our
18 regulation about that.
19 CHAIR JONES: Yes, sure.
20 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: I just want to go
21 into the issue that I started earlier on with
22 the first presenter, which is the training in

1 this more open-ended kind of questioning.
2 All of you seem to think that this is
3 a good thing, it's encouraged, has helped in
4 the investigation of cases, has helped victims
5 in their responses, it's helped them in
6 getting these cases prosecuted.
7 But just to quote one of the last
8 presenters.
9 "We're going to get there, in terms
10 of training, but we're not there yet." Can
11 you give me a time frame?
12 I mean, number one, do each of your
13 agencies have a policy that you want to get
14 everyone trained in this technique and
15 secondly, what is your time frame for doing
16 that?
17 MR. SURIAN: We have a policy -- we
18 have a policy to have all our agents trained
19 in the SVU course.
20 We'll never get there because agents
21 quit, retire, leave us --
22 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: I understand.

1 MR. SURIAN: -- and I got new guys in
2 every day.
3 So, I'm always in a -- always be in
4 the training mode, ma'am.
5 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Correct.
6 MR. SURIAN: So, I have no -- and I
7 can't give you an end date, when I'll be
8 there.
9 Obviously, if I can get somewhere
10 around 75 percent of the force trained, I'll
11 be real happy.
12 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Okay, when is that
13 going to happen?
14 MR. SURIAN: If we keep going at the
15 rate we're going, it will be probably be three
16 more years.
17 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: And what would you
18 need to speed that up?
19 MR. SURIAN: I probably won't need --
20 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Some solid line --
21 MR. SURIAN: -- anything but DoD IG,
22 who funds Russ Strand's course or DoD SAPRO,

1 the funds Russ Strand's course, probably needs
2 more money, so he can do more classes of --
3 than just one a month, which is what he's
4 basically doing right now.
5 So, he needs to hire more trainers,
6 more instructors, so he can put on more than
7 just one class a month.
8 MR. POORMAN: Plus, Russ has a
9 different -- well, our first goal is to get
10 our special victim unit trained, and all 24 of
11 those have been trained, and then our order of
12 prioritization, how we're going to training is
13 then to get an agent in each of our primarily,
14 70 to 75 -- 70 to 75 locations where we have
15 major Air Force installations.
16 That is a return on that investment,
17 getting it working for us as quickly as we
18 can. So, we've rolled that out.
19 By the end of this year, we'll have
20 trained 126 agents and 42 attorneys on
21 cognitive interview in this.
22 Where does it go? That is a question

1 we're still struggling with. We're relatively
2 new to cognitive -- to using cognitive
3 interview in sexual assault investigations,
4 about a year and a half, two years.
5 We believe it's the right thing to do
6 and the future for that, I believe, isn't in
7 an advanced environment.
8 We've had the discussions about, at
9 what point do we begin to back these promising
10 best methods, validate that they are in fact
11 best methods, and we think cognitive is
12 validated. It's got 25 years of peer review
13 research behind it. We're quite comfortable
14 with it delivering what it -- the research
15 would suggest it does, 30 to 50 percent more
16 information than you would otherwise get.
17 So the real challenge to us is taking
18 it from being an advanced technique and skill
19 and making it a basic technique and skill, and
20 that is backing cognitive bias, cognitive
21 interviewing back into our basic course, so
22 that we begin to use it as the protocol for

1 how to do that, and then --
2 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Okay, well,
3 whatever --
4 MR. POORMAN: -- when we are --
5 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: -- your objective
6 is --
7 MR. POORMAN: When will we --
8 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: -- when are you
9 going to achieve it and what is your plan for
10 that?
11 MR. POORMAN: I think that for us,
12 we'll have cognitive interviewing as part of
13 our basic course, within the next couple of
14 years.
15 The Federal Law Enforcement Training
16 Center had embraced cognitive interviewing and
17 they've began to train it at the advanced
18 level. They have not put it into CIT as
19 basic, but I'd say within a couple of year, we
20 should be able to -- we've already worked
21 cognitive bias training and put it into basic.
22 We did that in the last few months.

1 Cognitive interviewing training is
2 more problematic, because it just involves a
3 lot more time and classroom and some of the
4 practical exercises that are needed, and time
5 is a premium in basic training.
6 So, my guess is, a couple of years.
7 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: And my -- but is
8 your branch of the service --
9 MR. POORMAN: Air Force.
10 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: -- Air Force
11 committed to doing this? Are you committed to
12 doing this? Is this an objective?
13 MR. POORMAN: Yes.
14 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: To articulate --
15 MR. POORMAN: It's an objective
16 because we, I think collectively in our
17 leadership and those who decide whether it
18 becomes part of that, have decided that this
19 is promising and it needs to continue and we
20 need to make this a basic score -- basic
21 score.
22 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: One of my questions

1 also, that is raised by what you just
2 testified to is, if it's -- if the bias
3 training was adopted and made part of the
4 basic training, people have gone through basic
5 training, have missed that.
6 How do you get those people as part
7 of the --
8 MR. POORMAN: Well, I think we'll
9 continue to have to do that, through advanced
10 training for some period of time, and over
11 time then, we'll grow folks from basic.
12 Otherwise, we'll have to do this as a gap --
13 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Okay, so --
14 MR. POORMAN: -- a gap that exists
15 and we have to fix it.
16 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: So, at the present
17 rate, we're talking several years to get
18 people cognitive --
19 MR. POORMAN: No, I don't think that
20 it takes several years to get it into the --
21 into the heads and the hearts of those that
22 are actually running the investigations.

1 We have -- of our total agents corp,
2 about 300 investigators that are actually
3 responding to and handling sexual assault
4 investigations.
5 So, we can quickly, we believe, get
6 most of that into their tool kits. It's the
7 supervisors and the leadership that is going
8 to take some time to work through, and we do
9 through a variety of forums, in the cognitive
10 bias area, in particular.
11 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Okay, and the Coast
12 Guard --
13 MR. MARZLOFF: Five years, ma'am,
14 five years.
15 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Five years, all
16 right, and --
17 MR. GILLIARD: Well, I agree with Mr.
18 Surian. We believe in the product, but it's
19 advanced training for us.
20 We have about 120 trained -- agents
21 trained up in it now. I believe we started
22 around 75 and we're up to the beginning of

1 this year, we're up to about 120.
2 But as Mr. Surian said, it's a
3 constant turn. You're managing the training
4 of your agent core, and you have to take into
5 account, attrition, PCS, unlike our CID
6 brother, we have a counter-intelligence
7 mission, as well.
8 So, some of these agents, once they
9 transfer from one position, like say if an
10 agent is on an ASAP team in Norfolk, his next
11 position may be in counter-intelligence in
12 Rota, Spain.
13 So, you have a constant turn. Will
14 we ever get everybody up to speed? Probably
15 not, but we're trying to get 100 percent of
16 our -- at least 100 percent of our FNSV
17 billets at any one time, 80 to 100 percent of
18 our FNSV billets up to speed at any one time
19 on the adult sexual assault course.
20 Especially for those in the -- on the
21 ASAP teams, those individuals in FNSV units
22 outside of the ASAP teams, we would like to

1 get them even more advanced training.
2 So, it's sufficient to say that it
3 will probably never been 100 percent, but that
4 is something that we have to manage, and if I
5 could put a plug in for my Army brother,
6 that's the type of funding that they need. It
7 helps us all out.
8 But this is a constant turn. You
9 can't do this for three years and then say
10 we're done. It's a constant turn.
11 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: I understand.
12 Thank you.
13 MEMBER McGUIRE: I have a question
14 about the training that -- the felony level
15 training curriculum development authorities
16 that you have in each of your services.
17 And so, I know some of you use FLETC
18 and some don't use FLETC to the same degree.
19 So, what amount of influence do you have in
20 the development or requiring this -- a kind of
21 training that they receive, for example,
22 cognitive type, you know, so, you can mandate

1 it, if in fact, you're held to a different
2 standard because you use a different
3 organization for your felony level
4 investigation training?
5 MR. POORMAN: Well, if I may, the
6 criminal investigation training program is a
7 basic entry level for Federal law enforcement.
8 Now, that is an 11 week course. That
9 is the only course that is centrally, if you
10 will. The partner agencies decide what that
11 curriculum consists of.
12 After that, we have full control.
13 So, that is why we have an eight week follow
14 on. We have full control, as follow on basic
15 training for our agents, as to what they get.
16 So, we have full control to introduce
17 any of that into our advanced training at
18 FLETC. FLETC merely provides the
19 infrastructure and the facilities to do that.
20 But the agencies, any of those
21 agencies develop their own advance and follow
22 on training to their basic courses. It's

1 fully within their control to decide what they
2 train on. That's why we can decide that we're
3 going to do cognitive, even in our basic
4 course, we just have to make room for it in
5 our follow on course to the basic training the
6 FLETC provides.
7 MR. GILLIARD: We concur with that
8 comment.
9 MR. SURIAN: We have fairly positive
10 control over the United States Military Police
11 School and what they train there and what they
12 don't train there.
13 We have to comply with some United
14 States Army training and doctrine command
15 rules and procedures, in order to get
16 instruction pieces put in there, but it's just
17 a bureaucratic process, normally.
18 MR. MARZLOFF: We share our follow on
19 course with the NCIS team down at FLETC and
20 we've also sent agents out to LAPD to work
21 with their instructors at their police
22 academy, to see their standards and to bring

1 their standards back, with their permission,
2 to influence some of the -- some of the course
3 training in the follow on courses.
4 MEMBER McGUIRE: And quickly, just --
5 I know you've provided us the information, but
6 again, just quickly let -- inform the Panel,
7 what is the percentage of your agencies that
8 is either an 1811 series and an active duty
9 Military, roughly.
10 MR. GILLIARD: Within the agency.
11 MEMBER McGUIRE: Within NCIS, right.
12 MR. GILLIARD: Well, general --
13 probably 95 percent of our active 18 -- of our
14 active agents are civilian 1811's. There is
15 a very small percentage that are Military
16 agents and they come from the Marine Corps,
17 and those agents train at the Army School, and
18 they do their add-on with us, their add-on
19 training after CITP, as I described before.
20 They do that with us, and then they
21 get plugged in to -- into a field office.
22 Usually, it will be at a Marine Corps -- an

1 office -- field office that services the
2 Marine Corps.
3 MR. MARZLOFF: Our ratio is almost
4 one-third, one-third active duty and one-third
5 re-serviced and one-third civilian.
6 MR. POORMAN: About one-third of our
7 agents are civilian and the other two-thirds
8 are a mix of officer and enlisted
9 investigators.
10 MR. SURIAN: Out of the 747 agents
11 that do general crime cases on a day in and
12 day basis, only about 30 are civilian 1811's.
13 The vast majority are Military, either warrant
14 officers or enlisted.
15 MEMBER McGUIRE: Thank you.
16 CHAIR JONES: The only other question
17 I had was, Mr. Gilliard, I think you said that
18 case loads were increasing.
19 I'm assuming that is the fact -- that
20 is the case for all of you, that case loads
21 are increasing, and we heard a lot of
22 information in our visits to different

installations, and it seems as though case loads are really straining each of these investigative agencies, all four of them.

Look, I know police departments are never big enough. If you ask them, they never have enough resources, if you ask them, but I think we have an expectation there is going to be -- there are really going to be increasing case loads here and they're going to be difficult cases.

So, what expectation do you have or what are the possibilities of your getting more personnel?

MR. SURIAN: Probably zero, to be honest.

CHAIR JONES: Okay.

MR. SURIAN: We're faced -- we're probably going to face cuts within CID in FY2014, which is fast approaching.

MR. GILLIARD: In NCIS, we are facing cuts and our general crimes. We're separating several funding streams, but the criminal

1 investigations, the general criminal
2 investigations, we're facing cuts there.
3 The reason why I brought that up is
4 because some of the -- the requirements of the
5 5505 requires the MCIO to conduct those
6 investigations.
7 We have a cadre of specially trained
8 enlisted agents, as I said before, from the
9 Marine Corps, that we could utilize.
10 I think we're all talking about how
11 to better address this issue of the increased
12 case loads and look at an enterprise approach.
13 But right now, our hands are kind of
14 tied. We need a little bit of flexibility to
15 use our enlisted brothers, as we did in the
16 past, because essentially, we've just assumed
17 their case load, the case load that we -- we
18 would normally give to them.
19 So, if we could look at that, as a
20 possible remedy to help the MCIO's, and
21 speaking for NCIS in particular, we could use
22 our Navy and Marine Corps brother with -- and

1 with our oversight, we can work out some ways
2 to have MCIO oversight.
3 We've had programs like that before.
4 Our regional investigating -- regional
5 investigations coordinator program that we've
6 had in the past, where you've had a special
7 agent oversee the investigations from the
8 installation investigators, we could look at
9 the program again.
10 But right now, based on the
11 instruction, we just don't have that
12 flexibility.
13 CHAIR JONES: Well, am I right, that
14 the MP's, the MP force are your police, your
15 patrolmen certainly, on an installation, and
16 obviously, they work together, I would assume,
17 with CID.
18 What are the possibilities, and they
19 may be stretched too thin, I don't know, but
20 what are the possibilities of that sort of
21 arrangement that Mr. Gilliard is discussing?
22 MR. SURIAN: We're exploring that

1 also. We currently use MP's on our drug
2 suppression teams. It's possible we could use
3 them on sexual assaults, special victim unit
4 teams also.
5 But they're also facing some rather
6 large reductions, and they -- I mean, they
7 have a -- they have a Military operational
8 priority too.
9 CHAIR JONES: Right.
10 MR. SURIAN: That they're supposed to
11 be doing, as opposed to law enforcement.
12 CHAIR JONES: All right, no hope
13 there.
14 MR. POORMAN: Well, I think to answer
15 your question -- the question of whether we
16 can get more resources, first requires us to
17 come up with a real good argument in these
18 fiscally constrained times.
19 So, the first stop is for us to look
20 at our current portfolios and see what else we
21 could perhaps re-purpose to this.
22 We're going to run sexual assault

1 investigations. The question is going to be
2 the extent to which it encumbers our ability
3 to work other kinds of crimes.
4 Our reactive case load is already
5 declining. We've only been opening on all --
6 as NCIS, since March of this year, when
7 5505.18 required us to open on all.
8 So, we only have six or eight months
9 of --
10 CHAIR JONES: I'm sorry, you're
11 required to open all?
12 MR. POORMAN: On all investigations
13 effective March 1st, or actually, January is
14 when the guidance came out. We implemented it
15 in March.
16 So, we're just now beginning to see
17 the repercussions of opening on all. What
18 it's doing immediately is --
19 MEMBER FERNANDEZ: Sorry, can you
20 explain opening on all?
21 MR. POORMAN: Yes, that is before --
22 before January of 2013, we had discretion on

1 whether we opened on all sexual assault
2 investigations.
3 All sexual assault investigations
4 were investigated, it's just that your abusive
5 sexual contacts, what used to be wrongful
6 sexual contacts, the touching cases, as
7 opposed to the sex cases, were conducted by
8 our security forces investigators.
9 Effective January, when DoD changed
10 policy, NCIS and OSI followed what CID had
11 been doing, and that is the requirement for
12 the MCIO's, not security forces for us, to
13 open investigations on those cases too.
14 So, we've acquired a lot of cases, as
15 a result of us now opening on all sexual
16 assault investigations.
17 The impact to us now is, we're seeing
18 a reduction in reactive -- or in proactive
19 crimes. That is drug investigations are going
20 down for us because of the time constraints
21 and the need to re-leverage those resources.
22 We've discussed with security forces,

1 picking up more of the drug investigations
2 because of that, and that is re-purposing some
3 of their capabilities to assist with that.
4 Just last week, we posed the issue to
5 DoD IG on whether we could potentially utilize
6 some of the security force investigators who
7 used to conduct these cases, to work under our
8 supervision. We still open the investigation.
9 We're responsible for the sufficiency of the
10 case, but they would assist us conducting
11 certain limited investigative activities on
12 certain types of sexual assault
13 investigations, and our thoughts were the
14 contact, not the sexual penetration cases, to
15 assist us in doing it.
16 So, I think that's just the
17 foundation of what Air Force would look to us,
18 to see if we have actually tried to find an
19 internal solution, before we come to them, and
20 if we can't, then we'll have to have the
21 numbers in our experiences in trying to work
22 this and make an argument for that.

1 CHAIR JONES: Thank you very much,
2 gentlemen. It's very helpful.
3 What time is it? We will resume at
4 1:10 p.m.
5 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
6 went off the record at 12:41 p.m. and resumed
7 at 1:37 p.m.)
8 CHAIR JONES: All right, good
9 afternoon. We now are going to begin our
10 afternoon with civilian police department
11 representatives, and they include Deputy Chief
12 Kirk Albanese from the LAPD, and you're the
13 Chief of Detectives, is that right?
14 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: I am, that's
15 correct.
16 CHAIR JONES: Thank you. Sergeant
17 Liz Donegan, Austin Police Department, a sex
18 offender apprehension and registration unit.
19 SERGEANT DONEGAN: Yes, ma'am.
20 CHAIR JONES: Is that right, ma'am?
21 SERGEANT DONEGAN: Yes.
22 CHAIR JONES: Okay, and Deputy Chief

1 Corey Falls from Ashland, Oregon.
2 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: Yes, ma'am.
3 CHAIR JONES: All right, and you're
4 Deputy Chief of Police there, is that right?
5 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: Yes, ma'am.
6 CHAIR JONES: All right, great.
7 Could we start with you, Chief Albanese?
8 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Yes, thank
9 you, and thank you for having me.
10 I have two presentations, one a more
11 comprehensive, I'll make available to the
12 Panel, and one that I'll make my remarks from,
13 which is an executive summary of the one I'll
14 make available.
15 I think it's important to walk the
16 Panel through what we do, although it may seem
17 basic, if we don't do it right at the very
18 beginning, we won't get the result that we
19 need to get at the end.
20 And so, with that in mind, I'll walk
21 through and answer any questions that you may
22 have.

1 First, an immediate response from the
2 police department, should we get a call for a
3 sexual assault.
4 When we contact the victim, we start
5 by believing, and that is a phrase that's been
6 coined by sexual assault advocacy groups and
7 it puts our people in the right frame of mind,
8 in terms of not being cynical, regardless of
9 what the circumstances are, because when we
10 don't start right, we don't gather the
11 evidence that we need to gather, and we don't
12 get the result that we want to get.
13 Secure medical aid, if needed,
14 depending on the circumstances, immediate
15 medical aid, transport the victim for a sexual
16 assault examination. We usually do that at a
17 SART facility, a sexual assault examination
18 team approach.
19 Secure the crime scene, locate
20 witnesses, including fresh complaint
21 witnesses, video, photos, prints and
22 obviously, forensic evidence.

1 We offer a victim advocate. We offer
2 a victim support person and we offer an
3 officer of the same gender, should the victim
4 want to speak to an officer of the same
5 gender.
6 Victim confidentiality is foremost,
7 in terms of ensuring that, as it relates to
8 reporting and as it relates to everything we
9 do, victim confidentiality is a centerpiece of
10 making sure that protect the victim in that
11 regard.
12 The issue of the new definition of
13 rape, as you know, the uniform and crime
14 reporting under the FBI, has updated the
15 definition of rape.
16 We're in the process of recoding to
17 capture that. It won't, for the LAPD, change
18 the manner in which we investigate.
19 There are some that felt that because
20 traditional rape was a Part 1 crime, and a
21 crime say of sodomy was a Part 2 crime, that
22 it got a different level of investigation it

1 never has.
2 We'll handle it with the same
3 intensity, but in terms of reporting, we'll be
4 able to capture the full breadth of sexual
5 assault --
6 CHAIR JONES: Could you just tell us
7 what the FBI definition of now includes?
8 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Yes, the new
9 definition is as follows:
10 "Penetration, no matter how slight,
11 of the vagina or anus, with any body part or
12 object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of
13 another person, without the consent of the
14 victim." That will be the new definition.
15 CHAIR JONES: Thank you.
16 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: We work
17 closely from the onset with the District
18 Attorney's Office, and the District Attorney's
19 Office in Los Angeles vertically prosecutes
20 sexual assault.
21 So, it allows us for a better result
22 in terms of knowing what the District Attorney

1 wants from the very beginning, making sure
2 they're a part of the conversation, so that
3 again, we work towards success.
4 Consider investigative strategies.
5 We certainly do everything in terms of best
6 practices, as it relates to gathering
7 evidence, but sometimes that's not enough.
8 So, pre-text phone calls are a part
9 of our investigative strategy. When
10 appropriate, we work with the victim in that
11 regard. Polygraph examinations of suspects
12 and the post-polygraph interview, very
13 important to us. We solve a lot of cases in
14 that regard, and we conduct any re-interviews
15 as necessary.
16 The idea is to arrive at the truth of
17 the --
18 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Who uses
19 polygraphing?
20 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Who?
21 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Yes.
22 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Polygraphers

1 assigned to the LAPD who are accredited.
2 So, we have an accredited polygraph
3 unit --
4 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: No, whom are you
5 polygraphing?
6 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: The suspect.
7 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: The suspect?
8 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: The suspect.
9 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Okay.
10 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Yes, I'm
11 sorry, I didn't hear the question. The
12 suspect. Never the victim.
13 In terms of evidence, again, gather
14 all evidence and work with the District
15 Attorney.
16 I want to note, as it relates to
17 employee versus employee within the police
18 department, that would be handled by a
19 separate chain of command. That would be
20 handled by a Professional Standards Bureau,
21 along with special assault section, which are
22 detectives assigned out of downtown.

1 So, that would be separated from the
2 employee's chain of command.
3 I want to talk a little about
4 training. We have 83 detectives assigned to
5 sexual assault, dedicated to sexual assault
6 city-wide.
7 We have 21 police stations and each
8 of those police stations who serve a community
9 roughly of 250,000 to 300,000 people, they
10 have dedicated sexual assault detectives.
11 Robbery Homicide Division is a
12 centralized function that has about 25
13 detectives. They would handle the most
14 serious sexual assault cases.
15 So, home invasion, a kidnaping, a
16 sexual assault murder, a serial sexual assault
17 case, that would be handled by Robbery
18 Homicide Division sexual assault section, and
19 the reason for that is they have the resources
20 that they can dedicate to it, and overwhelm
21 the case very early, to make sure we gather
22 everything we need to gather, in terms of

1 evidence.
2 Every one assigned to sexual assault
3 investigations in the LAPD goes through a
4 major assault crimes course of 40 hours, and
5 a specific sexual assault course provided to
6 detective personnel, before they're allowed to
7 work the assignment.
8 They also attend quarterly training,
9 a mandated conference once a year and
10 enrichment training, as they do in terms of
11 extra.
12 We give all victims a taking action
13 booklet, which describes their rights and
14 gives them information to put in context, the
15 road that lies ahead for them, so they clearly
16 understand, and a domestic violence pamphlet.
17 Year to date, the LAPD, year to date
18 through November 30th has handled 591 reported
19 sexual assaults. Last year on the same date,
20 we were at 774. So, we've had a 23 percent
21 decrease in sexual assaults.
22 Our filing rate is 55 percent our

1 city-wide clearance rate is 63 percent.
2 COLONEL HAM: Could you explain what
3 a clearance rate is, please?
4 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: I'm sorry?
5 COLONEL HAM: Can you explain what a
6 clearance rate is, please?
7 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Yes, a
8 clearance rate is when a crime is reported, in
9 order for us to clear it, we either have to
10 make an arrest or clear it other, which means
11 we've solved it.
12 It may be that the suspect has died,
13 has been arrested for some other charges and
14 is in custody, but in terms of clearance,
15 we've solved the crime.
16 In terms of filing, that is a case
17 that is going to be -- that's been filed by
18 the District Attorney and the suspect has been
19 arraigned.
20 CHAIR JONES: And when you said 27
21 percent decrease, is that in reports of crime?
22 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: That is

1 reported sexual assaults in the City of Los
2 Angeles through -- and it's 23 percent, ma'am.
3 CHAIR JONES: I'm sorry.
4 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Through
5 November 30th. So, we've had a decrease.
6 We've noticed a decrease over the past several
7 years, and in fact, I was asked in terms of,
8 you know, what I would attribute that to.
9 I think it's a number of things,
10 public education, the manner in which we do
11 ABC and vice related enforcement in our areas
12 of the city that are heavily populated with
13 after-hours bars and those kinds of things.
14 Those environments where we tend to
15 see these crimes emanate from, and in fact, 47
16 percent of all our reported sexual assaults
17 have alcohol as a related factor.
18 MEMBER HILLMAN: May I just follow up
19 on that? So, that means that the reports are
20 decreasing and you think that means the
21 incidents are decreasing?
22 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: No, not

1 necessarily. We know that sexual assault is
2 largely under-reported, but we're comparing it
3 year to year, and so, we are getting less
4 reports. That's just a fact, but we don't --
5 MEMBER HILLMAN: Is that not a
6 troubling fact, in terms of --
7 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: It could be.
8 MEMBER HILLMAN: -- the education?
9 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: It could be
10 a troubling fact, if we believe that there is
11 a reason why people aren't reporting, but that
12 hasn't come to our attention, in terms of --
13 any different than any other year, in terms of
14 the last two or three years that we've looked
15 recently.
16 It could be a problem. You're
17 absolutely right. We certainly haven't
18 changed anything, in terms of making it more
19 difficult to report. In fact, if anything,
20 just the opposite, in terms of being
21 accommodating.
22 California has a law now, in terms

1 of, victims don't have to cooperate with law
2 enforcement. They can have a sexual assault
3 exam. That evidence can be held, if the
4 victim decides at a later time, they want to
5 be cooperative with law enforcement, they can.
6 So, there's no pressure, in terms of
7 the worry that they're going to have to speak
8 to a police officer or a police detective.
9 So, there are some things that would
10 suggest that reporting should increase, or may
11 increase, but we've had a decrease.
12 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Was that new law
13 publicized?
14 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Yes.
15 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: And when was that
16 adopted?
17 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Year before
18 last.
19 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Thank you.
20 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Thank you.
21 CHAIR JONES: Sergeant Donegan?
22 SERGEANT DONEGAN: Good afternoon.

1 I took over the Austin Police Department Sex
2 Crimes Unit back in 2002, where I spent almost
3 10 years prior to my current assignment, which
4 is a sex offender apprehension and
5 registration unit, and what I'd like to do
6 this afternoon is walk you through the
7 transformation of the APD sex crimes unit,
8 because I think it's extremely relevant,
9 because I would compare the way we responded
10 to sex assault back in 2002, as to what you're
11 seeing currently within the Military.
12 So, when I came into the unit in
13 2002, I was trained by the detectives in the
14 unit, because there had been some issues with
15 the previous supervisor, and the training that
16 I received was specifically on stranger sexual
17 assault and false reports. That was their
18 primary focus was, we would respond
19 appropriately to strange sex assaults. The
20 non-stranger sex assaults are typically false
21 report or they're not as egregious as the
22 stranger sex assaults.

1 I thought, okay, that makes sense,
2 when I was trained in the academy, it's all
3 stranger sexual assault. Yes, victims to
4 have, you know, the sense of responsibility
5 not to drink, all of the things that we talk
6 about, all of our bias. I was right there
7 with them.
8 So, it wasn't until I saw Joanne
9 Archambault of 'End Violence Against Women
10 International', which is right around
11 2002/2003, that I had to take a very hard look
12 at myself as a supervisor and say, "What are
13 you doing in the APD sex crimes unit? You're
14 not doing what you're supposed to be doing.
15 What can you do to effect change?"
16 Because what we needed to do was
17 spend the majority of our time and resources
18 on the non-stranger cases, which make up about
19 90 percent in Austin, maybe 95 percent.
20 So, what I did was to go back and
21 bring this change, this cultural change, to
22 the detectives within the unit, and tell them,

1 "This is what we're going to do. This is our
2 focus. We are going to change the way we
3 respond to and investigate non-stranger sexual
4 assault," because typically, you don't have a
5 problem with stranger sex assault cases, in
6 general.
7 So, I went back and immediately began
8 effecting change in the way they responded to
9 victims, the way they wrote their reports, and
10 I had probably over the next couple of years,
11 a pretty mass exodus, where either the
12 detectives did not want to work those cases,
13 didn't believe in the work, and that was
14 fortunate for me, and I think fortunate for
15 the community of Austin, because I was able to
16 then pick or choose the detectives to come
17 into that unit, that believed in the work,
18 that were passionate about the work and that
19 wanted to effect change, that we wanted to
20 hold perpetrators accountable.
21 So, I made those changes, supported
22 by my chain of command. Whatever I was doing,

1 if I could provide some rational response as
2 to the changes, they were all for it.
3 So, then next big change within
4 Austin was again, involving 'End Violence
5 Against Women International', where Austin was
6 chosen one of eight cities across the country,
7 to participate in a project called the 'Making
8 a Difference Project'.
9 What that project entailed was
10 bringing these eight communities together in
11 San Diego, from different disciplines, and we
12 discussed with the police, what are you seeing
13 happening across your community, the
14 prosecutors, the advocates, the SANE's.
15 We got back together in our group in
16 Austin and said, "Okay, we see the issues.
17 How can we effect change? How can we make
18 this work in Austin," and so, we made some
19 really significant changes within our
20 disciplines in Austin, so that we could
21 improve our response to victims.
22 At the same time, I went and

1 completely revamped the cadet training. We
2 took all of the stranger stuff out, went
3 specifically to non-stranger and were
4 educating these first responders on the
5 importance of that initial interaction with
6 victims, that they were going to make or break
7 this case, not all of the time, but a
8 significant portion of the time, if they did
9 not respond appropriately to victims.
10 Training the detectives at the same
11 time, we were dispelling the myths around
12 sexual assault, the biases around sexual
13 assault with these guys that were first
14 responders, and we also put in place advocacy,
15 which we had already in place in Austin, but
16 what we did was to have -- they're called
17 crisis counselors, and they respond to the
18 acute cases on the street.
19 We had them respond to all sexual
20 assault cases, instead of asking the victim,
21 because we knew from speaking to victims, that
22 this is just an additional question or how am

1 I -- you know, I don't know. I don't want to
2 bother anybody else.
3 So, what we did was, we're like,
4 we're sending the advocates out there, so, if
5 there happened to be an issue with the first
6 responder, we had an advocate right there.
7 One of the major changes as well was
8 not to ask victims if they want to prosecute,
9 because again, we're burdening them with
10 trying to make a decision and we, in policing,
11 have not yet even conducted our investigation.
12 So, why are we asking a victim if
13 they want to prosecute, but if you think back
14 to the ways things have been investigated
15 historically within policing, what was a way
16 to get rid of your case. You were done and
17 then you're on to another case.
18 So, when a detective would respond to
19 a crime scene, and it depended upon what was
20 happening, that initial interview was audio
21 taped, and we're just getting the basic
22 information we need to make a determination,

1 where we can go.
2 So, following that, within 24 hours,
3 we instructed our detectives that you're going
4 to make contact with the victim. Our crisis
5 -- our counselors who were assigned to the sex
6 crimes unit were making that contact, as well.
7 So, we wanted the support system in
8 place that not only do you have your advocate
9 that you're going to be assigned to throughout
10 your time with the police department, but
11 you're having an officer that is right there,
12 working with that advocate, and that's
13 incredibly important to the success of these
14 cases, is that you have advocacy for the
15 moment that victim chooses to make that
16 decision to place that phone call, to policing
17 throughout the judicial process, because we
18 often lose our victims in the system, because
19 it's so difficult for them to maneuver and
20 these cases can be drawn out for months or
21 years, before they actually get into Court.
22 So, they need that support to keep them within

1 the system.
2 So, when we interview our victims,
3 it's done typically 48 hours at the earliest,
4 because we know from some of the -- the
5 information from -- I can't recall, Greenspan,
6 I think, and I got this through Joanne
7 Archambault, that 48 hours is the earliest
8 that you should be interviewing your victims,
9 because a lot of that goes back to what Russ
10 said, the neurobiology of trauma.
11 Victims are taking this information
12 out. They're not able to recall it in a
13 manner that the police want to see it, so you
14 give them 48 hours to kind of get everything
15 together and that helps with bringing back
16 memories and it gives us a more complete
17 picture of what transpired. Instead of trying
18 to rush and get this case done quickly, you've
19 got to give them the time to be able to
20 assimilate everything that has happened to
21 them, in order to give the police the
22 information that we need.

1 Another huge change that we made was
2 language, both written and spoken, that we no
3 longer were going to be okay with utilizing
4 consensual language.
5 You often hear that they had sex or
6 she performed oral sex. That's consensual and
7 it really -- it lends itself to making these
8 types of crimes less heinous than they
9 actually are.
10 So, we changed the way that we word
11 our reports and the way that we spoke about
12 our reports, because that has an incredible
13 influence, not only on law enforcement, but
14 prosecutors and our juries, who are hearing
15 these cases.
16 The advocacy that we have in place in
17 Austin --
18 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Excuse me?
19 SERGEANT DONEGAN: Yes, ma'am?
20 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Just give an
21 example of what you're talking about, with
22 regard to language.

1 SERGEANT DONEGAN: What you see to --
2 in most police reports were, "They had sex,"
3 or "He had sex with her," or, "She performed
4 oral sex on him," and what we did was to say
5 that, "He forced his penis into her vagina.
6 He forced her mouth on to his penis," because
7 it paints a very different picture, when you
8 hear the variance in consensual language
9 versus non-consensual language, and we thought
10 that was really a critical piece, not only for
11 investigators, but for everyone who is
12 involved in working sexual assault cases.
13 Our advocacy, as I said before, they
14 are just a tremendous asset to the PD. They
15 assist in providing additional resources for
16 victims of sexual assault, that are kind of
17 outside the bounds of law enforcement, that
18 keep them within the system, and when we are
19 conducting our video-taped interview, which we
20 video-tape all of our interviews, because we
21 believe that is a best practice, that way, we
22 can go back in and take out any snippets that

1 we might need to use for probable cause, or if
2 there is questions later, we have it right
3 there.
4 So, we're not sanitizing or wearing
5 -- or picking and choosing what we think is
6 important.
7 Previously, they would type out the
8 reports, and I think it's really -- it's
9 impersonal and you also miss a lot of
10 information, but if you have it on video-tape,
11 you have everything right then and there, that
12 you can go back to, plus you see that
13 interaction with the investigator and with the
14 victim.
15 But we had advocates who would meet
16 with our victim, once we've scheduled the
17 appointment, kind of let them know this is
18 what to expect. The detective would meet with
19 them, and that is another critical piece.
20 You've got to really work with your
21 victim, prior to conducting your interview, to
22 help them understand, these are some of the

1 difficult questions that we might have to ask
2 you, so that they are well-prepared when we go
3 in, because many victims, we will know,
4 because of the bias and prejudice that they
5 incur, that society has really put upon them,
6 want to be better victims for us, for law
7 enforcement.
8 So, what you would see is victims
9 omitting, saying, "I only had two beers," when
10 in fact, I had five beers, or, "I took drugs,"
11 or, "I'm engaged in the sex industry,"
12 whatever it happened to be.
13 But if we could bridge that gap,
14 prior to that initial interview, we're getting
15 the most accurate information, but that takes
16 finesse, it takes experience, it takes rapport
17 with your investigators.
18 Some of the other changes we made as
19 a result of the 'Making a Difference Project',
20 through our SARRT, sexual assault response and
21 resource team, which is a group of
22 professionals within the -- the community,

1 that work within the realm of sexual assault.
2 It's your officers. It's your
3 prosecutors, your SANE's, your systems and
4 community based advocate, anybody who has a
5 stake in seeing these cases move forward, and
6 we would meet once a month, and we would have
7 these really heartfelt discussions about what
8 are we doing well? What are we not doing well
9 and how can we work together as a team, to
10 improve our response to sexual assault
11 victims?
12 So, as a result of 'Making a
13 Difference Project', we had an Assistant
14 District Attorney who was assigned to the sex
15 crimes unit, and the attorneys who were
16 bringing the cases forward in Court, were no
17 longer the most junior, which is what it had
18 been prior to the 'Making a Difference
19 Project'. They now were Chiefs. They were
20 the most experienced prosecutors moving these
21 cases forward.
22 The detectives were allowed to bring

1 their cases before the grand jury and present
2 these cases.
3 So, they had a vested interest in
4 seeing these cases move forward, and to
5 myself, along with Gail Rice of Safe Place,
6 would also present to the grand jury -- we
7 have grand juries that sit every few months.
8 So, what we did is, we would go in
9 and provide this educational piece for them,
10 about what they were going to see, because
11 what we knew was that they were expecting to
12 see stranger cases, you know, where there is
13 -- there is injury to the victim. There is
14 the guy jumping out of the bushes, and what we
15 presented to them was real life.
16 This is what you're going to see.
17 It's going to be a non-stranger case. Alcohol
18 is prevalent to many of these cases. The
19 victim might not respond the way you believe
20 they should, but this is the way -- this is
21 why they respond the way that they do.
22 So, they were much well versed in

1 understanding the psychology of sexual assault
2 victimization, why they might seeing things
3 that were out of the ordinary or their
4 expectations, and that was very helpful for
5 us.
6 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Were you
7 experiencing cases in which grand juries were
8 refusing to indict? Is that why you made this
9 change?
10 SERGEANT DONEGAN: Well, I don't
11 know, not necessarily. I mean, it was for --
12 I think -- that make sense.
13 No, I think we wanted to see more
14 cases go forward, and if we had an
15 investigator that was presenting this
16 information along side the DA, you had a more
17 fuller picture of what was transpiring, and we
18 did see an increase in cases that were true-
19 billed, than we had seen previous -- before
20 the 'Making a Difference Project', because you
21 have a prosecutor who is presenting a case
22 that isn't necessarily involved in the manner

1 that an investigator is and doesn't know all
2 the nuances of these investigations, that we
3 need to know, to move these cases forward.
4 So, we did see our no complaints,
5 which were cases that we sent over to the
6 prosecutor's office, that we couldn't make up
7 our mind. I stopped that. I'm like, you know
8 what? If we can't figure this out in the sex
9 crimes unit, how do we expect a group of
10 citizens that have limited understanding of
11 sexual assault, to make a decision?
12 So, we made the decision in the sex
13 crimes unit, what cases we were going to go
14 move forward, with the assistance of the
15 prosecutor's office here in Travis County.
16 Did that answer your question, ma'am?
17 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Yes.
18 SERGEANT DONEGAN: So, our SANE
19 program also made some changes. The Austin
20 Travis County sexual assault nurse examiner's
21 program, as a result of these -- this project,
22 changed the number of days that a sexual

1 assault examination could be had and it -- we
2 moved that to 120 hours, and that was a direct
3 result of best practices with the
4 International Association of Forensic Nursing,
5 working with the PD, to say yes, this is okay.
6 We'll go ahead and make this change, because
7 we think it's important, if there is an
8 opportunity to gather evidence, then that's
9 what we should be doing, and they also did a
10 blood draw on all victims, because this was a
11 result of a case that we had worked in which
12 the defense said that our victim was in fact,
13 a drug user and she was under the influence of
14 drugs, and we didn't have any evidence to
15 refute this.
16 So, as a matter of best practice, we
17 decided this is what we're going to do, so if
18 we run into this issue again, we have an
19 answer for you.
20 But this is -- this is a result of
21 collaboration, of having these discussions
22 about what we were seeing, that was working

and that -- other things that weren't working well.

In Safe Place, which is our community based advocacy, was another group that assisted us in all facets and long-term counseling or bridging any issues that the victims might have had with their interaction with the police.

All of this came as a result of really having those difficult discussions and honest, heartfelt, just discussions surrounding sexual assault.

So, I have a couple of things that I wanted to show you, but I wanted to talk and kind of bring this all together as a best practice, and I do have some history, because I have trained out at Fort Hood and Sam Houston, Camp Mayberry, also trained up at Fort Leonard Wood with Russ, and that's why I think I'm able to speak to the fact that we were there, and there is a way to move the issues that they're seeing within the Military

1 forward.
2 It takes a lot of work. It takes
3 passion. It takes commitment. It takes
4 vision, but I think most importantly, it takes
5 putting the right people in place, the right
6 investigators, the right supervisors and the
7 right management that understands the
8 complexity of this crime.
9 All too often in policing, we see
10 this hierarchy of crimes. It's homicide,
11 they'll tell you it's rape, child abuse,
12 domestic violence, and really when you get
13 down to it and you look at these cases, you
14 look at these units, the same resources are
15 not afforded in your sex crimes unit that you
16 see in these other units, and that's because
17 we still have these very ingrained beliefs,
18 deeply ingrained beliefs, about what real
19 sexual assault is.
20 So, if you're looking at maybe five
21 percent or ten percent of your cases, the
22 stranger cases, and those are what's most

1 important to your community, that's what
2 you're going to afford for resources, right?
3 So, that's an issue that I think we
4 see across the country, is that we've got to
5 be able to afford the resources, the manpower
6 and everything else that is helpful in making
7 these cases successful to move them forward.
8 So, I think at this point, I just
9 wanted to end with the couple of pieces I'm
10 going to have Dale play, but also, an
11 understanding about victim centered
12 investigations. That's it. That's where it
13 needs to be. That's where you're going to be
14 successful. You have to victim centered
15 investigations and it can't be a bad word to
16 say that. That has to be what everyone
17 believes and that's how the work has to
18 happen.
19 If we're really going to hold
20 perpetrators accountable, that's where we need
21 to start.
22 So, Dale is going to play a piece

1 that we -- a PSA that we made back in 2009 or
2 2010, I think.
3 {video plays}
4 SERGEANT DONEGAN: The reason we made
5 that is because we knew that the number one
6 reason victims don't come forward is the fear
7 of not being believed, and we wanted to try to
8 encourage more victims to come and report and
9 that their case would be worked with, you
10 know, the utmost seriousness. They would be
11 treated with dignity and respect.
12 We would take that case at face
13 value, and we would investigate it as such,
14 until the evidence proved otherwise, you know,
15 you handle it accordingly, instead of looking
16 at your investigation to poke holes in it, to
17 get rid of it.
18 The investigators were instructed,
19 and the first responders, take that case at
20 face value and whatever path that takes us,
21 that is where we're going to go down.
22 So, you didn't have false reports,

1 you know, right up in your face, that I
2 immediately are -- am suspicious about this
3 case because it is outside my realm of
4 understanding about sexual assault, and I
5 think in that manner, we were successful in
6 the way that we're responding to sexual
7 assault, and this is the website of APD sex
8 crimes, and it starts off at the beginning.
9 Our motto is 'We Believe', and then it just
10 kind of explains and there is a great FAQ,
11 frequently asked questions, that you can click
12 on, and it kind of answers the questions that
13 lots of victims have, like, "Can I be raped by
14 a coworker? If I was drunk, you know, can I
15 -- you know, do I have some sort of
16 culpability," all of those questions that we
17 heard over and over again, that we hopefully
18 answered, so we would encourage reporting.
19 MEMBER COOK: Sergeant Donegan, just
20 to clarify though, when did you -- you started
21 -- you said your changed your program back in
22 2005. When did you make that video and even

1 have this 'We Believe' concept, and from the
2 point that you instituted that, do you have
3 anecdotal evidence or statistics that show
4 that you did see a change, based on that
5 change in philosophy?
6 SERGEANT DONEGAN: I started in 2002,
7 and this is 2009 or 2010, and I don't know
8 whether we had -- I don't think we gather
9 statistics to see if -- that this campaign had
10 encouraged more reporting.
11 I don't think we saw anything,
12 because there were those spikes, you know,
13 like all of the sudden, we have an additional
14 50 cases that are being reported in Austin.
15 We didn't see that necessarily. I
16 just -- I think that the content of the
17 investigations was at a higher rate than it
18 had been previously, if that makes sense.
19 We just did a better job at
20 responding to victims of sexual assault and
21 the detectives believed in the work and I
22 think that was probably the largest change

1 that I saw, that we were seeing better
2 investigations moving forward, and hopefully,
3 you know, some sense of satisfaction or some
4 sense of justice for victims of sexual
5 assault, because the way they were treated,
6 even if we couldn't move the case forward
7 within the judicial system, that the way that
8 they were treated by law enforcement was a
9 positive experience, because we have such an
10 awesome responsibility, in the way we respond
11 to victims of sexual assault, that we can
12 impact a life-long impact on these victims.
13 Anne Ream, the founder of 'The Voices
14 and Faces Project' described her victimization
15 and her survivorhood as the eternal wound, and
16 that really just resonated with me, as to wow,
17 we have this incredible responsibility and
18 duty to victims of sexual assault. What can
19 we do to ease their burden, to hopefully get
20 them in a place that -- to a better a place,
21 by the way that we respond.
22 MEMBER COOK: Thanks.

1 CHAIR JONES: I'm sorry if I missed
2 this. Did you see an increase in reporting?
3 SERGEANT DONEGAN: I don't have --
4 CHAIR JONES: Or you don't have
5 statistics?
6 SERGEANT DONEGAN: I don't have the
7 stats, but I mean, nothing --
8 CHAIR JONES: That's what you're
9 saying?
10 SERGEANT DONEGAN: -- that would have
11 jumped out at me --
12 CHAIR JONES: Right.
13 SERGEANT DONEGAN: -- that we were
14 able to look at, to say, we had this
15 significant increase.
16 CHAIR JONES: And you don't take
17 every report to the District Attorney? You
18 pick -- you review them first, is that right?
19 SERGEANT DONEGAN: After the -- the
20 investigation is complete?
21 CHAIR JONES: Yes.
22 SERGEANT DONEGAN: Yes, ma'am. If we

1 have enough probable cause, we staff that case
2 with the DA's Office, and they have a higher
3 burden of proof, and they will make a
4 determination, okay, this is something that we
5 can move forward, you know, through the Court
6 system or not.
7 But those cases, I read every case
8 that came in and every case that was closed,
9 and if there was questions, I went back and I
10 said, "Hey, we need to do this and we need to
11 do that."
12 It's a -- you have to be on all the
13 time, when you're working these cases. I
14 mean, there is no, "I don't feel like doing it
15 today." I mean, you have to be on. You have
16 to be on your investigators, to ensure that
17 they are providing the level of service that
18 victims deserve, and first responders, as a
19 matter of fact, for that as well.
20 CHAIR JONES: Thank you. Any other
21 questions?
22 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: You indicated at

1 the outset of your marks, that you see the
2 Military as being where you were in 2002.
3 SERGEANT DONEGAN: Yes, ma'am.
4 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: So, just briefly,
5 what would you change from your vantage point,
6 from what you've heard here today and --
7 SERGEANT DONEGAN: What would I
8 change in the Military?
9 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Yes, ma'am.
10 SERGEANT DONEGAN: I think, you know,
11 victim centered investigations. You have to
12 have the right people in place to be
13 investigating these cases. You have to
14 believe in the cases and it has to -- you have
15 to manage up.
16 If you're -- if the individual at the
17 highest level doesn't believe in these cases,
18 and I'm not talking about, I need to get into
19 the minutiae of these cases and understand
20 what transpired in this particular case, but
21 understand the concept of sexual assault
22 victimization, of non-stranger sex assault

1 cases, and that is filtered down and it
2 becomes part of the culture, then I think you
3 can make a difference.
4 But it's not until all of those
5 things are in place, that you're truly able to
6 make a difference and you have to be able to
7 maintain that.
8 I heard a lot of the prosecutors
9 rotating out. When people rotate out, you've
10 got to be able to keep that same level, but it
11 has to be a cultural change.
12 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: And what do you
13 think about the issue of training, of the
14 people who are doing these investigations?
15 SERGEANT DONEGAN: Well, I know that
16 I work with Russ on occasion, who is
17 fantastic, and some of the other people that
18 are here.
19 It's incredibly important, but again,
20 if you don't believe in the work, all the
21 training in the world isn't going to make a
22 difference.

1 MEMBER FERNANDEZ: Can I have a
2 follow up on that?
3 We've heard now various times that
4 the SARCs that are assigned into these
5 positions, the people who, often the victims,
6 are disclosing their information to, are told
7 that they have to be in these positions. They
8 don't volunteer for them.
9 What do you think about that, and
10 given that one of the issues is, there is not
11 enough bodies to go around, to fill the
12 positions?
13 SERGEANT DONEGAN: I think you're in
14 a very difficult position, and especially when
15 you're being forced to do something. I mean,
16 that is the level of service that you're going
17 to get, really.
18 I just -- I think it's not -- it's
19 not a best practice. I don't know what the
20 answer is, but I think that the SARCs need to
21 feel valued in the work that they're doing and
22 I don't know whether that is occurring within

1 the Military or not, that you know, what
2 you're doing is incredibly important, and this
3 why we need you in this position.
4 MEMBER FERNANDEZ: Can I hear from
5 the other two? Do you think that this a
6 position that you can train somebody in to?
7 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: Are you asking
8 --
9 MEMBER FERNANDEZ: Yes.
10 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: -- specifically
11 about the advocates?
12 MEMBER FERNANDEZ: Advocates, yes, or
13 investigators.
14 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: I'll start.
15 In terms of those that are assigned in the
16 LAPD, they have asked to be in that
17 assignment.
18 They're required to take additional
19 training, and we'd like to think that they
20 take ownership and quite honestly, that is the
21 case. I believe that most have taken
22 ownership, similar to what Liz is talking

about, in terms of being passionate, wanting to be in those assignments, caring about the victims, because they don't have to work that type of an assignment, and it's difficult to work that type of an assignment.

So, they have to raise their hand. They have to go for the additional training and then they have to work that case load.

So, it is critical that if you're going to work these cases, it's like child abuse cases. That was a prior responsibility of mine. You don't work child abuse unless you really want to work child abuse.

Those that get put into those positions because they didn't want to ever -- didn't want to be there, they're asking to leave right away. It's a very difficult assignment.

It is a parallel to what we're talking about here with sexual assault.

SERGEANT DONEGAN: I mean, I have to agree with the Chief. I'm sorry, just one

1 second, is that what you see across the
2 country though, in some police departments is
3 that sex crimes can be, at times, a place
4 where you're forced to go and then you're
5 going to have that -- that response by this
6 investigator, because they don't want to work
7 these crime types.
8 They are, by far, the most complex
9 and difficult types of cases to work in all of
10 law enforcement hands down.
11 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: Yes, and I don't
12 think somebody should be forced into those
13 positions or trained, if they don't want to.
14 However, I do think a victim centered
15 philosophy should be imposed on the
16 organization, so everybody understands that
17 this is the philosophy we're going to;
18 however, whoever specifically investigates
19 those crimes, I think it should be somebody
20 that is willing to do that.
21 CHAIR JONES: All right, did you have
22 a question?

1 MEMBER HILLMAN: If I could, just one
2 more question, before we leave Austin,
3 figuratively, and go to Oregon.
4 About the University of Texas, and
5 your relationship with the University and when
6 assaults come up on campus, because one of the
7 environments that has been compared to the
8 military, especially training environments,
9 are college campuses.
10 So, how does that work for you? Do
11 you run into special problems with it? Do you
12 -- what is your sense of that particular
13 demographic and the challenges of
14 investigating and prosecuting there?
15 SERGEANT DONEGAN: Well, UTPD sits on
16 our sexual assault response resource team.
17 So, we are familiar with their cases and how
18 they work.
19 But we don't work their cases for
20 them. I mean, I believe that they have the
21 same philosophy that we have, as they sit on
22 -- as a member of the SARRT team, so, we don't

1 cross over, unless we see a series, and then
2 we will work in collaboration with UTPD.
3 MEMBER HILLMAN: So, it's handled
4 independently then?
5 SERGEANT DONEGAN: Yes.
6 MEMBER HILLMAN: So, their police
7 force handles it, essentially, the
8 University's?
9 SERGEANT DONEGAN: That's right.
10 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: I can add a
11 little bit to that, too, from Oregon.
12 MEMBER HILLMAN: Great.
13 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: Because we're in
14 a college town, also, and our issue is the
15 University has to deal with Title IX in their
16 Title IX investigations, which is different
17 than our philosophy because they certainly, as
18 a university, want to address their problems
19 immediately, when they find out that they have
20 a perpetrator or a victim.
21 So, it's a partnership that we've
22 built with them. We'll take investigations in

1 a different direction often times, because we
2 don't have the restraints of Title IX, but
3 actually, that is a work in progress that
4 we're doing with our university right now, and
5 members of the university and our police
6 department just went to a Title IX training
7 over the summer, so we could get on the same
8 page as to what they're required to do and
9 what we're doing with our investigations.
10 MEMBER McGUIRE: I think we'd like
11 to, if you could share with us, what are those
12 nuances with Title IX, that you're having
13 issues with?
14 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: I don't know it
15 that well. From my understanding of Title IX
16 within a university system is, once they're
17 aware of a sexual assault or reported sexual
18 assault, if a victim reports to the
19 university, the university is obligated to
20 investigate that or contact the perpetrator
21 and determine if there is a policy violation
22 within the university and to address that.

1 That's a little different than our
2 philosophy. So, I hope I didn't beat up Title
3 IX too much, but I think that is the overall
4 philosophy, as universities want to address
5 those types of issues as they come up
6 immediately.
7 CHAIR JONES: Do you see many
8 students actually going to the police
9 department, even though they may be in a
10 university setting?
11 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: I think ours are
12 increasing.
13 CHAIR JONES: Sergeant?
14 SERGEANT DONEGAN: We do have
15 university students that report, but a lot of
16 their sexual assaults take place off campus,
17 and so, they do report to the PD. But there
18 are services through UT, the Voices Against
19 Violence -- I'm drawing a blank, project that
20 they have at UT, which is their advocacy on
21 campus, that is very supportive of students
22 there.

1 But because they sit on the SARRT, I
2 mean, we really do collaborate well with the
3 PD and with the advocacy group that sits on
4 the SARRT, as well.
5 So, I mean, we kind of know what's
6 going on with campus issues involving sexual
7 assault, but we're not directly involved with
8 them.
9 MEMBER COOK: Does the campus employ
10 a victim centered approach the same way you
11 do?
12 SERGEANT DONEGAN: That's my belief,
13 that they do. I mean, as being part of the
14 SARRT, that is what, is really what the SARRT
15 is about.
16 You know, that we would investigate
17 these cases with a victim centered approach.
18 We've signed memorandums of understanding that
19 this is what each of our agencies have agreed
20 upon to do, and it really is the focus, if
21 you're going to sit on our SARRT, the
22 expectation is you're going to share this

1 information, you're going to have the same
2 goals as a representative of the community
3 within Austin.
4 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Can I just follow
5 up on that? Are you saying that there is a
6 serious sexual assault that takes place on the
7 university campus, that the local police are
8 out of that, so the whole decision about
9 whether to investigate or not is completely
10 made by the university?
11 SERGEANT DONEGAN: Not by the
12 university --
13 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: And then --
14 SERGEANT DONEGAN: I'm sorry, go
15 ahead, ma'am.
16 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: By the university
17 and its police force?
18 SERGEANT DONEGAN: That's correct.
19 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: That's what I mean.
20 SERGEANT DONEGAN: Yes.
21 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: And then that goes
22 where? To the prosecutor directly?

1 SERGEANT DONEGAN: Right.
2 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: So it doesn't go
3 through you?
4 SERGEANT DONEGAN: No, it does not go
5 through us. They have the same -- Travis
6 County prosecutor's office, so they would vet
7 their cases to them, as well.
8 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Okay.
9 CHAIR JONES: Do you have any
10 experience with this?
11 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: The only
12 thing I would add, in terms of Los Angeles is,
13 we handle sexual assaults that are reported at
14 our universities, and so, we are responsible
15 for those criminal investigations, to work
16 with the District Attorney's Office in that
17 regard in Los Angeles.
18 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Yes, I would be
19 really surprised if universities had the --
20 police forces had the experience in criminal
21 investigations that normal police forces do
22 have, but I could always learn.

1 SERGEANT DONEGAN: Well, we have a
2 lot of the same supporting resources. Our
3 sexual assault nurse examiner's program, they
4 utilize them. The prosecutor's office. Safe
5 Place.
6 So, there is a lot of the same
7 agencies that are assisting, but not
8 specifically within the investigation itself.
9 That is solely UTPD.
10 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: So, even forensics,
11 for instance?
12 SERGEANT DONEGAN: They could use our
13 lab. We have our own lab and --
14 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: But I mean,
15 collecting them in the first place?
16 SERGEANT DONEGAN: You know, they
17 could call APD and I'm -- I don't want to say
18 for sure, that's what happens, but if it was
19 a crime scene that was significant, that they
20 would utilize Austin PD crime scene unit.
21 MEMBER COOK: Chief Albanese, if you
22 all -- if your office handles the crimes unit

1 at the university setting, are there any
2 different procedures that you would follow or
3 any lessons that you would think that a
4 military environment, where it is more non-
5 stranger offenses, that there may be some
6 lessons that we'd learn by the way you process
7 the cases, since your office does process it,
8 even for the schools?
9 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: You know,
10 there are unique challenges, as it relates to
11 the universities, and they are cities within
12 themselves, in terms of population of
13 students.
14 But we approach in the same way as I
15 presented. As soon as we find out about it,
16 it's a victim centered approach, as you've
17 heard, but we do all the things we do early
18 on, to make sure that at the end of the
19 investigation, we are where we want to be,
20 which is at the truth of what occurred.
21 So, I'm not sure that that entirely
22 answered your question, but any of the -- any

1 crime of that nature is going to be handled by
2 the LAPD and the City of Los Angeles.
3 CHAIR JONES: Anyone else? Go ahead.
4 MEMBER BRYANT: I guess the issue
5 though is, you said when we find out about it,
6 and I think across the country, we're seeing
7 news reports, and I'm not attributing it to
8 any particular school. I won't name names,
9 unless you really want me to, that when the --
10 a student goes and reports that to the campus
11 police, he or she believes something is going
12 to be done about it, and in one east coast
13 college, they found that there were 60 of
14 reports of sexual assault that had never been
15 followed up by the campus police.
16 It wasn't until the city police were
17 notified, that the city police and the local
18 prosecutor came in and took over those cases.
19 So, I guess the question we're asking
20 is, it's possible, isn't it, that the campus
21 police department screen these out?
22 In other words, if the campus police

find the victim not credible, for whatever reason, are they still calling LAPD?

DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: That is the --

MEMBER BRYANT: Unless you have an MOU. I understand some of the college campuses have an MOU with the local police department and yes, the answer is, yes, we automatically call the local police department.

DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: We do have MOU's with major universities, but I -- but you're absolutely correct, there are instances of late reporting, which are very problematic, in terms of evidence recovery, and in terms of getting started with the victims.

So, you're absolutely correct, it isn't an exact science in that regard, and we're constantly working in terms of making sure that we know what is going on, when it relates to a crime like that.

MEMBER BRYANT: All right, thank you.

1 CHAIR JONES: Chief Falls, I don't
2 think -- any other questions?
3 COLONEL HAM: May I ask --
4 CHAIR JONES: Yes, sure.
5 COLONEL HAM: -- a couple of quick
6 ones?
7 CHAIR JONES: Go ahead.
8 COLONEL HAM: For all three of you,
9 what do you count as a report of a sexual
10 assault? Is it when you present it to the
11 District Attorney or Assistant District
12 Attorney? Is it when it comes into your
13 office by a 911 call? Is it something else?
14 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: Ours is when it
15 comes into our office, whether in person or
16 911. We consider that a report.
17 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Same for us.
18 SERGEANT DONEGAN: Same for us and
19 anything that is of sexual nature, a report is
20 going to be written, and it is going to be
21 followed up upon.
22 COLONEL HAM: For Sergeant Donegan,

1 have you worked military cases for -- Austin,
2 of course is a popular place for the soldiers
3 from at least Fort Hood, to come from, or to
4 come to.
5 Have you worked joint investigations
6 or has Austin turned over primary jurisdiction
7 on cases and could you describe your
8 experience in those cases?
9 SERGEANT DONEGAN: It's actually --
10 we've actually had both of those experiences,
11 where we have worked cases involving Hood
12 soldiers, in which we worked the case because
13 it happened here in Austin, but it has been a
14 collaboration with the military, and vice
15 versa, where we could not move a case forward,
16 just recently here in Austin, in which the
17 military took ownership of it and they're
18 going to handle it on their end.
19 So, we've had experiences in both
20 areas.
21 COLONEL HAM: Was it a declination by
22 your DA or just an arrangement where Fort Hood

1 would take it over or something else?
2 SERGEANT DONEGAN: No, it was after
3 speaking with the DA, that they decided to
4 decline prosecution, and Fort Hood said,
5 "We'll take it," and then went and ran with
6 it.
7 COLONEL HAM: LA, Detective Albanese,
8 you presented the -- or you told us the
9 percentage of cases that are presented to your
10 DA and followed.
11 Do the other jurisdictions have that
12 information, as well? What percentage of
13 cases go to the DA? What percentage are
14 indicted or criminal complaints filed?
15 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: I don't have
16 those statistics. I could probably come up
17 with them, but I don't have that right now.
18 SERGEANT DONEGAN: I don't either, I
19 don't have those numbers.
20 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Can I just --
21 to your question, expound.
22 If we have a victim that has reported

1 a sexual assault, maybe to a hospital, but
2 doesn't want to have contact with the police,
3 we still respond. We still take an
4 undetermined sexual assault crime report, so
5 that we get a number. We can track it.
6 The evidence is recovered from the
7 hospital, and so, if the victim at a later
8 time, decides that he or she wants to
9 cooperate with law enforcement, we have -- we
10 have everything started, so that we're not
11 behind the curve.
12 COLONEL HAM: How long would you
13 retain that evidence and when the time is
14 running out, does anybody notify the victim
15 that time is running out to change his or her
16 mind?
17 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: There are
18 very strict laws that dictate when we destroy
19 evidence. I would say as a general comment,
20 we never destroy evidence, unless a suspect
21 were arrested, convicted, served his entire
22 sentence, has no appeals left, it has to be

extraordinary, and that is why we have a number of rental trucks, refrigeration trucks that drive our budget people crazy, because we save everything, forever.

CHAIR JONES: Chief Falls, I don't think you've had a chance to tell us about your department.

DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: Thank you, Madame Chair and members of the Panel. It's an honor to be here.

Well I'll talk about our sexual assault program, and it came about based on a series of sexual assaults that were reported in our community.

We realized that we needed to change the traditional law enforcement method of responding to sexual assault, and basically, what generated this was victims were telling us what they thought we wanted to hear, opposed to what really happened, and during those investigations, we learned, by not addressing the common barriers that sexual

1 assault victims face when reporting to law
2 enforcement, that we were receiving inaccurate
3 or incomplete information. Which is tough,
4 because our goal in law enforcement, of
5 course, is to keep people safe, give them the
6 resources they need, keep predators from
7 victimizing people in our society. We can't
8 do that with inaccurate or incomplete
9 information.
10 So, what we did and what I want to
11 spend time talking about today with our
12 program, you've all been given a brochure that
13 talks a little bit about our sexual assault
14 program.
15 But I specifically want to talk about
16 our program, as it addresses the issues of
17 under-reporting because we know sexual assault
18 is one of the most unreported crimes in
19 America. The barriers of reporting, because
20 if you deal -- if you work with a victim of
21 sexual assault the same way you would a victim
22 of any other crime, it doesn't work because

1 the barriers are so drastically different.
2 And also, our program addresses the
3 traditional law enforcement response, where
4 most of the time, in a traditional law
5 enforcement response, victims are willing to
6 report and they want to see the perpetrator go
7 through the criminal justice system.
8 That doesn't always happen with
9 sexual assault victims because sometimes
10 they're reluctant to report.
11 We realized we needed to do two
12 things with our sexual assault program.
13 First, we wanted to increase
14 reporting, and we wanted to foster an
15 environment where people wanted to report to
16 us.
17 The second thing we wanted to do was
18 increase information about offenders, and that
19 leads back to the first one. The only way we
20 could gather more information about offenders
21 was to get more -- more people to report, tell
22 us what was going on.

1 So, let me tell you how our program
2 accomplished this.
3 We utilize a victim centered offender
4 focus response to each reported sexual
5 assault, and what this means in our
6 department, or what we do differently is, with
7 a victim centered response, every victim
8 controls how much or how little they
9 participate in the investigative process and
10 they're not pressured to do one thing or the
11 other.
12 We also provide all our victims with
13 options, and they have several options when it
14 comes to our investigative process.
15 Three of our options are, they can
16 give information only. The second option is,
17 they can do a partial investigation and the
18 third option is a complete investigation.
19 Now, if a victim wants to give
20 information only, we would just document
21 whatever they wanted to tell us in a report,
22 and they can do that anonymously, they can

1 report online through our website, or a third-
2 party can report for them.
3 A partial investigation, the victim
4 would be provided with any medical and
5 advocacy resources that they need. A victim
6 statement, a victim statement would be taken
7 and any evidence would be preserved.
8 Then the victim would be consulted
9 regarding the suspect or witness contact.
10 Once again, the victim controls how
11 much or how little they would be involved in
12 this process in a no-pressure environment.
13 If a victim chose to do a complete
14 investigation, this would be everything that
15 was in a partial investigation, but it would
16 include interviewing suspects and witnesses,
17 and then the results of that investigation may
18 be submitted to the District Attorney's Office
19 or an arrest could be made, if probable cause
20 existed.
21 So, with these options, all questions
22 and concerns of the victim can be addressed

1 prior to them making any of these decisions or
2 what they want to do. We'll sit down and talk
3 with them about it.
4 The other things we do specifically
5 for a victim centered response, and we do
6 these unless there is a rare circumstance or
7 there is a law that says we can't do it.
8 The victim controls who is contacted
9 during the investigation. No person is told
10 about the report until the victim is ready for
11 that information to be known.
12 Victims are given the time they need
13 to make the report, and we do it on their
14 time, a time that is right for them and not
15 necessarily what is always right for the
16 police department.
17 A victim can disengage at any time
18 during the process, if they -- before it goes
19 to the District Attorney's Office or an arrest
20 is made, they can disengage, and no arrest is
21 made until a victim is ready to proceed with
22 charges.

1 We also have our detectives use the
2 interviewing method of the trauma informed
3 manner that Mr. Strand spoke about earlier
4 today.
5 So, that is our victim centered
6 process when we are working with our victims.
7 The offender focused investigations,
8 we do this, so we can try to increase
9 information about who these offenders are and
10 at a victim's request, we'll conduct an
11 investigation and gather as much information
12 as we can on the case, and evidence,
13 regardless of whether the victim wants to go
14 forward or not.
15 We will also take cases outside the
16 statute of limitations, and the reason why we
17 do these two things is to gather intelligence
18 and to gather information on offenders, and we
19 spend significant amount of investigative time
20 and resources trying to identify these
21 offenders in an attempt to identify serial
22 perpetrators, because if you heard -- as you

1 heard earlier today, a lot of these offenders
2 are serial perpetrators.
3 So, I want to talk a little bit about
4 what we do investigative-wise, to do that.
5 We focus on how the suspect may have
6 made the victim vulnerable or accessible, or
7 appear to lack credibility during our
8 investigation, and identify those who can
9 corroborate that behavior.
10 We try to identify witnesses to the
11 victim and suspect's behavior prior to and
12 after the assault. We'll also investigate
13 online networks, to identify potential
14 locations of digital evidence or try to
15 identify other witnesses.
16 We'll interview suspects'
17 acquaintances, friends, coworkers, past
18 relationships and others who may provide
19 corroborative intelligence or motive for the
20 investigation.
21 We also utilize information gathering
22 strategies that focus on identifying suspects,

1 their current and former employees, residents
2 and where they went to school, to see if there
3 is any history there.
4 Our investigations also include
5 locating additional witnesses and victims of
6 the suspect, by obtaining records that reach
7 beyond the traditional criminal history
8 checks, which include NCIC offline searches,
9 and we also collaborate with child advocacy
10 centers, child welfare offices and sexual
11 assault advocacy centers, to see if there is
12 any other information out there that we can
13 glean on the offender.
14 What an NCIC offline search is, is
15 what we -- what our detectives do is, they'll
16 email the NCIC database and ask if the named
17 perpetrator that we have has been ran by any
18 other police agency or popped up in any other
19 agency, and if we get that information, then
20 we'll send -- if say, University of Texas ran
21 this subject for whatever reason, then we'll
22 send information to the University of Texas,

1 asking them any information, as to why they
2 ran them or what information they have on
3 those investigations, because we'll try to
4 find prior incidence that is -- the only thing
5 criminal history shows is if you've been
6 arrested or if you've been in jail. We'll try
7 to glean other information that way.
8 We also use a serial sexual
9 perpetration profile questionnaire, during
10 interviews with those who have been in contact
11 with the suspect, and I think you -- I think
12 I may have sent that ahead of time, that lists
13 some of the questions that we ask.
14 So, this is our victim centered and
15 offender focus response, that we expect
16 everybody in our police department to follow,
17 and ma'am, you were asking can this be forced,
18 or what is the best way to train this.
19 We expect our -- everybody in our
20 police department to follow this philosophy.
21 However, we do have a set few detectives that
22 specifically will do these investigations, but

1 everybody -- in fact, we have a policy on it.
2 We'll follow this victim centered philosophy.
3 This program doesn't work without
4 partnerships, and we work with our local
5 advocates, our sexual assault response team
6 members, our sexual assault nurse examiners,
7 and other experts in the field, to make sure
8 that our response is appropriate at all times,
9 and we wouldn't be where we are today and we
10 wouldn't have built this program without our
11 working collaboratively with those other
12 agencies and those other experts in the field.
13 So, does this work? Over the past
14 three years, we have seen a significant
15 increase in reporting, and I don't have -- I
16 think it's about a 40 percent increase from
17 2009 to 2012.
18 But anecdotally, victims are getting
19 the response they want, and since we have been
20 doing this, the victims feel that they are
21 supporting -- they feel supported and what
22 we're seeing is victims who originally just

1 wanted to come in and give us information only
2 are moving to complete investigations.
3 The other positive thing is we've
4 already identified some serial perpetrators
5 with this program.
6 We've also identified previously
7 unreported victims that chose to come forward
8 and report.
9 The other interesting thing is, is
10 victims are reporting from outside our
11 jurisdiction to us, and unfortunately, we
12 can't take those cases, but we can certainly
13 get the information back to those agencies,
14 and victims are more confident and more
15 trusting of our process, and we've had victims
16 encourage other people to report to us, not
17 only crimes of sexual assault, but other
18 crimes, as well.
19 So, we feel positive about those
20 things.
21 This program has come with some
22 challenges, and one of the challenges, just in

1 our organization and if this were going to be
2 implemented in any organization, there really
3 has to be a command level support for this.
4 There has to be a support and --
5 command level should support that this program
6 is universally implemented with all staff.
7 Another challenge is, there needs to
8 be an education component of this program.
9 There needs to be a component where you
10 educate the community, educate your elected
11 officials, educate the governing body, educate
12 other agencies, why an increase in reporting
13 is valuable and doesn't necessarily mean that
14 more sexual assaults are occurring, but we're
15 doing a better job of getting victims to
16 report to us, and that is one of the first
17 things we did, and it was tough.
18 But we went to our City Council and
19 we said, "We're going to do this program and
20 we're going to have a lot more sexual assaults
21 coming." So, just be prepared -- excuse me,
22 a lot more reported sexual assaults coming,

1 but it's imperative, because once our elected
2 officials and governing body got onboard and
3 we went to them up front, they were very
4 supportive of this.
5 The final challenge is amongst
6 others, I just wanted to keep three as, this
7 type of response is time consuming. It takes
8 a lot of time and it takes a lot of resources.
9 The things we ask our investigators
10 to do with the work up on trying to identify
11 serial perpetrators is much more time
12 consuming, and the victim centered approach,
13 where you're doing an investigation on the
14 victim's time and what is best for the victim
15 and not necessarily what is best for the
16 police department takes time, and it's tough.
17 So, we asked, and part of the reason
18 why we're here today is, why is this
19 necessary?
20 Well, I think we all understand that
21 responding to victims of sexual assault the
22 same way you would to any other victims is

1 different because of those barriers that we've
2 heard about today and talked about today, and
3 some of those barriers being confidentiality
4 and fear of not being believed, and just the
5 shame or the guilt or embarrassment that comes
6 with this, and what we have found is, our
7 relationship with the advocates has really
8 helped to -- helped with some of these
9 barriers with the victims, because that is one
10 of the first things we try to do.
11 The other thing that we feel is why
12 this is necessary is, information obtained may
13 be important for other criminal
14 investigations, whether a victim -- when a
15 victim doesn't want to proceed with charges.
16 What we have found is if a victim
17 knows that there is a second victim out there,
18 they'll often come forward then, and we feel
19 that that is very valuable.
20 Increased reporting of sexual
21 assaults provides the opportunity to identify
22 and prosecute sexual predators in our

1 community, and most sexual predators are
2 serial offenders.
3 Not only is this information being
4 provided to victims, that they have options
5 for reporting, we're sending a message to
6 predators that if they commit a sexual assault
7 in our community, there is a stronger chance
8 that they will be identified.
9 So, thank you.
10 CHAIR JONES: Thank you.
11 MEMBER FERNANDEZ: Madame Chair? I
12 want the three of you to be problem solvers
13 for a moment.
14 One of the things that we heard
15 yesterday at Fort Hood, as you all may know,
16 you can proceed with a case in the Army, by
17 either going restricted or unrestricted.
18 Restricted means your Commander is not going
19 to know, and unrestricted means they're going
20 to know.
21 What we heard was that there is
22 problems when a victim may decide to go

1 unrestricted, but then start the process and
2 be like, "You know what? I just can't do
3 this," but by that point, the cat is out of
4 the bag.
5 It's already gone to the Commander,
6 and you know, sometimes it's going to be
7 somebody that -- the perpetrator is going to
8 have to be somebody that they have to deal
9 with.
10 In a victim centered -- with a victim
11 centered philosophy, how do you deal with that
12 situation? How do you deal -- how do you keep
13 a victim centered philosophy when you can't --
14 when the cat is out of the bag already?
15 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: I would -- our
16 philosophy would be, then we would wait until
17 they were ready to come forward, even though
18 the cat is out of the bag, and I say that
19 because what we have seen with the
20 alternative, especially when the cat is out of
21 the bag, and the victim is told that they need
22 to go forward, it doesn't make your case as

strong and a lot of times, the only way you can get out of going forward, once the cat is out of the bag, is to recant.

So, and say it didn't happen, so our philosophy would be that we would let that victim wait, even though the cat is out of the bag, and come forward on their time.

Now, the tough thing about that, and I -- this might be your follow up is, what do you do if you have, you know, somebody out there that is a possible predator? What happens with them?

MEMBER FERNANDEZ: Right.

DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: And I think that is -- that is the difficult question that you have to deal with, and these are the difficult decisions that have to be made, when you're talking about these types of cases, and I don't know the answer to that, but I do know that your cases, from what I've seen, our cases are better when we are patient with the victim and we get them the resources they need

1 and we're -- we allow them to do things on
2 their time, and what we're seeing is they're
3 coming back around and wanting to follow
4 through with those charges, even when they get
5 -- initially want to pull out.
6 SERGEANT DONEGAN: We have very
7 similar philosophy in Austin, as to what the
8 Chief just spoke about, but what we would do,
9 would -- to lend support services to that
10 victim, to help them make an informed choice.
11 We want to give them the power to
12 make decisions, but you have to give them the
13 information, but we would not force them to
14 move forward. We don't do that in Austin.
15 If a victim does not feel that they
16 want to move forward, we're okay, wherever we
17 are in that investigation, even if we know who
18 the perpetrator is, and it's a potential
19 serial rapist, because we want to do what is
20 best for the victim.
21 But when you -- and we have had
22 similar cases, where we have identified a

suspect and it -- they're not in the same organization, but they're still in our community, but we want to do what is best for the victim, period.

DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Just to echo the importance of the victims' advocacy groups, we have strong groups in Los Angeles and quite honestly, without them, our efforts would be greatly diminished.

So, in terms of victims making an informed decision, the police department plays a role in that, but just one role, and those victim advocacy groups play a very important role in that, as well, in terms of giving their perspective as to what they believe is best for the victim and working with the victim in that regard.

So, at least then, an informed decision can be made, based on all of the information.

CHAIR JONES: Colonel?

MEMBER COOK: Just so I'm not going

1 to misinterpret what all three of you are
2 saying, with this victim centered approach,
3 what is obvious is, you're resulting in
4 increased reporting, but depending upon how
5 much the victim wants to participate in that
6 process, that doesn't necessarily mean that
7 there is increased prosecutions of the cases,
8 and that works across -- the victim gets a
9 choice in what to prosecute, which would be
10 different than what the Military does, where
11 even if the victim wants this reported, then
12 the victim -- it's not the victim's decision,
13 it goes back to be a command decision, of
14 whether or not that case is going to go to
15 Court and whether the victim becomes
16 recalcitrant and you use it as a statement
17 that's made to law enforcement against them,
18 they continue to prosecute.
19 What would be your view -- you know,
20 if -- knowing the way you work, that it
21 becomes increased reporting, not necessarily
22 the prosecution, versus the Military's

1 approach of, once a Commander understands it,
2 they've got the control of the system, and if
3 it's originally unrestricted -- restricted, it
4 goes unrestricted, we're still going to pursue
5 it. What would be your -- any advice on that,
6 for the way the Military currently does it is
7 -- I mean, based on what you're doing, that is
8 obviously not a way you would necessarily
9 support, but what your views on that would be.
10 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: One thing we're
11 seeing is with the options we have, is victims
12 who initially want to -- well, first of all,
13 I don't have our stats. I don't know if this
14 will --
15 Our long term goal is to see if this
16 -- if prosecution increases, to see if sexual
17 perpetration decreases, and I think with our
18 program, because it's so new, it's going to
19 take, I don't know, three to five years to see
20 that.
21 However, we are seeing victims who
22 initially report and just want to give

1 information, come back to us and say, "Okay,
2 I'm ready to do a complete investigation,"
3 because we haven't forced them to do anything.
4 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: In terms of
5 adding, you know, it -- for us, it's -- we're
6 driven by the evidence, and we start by
7 believing. We start with a clean slate. We
8 gather the evidence and we present that to the
9 District Attorney.
10 The District Attorney has the same
11 viewpoint and their decision, as to whether or
12 not to prosecute and file the case is driven
13 by the evidence.
14 So, it's a very pure process, in
15 terms of what are the elements of rape? Have
16 those elements been met? Is the evidence
17 strong in that regard, and if it is, move
18 forward and bring it before a jury and you
19 know, the case is handled in that regard.
20 When somebody is going to make a
21 decision for other than those reasons, that is
22 problematic, in my view.

1 MEMBER COOK: Okay, but you say take
2 -- depending on the evidence.
3 If the victim, after having presented
4 that evidence and you've investigated the
5 case, if that victim says they no longer want
6 to participate, would your District Attorney
7 continue to take that case forward,
8 understanding the complexity that has just
9 been added to the case? Would they put the day
10 in Court?
11 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: You know, a
12 rape is a crime against the State of
13 California, when we're in California.
14 The District Attorney would make a
15 decision as to whether or not to take that
16 case forward, depending on the totality of
17 facts.
18 MEMBER COOK: Okay.
19 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: I hear what
20 you're saying and it would be hugely
21 problematic for the victim not to want to
22 cooperate.

1 But at the end of the day, it's a
2 crime against the state, and so, it could move
3 forward, but it would be a case by case basis,
4 based on the totality of evidence and
5 information available.
6 MEMBER COOK: Okay.
7 SERGEANT DONEGAN: In Austin, our
8 prosecutor's office is not going to move
9 forward with the case, if the victim does not
10 wish to proceed, and I think if you're looking
11 at forcing a victim to stay within the
12 process, against their will, it's really
13 detrimental to the whole mission of sexual
14 assault.
15 I mean, what does that say to other
16 potential victims, that want to report and
17 then change their mind that regardless, you're
18 not going to have any control over your
19 situation, once again.
20 So, I think it's incredibly
21 detrimental to the mission, to force a victim
22 to stay within the system, when they don't

1 want to -- wish to proceed.
2 COLONEL HAM: I have to step in as a
3 legal advisor to the Panel.
4 That is not correct, if the victim
5 withdraws from participation, they do not go
6 forward.
7 CHAIR JONES: I'm sorry, I didn't
8 hear what you said, Colonel.
9 COLONEL HAM: If the victim withdraws
10 her consent to participate any further, the
11 case does not go forward.
12 MEMBER COOK: It does not go forward?
13 Okay.
14 MEMBER HILLMAN: Except it's already
15 been disclosed. I mean, it depends on what
16 'go forward' means, I guess, when you put it
17 that way, because once there has been -- the
18 information is out there, and all the sheep in
19 Mr. Strand's picture are out there and we're
20 worried about how they're going to respond,
21 anyway, that disclosure of information has
22 already happened, and things are moving

1 forward, in some way.
2 So, it does raise -- anyway, it's --
3 it depends on which vector you're sort of
4 looking.
5 MEMBER BRYANT: I have a comment on
6 that too.
7 MEMBER HILLMAN: Sure.
8 MEMBER BRYANT: Or a question. When
9 we say they're not going to go forward, and
10 this is for the civilian and the Military, are
11 there situations in which you know the victim
12 is not going to go forward, but the defendant
13 has already been arrested or charged, which
14 then, with the knowledge of the victim not
15 going to go forward, cannot the prosecutor
16 then offer a plea agreement that at least
17 those that have no prior record, so that
18 you've got this person at least identified and
19 eventually entered on NCIC?
20 I mean, haven't you had those
21 scenarios? You go to the Assistant DA that's
22 handling the case, that she says she's not

1 coming. He picks up the phone and calls the
2 defense attorney and says, "I'll give you
3 sexual battery, three years suspended."
4 I have to believe that happens in an
5 awful lot of jurisdictions, maybe not the
6 three years suspended, but I'm using that as
7 a hypothetical.
8 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: So, we're a
9 little out of our lane here, in terms of --
10 MEMBER BRYANT: No, I don't know, I'm
11 just --
12 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Of law
13 enforcement officials, but --
14 MEMBER BRYANT: No, we're not out of
15 our lane at all, because in our jurisdiction,
16 and I would assume in yours, the protocol and
17 the ethics are that the prosecutor doesn't
18 make a deal like that until he runs it by the
19 investigator, or any kind of plea agreement.
20 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: I would
21 agree, in terms of that conversation, that is
22 an ongoing conversation, and if law

1 enforcement and prosecution think this is a
2 predator, and for whatever reason, the victim
3 now declines, I think the prosecutor is driven
4 by what's going to be best for the community.
5 To cut a deal like you talk about, I
6 think is definitely one of the items on the
7 table and law enforcement would support that.
8 MEMBER BRYANT: Okay.
9 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: We've got him
10 arrested. We've got him uploaded into CODIS,
11 but now, what is the outcome of the case?
12 Do we throw the towel in completely,
13 after pre-lim and release him or is there some
14 deal cut, and I would offer that there is a
15 good chance a deal could be cut.
16 MEMBER BRYANT: And so, I would want
17 to ask Colonel Ham, because I -- that was new
18 information at least to me, that if the victim
19 withdraws, that is the end of the case, is
20 that just -- a bright line situation or can --
21 is there a lesser alternative, such as we've
22 discussed in the civilian world?

1 COLONEL HAM: I'd have to defer to
2 the DoD policy people about -- folks who went
3 to Hood yesterday, their initial briefing
4 from the Chief of Justice highlighted that DoD
5 policy. I wish I could quote it to you, but
6 I don't have it in front of me.
7 So, I'll have to get it for you.
8 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: Sir, sir, part
9 of our victim centered approach too is, to try
10 to cut this off also before is -- we work with
11 the victims and we let them know that once the
12 case goes to the prosecutor and arrest is
13 made, there is less we can do.
14 So, we try to give them that
15 information up front, and when we're
16 explaining exactly what a complete
17 investigation entails, and we try to educate
18 our victims that prior to it going to the DA
19 or an arrest is made, do you still want to go
20 through with this, and if yes, once it goes
21 there, there is less control we have, once
22 it's in the District Attorney's Office.

1 So, part of the victim centered
2 approach is them knowing that, so they know up
3 front.
4 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: I just make a small
5 comment about the victim.
6 Generally, I agree with victim
7 centered approach, but I'll tell you about a
8 case, it wasn't rape, but domestic violence,
9 involved a woman who had been severely,
10 severely beaten, and she was also disabled.
11 For whatever reason, we had
12 substantial evidence to prosecute the case,
13 and she objected, objected, objected, called
14 us, said it was a terrible thing to prosecute.
15 He was convicted. The minute he was
16 convicted and went to jail, she called and she
17 said, "Thank God." Just a story.
18 Anecdotal, did happen, Brooklyn DA's
19 Office.
20 I want to go to some of the points
21 that you made.
22 One is, do you use any special

1 techniques in the investigation of when there
2 is a male victim, in investigation? Or is --
3 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: I don't think
4 our investigators have to do anything
5 differently with a male --
6 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Okay.
7 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: -- victim.
8 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Just same answer?
9 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: No, we would
10 offer a person of the same gender, a victim
11 advocate, a support person. We would do the
12 same thing we would do for a female, just
13 reverse.
14 SERGEANT DONEGAN: And we know the
15 dynamics are slightly different and the
16 investigator is aware of that, but we wouldn't
17 do anything necessarily different with a male
18 victim.
19 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Okay. Secondly,
20 given limited resources, I think that is
21 probably true in general, for even criminal
22 justice agencies, do you prioritize the cases

1 of sexual assault?
2 In other words, do you provide
3 exactly the same services if the case is a
4 touching, as you do for a case that involves
5 penetration or is it all handled the same way?
6 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: Ours are all
7 handled the same way. All our sexual assaults
8 are handled out of our detective unit, and
9 they would all be handled the same way.
10 SERGEANT DONEGAN: Ours is going to
11 be where does the evidence take us? What do
12 we have and what sources we would utilize,
13 depending upon the particular type of
14 investigation that we're working.
15 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: What does that
16 mean?
17 SERGEANT DONEGAN: I mean that if --
18 if you have a sex assault and you have a
19 perpetrator that is on scene, or you have a
20 crime scene, or you have an acute case, you're
21 going to utilize different resources in that
22 particular case, than you would in a case that

1 has a delay in reporting, or it's a case of
2 assault by contact, where touching is just
3 involved.
4 So, it would depend upon the
5 complexity of the case, as to what resources
6 we would utilize.
7 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: The
8 individual, and we've had a recent case in Los
9 Angeles, the individual that -- in a public
10 place is touching women for sexual
11 gratification, outside of the clothing,
12 running by them, grabbing them, that is a
13 precursor to other behaviors, and so, we need
14 to find that individual and arrest and
15 prosecute for the crimes that he's committed.
16 So, we would approach that in an
17 aggressive way.
18 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: But if it were a
19 single incident?
20 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: I'm sorry?
21 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: If it were not that
22 kind of a case, but just --

1 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Well, if
2 we're talking about a sexual assault --
3 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Touching.
4 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Well,
5 touching --
6 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: No, I'm not saying
7 -- right, I'm just --
8 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Right.
9 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: I'm trying to ask
10 whether you do prioritize in any way, in terms
11 of resources.
12 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: We would view
13 that as a serious matter.
14 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Okay, finally, with
15 regard to the issue of a case in which the
16 victim does not want to go forward and you
17 feel, or you have -- the evidence was strong
18 enough to suggest that this was not only a
19 defendant who perpetrated the crime, but that
20 may have been involved in other crimes, do you
21 in those cases, look for evidence to support
22 another kind of prosecution outside of that

1 particular victim who came forward?
2 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: I'm not really
3 sure what you mean.
4 MEMBER HOLTZMAN: Well, let's just
5 say, the victim -- maybe my question was too
6 complicated.
7 The victim comes forward and
8 identifies John Doe, and she says, "No, I
9 don't want to do it. I'm not going forward."
10 But you believe, after having done an initial
11 investigation, that not only is John Doe
12 responsible for this assault, and you could
13 prove the case, but it's probably likely that
14 he may have been involved in other cases.
15 Do you start at that point, looking
16 at his -- even though you can't go forward in
17 this case, under your policy, do you start
18 looking as to whether or not you can have
19 evidence against him in another circumstance?
20 DEPUTY CHIEF FALLS: Absolutely, and
21 in addition to that, we'll tell the victim
22 that there is another victim out there and

1 possibly another one, and that may change
2 their mind to come forward, but yes, and we'll
3 look into that before there is a second
4 victim. We'll try to identify if there is --
5 if this person is a serial perpetrator, right
6 out of the gate.
7 SERGEANT DONEGAN: Absolutely. To
8 echo what the Chief said, I mean, we have a
9 duty. If we believe that this perpetrator is
10 responsible for other crimes, we have a duty
11 to follow up on that case, or other cases.
12 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Absolutely,
13 ditto.
14 CHAIR JONES: Any other questions?
15 All right, thank you so much. This is very,
16 very helpful.
17 DEPUTY CHIEF ALBANESE: Thank you.
18 CHAIR JONES: We'll take a 10 minute
19 break.
20 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
21 recessed at 3:03 p.m. and resumed at 3:21
22 p.m.)

1 CHAIR JONES: All right ladies and
2 gentlemen. I think we're almost ready to
3 begin.
4 All right, we finish our hearing
5 today with, in terms of formal presentations,
6 with our academic discussion, which I'm sure
7 promises to be much more lively then the term
8 academic discussion may sound. And the title
9 of it is Civil Police Response and Handling of
10 Sexual Assault Reports.
11 And I believe Dr. Lonsway, you're
12 going to begin for us today, is that right?
13 DR. LONSWAY: Yes. Thank you so
14 much.
15 CHAIR JONES: Thank you.
16 DR. LONSWAY: And thank you for
17 inviting us. It's truly an honor to be a part
18 of this. And it's funny you that you would
19 bring that up about the title of that. You
20 actually have one academic up here.
21 CHAIR JONES: We only have what?
22 Only one academic.

1 DR. LONSWAY: Only one of us is
2 probably a card carrying academic. But I
3 think what we hope to do -- I think we are all
4 delighted to be here at the end because we've
5 had a chance to hear what everyone else has
6 said.
7 CHAIR JONES: Well I think that will
8 be great for us as well.
9 DR. LONSWAY: And bring it together.
10 And I know Sergeant Archambault was even
11 changing her slides a moment ago. So this is
12 up to the minute information on what we think
13 will be useful given what's already happened.
14 And so I think what we hope to do in
15 our hour and a half is bring in the research
16 component. What can an empirical base inform
17 to combine with the practitioner perspectives
18 that we just heard a moment ago. And I think
19 one of the things you will see is that in the
20 perspectives you've heard so far, they are
21 grounded in an empirical base.
22 And so I think we're not just

1 shooting in the dark here. We really do bring
2 some knowledge base to what we're guiding in
3 terms of recommending best practices.
4 So, let me also begin by saying as I
5 am a PhD in psychology, but I work for End
6 Violence Against Women International, which is
7 a national/international non-profit
8 organization. We are primarily a training
9 organization. We have done some research
10 along the way, but most of what we do is bring
11 research to practitioners through training,
12 technical assistance and other avenues.
13 So I think that will help in terms of
14 the perspective that we bring. As an
15 organization, we were founded by Sergeant
16 Joanne Archambault here, who had her career in
17 law enforcement in the San Diego Police
18 Department. You'll hear from her second. But
19 I think again, the partnership between the two
20 of us really again reflects the partnership
21 and the collaboration between research and
22 practice that we hope to bring today.

1 So I get to go first. And I'm going
2 to begin with the slide that actually Russ had
3 on this morning. And I'm not going to spend
4 that much time on it, because I think you know
5 the concept of attrition as well as anyone.
6 I include it here just to remind us that if
7 we're talking about investigations and
8 prosecutions, we need to think about that
9 whole picture. We need to keep this triangle,
10 this funnel in mind, because we are losing
11 sexual assaults at every single point, for a
12 variety of reasons.
13 But it also because of that as we
14 think about you know, of all the sexual
15 assaults that are committed in our
16 communities, in terms of how many we pursue
17 with investigation and prosecution, to the
18 point where someone is held responsible for
19 that. That really is the rare event.
20 We haven't been doing so well at
21 this. We need to keep this triangle in mind
22 for a variety of reasons. But one of them is

1 it reminds us that there are multiple places
2 where we can intervene. And I know that I
3 have heard that as a theme reflected
4 throughout today. That because there are so
5 many points of attrition, we can act and
6 interact at each of those levels. And those
7 strategies are going to be different.
8 So how Joanne and I have divided up
9 our time here with you today is to walk
10 through that triangle on some level. And talk
11 about some of the practice recommendations
12 that might apply at each level.
13 And any time we're looking at that
14 funnel, it's not drawn to scale. When we talk
15 about where we're losing most of the sexual
16 assaults in that process, it is that very
17 first slice. So if you had to draw the funnel
18 in terms of what the statistics reflect,
19 you're actually going to be way down to here
20 by the time they even come into contact with
21 law enforcement.
22 So I think that we've heard a lot

1 about reporting and non-reporting. And I know
2 for an institution that already is seeing an
3 increase in reporting, this is something you
4 know so well. But that is where we are
5 continuing to lose most of our cases. Most of
6 our sexual assaults are falling out at that
7 very first level before anyone in a
8 professional capacity has been asked to
9 respond.
10 And so we know a lot from the
11 research base and from our work with survivors
12 in terms of why they don't report. In fact I
13 think on some level the more interesting
14 question is why do some of them report. It
15 really is asking an enormous amount from
16 someone. Especially after a traumatic
17 victimization.
18 So you know, I find with lay
19 audiences if I ever ask people why would
20 someone not report a sexual assault? No one
21 has ever had trouble answering that question.
22 And their responses reflect what the research

1 tells us.
2 So this is from the National Women's
3 Studies in 1992, Kilpatrick, et al. But it
4 has been echoed in many other studies as well.
5 When you ask victims of sexual assault why
6 they don't report, certainly fear of the
7 perpetrator will always arise as a potential
8 reason.
9 But almost all the others there are
10 various shades of, I'm afraid of how other
11 people will respond. Both professionals and
12 also in my personal life. My loss of privacy.
13 Everyone will know, is something that victims
14 so often say.
15 So you'll see you know, in this
16 study, these were how they were worded. Again
17 they're similar in different studies, but
18 again if you had to boil it down to what
19 people are afraid of, what keeps them out of
20 the system is fear of what other people are
21 going to do. Fear of what other -- how
22 they're going to respond.

1 And I think when we look at it from
2 our criminal justice perspective, we tend to
3 think of reporting as the most important
4 decision they're making. But for many
5 survivors, most survivors perhaps, that's --
6 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Can I just
7 ask you. I'm sorry, I don't mean to
8 interrupt, but --
9 DR. LONSWAY: Yes, please.
10 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: This one
11 thing that's a little ambiguous in your prior
12 slide.
13 DR. LONSWAY: Shall I go back?
14 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Yes.
15 DR. LONSWAY: Yes ma'am.
16 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Which is, do
17 not view it as a crime.
18 DR. LONSWAY: Yes.
19 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Is that the
20 victim doesn't view it as a crime, or that
21 they think that society doesn't view it as a
22 crime? Or is it both?

1 DR. LONSWAY: You know this is a
2 survey, so that is how it was worded. It
3 could mean any or all of those things.
4 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Oh, okay.
5 DR. LONSWAY: But one of the things
6 we know from sexual assault victims in terms
7 of when we try to find out you know, why? We
8 know for example that most don't physically
9 fight back during the assault in the way that
10 people expect. Most don't report in the way
11 that people expect.
12 A lot of that is because they are not
13 to the point of saying oh, that thing that
14 happened to me, that is a rape. That is a
15 crime. I'm going to call 911 and call the
16 police department.
17 So a big piece of that can be
18 labeling and understanding that as a sexual
19 assault, as a crime, as a police matter. But
20 in terms of what individuals were thinking
21 when they answered that, it's going to be a
22 variety.

1 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Thank you.
2 DR. LONSWAY: And this is perfectly
3 relevant actually to this slide, which is
4 again, that reporting question is only one of
5 a million decisions that victims are making in
6 the aftermath of sexual assault victimization.
7 And that unfolds, it's not a zero-one sort of
8 decision they're making. They're making lots
9 of decisions about what to do to next. And
10 that unfolds organically in their life.
11 They're trying to make sense of what
12 happened. Trying to figure out what to do
13 about it. And they do what all of us do, or
14 tend to do in trauma, which is we turn to
15 people we love. We have someone that we love
16 that we talk to figure out what we should do
17 next.
18 So we know that most survivors will
19 tell someone. Family members, friends, et
20 cetera. And that is key. Because what that
21 person does plays a large role in dictating
22 what happens next. And I have to say thank

1 you to Russ Strand this morning for sharing
2 the story about his daughter. And thank you
3 to your daughter for allowing that to be
4 shared.
5 That story of what he described, if
6 you may recall, his daughter being raped in
7 the back room, coming out, telling her friend
8 I was just raped. Friend says by who, she
9 says him. And she says no way basically, you
10 know. And it's immediately shut down. It
11 sort of brings to focus everything that we
12 understand about sexual assault and response
13 and disclosures.
14 Once that happens and then we can see
15 two pieces of that. One, the negative impact.
16 Just the sheer damage that response does. And
17 we see that response every single day from
18 friends, from family members. From
19 professionals as well, but again we're mostly
20 talking in people's social circles at this
21 point that they're reaching out to.
22 If they reach out and tell someone,

1 disclose to someone that they presumably love,
2 which is why they're reaching out to that
3 person. If that person responds with that
4 disbelief, with that blame, with that negative
5 response, the research is clear that there's
6 actually an additional negative impact above
7 and beyond the sexual assault. You can
8 actually sort of count the impact of that.
9 And that makes sense because it's yet another
10 betrayal on some level.
11 So A, the damage that that kind of
12 negative response has, but B, the other piece
13 of it which we heard from that story, which is
14 how likely is that person then to reach out to
15 anyone else? Law enforcement, mental health,
16 social services, any kind? If this is how my
17 loved one responds, how do I think anyone else
18 would respond?
19 And so I think that's key when we
20 think about our triangle. When we think about
21 our funnel of attrition, where we're losing
22 folks. A big piece is that initial disclosure

1 before they ever come into contact with any
2 system.
3 So the flip side of that is we know
4 that if they're going to come into the system
5 and stay in the system, the key is support.
6 That is asking a lot. As I've heard victim
7 advocacy described as holding someone's hand
8 on a walk through hell. To just sort of go
9 through that process alone is too much to ask.
10 So we know that in terms of both
11 formal and informal support systems, there are
12 documented benefits for people who do reach
13 out to help that can be very positive for
14 their recovery and healing process. And it is
15 also the key to becoming engaged and remaining
16 engaged with the criminal justice system.
17 And when you look into what that
18 positive response should look like, when it
19 happens and it works right, what does it look
20 like? Victims will describe in studies what's
21 helpful to them. And really the two key
22 pieces are that having someone to talk to, and

1 being believed.
2 And like so many things, this doesn't
3 seem like rocket science, this reflects what
4 we experience in our own lives, and yet it
5 really is important to keep in mind in terms
6 of what victims need. Because some days when
7 you look at our system, it's as if we've
8 designed it completely in the opposite of what
9 it is that victims need to be able to become
10 engaged and remain engaged.
11 So when we look at tackling that
12 funnel, looking back to our triangle, how can
13 we impact? And again I'm taking the first
14 piece and Sergeant Archambault will take it
15 from there. As a general response, how are we
16 going to attack that?
17 The first is to improve responses to
18 disclosures. And I'm going to give you a few
19 examples of each of these in a moment. But
20 this is just as a general strategy. Provide
21 support for reporting at the outset, and then
22 ongoing through the system. And I would be

1 remiss if I didn't talk at all about the
2 question of the fear of false reporting,
3 because that is so often what drives all the
4 other problems.
5 On some level when we're talking
6 about sexual assault, the elephant in the
7 middle of the room is this question of false
8 reporting. It effects everything in our
9 system including victims' responses before
10 they even come in.
11 MEMBER HILLMAN: May I --
12 DR. LONSWAY: Yes.
13 MEMBER HILLMAN: May I just ask you.
14 DR. LONSWAY: Please.
15 MEMBER HILLMAN: This is a question
16 that keeps coming up in my mind. The military
17 itself is not a single culture. There are a
18 lot of sub-parts to it. Neither are any of
19 the communities in which you've all worked and
20 studied. So are these universal? Are those
21 responses, how are they culturally specific or
22 defined by communities, or?

1 DR. LONSWAY: Which response in
2 particular -- you mean response to disclosure?
3 Or false reporting? Any and all.
4 I'd have to unpack each one
5 separately. Because these are coming from a
6 research base, so for example if we come back
7 to something like this. Many of them are done
8 with community based studies. For example,
9 you know, if you're studying criminal justice
10 response, you're going to often access it
11 through those statistics and you're going to
12 access through that.
13 If you're trying to find folks who
14 didn't ever come into contact with the
15 criminal justice system, obviously it's going
16 to be a community based survey. And so really
17 the gold standard for how those are done now,
18 they tend to be telephone surveys, or in
19 person surveys.
20 But they really have developed a
21 pretty effective way of measuring. You don't
22 ask someone have they been sexually assaulted,

1 have they been raped. You ask behaviorally
2 based questions. Have you been in a situation
3 where. And then dot, dot, dot. And their
4 behavioral situations. You had sex with
5 someone when you didn't want to because they
6 held you down, et cetera. Those kinds of
7 questions.
8 So that's why you identify who has
9 been sexually assaulted. And then depending
10 on what else is in your survey, you're going
11 to ask them other things. And so for example,
12 here you're asking about disclosure and
13 responses. Or maybe you're asking about did
14 you contact law enforcement, et cetera. But
15 you have to start by identifying those folks
16 who have been sexually assaulted and that's
17 generally how it's done.
18 I'm not sure if that addresses any of
19 what you were hoping for. It doesn't look
20 like it.
21 MEMBER HILLMAN; I'm not sure there's
22 an easy answer here at all. I just -- it seem

1 that these are very sort of intimate responses
2 that would seem dependent on one's faith and
3 one's family and one's -- many different
4 factors, so I just wonder if you have a
5 knowledge, a sense --
6 DR. LONSWAY: Right.
7 MEMBER HILLMAN: Of what works in
8 particular communities.
9 DR. LONSWAY: No, we're not there
10 yet. When you think about the kind of study,
11 if you're going to study anything about sexual
12 assault victims, you have to find them. So
13 you have to go through that process I just
14 described. You know, community based survey
15 to find folks who have had that experience.
16 And then based on what else is in your survey,
17 that's what you're going to study.
18 And so these are difficult and
19 expensive to do. And so there are some
20 studies that are done extremely well and we
21 know some general dynamics. Can we break down
22 on the level that you're describing?

1 Absolutely not. For most things.
2 Because by the time you're slicing
3 your variables that many, you know, we can
4 take male versus female victims, but now if
5 we're studying female victims by culture, by
6 disclosure, by whatever, every time you're
7 breaking your cell size smaller and smaller.
8 If you're with me.
9 MEMBER HILLMAN: Thank you.
10 DR. LONSWAY: All right. And this,
11 I don't need to say this because we've heard
12 this several times today. But in terms of if
13 we're doing this kind of response where we're
14 really thinking about what it is victims need
15 to become engaged and remain engaged in the
16 system, on some levels the success measure, at
17 least an initial success measure is going to
18 be increased reporting. Or at least it can be
19 increased reporting.
20 And as Deputy Chief Falls was
21 describing, one needs to be able to put that
22 in context to explain it to people who may not

1 think that's what it means immediately. So I
2 know that's something we've already talked
3 about today.
4 So at this point I want to transition
5 into just a few sort of samples, or examples,
6 or recommendations, et cetera. You know, with
7 such limited time, you get to choose just a
8 few things to talk about.
9 I've been delighted that Start by
10 Believing has been mentioned already today.
11 This is this first piece in terms of improving
12 disclosure, is one sample program. This is a
13 program that we at End Violence Against Women
14 International started as a public outreach
15 campaign designed not just for professionals,
16 but for those friends and family members. You
17 know, they are the gatekeepers.
18 We think of law enforcement as the
19 gatekeepers, but really it is friends and
20 family members who are playing that role. And
21 they have no idea. And they're totally
22 unprepared for it. So as one example of a

1 public awareness campaign designed to at least
2 make people think for a moment that they might
3 be prepared to be in this position, and how
4 are they going to respond.
5 So we've got a variety of materials
6 to talk about that. But as one example.
7 Expanding victims' option. You heard Deputy
8 Chief Falls describing their program. But I
9 think again if we come back to what is it
10 we're asking of victims and how can we design
11 a system that is more designed around what
12 they're experiencing.
13 One of the reasons victims are so
14 reluctant to enter our system, civilian and
15 military, is because we are presenting them
16 with Mount Everest after their sexual assault
17 victimization. We are presenting them with an
18 all or nothing, now or never, are you going to
19 prosecute. And they look up the mountain and
20 think, I don't know if I can do that.
21 Anything that we can do to design a
22 system more in line with one step at a time.

1 Do you -- would you talk with an officer? Now
2 that's not so frightening, I can do that. And
3 if that goes well, would you do this? Would
4 you get an exam? Well maybe that sounds okay
5 too.
6 You know, if we're all doing our jobs
7 right, and we take it one step at a time,
8 victims are going to be more likely to
9 proceed. And that's you know, not just common
10 sense, but we're seeing that in terms of an
11 impact for programs that are designed around
12 that philosophy.
13 Again one cannot talk about sexual
14 assault without addressing the question of
15 false reporting. When we think about to that
16 slide about why victims are afraid of how
17 other people are going to respond. A core
18 element of that fear is the fear that they
19 will not be believed. And that is a well
20 grounded fear, because so often they are not.
21 And so anything that we need to do
22 to improve the investigation and prosecution

1 of sexual assault cases will involve looking
2 the question of false reporting in the face.
3 And I think one of the things we have made
4 great advances in is getting a general sense
5 of what the numbers are. So I think we're
6 getting pretty close on that. That it's about
7 two to eight percent of all reports of sexual
8 assault to civilian law enforcement agencies
9 are false reports. We're probably in the ball
10 park on that.
11 We are just beginning to get a sense
12 of sort of what the characteristics might be.
13 What they look like. What I think we need to
14 know a lot more about, and what I -- yes
15 ma'am?
16 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Another
17 question.
18 DR. LONSWAY: Yes ma'am.
19 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: When you say
20 that they're false reports. Are these in fact
21 false reports that the sexual assault never
22 happened? Or is it that somehow you couldn't

1 prove the case? What are we talking about
2 here when you say it's false?
3 DR. LONSWAY: Right. And this is
4 what I spend most of my time training on these
5 days. Those are research -- social scientific
6 research studies designed to establish how
7 many, there is evidence to establish that it
8 was false. Now are they perfect? No. Are
9 there strengths and weaknesses to those
10 studies? Yes. But they're not designed to do
11 what you're describing as far as the we don't
12 know yet.
13 Agencies call them different things,
14 but conceptually, really there's three types
15 of reports. Reports that you know, we have
16 some evidence to establish that it happened.
17 Reports that we have some evidence to
18 establish that it didn't happen. And then a
19 lot of cases where we don't know. We don't
20 know yet. We may never know.
21 So these studies are designed to sort
22 those three out. To say not the ones where we

1 don't know yet, but the ones where we have
2 some evidence to establish that it's false.
3 Now one of the ways agencies, law
4 enforcement agencies get into trouble is by
5 calling these false reports, when in fact we
6 just don't know yet. We may never know. And
7 they may remain open forever on some level.
8 But that doesn't make it a false report
9 necessarily. It could be.
10 So training around this issues, it is
11 the most common training request we get. It
12 is the most common media question we get. It
13 really is something that we have to address.
14 Because on some level, all the training in the
15 world, I think I heard someone say this
16 already. All the training in the world won't
17 matter if you don't believe ultimately what's
18 coming in.
19 And you know, just think for a moment
20 about when someone knocks on your door trying
21 to sell you something. That orientation, are
22 we hearing what they're saying? You know,

1 that's the orientation we need to make sure
2 that folks aren't bringing into the room.
3 Because that will set them on a different path
4 entirely.
5 And just the last thing that I will
6 touch on with my time so I can pass it off to
7 my colleagues here. Because I'm focusing on
8 that first piece of the funnel, the reporting
9 question. How do we encourage, how do we
10 design our system so that it is welcoming? So
11 that it communicates in the way that you heard
12 from the folks on the prior panel? That we
13 care about this, that we take this seriously,
14 and that the only way to do that is for folks
15 to be able to come into the system and stay in
16 the system.
17 A big piece of that is advocacy. You
18 know, in our communities, it's just too much
19 to ask of victims without that expertise.
20 Without that support. Without someone who can
21 help them make those decisions. Not be
22 imposing you know, or expressing their

1 opinions, but giving people the information
2 they need to choose various paths.
3 And a big piece of that is removing
4 you know, as a volunteer advocate myself, you
5 know, the philosophy of community based
6 advocacy is that it doesn't matter what I
7 think you should do. I'm going to give you
8 the best information I can so that you can
9 decide what you want to do. And I will help
10 you to do that.
11 And there again, when we think about
12 designing a system that is truly in line with
13 what victims need, it's hard to imagine not
14 having that kind of a neutral supportive
15 resource. And I believe --
16 MEMBER COOK: You just mentioned a
17 neutral supportive resource. When you're
18 doing this as a civilian advocate, are you
19 doing this as part of the investigation team?
20 Are you doing it for prosecution? Are you
21 doing it as they -- how does the victim know
22 to even reach out to you?

1 DR. LONSWAY: Right.
2 MEMBER COOK: How do you bring
3 yourself into that process in an advocacy
4 role?
5 DR. LONSWAY: Right. When I do that
6 I'm a volunteer in my home town with the rape
7 crisis agency. So -- and I have done that in
8 two communities. And that's -- when we think
9 about advocacy, there are community based --
10 we tend to use this language, community based
11 victim advocates and system based victim
12 advocates. And their role is somewhat
13 different and they're equally important, but
14 they're different.
15 And so thinking in terms of system
16 based advocates in a community, that would be
17 an advocate that works for the police
18 department. That works for the prosecutor's
19 office and victim/witness assistance, et
20 cetera. And that person can do all kinds of
21 wonderful things for a victim.
22 And because they're in that system

1 and they work for the government, ultimately
2 they're going to have different roles. And
3 confidentiality for example is typically not
4 going to be there. Almost never. There's
5 very rare exceptions for that.
6 So that is a terrific resource. We
7 want that. On the other hand here is a
8 different gap that exists for community based
9 victim advocates, who their whole job is to
10 help the victim do what they need to do and
11 support them and help them through this
12 process toward their recovery and healing.
13 So again, as a philosophy for a
14 community based victim advocacy organization,
15 they're fundamentally based in the empowerment
16 philosophy of, I'm going to give you all the
17 information, all the resources I can give you.
18 You're going to decide what you're going to do
19 and I'm going to help you to do whatever it is
20 that you've chosen.
21 MEMBER COOK: And how do you -- how
22 does the victim get matched up with the

1 community based advocacy? How do they find
2 them?
3 DR. LONSWAY: They're going to reach
4 out. I mean you're -- in terms of a typical
5 rape crisis center in your community, it's the
6 victim contacts.
7 MEMBER COOK: Okay.
8 DR. LONSWAY: Whereas a system based,
9 it might be different. The police department
10 might proactively send someone to contact.
11 Again it's yet another way that you can
12 imagine those roles are different. So it's
13 going to be based on the victim reaching out
14 for contact.
15 MEMBER COOK: Thanks.
16 DR. LONSWAY: Thank you.
17 CHAIR JONES: Thank you. Ms.
18 Archambault?
19 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: That's pretty good
20 on my name there.
21 CHAIR JONES: I'm very happy with
22 myself.

1 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: Yes. Yes. So I
2 didn't even know until I was grabbing my
3 PowerPoint that I was in the academic group.
4 So I must be that card carrying one that Kim
5 was talking about. Or you guys are the --
6 DR. LONSWAY: She's further left.
7 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: Yes. Anyways, it
8 is an honor to be here. So just a little bit
9 about myself. I spent almost 23 years with
10 the San Diego PD, retiring as a Sergeant. So
11 I have investigated, or supervised over 10,000
12 felony sexual assaults.
13 And I think that's really important
14 because very few people in law enforcement get
15 to have that sort of expertise. We, like the
16 military, transfer people every couple of
17 years. There's lots of history with that.
18 In addition to supervising sex crimes
19 for ten years, and by the way, I started
20 working child abuse though in the early '80s.
21 So actually my career goes back beyond just
22 dedicated full-time as the supervisor in

1 charge of sex crimes. And the other thing I
2 bring is that I've trained in 48 states, eight
3 countries, law enforcement all over the
4 country.
5 So I'm not just going to be talking
6 about my experience with San Diego PD, but
7 really best practices and challenges both with
8 the military and law enforcement throughout
9 the country. And as Kim said, I was actually
10 back there making notes, because the dangerous
11 thing for me was I got to listen to the entire
12 day.
13 So whereas this was all organized, I
14 was adding points. So I'm actually going to
15 pass through some of these issues and get to
16 some based on comments I added because of the
17 information I heard this morning.
18 One thing is that when you study
19 attrition, there is a lot of attrition hidden
20 in our systems. Whether it be the military or
21 whether it be civilian law enforcement. For
22 example somebody already talked about the fact

1 that law enforcement can be dispatched to take
2 a report, but when they get there, they decide
3 that it's not valid and they clear without a
4 report.
5 And Sergeant Donegan, after attending
6 the Making a Difference program and
7 participating in that, she's one of the
8 agencies, the communities that went back to
9 her agency, and changed that policy. If you
10 get dispatched to a sexual assault, you clear
11 it with a report. And she would actually
12 check those communications dispatch printouts
13 everyday to make sure that that was in fact
14 happening.
15 So when I see some of the data coming
16 out, I just use extreme caution that one,
17 there be an independent evaluation, external
18 audits. And really looking at every aspect.
19 So in my case, I don't care if the report has
20 a case number and it's being scored and
21 reported to the FBI.
22 My department collected information

on every form of sexual assault. And whether that was a mandatory report and it was sent to us on a napkin. Whether it was faxed. We're accountable to understanding what happened to that report regardless of how we scored that report.

So that's just a caution, and I'll share with you some of my concerns based on some of the data I'm seeing coming out of the military. We talked a little bit, there were questions about clearances, but it's another way that law enforcement can hide investigations. And I'll show you a U.S. Army stat and compare that with civilian to help you understand this.

But knowing exactly what something means. For example, the media and social scientists are always using arrest rates to measure the success of law enforcement. It's because arrest rates are available. But the truth is using an arrest rate as a measure of success is the worst mistake that anyone can

1 possibly make.
2 Because the truth is in law
3 enforcement, I can easily make an arrest on
4 probable cause, send my case to the District
5 Attorney before I've supported the
6 investigation prosecution, I get a DA reject.
7 But I get to clear my case and it makes it
8 look like I did a great job.
9 So really, really understanding
10 what's in these numbers, and a lot of people
11 misunderstand. They think that I'm against
12 clearances. I'm not against clearances, I'm
13 against using clearance numbers without
14 understanding what's in those clearances and
15 where cases are being hidden. All right.
16 And I just showed you here, actually
17 did two different levels. And this is ten
18 years with San Diego PD where I looked at this
19 data. And so to give you an example of what
20 I would want to see with the military, they
21 don't use UCR clearances, but you know what?
22 You can talk about it, and we might not use

1 the same terms, but the outcomes, they are the
2 same.
3 So I am interested in knowing for
4 example, the difference between those cases
5 determined to be false with evidence. The
6 same burden that I needed to present a case to
7 the prosecutor, versus those cases where the
8 elements of a crime just weren't able to be
9 established. Okay, those are really healthy.
10 Exceptional clearances is one I'm
11 very, very interested in because I want to
12 know how many victims are declining to
13 participate in the investigation/prosecution.
14 Just two examples of how you have to look
15 inside these categories to really understand
16 what's there and whether the numbers are
17 accurate.
18 Again with the military as with all
19 other agencies, tracking false allegations
20 versus unfounded, meaning an element of the
21 crime is just not there. Victims declining
22 prosecutions. A question was asked earlier

1 about do we give the same attention to a
2 sexual contact versus a rape for example, a
3 forceful penile/vaginal penetration? I would
4 argue that it's not appropriate.
5 I actually see problems in many
6 jurisdictions where they do lump, for example
7 child abuse together with your felony sex
8 crimes. The felonies do require more
9 investigative effort. The truth is, our
10 juries don't have a problem convicting
11 somebody of a misdemeanor. And they give
12 probation, or they get a maximum of one year.
13 But when I'm working felony sexual assaults,
14 my offenders, we're looking at multiple life
15 sentences in many of our cases.
16 So there is a difference. And the
17 amount of effort and resources that go into
18 felony level sex crimes versus misdemeanors.
19 And that's one of the reasons why comparing
20 domestic violence to sexual assault is so
21 dangerous. Because the majority of domestic
22 violence in this country, they're prosecuted

1 as misdemeanors.
2 I think one of the things that we
3 have to be careful of also, is comparing
4 civilian prosecution and military prosecution.
5 There are advantages and disadvantages within
6 the military. I'll be honest with you, San
7 Diego PD, when we had joint jurisdiction, or
8 I had sole jurisdiction, I didn't give a case
9 to the military unless I couldn't do anything
10 with it. We kept all the good ones.
11 It's true. And the reason we did
12 that was because the military had the ability
13 to still sanction military personnel in
14 different ways. And I think when you look at
15 prosecutions in the military and the
16 commanding officers, and this whole discussion
17 about whether they should be the determining
18 factor as to whether something is going to get
19 prosecuted.
20 In my opinion, the real issue is that
21 the commanding officers are really in those
22 lower levels violations. What we would

1 consider in civilian police departments,
2 internal affairs violations. These are
3 violations of policy like you know,
4 fraternization, or conduct unbecoming.
5 And so I see a lot of people looking
6 at the military prosecution, and they include
7 all those collateral violations and
8 prosecutions versus our county attorneys in
9 most of our communities, we're talking about
10 felony sexual assaults. And then Dr. Spohn's
11 going to talk more tomorrow, in fact I'm going
12 to be back because I'm very anxious to hear
13 what she has to say, being such a known
14 researcher in civilian prosecutors charging
15 decisions.
16 I think there are positive things
17 with those commanding officers and their
18 ability to influence those other sorts of
19 violations, which is why we would send cases
20 that I couldn't touch in the civilian
21 community to the military. And actually
22 welcomed the ability to be able to do that.

1 I think though that one of the things
2 that we have to be careful of, where ever we
3 work, is that we involve outside subject
4 matter experts, community based advocates,
5 conducting external audits. For example I
6 know that Fort Leonard Wood did look at cases.
7 But you know, an audit should be done by
8 someone independent. And I'm not saying that
9 they said it was an audit, but it's one of the
10 better sorts of reviews I've seen.
11 But it should include external
12 auditors and other members of the community
13 like advocates. And of course always going
14 back to victims. And I have this example up
15 here. We had a series of stranger sexual
16 assaults in San Diego and we were really
17 working hard on our SART. We'd done
18 incredible things. This was the early '90s.
19 And this victim went on national
20 television. She was like sixth in a series of
21 eight that we investigated. And she's very
22 articulate, very attractive. So the media

1 really liked her. And she wanted to be on the
2 news. And she talked about how San Diego PD
3 and the forensic examiner tortured her by
4 plucking 50, 100 pubic hairs, head and pubic
5 hairs. We really were back in those days
6 plucking between 50 and 100 head and pubic
7 hairs. I'm talking from each location.
8 And at first when I heard this I was
9 devastated because we'd been working so hard
10 to make this improvement. But after I got
11 over being so devastated, I actually listened
12 to her and thought, why are we? I've been
13 doing this since the early '80s. I have never
14 seen us use one of those hairs in a sexual
15 assault case.
16 And so I actually wrote about this
17 and included in training, I'm happy to say
18 that today in 2013, the majority of the
19 country actually does no -- not any longer
20 pluck head and pubic hair from victims. So
21 listening to victims even when we don't like
22 what they have to say, is really important.

1 And I know my detectives often times
2 translate it, I am working really hard, I'm
3 being buried too, I'm working well for
4 victims. And that's really hard as
5 investigators, when we believe in what we do,
6 and we know we are doing our best. It's very
7 hard to hear how bad victims often times
8 actually think we're doing. But it's really
9 critical to making those changes.
10 Just some differences again between
11 civilian and military. Our minimum basic
12 academy, San Diego PD I'll use for example, is
13 four months. And you had one of your
14 presenters up here talk about MP school being
15 11 weeks. So there's a really big difference.
16 I've always been concerned with the first
17 responders in the military being the MPs. And
18 I don't mean that they are. I mean in my
19 perception they're being left out of a lot of
20 the training.
21 I remember years ago, again in the
22 '90s, I went to 29 Palms with a team. And I

1 walk into this room and there were all these
2 people from DOD, Washington, D.C. And the
3 first thing I said was where are the MPs? And
4 the answer was they're not too smart. We're
5 just going to create a checklist.
6 That is really sad and actually
7 pretty offensive. Because what someone thinks
8 is that when I drive up in my patrol car and
9 I get out, that victims are just dying to tell
10 me what they've been keeping, not just from
11 law enforcement, but from friends and
12 families. Not for days, weeks, but often
13 times years. And sometimes decades. This is
14 a very, very, very complex field.
15 I think though with your
16 investigators, you have more training in the
17 military than the typical civilian law
18 enforcement agency. The difference is in most
19 of our departments, like San Diego PD, you
20 wouldn't even be looked at to come to sex
21 crimes without seven to ten years experience.
22 And it's not an entry level assignment.

1 So whereas in the military, they have
2 a lot more investigator training. Our
3 training is a lot more like on the job, and
4 it's progressive over long periods of time.
5 Kind of like what we were talking about with
6 prosecutors.
7 We launched the Online Training
8 Institute in 2007, funded by the Department of
9 Justice, Office for Violence Against Women, or
10 On Violence Against Women. And I just want to
11 share with you my frustration with this.
12 I called at the time Dr. Kaye
13 Whitley, and I said look, we've been funded by
14 the Department of Justice to put together this
15 online training institute. I'd really like to
16 collaborate with the military to you know,
17 have the basic foundation for sexual assault,
18 but we can work on specific military issues
19 and resources. So design at least some
20 modules just for the military.
21 And her response to me was, we're
22 policy and we don't have anything to do with

1 training. I'm not saying that that still
2 exists today. But I know in my experience
3 that that happens a lot. That you've got
4 policy folks and training folks, and they
5 don't necessarily meet or have a lot of
6 influence over each other.
7 The OLTI is free. And I've got a
8 slide here that I put together for you as I
9 was sitting there. I've already talked about
10 all this. Here we go.
11 We launched it in 2007. You can see
12 that as of July 1, 2013, Russ calls me up and
13 says, we're making your first module mandatory
14 for our investigators. Starting July 1, 2013,
15 to -- I left last week, so until last week,
16 903 military investigators enrolled for the
17 Online Training Institute.
18 In my opinion, that should have
19 happened back in 2008 or 9, whenever I talked
20 to Dr. Whitley. Because you're dealing with
21 investigators as you know, all over the world.
22 And you've got people with down time on ships

1 while they're waiting to be deployed, or
2 transferred, and it's not to replace in person
3 training like the SVU Course at Fort Leonard
4 Wood, but the good thing about police
5 departments and military is that we do work in
6 a chain of command structure.
7 So just like this, somebody made it
8 an order, starting in July, that those
9 investigators are going to go through the
10 OLTI. And sure enough, you've got 903 that
11 have followed that order. Notice that from
12 2007 until that order in July, you're looking
13 at just over 100, maybe 200 military
14 investigators had gone through the OLTI since
15 its launch in 2007 until it was ordered in
16 2013.
17 I want to talk briefly about some of
18 the issues I heard. San Diego of course we
19 have Balboa Hospital. Balboa Hospital is a
20 teaching hospital. So one of the issues with
21 having the medical forensic exam done at your
22 military hospitals is that there, the people

1 who perform the exams are gone. They're gone
2 when I'm doing my follow up investigation.
3 They're gone when we go to trial.
4 And so even though the hospital was
5 very interested in doing the exams, in San
6 Diego, we ended up contracting out with
7 civilian forensic exam facilities because of
8 this issue of transfers and ongoing
9 investigations and trials. Which was really
10 disappointing for the people of Balboa.
11 Captain Sue Risk for example, she was
12 dedicated to putting together a good forensic
13 examiner program. Yes they could do it, but
14 as far as maintaining that sustainability, and
15 for us using them in our investigations as
16 experts in the cases, either you know, a
17 percipient witness, or an expert witness,
18 forget it. They would be transferred very
19 quickly.
20 I think the other thing that people
21 have failed to understand is that sexual
22 assault is extremely complex as far as

1 investigations. In fact I think the most
2 complex. I know as a young gang detective in
3 the you know early '80s, I was so proud
4 because I had you know, informants. I'm a
5 Spanish speaking white female, working in a
6 Spanish speaking neighborhood. And I had the
7 ability to develop informants. And I thought
8 I was really cool and hot and a supreme
9 investigator. Seriously.
10 Until I go to child abuse, and I'm
11 working cases with subdural hematoma and you
12 know, retinal hemorrhaging and dead babies
13 with multiple care takers. And children who
14 could not walk or talk. Now you work that
15 case.
16 Or in the case of sexual assault, you
17 work cases where our entire community believes
18 that women and men are sexually assaulted
19 because of what they were doing. They were
20 out partying, they were drinking too much.
21 And if you just hadn't been doing those
22 things, this would not have happened to you.

1 These are very, very tough
2 investigations. Even domestic violence.
3 There is no consent offense in domestic
4 violence. You can't consent to being beaten.
5 But the consent defense worked really, really
6 well. So a high level of skill.
7 One of the changes I have seen is for
8 years, starting in the early '80s, I heard
9 people I had a lot of respect for say that we
10 weren't doing better in child abuse and sex
11 crimes because the cops just didn't get it.
12 They were too macho, too cynical, too jaded,
13 you know not sensitive enough.
14 It took me a long time. I'm talking
15 until the '90s that I finally had enough
16 experience, and enough ability to read the
17 research myself to understand this is not
18 about law enforcement. We have a serious
19 problem in our society across all areas, with
20 people believing sexual assault victims.
21 Which is why we started the Start By Believing
22 Campaign.

1 But that was important to me. And I
2 think that's important in these cases too.
3 Russ talked about the fact that the military
4 is just a part of our culture. No different
5 really than any other group that I've worked
6 with.
7 Retaining personnel in specialized
8 positions like the military is very, very
9 difficult. In the civilian community, you'll
10 actually see long term personnel being damaged
11 as a result of that. Not just because for
12 example, when I decided to stay in sex crimes,
13 I gave up promotion. You do not stay in an
14 assignment, or choose a career path like I did
15 and expect to be promoted. But I was willing
16 to make that choice.
17 However, there are lots of people,
18 it's not just a matter of not being promoted,
19 it's a matter of being sabotaged. Especially
20 in law enforcement where terms like being too
21 victim centered can actually be a dirty word
22 and seen as negative. And I've actually seen

1 people disciplined and moved when they are too
2 victim centered or when they have a lot of
3 credibility within the community because a lot
4 of times insecure command staff, they don't
5 want someone in lower levels of ranks to have
6 more clout, more credibility in the community
7 then the command staff does.
8 And I've seen this across the
9 country. I think that's really important that
10 we address that.
11 MEMBER COOK: I'm sorry, before you
12 go from that slide.
13 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: Yes.
14 MEMBER COOK: Are those
15 recommendations that you're making now that
16 you think the military ought to do to improve
17 now? Because I guess you've been here today,
18 and maybe I've missed something. But I
19 thought that some of the testimony today, we
20 have added specialized investigators in terms
21 of qualified experts.
22 We do have gender investigators. We

1 may not retain the specialized skill set in
2 one location, but we do still retain it within
3 that criminal investigation community. It
4 just might be in Korea versus Washington, D.C.
5 or San Diego.
6 We are cross-training with the
7 branches as we heard Mr. Strand talk about.
8 He is training across the board. And each of
9 the criminal investigators this morning talked
10 about how they'd like to get more of that
11 training. And maybe he should get more
12 funding more often to get people up to speed
13 quicker. And subject matter experts do
14 include the military and the civilian
15 population.
16 So I guess I'm just -- on some of
17 these I agree that it sounds like we need to
18 be doing these things, but it also sounds like
19 from today and from other information we have
20 been provided, that the military has already
21 instituted many of the things that are
22 recommended in this presentation, including

1 some of the things you said in earlier slides.
2 That it may be what happened in the '90s, but
3 what's happening today is perhaps late to the
4 table, but significantly better than what it
5 has been.
6 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: I actually think
7 maybe I was asked to compare civilian and
8 military. Mine were actually complements to
9 the military.
10 MEMBER COOK: Okay.
11 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: And what I was
12 trying to say is that we still suffer these
13 problems. I'm also, because I do a lot of
14 training, sometimes I hear what's policy. As
15 you know, when you establish a policy practice
16 and for the ripples to really penetrate in all
17 areas, is a little bit more difficult.
18 But I agree. I'm just letting you
19 know where we still see a lot of problems
20 within the military, which is people being too
21 victim centered are often sabotaged. And
22 their careers are basically at a dead end.

1 MEMBER COOK: Okay, because that's
2 one of the things as we get to the end of
3 this, I would really appreciate if you can
4 focus in that there might be some things that
5 the military has made huge strides. There may
6 be areas where we haven't, so if you can, as
7 you're going through this and saying look, and
8 this is one area --
9 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: Okay.
10 MEMBER COOK: Where in particular I
11 don't think you've moved the ball far enough
12 forward. So that would be --
13 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: Yes.
14 MEMBER COOK: That would be helpful.
15 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: Okay. And one of
16 those is the use of advocates. I mean I can
17 tell you, and I'm talking about community
18 based advocates or systems based, in this
19 case, your military advocates. I've worked
20 with people in the military and within
21 civilian communities who are adamant that an
22 advocate will not be part of their interview

1 or their investigation. Whereas in San Diego
2 PD, the investigators would tell you that
3 utilizing community based advocates are their
4 best asset.
5 So I know that's still a struggle.
6 And I think it goes back to you know, nobody
7 really likes to have people outside our
8 organizations looking in, or feeling like
9 they're going to judge them, or that they're
10 there to catch them doing something wrong.
11 But Dr. Lonsway talked about the fact that if
12 we want to change that funnel of attrition,
13 that we have to provide these victims with as
14 much support as possible.
15 So that's one area that I think I'm
16 hearing a lot less of an argument in the
17 civilian police departments. Once in a while
18 I still get it, but a lot less. I used to get
19 it a lot more. I still think there's
20 resistance in the military. And we don't wait
21 for the victim to say I want an advocate.
22 Because most victims don't have the knowledge

1 or understanding of what that person can do
2 for them. The best practices that the
3 advocate responds and is there unless the
4 victim declines. And then of course we always
5 honor what the victim wants.
6 So what I'll try to do as I move
7 forward is differentiate between what you've
8 done and what we still have a lot of work to
9 do. HQEs is one of them. Your high quality
10 experts. You know, in this country, there are
11 probably only six folks from the criminal
12 justice field that I could highly recommend as
13 an expert in sexual assault investigations.
14 And that's really a symptom of the problem.
15 If you were doing child abuse or domestic
16 violence, I could give you hundreds.
17 So this -- creating these experts and
18 having them available, it's not easy to do.
19 And I think the people who are involved in
20 hiring those high quality experts probably
21 experienced that. My reason I'm up here for
22 gender in investigators is that I heard it

1 this morning. I actually do not agree with
2 people who think that this is about having
3 investigators based on gender.
4 I actually see it with universities
5 a lot. With they're small enough and they'll
6 say, we guarantee you a female officer. One,
7 they can't guarantee it because you don't know
8 who's going to be on shift 24/7, 365. But the
9 other problem is that your female
10 investigators can actually be that victim's
11 worst enemy.
12 We've actually seen that when an
13 officer is doing their job right, it can be
14 very important to that victim. Some of my
15 favorite investigators are males. And the
16 reason I bring that up is because it's an easy
17 fix for people to say, we're victim sensitive
18 now and we're victim centered. Because look,
19 I have X number of female investigators and
20 female prosecutors, and I always have concerns
21 when I see people making quick and easy fixes.
22 It is really not about gender. It is about

1 whether this person can show compassion,
2 empathy and skill.
3 And victims, even when we screw up,
4 and trust me, we screw up a lot in law
5 enforcement, victims are very smart. They
6 know the difference between a mistake that
7 involves malice and someone who's working
8 really hard to do the best they can, and
9 they're actually very, very forgiving.
10 So that's the reason that's up there.
11 Not that you're doing anything wrong, but I
12 know what these discussions are across the
13 country. And I was just sharing this
14 retention of personnel is a problem in
15 civilian communities. It's not just the
16 military community that has this issue.
17 I already talked about my own career.
18 I want to talk about some of the other best
19 practices. Russ has talked a lot about FETI,
20 the forensic experiential trauma interview.
21 And people have talked about cognitive
22 interviewing. Now Russ and I don't always

1 agree on all this. But he reminded me as I
2 was coming here, that if we always agreed, one
3 of use wouldn't be needed in the world.
4 Right? Which I think is really true.
5 I personally think that what Russ has
6 done in his team with FETI is taken a lot of
7 the best, and then some new research from the
8 neurobiology field and brought that in. When
9 I train law enforcement, I always try to show
10 them what they already know, and then how can
11 we do it better.
12 So I don't think FETI is absolutely
13 new. I think what Russ has done is pulled
14 together the best and then supported that with
15 some research. But frankly, we need a lot
16 more research.
17 The conversation surrounded cognitive
18 interviewing. Cognitive interviewing has been
19 around for decades. But even Dr. Fisher talks
20 about that cognitive interviewing was not
21 designed to be used with victims who've
22 experienced trauma. You're talking more about

1 strangers types of crimes, where somebody was
2 describing the color of a car, or you know,
3 what they heard or what they saw.
4 So just be careful when you talk
5 about cognitive interviewing or FETI. It's
6 really much, much bigger. I remember many,
7 many years ago going to FLETC, the you know
8 the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
9 has these smart rooms. And every room on
10 every wall, not one wall, but every wall, was
11 who, what, when, where, why. And then I get
12 there and I say forget everything that's on
13 that wall.
14 So again, what we need is a lot more
15 research. I thought there were really good
16 questions this morning from the panel about do
17 we know this, do we know this. In fact Mr.
18 Bryant, you brought up the 48 hours. As far
19 as I know, I was the first person in this
20 country to bring that into training for law
21 enforcement when it comes to sexual assault.
22 But what people have forgotten, I

1 don't do because I've got Kim Lonsway here
2 that wouldn't let me get away with it, always
3 citing where this information comes from.
4 That information actually comes from
5 Lieutenant Colonel David Grossman, military.
6 And what Lieutenant Colonel David Grossman
7 did, was based on his military experience.
8 Him and his partner put together a
9 program for police chiefs and sheriffs to send
10 their internal affairs investigators, and it
11 wasn't just for police officer involved
12 shootings, it was for any incident, critical
13 incident. And why would police chiefs and
14 sheriffs be interested? Because it's those
15 critical incidents where we are going to be
16 sued. And what Lieutenant Colonel David
17 Grossman was doing, was trying to help his
18 chiefs and sheriffs understand how to best
19 interview officers following these critical
20 incidents to get the best information when you
21 are in fact taken to court to be sued for
22 money.

1 So I'm glad to see it spreading
2 across the country, but I wish people would
3 kind of go back to where this came from.
4 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Excuse me,
5 can I ask about that? Does that -- are you
6 suggesting -- I'm not sure I follow. Are you
7 suggesting then that the 48 hours, the 48 hour
8 rule in terms of not going forward with
9 investigations for 48 hours because it's
10 genesis had to do with police officer
11 shootings, doesn't necessarily apply to --
12 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: Oh no. No, I'm
13 saying exactly opposite, which is, it does
14 apply. What I'm saying is that --
15 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Is there
16 scientific basis that it applies?
17 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: That's actually my
18 point. And I am sorry --
19 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Okay.
20 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: I know I talk
21 really, really fast. So what I was trying to
22 say is, I went to a training -- I actually put

1 on a training. And this guy says you've got
2 to look up Lieutenant Colonel David Grossman's
3 work. So I did. He's got a book called
4 Killology. He's got a website. He's talked
5 about critical amnesia. I adopted this.
6 I had already believed it based on my
7 own experience investigating these cases for
8 many, many years. When I heard Lieutenant
9 Colonel David Grossman, it made sense. I know
10 that victims are much better off beyond that
11 preliminary interview and contact after
12 they've gone home. After they've contacted
13 advocates for support. After they've you
14 know, taken a shower or a bath, or just being
15 surrounded by things they know. Of course I
16 knew this. I knew this from experience.
17 What I'm saying though is that I'm
18 watching this 48 hours just like Mr. Bryant
19 brought up. It's being used all over the
20 country without anybody really understanding
21 that it actually came from a military person
22 based on trauma and military. I personally

1 went back to Dr. Lonsway because she makes me
2 always you know, bridging research to
3 practice, and practice to research, and said,
4 go find me the research to back this up.
5 So she contacts some of the leading
6 researchers in this country. Dr. Mary Koss.
7 It isn't out there. Now from a cop's
8 perspective, I knew this. I still know it,
9 just from my own experience. But we're
10 missing some of this research. Not just with
11 FETI, because FETI is really more than just
12 the experiential trauma interview.
13 We should be doing trauma informed
14 investigations and prosecutions. And that's
15 another thing that concerns me. Right now the
16 buzz word in the country is trauma informed
17 interviews. Well, it's much more than that.
18 We need more research. Research like the
19 research coming out of Noel's team, Dr. Becky
20 Campbell, Dr. Debra Patterson, to help us come
21 up with the research to back up what I for one
22 as someone who's done this for a long time,

1 knew. All right?
2 So no, I'm thankful for Lieutenant
3 Colonel David Grossman's work out there when
4 it comes to internal affairs. But we need to
5 understand, and I think in assaults and
6 shootings, you've got an officer involved in
7 a pursuit. What we do with victims is say,
8 you know, where was your right hand, where was
9 his left hand. Well how many minutes did that
10 occur. It's all ridiculous, they can't do it.
11 So for example when I train cops, I
12 say you know, almost every cop has been
13 involved in a high speed pursuit. So if I
14 look at this cop and say tell me, where was
15 your right hand, where was your left hand, and
16 what time was it when you went by that
17 intersection? And was the light red, or
18 yellow, or green? And how many pedestrians?
19 They look at me like I was crazy. That's my
20 point.
21 Funding additional research. Some of
22 the things that I also think is pretty

1 incredible, is I was on the advisory board for
2 the Brig at Miramar. And I got to be honest
3 with you, at the time I was shocked. Because
4 in the civilian population, when we convict
5 offenders, they don't get treatment.
6 These were people who were being
7 treated. They had to have a minimum of three
8 years in confinement to be eligible for the
9 program. But these were people who were never
10 going to go back into the military population,
11 but the military cared enough that they
12 actually were involved in varying extents of
13 sex offender programs.
14 That's amazing, because we basically
15 don't do anything with our people when we lock
16 them up in prison. We actually end up making
17 angrier sex offenders when they come out.
18 Some of the things that -- and I know
19 I'm out of time. So some of the things that
20 I have proposed and would like support for,
21 and I know that at least Russ and some of the
22 people who work in these positions, are all

1 for it. But for a long time I've wanted to
2 collaborate with the U.S. Navy, just because
3 Teresa Scalzo and I go a long way back. I
4 think she's an outstanding prosecutor and her
5 work with the JAGs and then Russ Strand.
6 But we need not only to fund the
7 research, but we actually need to answer a lot
8 of the questions that I heard this morning
9 about all this. And we are funded by the
10 Department of Justice, Office on Violence
11 Against Women. October 1st we just got a
12 comprehensive technical assistance grant for
13 law enforcement.
14 So for many years I've offered to
15 collaborate with the military to combine our
16 resources and our expertise. And collaborate
17 with researchers like Dr. Campbell or Dr.
18 Patterson, to put together an online training
19 module on this issue. But not just trauma
20 informed interviews, but trauma informed
21 investigations and prosecutions.
22 I am actually jealous of some of the

1 funding that's coming out of the military,
2 because in my department, I had zero dollars
3 in my training budget for training. And the
4 reason is because law enforcement in many
5 states, we have to go to the training that's
6 funded by our, like in California, POST,
7 police officer standard in training, which is
8 money taken out of fines.
9 So and the problem with that is a lot
10 of our state training, it's not cutting edge.
11 It's not best practices. It's pretty much
12 minimum standards versus setting the bar as
13 high as we can.
14 So I have watched incredible changes
15 take place within the military, and that's
16 what I was really trying to say, is some of
17 the best practices, like the military led this
18 country in what's called forensic compliance
19 in the civilian community. In the military,
20 it's restricted reporting. A lot of people,
21 that really hasn't been a discussion. You
22 were doing that, the military was doing that

1 before this was even an item of discussion in
2 the civilian population.
3 I'm concerned, I saw something where
4 the Army said that they had a 40 percent
5 increase in reporting. I can tell you that
6 your command staff and all your people have to
7 be really prepared for that. I've not seen
8 any other community report that sort of
9 increase.
10 And I had a mandatory program that I
11 developed for all high schools in the City of
12 San Diego for freshmen. I can tell you that
13 when we would go to a school, and one school
14 allowed us out twice a year, and all the other
15 schools were once a year. In the school that
16 allowed us out twice a year, our reporting
17 doubled.
18 So we know that communities when they
19 see increases in report, they think it's
20 negative. So really being prepared as Dr.
21 Lonsway showed on that slide, being prepared
22 to help people understand that an increase in

1 reporting is a really positive thing, knowing
2 that 80 percent of victims don't come forward.
3 This is what I work on with law
4 enforcement too. They get upset when a victim
5 delays reporting five days, let alone 50
6 years. Right? Flagstaff as an example, I
7 just recently trained for the Arizona Chiefs
8 of Police. Flagstaff has had an incredible
9 increase in reports because they have really
10 implemented the Start by Believing campaign.
11 What that means is that their
12 reporting rates are higher right now than
13 Tucson. And you know Tucson has the
14 University of Arizona, which is a huge student
15 population. So can you imagine that Flagstaff
16 would be getting possibly, if someone didn't
17 know how to respond, getting negative media
18 attention because how can Flagstaff have more
19 sexual assaults than Tucson that houses the
20 University of Arizona?
21 Well I know the answer to that. But
22 we've really got to help people understand

1 that. And I think the military needs to do a
2 better job helping people understand that.
3 I've actually seen the media report that 40
4 percent increase as though it's negative. And
5 it's not negative. Anytime you see an
6 increase in reporting, somebody is doing a
7 good job.
8 We see about 25 to 35 percent of our
9 cases where victims just decline prosecution.
10 I'm really glad that the panel focused on, do
11 we force victims to prosecute. And I've yet
12 to go to a community where that happens unless
13 there was a stranger sexual assault where they
14 would really be concerned about the safety.
15 Because you know, the prosecutors and law
16 enforcement, we have a responsibility to a
17 community, the rights of many versus the
18 rights of an individual.
19 But I think that's really important
20 and I want to say that at least from
21 experience, when I hear someone say that
22 victims in the military also have a right to

1 decline participation with the investigation
2 and prosecution. That's not the perception.
3 And I think it might be a situation where
4 policy has changed in policy and practice.
5 I know that many military victims
6 feel that they're not in control of what
7 happens. And maybe it's this issue of the
8 sexual assault versus collateral violations.
9 But I for one, what I tell civilian law
10 enforcement agencies and their commanding
11 officers, victims all over this country are
12 screaming for their day in court, and they
13 can't get there.
14 So what business do we have forcing
15 victims to participate in a system that most
16 victims are failed in this country? This is
17 a stat, U.S. Army's reporting anecdotally six
18 percent of victims withdraw from the
19 investigation. I have a couple concerns. I
20 find that absolutely impossible to believe
21 because I know that even the most sensitive
22 investigators are going to lose victims.

1 Just because, believe it or not, we
2 are not their first concern. These people are
3 trying to survive. They're trying to get to
4 work, they're trying to get their kids off to
5 school. We just are not their priority.
6 However, with that said, based on my cynical
7 you know, perspective, that it's impossible.
8 If it's true, if we can actually establish
9 that that's true, then somebody better find
10 out what's making that happen.
11 My cynical part of me says that it's
12 because victims don't have the ability to
13 withdraw as someone said earlier, when the
14 cat's out of the bag. But I know I've seen
15 this number right there. And the last thing,
16 and then I'll just pass this out over to Noel,
17 regardless of where I am. Is just as an
18 example, California is a medical mandated
19 reporting state.
20 So what that means is a victim of
21 sexual assault goes in for a medical forensic
22 exam, the examiner has to report to law

1 enforcement. So all states you know, have to
2 provide what the military refers to as
3 restricted reporting. But in cases of the
4 military in California, the examiner is going
5 to report let's say San Diego to NCIS.
6 And what I hear is that once that
7 report is made to NCIS, even for cases where
8 it occurred you know, 100 percent within the
9 civilian community, they're not in control of
10 whether or not there's a restricted versus
11 unrestricted report, because NCIS got the
12 mandated report. And I bring that up because
13 it kind of goes with that thing, are victims
14 really in control? Is it really true?
15 Because as a supervisor of a unit
16 response for investigating over 1000 felony
17 sexual assaults a year, no domestic violence,
18 no child abuse, I've got to tell you, when I
19 got those mandated reports, if the victim
20 didn't want to talk to me, I didn't dispatch
21 an officer out to bang on the door and say I
22 don't care whether you want to talk to me, I'm

1 going to talk to you. And you have to talk to
2 me. Because it's not going to go anywhere.
3 We're actually going to create more damage
4 then what's already done.
5 I know some civilian law enforcement
6 agencies, usually the smaller one, and it's a
7 complaint by University people, is that they
8 will run with an investigation, kind of like
9 these are felony crimes against the state. I
10 have every legal authority to force this
11 investigation. And some do, but most do not.
12 Anyway, so it's just an area that
13 restricted reporting, medical mandated
14 reporting, especially in states like
15 California, that we still need to work on.
16 MEMBER BRYANT: May I ask a question?
17 CHAIR JONES: Yes sure, Mr. Bryant.
18 MEMBER BRYANT: Do you think that
19 there's the perception that they're not in
20 charge in the military is -- goes along with
21 the whole thing that a certain rank, and up
22 through certain ranks, you're not in control

1 when you're going to sick call.
2 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: Yes.
3 MEMBER BRYANT: You're not in control
4 of what time you're going to get up, or what
5 time they're going to blow taps. So in the
6 military, depending on where you are in the
7 command structure, do you think that that has
8 some -- that it's not just sexual assault, in
9 other words what I'm trying to get to.
10 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: Um-hum.
11 MEMBER BRYANT: Victims probably in
12 the military feel less in control period. Is
13 that fair?
14 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: Yes except that I
15 know the victims that I've talked to, their
16 speaking specifically to the investigation of
17 the sexual assault. And I, my personal
18 opinion, I think what we need to look at, I
19 think it might be some of the collateral
20 issues that are going on. That maybe the
21 sexual assault's being dropped.
22 But once the cat's out of the bag,

1 and you've got a minor in possession, or there
2 were drugs, or there was fraternization, or
3 there was oral cop, or I mean there's all
4 kinds of things. I think that might be more
5 what it is versus just the sexual assault.
6 MEMBER BRYANT: Okay.
7 DR. LONSWAY: And I think she's
8 talking specifically about a restricted report
9 that becomes unrestricted involuntarily.
10 MEMBER BRYANT: Well I understood
11 that. But when we talk about the perceptions
12 that victims are not in charge, there's a lot
13 of things when you are in the military, you
14 are not personally in charge.
15 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: Yes. But here
16 they're specifically talking about the
17 investigation and prosecution of their sexual
18 assault.
19 MEMBER BRYANT: All right.
20 MEMBER COOK: But are you hearing
21 from victims that somebody will go bang on
22 their door and force them to actually talk

1 about -- I mean it's one thing when a victim
2 comes forward, or if the military, because of
3 the community that's there, that they make a
4 decision to pursue a case. Whether the victim
5 participates in that case is a different and
6 a separate issue.
7 I'm not a -- I mean, are victims
8 telling you, is that the perception, that
9 victims believe they're going to bang on their
10 door, they're going to be forced to testify,
11 or? I mean I don't think we've even heard
12 that in the testimony that's come before this
13 panel.
14 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: I don't think
15 anybody's banging on their door because the
16 military NCIS would call them up and tell them
17 to report in a certain location. So I can
18 tell you that yes, that in cases where a
19 military person is sexually assaulted in a
20 civilian community like in California.
21 MEMBER COOK: Um-hum.
22 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: And a medical

1 mandated report is made to NCIS, that we are
2 being told because End Violence Against Women
3 International, we're the national technical
4 assistance provider on forensic compliance.
5 So we get reports that because of that medical
6 mandated report being sent to NCIS, that NCIS
7 launches an investigation at that point.
8 Basically meaning that restricted
9 reporting for military personnel isn't an
10 option because of California's medical
11 mandated reporting requirements.
12 MEMBER COOK: And just to clarify,
13 because you -- is that recent? Is that recent
14 processes that you're hearing? Or is that
15 also back in the '90s or --
16 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: No, no.
17 MEMBER COOK: Oh, that's recent,
18 okay.
19 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: No, yes, we're
20 talking -- we've been the technical assistance
21 provider on a national level since 2009. And
22 in those instances with medical mandated

1 reporting, it's still currently an issue.
2 MEMBER COOK: Thanks.
3 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: I'm not saying it's
4 true.
5 MEMBER COOK: No, no, I'm just --
6 that's --
7 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: I'm just saying
8 that those are the conversations.
9 MEMBER COOK: It's what you're
10 hearing. And that's what I'm asking about.
11 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: Yes, yes.
12 MEMBER COOK: Is that what you're
13 hearing and is it current, and the answer's
14 yes.
15 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: Yes.
16 MEMBER COOK: Okay.
17 CHAIR JONES: Dr. Busch?
18 DR. BUSCH: I think my PowerPoint's
19 being put up. But I'll go ahead and start.
20 Chairwoman Jones and distinguished panel
21 members. Thank you for giving me the
22 opportunity to address this panel on this very

1 important subject. On behalf of the
2 distinguished faculty and staff of the
3 University of Texas at Austin, and the school
4 social work, I'm very pleased to welcome you
5 to our campus.
6 UT Austin ranks among the top 25
7 universities in the world, with the core
8 values of learning, discovery, freedom, and
9 responsibility among others. And I understand
10 that the charge of this independent panel is
11 to investigate issues of sexual assault
12 occurring in the military, and to make
13 recommendations regarding how to improve
14 investigation, prosecution and adjudication.
15 It seems fitting then that this
16 hearing takes place at our public university,
17 where the ideals of learning through dialogue
18 and discourse are a shared value. So I'm very
19 pleased to be a part of it.
20 By way of introduction, I have worked
21 in the field of inter-personal violence for
22 about two decades, and I've been a social

1 scientist for about 15 years. I'm also a
2 survivor of sexual assault. I'm a licensed
3 social worker and practitioner, and today I
4 still listen to the voices of practitioners,
5 including those working in the criminal
6 justice field, and other professionals such as
7 sexual assault nurse examiners.
8 I'm also the Associate Dean for
9 Research of the School of Social Work and the
10 Director of the Institute on Domestic Violence
11 and Sexual Assault. IDVSA is the only inter-
12 disciplinary academic institution of its kind
13 in the nation. We are collaboration of the
14 Schools of Law, Social Work and Nursing, and
15 the Bureau for Business Research, with more
16 than 150 community collaborations, or
17 community practitioner affiliates.
18 IDVSA researchers, like social work
19 scientists, investigate social work problems
20 in the context of systems and structures in
21 the lives of human beings. And so we use bio,
22 psycho, social context, their families, their

1 communities, their social structures, such as
2 schools and court systems to look at those
3 dimension of social problems.
4 We also consider a historical
5 analysis that helps us understand how things
6 got where they are, and what moves us forward.
7 It's a complex social science discipline
8 grounded in ethics and principles. I'm proud
9 to have family members who are both veterans
10 and active members of the military. And over
11 the years I've also collaborated closely with
12 colleagues who are career military social
13 workers.
14 However I have not served in the
15 military, and so I don't consider myself an
16 expert in the military system. So it's from
17 these previous viewpoints that I will talk
18 with you today.
19 The research that I've conducted
20 clearly demonstrates the professionals in
21 response systems to sexual assault need better
22 tools and strategies to more effectively

1 address the pervasiveness and the complexity
2 of these crimes. Little is known about the
3 range and effectiveness of services for sexual
4 assault victims from their point of outcry to
5 the indictment and adjudication of the
6 offender. And the factors that promote or
7 hinder victim restoration and offender
8 accountability.
9 My research has been aimed to enhance
10 our understanding of what contributes to the
11 scope and effectiveness of services, with the
12 major goal to provide direction to policy
13 makers, practitioners, and to advocates, to
14 first responders, to community members, about
15 how to meet the complex needs of victims. To
16 hold offenders accountable and to ultimately
17 end this violence.
18 The underlying premise -- my
19 underlying premise is that sexual assault is
20 a social problem and that if we are to reduce
21 it, and lessen its impact on society, it
22 really will require a complex, multi-

1 dimensional systemic response. At the same
2 time though, we know that professionals
3 engaged in response systems can uniquely make
4 a difference in the validation and treatment
5 of victims and the accountability of
6 offenders.
7 What I've learned is that this crime
8 is really difficult. It's really thorny. In
9 previous testimony you've heard why these
10 issues and why these cases are so difficult.
11 I know that you've learned that for example,
12 the difficulty lies in the relationship that
13 exists between the offender and the victim.
14 The tenacity of the offender's behavior. The
15 lack of reporting. Under-resourced services.
16 These crimes are among the most nuanced of all
17 violent crimes, and yet our criminal justice
18 system is set up to discretely measure
19 behavior.
20 And so there's quite a mismatch in
21 those two things. And so what we have to
22 learn is really how to hold complexity. So a

1 prism might be a good metaphor here for both
2 the crime itself and the process for
3 addressing it.
4 A prism by definition is a tool that
5 refracts light. Prisms are also used for
6 internal reflection and they can operate like
7 mirrors. Before the prism was invented, we
8 believed that light was colorless. Today we
9 know that prisms can be used to break light
10 into its color spectrum. Refraction changes
11 the direction of the wave, while color travels
12 along its frequency.
13 Sexual assault crimes as you know,
14 have historically been invisible. They've
15 been unspoken, they've been under addressed.
16 So every time we undertake a process like
17 you're undertaking, like this hearing, we
18 refract light onto it. We see the crime in
19 color. We indeed see its truth.
20 Perhaps too like the prism that shows
21 the color along the spectrum, we start to
22 develop an integrated, interdisciplinary

1 response that I hope is forthcoming for all of
2 our communities. And I think that our
3 research supports is the way forward.
4 So let me relate that metaphor more
5 precisely to the research that I've conducted
6 over the last 14 years with IDVSA. I've
7 directed large scale studies with surveys of
8 representative samples of 1200, to smaller
9 scale quantitatively driven studies where we
10 collected individual and focus group data.
11 We've collected data from
12 stakeholders across every stage of this crime,
13 including from sexual assault nurse examiners,
14 Hospital administrators, crime lab personnel,
15 first responders, law enforcement
16 investigators and their leadership,
17 prosecutors, defense attorneys, system based
18 victim advocates, community based advocates
19 and policy makers. Currently we are working
20 with an interdisciplinary team from Houston,
21 some of whom are in this audience today, on a
22 project funded by the Institute of Justice,

1 where we're exploring the reasons for untested
2 sexual assault kits.
3 Often talked about in the public as
4 a backlog, which is actually not the right
5 term for it, but we'll go with that. The aim
6 is really to develop a national model that
7 addresses why we have this backlog. You know,
8 what were the conditions under which these
9 kits were left untested? And then how do we
10 solve that for the nation so that we don't end
11 up with sexual assault kits left in property
12 rooms untested?
13 Victims and their families are also
14 at the center of our research. And we've also
15 engaged men who in surveys have identified as
16 perpetrating this crime. We have over the
17 years have interviewed many, many victims. By
18 in large, most victims who have not reported
19 to law enforcement.
20 In all our studies, the central goal
21 has been to fully describe the issue. To
22 understand the complex decision making of

1 every actor along that continuum. Because
2 everybody makes a decision or maybe an
3 indecision about the crime. And then to offer
4 solutions for improved systems response.
5 Today I will offer you our framework.
6 What we have implemented at least here in
7 Texas to answer these questions. And perhaps
8 these questions that I have in front of you
9 are lofty, but we think they're achievable.
10 I offer you this as perhaps a model, although
11 there will be some differences in its
12 translatablility for the military.
13 So here are the questions that we
14 have explored here in Texas. And this is our
15 36,000 foot view really, probably pulling some
16 of what you've heard all day long together.
17 We wanted to know what systems are working
18 well to meet the needs of sexual assault
19 victims? What are the current organizational
20 needs to address the crime? What are the
21 challenges to collaboration? And then what
22 are the preferred outcomes?

1 And the preferred outcomes, you can
2 talk about best practices, but we really want
3 to talk about them in terms of preferred
4 outcomes, and we want to reach towards that.
5 And that is always the goal, to reach towards
6 that preferred outcome. So keep moving us
7 down the road towards that preferred outcome.
8 To answer question number one, what
9 systems work well to meet the needs of sexual
10 assault victims, we took an inventory. We
11 developed a trajectory, calculated the
12 incidents of sexual assault crimes and
13 essentially what we did really was conduct a
14 full needs assessment. So I don't know if
15 that's what the military has done, but that's
16 where we had to start. We really had to
17 understand the scope of the problem.
18 To answer question, queries number
19 two about organization needs, the framework
20 led us to estimate victim and societal costs
21 around sexual assault crimes. Estimating
22 costs for a new and expanded services,

1 expenditures and revenues for programs, such
2 as law enforcement and same programs.
3 So as a quick finding, we know in the
4 state of Texas, at the very base level, we can
5 tell our policy makers that sexual assault
6 costs the state of Texas $42.8 million a year.
7 And that's a real underestimate, but I can
8 tell you per dollar where we spend that money.
9 Now we don't -- what we did not measure, were
10 costs to prisons, how it is to house people
11 who are eventually adjudicated. We don't do
12 treatment of offenders, that's not in that
13 cost. But we can at least tell our policy
14 makers this is a reason to solve this problem.
15 If for no other reason, this is what it's
16 costing us.
17 Research queries three and four are
18 driven to divine collaboration. And the
19 current context of current conditions around
20 awareness, collaborative efforts, training
21 needs and prosecution processes. So here best
22 practices are included in what's working, such

1 as reduced investigation time and expansion or
2 availability of what we call a vertical
3 prosecution services.
4 What we found -- you know, when you
5 think about a current condition, you really
6 think about what is needed. What we found was
7 that latent in all of these means is what
8 you've heard over and over today, which is the
9 value latent should be around victim inclusion
10 and victim centered approaches.
11 So I want to share just two of our
12 outcomes. This is really at the very
13 beginning of what we have found.
14 The first illustration here shows you
15 the chronologically the course of a sexual
16 assault incident from victimization to victim
17 restoration. This is a good start. The
18 reason it's a good start is because again, we
19 reach towards preferred outcomes. If we know
20 what -- where's our data's going, and we look
21 at that bottom circle, we know in the state of
22 Texas, 82 percent of all cases end here

1 without a report. And we know that's not a
2 preferred outcome, so how do we make a deep
3 dive with that circle?
4 So it was important for us -- so part
5 of our research was to actually build this
6 trajectory of what this inventory and
7 trajectory. And it really has helped us then
8 map where we're going to go next. So you
9 could take each one of these blocks, and it
10 could be its own research piece when you
11 really understand what's going on, that full
12 assessment.
13 So this model doesn't fit the
14 military system exactly of course, because it
15 was built on data from the civilian structure.
16 But it really does give you a point -- a
17 similar model could give you a point of how to
18 do a deep dive. I might say where it says in
19 the middle there, it's highlighted, it says
20 case reported, see Figure 4. I'm going to
21 talk about that.
22 Secondly, the second illustration

1 gives you a piece of information about cases
2 reported to law enforcement. And that is
3 informing our NIJ funded project in Houston,
4 which is a research action project. So you
5 can see that 18 percent of cases reported now,
6 we're taking one jurisdiction, although a very
7 large jurisdiction, and just one piece of law
8 enforcement, right, because we have the
9 sheriff's department and also Houston Police
10 Department. But of those 18 percent reported,
11 and now we're taking a really deep dive.
12 What we know is that we're looking
13 then at that box now saying, exam performed,
14 sexual assault nurse exam performed, and
15 actually we're taking a deep dive. Those that
16 are performed now, we're now actually opening
17 up those cases, not only about those
18 performed, but those cases that were
19 performed, and nothing has been done about
20 them. So those were the unrequested or
21 untested kits.
22 So again, this is just one example of

1 what research can do to move an agenda forward
2 when you really do understand the element of
3 what you're dealing with. Sort of a whole
4 picture or a map.
5 The problem here, as I see it, is
6 both these examples I gave you are really
7 focused on victimization. And I really do
8 believe that we need to focus some on -- we
9 need to make a major pivot towards
10 perpetration, and I'll talk about that in a
11 minute.
12 The framework of preferred outcome
13 serves as a guide for future directions and is
14 a mechanism to achieve exemplary services.
15 Recommendations can't be one size fit all,
16 particularly given the vastness and diversity
17 of our system, and perhaps particularly around
18 the military system.
19 Nonetheless, preferred outcomes are
20 a way to initiate useful conversation. They
21 are a means to spark open honest and useful
22 dialog that will strive towards those

exemplary responses to this crime. So in the end I guess I would urge a process. A longitudinal courageous process that involves a multi-loop diagnostic and implementation phase or phases.

This would be a process that really could hold complexity, and I think you've heard that over and over. And it would be a way to map what's going on and how you're doing. And it would be a way to map both the process and the outcome. So the change of that process.

In anticipation of this panel, I was really thinking about the reasons for the upsurge of sexual assault and the reports about sexual assault in the military. And really trying to theoretically think about that, because I am one of those card carrying academics.

I see the military as the great equalizer. It really is society's great equalizer in so many ways. And I wondered if

1 that is because the military has fast forward
2 society, whether it's about race or sexual
3 orientation, or the definition of marriage.
4 The civilian world goes incrementally on
5 things. We engage in some national discourse
6 when we disagree, and in so many ways, we get
7 to have our individual opinions.
8 Relatively speaking, in the military,
9 equality changes are comprehensive and abrupt
10 and broad. The military has taken on gender
11 disparities perhaps like no other system in
12 the U.S. Characteristics embedded in sexual
13 violence of women, such as entitlement, power
14 and control that have essentially been leveled
15 in the military, and to some degree, you have
16 undone sexism.
17 While the presence or undoing of
18 sexism does not fully explain the occurrence
19 of sexual assault, so I don't want to misstep,
20 but I want to offer this as a theory. The
21 status of women and the embedding of the
22 occurrence of sexual assault, I think deserves

1 some attention in your discovery about how the
2 military has equalized the status of women and
3 what that has done, and how this maybe has
4 promulgated the issue of sexual assault.
5 So I'm going to offer you what I
6 found is some exemplary service --
7 characteristics around services as I close.
8 First, I think you need to strategize, or
9 first what we did, I'll tell you what we did.
10 We had to strategize some innovative ways to
11 enhance collaboration and communication among
12 professionals that assist sexual assault
13 victims.
14 Interdisciplinary teams are really
15 important and providing support structures for
16 those are really important. Joanne said
17 earlier, she talked about the justice -- an
18 advocate and working with investigators.
19 We have implemented that and are now
20 testing that model in Houston. That person is
21 called a Justice Advocate. They are embedded
22 with the investigative unit. And so in six or

1 eight months, we'll know how that's going, but
2 the preliminary research is that it's
3 actually, this particular person is able to
4 bridge really nicely, the needs of the victim
5 and move the investigation forward in a way
6 that originally investigators did not believe.
7 So that's a little bit different than
8 the model that a community based advocate. So
9 that's what we're testing in Houston.
10 Recruitment and retainment of the
11 most seasoned professionals and responders and
12 champions, we've also found this is really
13 important. You know, there's a lot of
14 research that says you can change the
15 knowledge of people, but you can't change
16 attitude. And I have to tell you, I think
17 what you were talking about is, you know when
18 I know something. And that's called actually
19 practice wisdom. And when you don't know it
20 empirically, but you know it.
21 And it has meaning and relevance.
22 And what I know from my practice wisdom but

1 not yet empirically, is that we have changed
2 people to champions in this work, particularly
3 in Houston. And what that has really taken is
4 some longevity and some relationship and some
5 keeping at it. And so that's how I would
6 encourage you to keep the most seasoned
7 professionals as these responders and find
8 champions to do this work. It's very
9 difficult work.
10 I also think you need to take care of
11 them. These are not easy cases. They are
12 cases that can burn people out. So we have to
13 think about that.
14 Accessible and competent services,
15 and I think the question about culturally
16 competent, culturally grounded, contextual
17 services was a really important question.
18 Courageous victim centered approaches, and I
19 do mean putting things on their head
20 sometimes. And then, revolutionary campaigns
21 to broaden our understanding of this crime and
22 decrease it's stigma.

1 So in closing, I want to go back to
2 my metaphor about the prism. Scientists use
3 reflective prisms to invert, displace or
4 otherwise disrupt an image. Without a prism,
5 some objects would really appear upside down.
6 Using a pair of prisms can be used for what is
7 called steering, where deflection is focused
8 to desired angle within a narrow field of
9 regard.
10 This framework perhaps provides a way
11 to look in, narrowing of understanding, a
12 steering, a way forward, a way to continue or
13 engage in our courageous dialog to solve this
14 problem. I really do see this panel as an
15 opportunity and that your ultimate
16 recommendations to Congress as being able to
17 make meaningful shifts in the anti-violence
18 field, you will pivot towards justice, towards
19 the accountability of offenders, not just for
20 the military, but for our society in general.
21 Thank you.
22 CHAIR JONES: Thank you. Questions,

1 comments? I just had one question, you talked
2 about the military equalizing the status of
3 women. Could you amplify that remark.
4 DR. BUSCH: Well you know, when I was
5 thinking about the upsurge and the reports and
6 this 40 percent reports, I was really trying
7 to theorize about that. I know that there has
8 been rhetoric about why that would happen.
9 Does sexual assault happen more often in the
10 military is, I think, the theory that more
11 people want to go to. Or is it something
12 about the military culture where sexual
13 assault would happen more often?
14 And so I wanted to shift the
15 conversation and offer an alternative theory.
16 Alternatively it might be that if we look at
17 the issue of sexual assault being embedded in
18 the issue of the status of women, and it's not
19 about gender. The issue of sexual assault is
20 not about gender, it's about power and
21 control. Embedded that in that, certainly is
22 the status of women, right?

1 So it's a very sort of multi-layered
2 complex issue. But we think about what the
3 military has done in terms of the status of
4 women as a great equalizer. Right? People
5 are able to be equal in the military. You're
6 in the context of a bigger society where the
7 status of women is not equal.
8 And so I think people that live and
9 work in the military, make their lives in the
10 military, live in this juxtaposition where the
11 status of women and the place in which they
12 make their careers is one way, and in the
13 bigger society it's in another way. And so it
14 was really a hypotheses to sort of provoke
15 thought that it is really not about the people
16 who exist in the military creating sexual
17 assault, but something that's culturally
18 shifting in the military that could explain
19 the upsurge.
20 Was that helpful?
21 CHAIR JONES: Yes. I understand your
22 comment better.

1 MEMBER HILLMAN: I have lots of
2 questions about that. But let me -- let me
3 come back to something more targeted, which is
4 what metrics we should be looking for? So one
5 of the things you actually mentioned, I think
6 while this slide was up on recommendations,
7 but you mentioned the shortening the
8 investigation time might be one way to measure
9 progress.
10 And yet I worry that's a lousy way to
11 measure progress, because we need to give
12 victims and survivors time to come forward.
13 And therefore encouraging law enforcement to
14 shorten that time and to press on that metric
15 could be counterproductive actually.
16 So I -- another number I was
17 wondering about, and this goes to the question
18 about how the Army's suggestion that maybe
19 only six percent were -- this came up in a
20 previous hearing where we were talking about
21 conversion rates, and the conversion from
22 unrestricted to restricted. And one of the

1 Air Force's great victories in the special
2 victims counsel era that has only been these
3 past months, has been a much higher conversion
4 rate, a conversion rate of restricted to
5 unrestricted reports.
6 And I've asked previously of some of
7 the civilian experts, what should be our goal
8 for that? I mean how can we tell we're
9 actually doing what we should be doing there?
10 And at one point somebody suggested
11 to us 80 percent should be a goal for the
12 restricted to unrestricted. And I just -- or
13 should our goal be five percent? I mean I
14 just -- your reactions to that would be
15 helpful to me at least in trying to think
16 about how we should address that. Why would
17 anybody ever report this sort of thing?
18 DR. BUSCH: Let me go back to the
19 first question. So when I talked about
20 shorter investigation times, that was one
21 example. And what I want to really emphasize
22 is that, I think maybe we've all said this,

1 this crime is really complex.
2 And so what people want to do is have
3 some absolutes and, what I'm hoping my take
4 away message is, is that people need to be
5 able to hold the complexity. So in some
6 cases, shorter investigation times is the
7 absolute answer, and in some longer.
8 And so people need to be able to sit
9 with that complexity and so I guess that was
10 one recommendation. But we have actually a
11 list of recommendations. So it wouldn't be
12 carte blanche that we're talking about making
13 that, because as soon as you make a
14 recommendation with that sort of emphasis,
15 you've made a mistake.
16 So I would just urge complexity. And
17 then I guess to the other point is, you know,
18 I'm a scientist. And so until I understand
19 the impact of what 80 percent means for that
20 80 percent or 20 percent, I'd have a hard time
21 saying that should be the target.
22 So part of what I wanted to recommend

1 is that you know, unless the 36,000 view has
2 been done where there's a real assessment of
3 what's going on. While I think the training
4 that I've heard about is really important,
5 that engaging in a process, a long term
6 process that keeps looping back and trying new
7 things, and giving you the 36,000 foot view is
8 really critical.
9 DR. LONSWAY: I want to jump in and
10 keeping all of that in mind, I think a simple
11 answer is, ask victims. Is it working? Is it
12 not working? You know, and I think that
13 really comes back to what you were asking
14 about some of these things. You were saying
15 some of these things we've done, some of these
16 things we haven't. Some we've done
17 extensively, some we've just tried.
18 Is it working? Is it working? We
19 need to just keep asking, because you know
20 maybe it's something you've done but not
21 enough of, or maybe that wasn't the right
22 thing, or maybe that's exactly the model

1 everyone should -- we don't know yet. But we
2 can know. And you are in such a perfect
3 position to guide that learning.
4 And that's where all of us I think
5 are so excited about the work you're doing.
6 No one else is doing this experimentation on
7 the level that you all are. And you have the
8 opportunity to answer so many of the questions
9 that we have all had in the field.
10 But I think it does start with asking
11 victims, you know, is this working? And I
12 think specifically one of the things I would
13 like to see is a study of following folks who
14 report a sexual assault, where are they one
15 year later? You know, what happened? Not
16 just the outcome of the case, but the outcome
17 of their life on some level.
18 And I think one of the things that
19 will help us with, is coming back to that
20 false reporting question. When we train in
21 this area, what we hear in military audiences,
22 it's a different flavor of exactly what we

1 hear everywhere else.
2 But it's the incentives of false
3 reporting. All you do is file a report. You
4 say you've been raped and you avoid deployment
5 and you get your spouse -- all these goodies
6 flow, is sort of what people say. There's
7 this incentive, this unique incentive to
8 report and therefore falsely report.
9 And I think that's an empirical
10 question. When someone reports a sexual
11 assault, what is the outcome? Not just with
12 the sexual assault case, but any collateral
13 misconduct issues. And then again, their well
14 being. Did they -- what services did they
15 access? How are they doing? And I think that
16 could guide a lot of what we do.
17 DR. BUSCH: I would say that the --
18 also that is true for people who perpetrate.
19 You would want to know -- there's quite a bit
20 of -- there's a body of literature about under
21 what circumstances people perpetrate. Because
22 they don't -- people who perpetrate, don't

1 always perpetrate. So under what
2 circumstances, and what characteristics are,
3 at the time are they perpetrating? And so
4 could you follow that.
5 So I guess you know, the
6 recommendation might be to broaden up the view
7 point so you're getting those data and
8 following it. And the model around an action
9 research plan really engages the practitioners
10 at all levels. Everybody involved in a
11 continuous, with the researchers, the
12 academics, in a continuous dialogue.
13 And that is actually what has changed
14 people quite frankly, in Houston. It is the
15 relationship and the need to be accountable to
16 each other across this continuum of response
17 systems. From the same nurse to the crime lab
18 to the prosecutor, over two and a half years.
19 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: If I could just add
20 something really quick. It's one of the
21 reasons I was trying to give a long term view
22 of the changes I've seen. What we're really

1 good at, both in the military and police
2 departments, is thinking that if I've changed
3 a policy, my problem has been taken care of.
4 And what I was trying to show you is
5 that this is a constant. It takes a lot of
6 work. And you don't just create a policy and
7 think that we've taken care of the problem.
8 Even when we're doing things the way we say
9 we're doing them, changing victims'
10 perceptions, changing the community
11 perception, that's a battle of its own.
12 Even when I'm doing everything right.
13 Which is why I was trying to also talk about
14 going -- what Kim said, is going back to
15 victims all the time. Because it's really
16 easy to say, oh no, that would never happen
17 here because we have a policy against that.
18 I see it all the time, cops tell me that. Oh
19 that could never happen here. I'm like yeah,
20 that's why we have prisons full of people who
21 violated laws.
22 All right, so establishing policy is

actually the easy part. And then changing practice is really difficult, and keeping that up, keeping that sustained. Not over one, two, five years, but over decades of improving and going back to victims and checking in. You know, are we still doing better, right? Have things really changed? That is a constant challenge.

CHAIR JONES: Yes, Liz.

CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Well going back to the point that was made earlier about victim satisfaction. What jurisdictions are doing victim satisfaction evaluations? Are they?

MS. ARCHAMBAULT: We have the numbers. I'm proud to say that San Diego County, not just the PD, which just to give an example, we started our dedicated sex crimes unit in '71. To this day the Sheriff's Office does not have a dedicated sex crimes unit. So there's very different ways of responding within the county of San Diego.

1 But from the county and all of law
2 enforcement, victims, unfortunately only those
3 victims who get forensic exams, which from a
4 scientific evaluation is a little bit biased
5 there. But they actually rated the officers
6 very, very high. We in End Violence Against
7 Women International have tried to promote
8 that. Like for example, Washington D.C. has
9 been in the news a lot, the Metropolitan
10 Police Department.
11 But checking back in. I actually
12 went back over two years and tried, hired
13 multi-lingual advocates, and we tried to go
14 back and do phone interviews with victims.
15 But this, in this civilian population, the
16 victims, they're a very transient population.
17 They're very hard to find, which is why so
18 many of us that do victim satisfaction surveys
19 are doing them around the forensic exam.
20 The victim is given the information
21 there. We don't ask them to fill it out in
22 San Diego County there, because I actually

1 wouldn't allow that. I mean like this
2 victim's already going through all that and
3 now you want me to fill out a form. But they
4 take it with them, and surprisingly our return
5 rate is really, really high.
6 So a lot of communities are going
7 toward checking in, in one way or another.
8 And I think it's really important, because a
9 lot of times people only want to focus on how
10 is law enforcement doing? Where we really
11 need to be evaluating the forensic examiner,
12 the prosecutor's office, as well as advocacy.
13 And we have some communities, some
14 really good models of how that's being done.
15 But it does look different in different
16 communities.
17 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Also, is
18 there a kind of standard -- because this was
19 a question I asked when we had military people
20 appearing at some prior hearings. Is there a
21 standard for the caseload of a victim
22 advocate? I mean how many cases can you

1 handle? Are there norms?
2 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: I don't know that.
3 DR. BUSCH: We do have that data, but
4 I don't have it in front of me.
5 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: If you could
6 share it with us, that's good. Because that's
7 --
8 DR. BUSCH: Yes, I'd be glad to look
9 that up. We did that literature search last
10 year. And also there's a measure called
11 procedural justice theory, that measures some
12 psychological changes around procedural
13 justice. The victim's voice. How they felt
14 heard and it doesn't focus on what happened in
15 the case, but actually the degree to which the
16 victim felt heard, listened to, that would --
17 we are testing that measure in Houston.
18 And then Becky Campbell also has a
19 measure that looks at, across the continuum,
20 of response systems from the SANE nurse to the
21 prosecutor, how the victim perceived that he
22 or she was served by those professionals.

1 Which might also be a good tool to use in
2 terms of evaluation.
3 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Well if you
4 would provide us with that --
5 DR. BUSCH: I'd be glad to.
6 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: That would
7 be great. I would appreciate it very much.
8 DR. LONSWAY: And just to sort of
9 circle back too, and even beyond all of that
10 being true. What I'm also talking about, is
11 beyond victim satisfaction. Because what do
12 they have to compare it to?
13 That is a critical piece of it, but
14 part of what I was talking about too was in
15 terms of archival data. Whatever we can find
16 out about, where is this person for example,
17 a year later? You know, are they still in the
18 military?
19 You know, we don't know some real
20 fundamental questions I think about what
21 happens from the minute you report a rape,
22 what happens, you know? And because we can

1 compare that with some baseline on where
2 someone might have been if they hadn't.
3 It's not going to be perfect, but you
4 have numbers. And so I think that would be a
5 fascinating thing to know.
6 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Well I think
7 that's an important issue for us. Is what
8 kind of evaluations need to be done of these
9 programs. I obviously agree that it needs to
10 be done. We're not just talking about the
11 investigation or the medical help, or the
12 victim advocate, but the whole process.
13 And also what, I mean we're finding
14 the annals of their issues once people get out
15 of the military and then have to deal with the
16 Veteran's Administration. So it's a -- you're
17 laughing.
18 So this is an ongoing process. But
19 any thoughts you have about the evaluation
20 process as this goes forward, because it's one
21 thing to put programs and policies and
22 procedures in place, but how do you know a

1 year from now whether they're working, two
2 years from now. And what information do we
3 need to find -- even assuming that they're in
4 the right direction, how do you fine tune them
5 and how do you improve them.
6 So that was very helpful.
7 DR. LONSWAY: And beyond even the
8 things that we've already talked about here,
9 I think what your potential evaluation ideas,
10 you know one can do quality of work type
11 evaluations. You know poll a sample of
12 investigative reports from folks who have been
13 through the training and folks who haven't,
14 for example. Or now or a year from now. And
15 have experts evaluate the quality of the work.
16 There again, it's not going to be
17 perfect, but if we're looking for measures of,
18 you know for example is our training working?
19 Is it having an effect? Are they doing better
20 investigations? That's not impossible to do
21 that.
22 MEMBER HILLMAN: You all mentioned

1 one thing that I don't think we have time to
2 get into. But a pivot towards the
3 perpetrators. And this last line on the chart
4 up here says decrease its stigma. Well we
5 actually want to increase its stigma for the
6 perpetrators.
7 But we haven't really talked much
8 about that here. But if you have ideas for
9 what we should be doing in order to close
10 those windows of opportunity, those points at
11 which persons do find the ability to exploit
12 the vulnerable populations or -- that would be
13 helpful to us, I think.
14 Because it's a part of the front line
15 services that you are talking about, and that
16 we've heard about today. Those of you have
17 been out there and are out there now, working
18 on this. It's helpful for us to better
19 understand what kind of guidance we might be
20 looking to make sure we're aware of.
21 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: And just to
22 follow up on that. I mean I've asked this a

1 few times. But what understanding do we have
2 that would allow us to screen, if we could,
3 for potential offenders. For example, in
4 terms of recruitment. Are there -- is there
5 a profile? Is anyone studying where there is?
6 Maybe there isn't.
7 DR. LONSWAY: No, there's no such
8 thing as a profile, wouldn't that be nice.
9 But the best predictor --
10 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Now. Excuse
11 me, now there's no profile. Maybe we don't
12 know enough.
13 DR. LONSWAY: Right. And the best
14 predictor we have is prior perpetration. So
15 I guess that was the two parts of it. When we
16 say profile, we're thinking personality
17 characteristics, or whatever. I mean there
18 are some things that are more -- you know that
19 are, along the dimension, more likely to be
20 seen in an offending population then not.
21 So there are variables that
22 differentiate, they're just -- they don't have

1 a clear threshold to say you're in this camp
2 or that. But the second piece of that is you
3 know, if you're going to predict out of a room
4 of 100 people who is likely to sexually
5 assault in the future, the one thing that
6 would be most helpful to know is have they
7 sexually assaulted in the past?
8 It's not perfect prediction. It's
9 not going to be true for everybody, but it
10 would be the best prediction.
11 DR. BUSCH: I think there is a bit of
12 research around. We did a survey around the
13 legal definitions of perpetration and gave it
14 to a sample of men. Have you done these
15 things? A surprising number, and I know it
16 was a small sample, it was surprising
17 percentage said yes.
18 I think we have a lot of work to do.
19 I don't think we know yet. I think we would
20 be remiss in making recommendations
21 specifically about that, other than to say
22 that's where we need a really deep dive.

1 Resources I think, a recommendation around
2 resources going to that to find that out, is
3 probably maybe one of the top priorities.
4 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: And along
5 that line, I mean it's not exactly the same
6 thing, but also research on the victim.
7 Because one of the things that I've learned in
8 this process, is that at least in the
9 military, and maybe it's not true in the
10 civilian sector. But a substantial
11 proportion, more than 40 percent of rape
12 victims in the military, sexual assault
13 victims, have been previously victimized.
14 Well why is that the case? What
15 makes victims more susceptible? And if that's
16 true, what can be done to de-susceptify them?
17 To strengthen them? To protect them? To make
18 those fences that somebody was talking about,
19 budget or otherwise.
20 But in a human sense, I mean have
21 people looked at that? Is there research out
22 there on those subjects?

1 DR. BUSCH: I think that research
2 bears true what you're talking about. And I
3 think one of the things that we haven't done
4 is because the issue of sexual assault is
5 stigmatized and people don't talk about it for
6 20 years to their close -- they don't
7 disclose, is they don't get the help, the
8 assistance that they need.
9 And so then I think we see victims
10 who then may -- some victims who do fine.
11 There's a group of victims who go on and do
12 just fine. And then there are victims who
13 then are troubled by other things, like
14 addictions and that sort of thing and have
15 trouble in school and all those things.
16 And then I think it makes them more
17 vulnerable to You know, sort of that other
18 victimization. And so I think where we
19 haven't addressed the issue immediately. Does
20 that makes sense? And so their first
21 victimization hasn't been addressed. And
22 that's what makes them --

1 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Well
2 whatever the answer is. I'm just suggesting
3 that maybe this is something that the military
4 needs to look at so that it can protect the
5 people that its recruited who fall in this
6 category. And develop some programs to assist
7 them to deal with these problems. Even if
8 they -- so --
9 DR. BUSCH: Can I say amen to that.
10 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Oh okay.
11 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: Can I add to your
12 question though that you asked about
13 profiling. You know law enforcement for many
14 years, we have to go through psychiatric eval
15 and I mean there's all kinds of things.
16 So when some high profile cases
17 occurred in the military with some pretty high
18 ranking folks, I went to some friends and I
19 said, what are you guys doing to screen these
20 folks that get these particular positions?
21 What I was told is that they cannot.
22 And I said you mean to tell me when

1 you've got somebody that goes into special
2 forces, I mean that you're not looking for a
3 certain type of soldier, I mean right? And I
4 was told, yes we can there. But to do
5 anything else for any other sorts of jobs, it
6 would require Congress to make some changes.
7 Because there are -- we can't
8 identify a sex offender, but we know for
9 example in police work, that we can identify
10 people who want to abuse their power. There
11 are certain characteristics that we can look
12 for, and we can try to exclude those folks
13 from ever joining law enforcement.
14 So I just wanted to share that. That
15 I think there are screening tools for some of
16 those military personnel in special
17 assignments and that they can't be applied in
18 other places.
19 MEMBER DUNN: Can I ask one question?
20 CHAIR JONES: Of course.
21 MEMBER DUNN: In your interactions
22 with the community, in terms of trying to get

1 women to report, has there, have any of you,
2 or are you aware of, or have you been involved
3 with a program, that maybe goes beyond the we
4 believe. And more into the hey, you know
5 these guys are out here this is how many
6 sexual assaults we have. This is how many get
7 reported. You need to come forward, it helps
8 you, it helps your community if you will band
9 together.
10 I mean have we ever gone down that
11 path in any type of public campaign?
12 DR. BUSCH: Well I can tell you from
13 the research. Of the 18 percent that do
14 report, one of the reasons that they do report
15 -- there are two reasons that they report.
16 Becky Campbell's research says first
17 of all they report because somebody else helps
18 them report. They say I'm going to take you
19 now to the police or I'm going to take you to
20 the hospital.
21 And the second reason they do it,
22 their second motivation is for that exact

1 reason. So that that offender can be held
2 accountable and it won't happen again. Those
3 are the two primary reasons.
4 So for the 82 percent that don't, we
5 don't know yet. But I can tell you in Houston
6 again, because we have this big project, we're
7 putting out a hotline now for all these cold
8 cases, for the lack of a better word. And
9 some of these cases are 10, 20 and we
10 interviewed some cases that were 30 years old.
11 And I think we'll ask these questions exactly.
12 What we have found and we've
13 interviewed 40 cold case victims, they
14 actually would have -- actually maybe I'm
15 confusing my data for a minute, because those
16 victims did report.
17 Other victims who did not report that
18 we interviewed in the 1200, I think went back
19 to the what Kim presented, they didn't define
20 it as a crime at first. They didn't make
21 sense of it in their head at first. They
22 didn't believe that people would believe.

1 That the veracity of their story would be
2 undermined. They blamed themselves.
3 So that's that stigma part I think is
4 really increasing, or decreasing stigma,
5 whatever the marketing is on it is important.
6 MEMBER DUNN: So it sounds to me
7 though like based on the data that you have,
8 and I realize that all of this is very
9 imperfect. But based on the data you have,
10 and given the nature of the hierarchal nature
11 of the military and the fact that there is
12 essentially a captive audience to do any type
13 of training that you want to do, that there
14 may be some value in training for -- I suppose
15 I won't distinguish between genders, but
16 training for everybody on how to avoid --
17 Well not how to avoid victimization
18 so much, but on the benefits of bringing this
19 to the public, as a tool among many of the
20 other tools that we can use.
21 DR. BUSCH: Can I -- I was just going
22 to say, and I think there's a lot of effort

1 now about men standing with men against rape
2 as an effort to pivot a little bit on around
3 accountability. Men holding other men
4 accountable as a way to get to the same place,
5 but a different avenue.
6 DR. LONSWAY: And I want to respond
7 to that too. Yes, what Noel just said is
8 true, that we know that for victims who report
9 and victims who remain engaged in the system,
10 a very common reason they will give is because
11 they don't want this to happen again. That is
12 a very common reason.
13 So yes, that is a motivation for many
14 folks who do come forward and stay engaged.
15 To imply then that that would be something
16 that we would teach victims and potential
17 victims, that if this happens to you, here's
18 what you need to do. They know that already
19 and feel that.
20 I think it's unfair to put that
21 burden on folks who are -- the sexual assault
22 was unfair enough. And devastates one's life

1 to a certain point to say now you have to go
2 through this even perhaps more miserable
3 experience.
4 And again we know the impact of that
5 on people over time. I think it's unfair.
6 It's too much to ask of people to sort of put
7 our efforts there.
8 I think what you're asking really
9 connects to the previous question, which is
10 this is one of the things that keeps me up at
11 night. The fact that someone who was sexually
12 assaulted, just like I said with perpetration,
13 if you want to know who's most likely to be
14 victimized, most likely sexually assaulted,
15 again it's not a perfect measure, but the
16 single variable that will give you the most
17 information is have they been sexually
18 assaulted in the past?
19 And that is -- again, working in this
20 field, it's disturbing enough. But that is so
21 fundamentally unfair on some level, that that
22 burden would be borne so much on some folks.

1 But when we think about perpetration,
2 if you imagine for a moment that you are
3 wanting to sexually assault someone, you're
4 going to look for -- and we go back to our
5 sheep where started this morning. If you want
6 to commit a sexual assault, or at least your
7 indifferent to whether or not that's what it
8 is, you're going to look for someone who's
9 vulnerable and/or you're going to make them
10 more vulnerable. And you're going to look for
11 somebody who lacks credibility. So that even
12 if they do come forward, they're not taken
13 seriously.
14 And so if I'm out looking for someone
15 to target and I'm looking for vulnerability
16 and lack of credibility. Chances are that
17 whatever I see someone else is going to see as
18 well.
19 So of course, we all want folks who
20 have been sexually assaulted to shore them up,
21 give them -- we want to do everything we can
22 to make sure this doesn't happen again. But

1 if we don't address the perpetration, it's
2 just going be not this persons, the next
3 person. And You know that. I'm not
4 suggesting imply that.
5 So yes, whatever we can do to shore
6 up the resources and help people to heal,
7 obviously is good on its face. Whether or not
8 it does prevention. But that's not going to
9 get us anywhere until we deal with the
10 perpetration piece as you know.
11 MEMBER COOK: But as part of that
12 training initiative that was just mentioned,
13 based on what has been presented today. It
14 would not be unfair to put that burden in part
15 on the bystanders that are there and watching.
16 The situations that created, get created,
17 especially within a military culture where
18 frequently, not always, but alcohol, or a
19 group environment, or we got battle buddies.
20 You want to watch out for them.
21 And maybe by doing that education,
22 You may keep somebody from becoming that

1 perpetrator or becoming that victim, because
2 there's somebody else watching out for the
3 people who may become involved. And that
4 might be a fair focus in the training process.
5 DR. LONSWAY: Yes, absolutely.
6 MEMBER COOK: I don't think is
7 actually addressed as much as maybe it could
8 be.
9 DR. LONSWAY: I think absolutely.
10 Because the goal there is protecting my
11 friend, my colleagues.
12 MEMBER COOK: Right.
13 DR. LONSWAY: So protecting someone
14 from harm, very different motivation then
15 saying, you who were just sexually assaulted,
16 you are now responsible for preventing this
17 person from perpetrating again. Those are
18 very different things. I think you're
19 absolutely right.
20 DR. BUSCH: And then how do you make
21 it safe for that person to report potential
22 perpetrators? I mean that is a real

1 challenge. Because bystanders, the backlash
2 on bystanders, right, I think is a real
3 challenge. I think that's where the field is
4 going. The civilian field is going in that
5 direction.
6 There's quite a bit of work being
7 done in that area. Again I don't know that
8 it's being evaluated as effectively as it can
9 or should be.
10 MEMBER BRYANT: Along the same lines
11 as General Dunn's questions in terms of
12 reporting that we've been discussing. What
13 did you think -- and I'm going, she's on the
14 spot, she's still here. What did you think of
15 Sergeant Donegan's public service piece?
16 Where they victims coming by, and they had
17 various excuses. Were you here to see that?
18 DR. BUSCH: Yes.
19 MEMBER BRYANT: For not reporting.
20 And then having them say, what did you think
21 of the effectiveness of that? And suppose we
22 added the piece that then said, and by the way

1 in so many words, sexual offenders usually
2 have X number of victims. And that --
3 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: Actually, I brought
4 some brochures for you all to figure out.
5 What Sergeant Donegan was talking about
6 actually, was borne of the Making a Difference
7 Projects, which were started in eight states
8 in the United States, and eight provinces in
9 Canada.
10 And that whole concept was actually
11 borne of my frustration with the fact that
12 this isn't about law enforcement. I, for
13 example, I'm never going to sit on a jury.
14 I'm never going to be selected on a sexual
15 assault trial jury, right?
16 So I knew again, my practice wisdom,
17 I learned a new word today. My practice
18 wisdom said, we're not the only problem here.
19 We have a problem with all the gatekeepers out
20 there, the mothers and the fathers and the
21 sisters and the neighbors.
22 MEMBER BRYANT: But did you think it

1 was effective in encouraging people to come
2 forward and report?
3 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: No, there was a
4 reason that I was going there. That -- Liz
5 was the first person out of those sixteen
6 teams, the first agency to go back and create
7 that campaign, which is actually the Start by
8 Believing campaign that Dr. Lonsway talked
9 about. So yes, I mean we know that the first
10 thing that we have to do when we talk about
11 that funnel of attrition, is to get those 80
12 percent of those victims who choose not to
13 come to us.
14 So I think it's a very, very
15 effective and if you actually -- I'll give
16 you the Start by Believing brochure. But we
17 talk about, not just believing when these
18 victims disclose to us. But we talk about our
19 failure whether you're the father or the
20 cousin. Our failure, based on research, is
21 that there are going to be five more victims
22 from this perpetrator. Because the average

1 perpetrator with adults, offends six times.
2 And you know we've got Dr. Lisak and
3 McWhorter, I mean there's some good solid
4 research. So of course I'm biased because we
5 were all part of creating that campaign. And
6 then took the Start by Believing campaign on
7 an even much larger level then Liz did in
8 Austin.
9 MEMBER BRYANT: Well in line with the
10 statistics that so many victims stick with it
11 though the investigation/prosecution process
12 because they don't want there to be other
13 victims or if there are other victims, they
14 want them to come forward. I don't know
15 whether this, that piece is being used in
16 other jurisdictions, but it certainly seemed
17 in a very encouraging way to encourage victims
18 to come forward. It covered almost every
19 scope of why I didn't go forward.
20 MS. ARCHAMBAULT: But what's so
21 incredible for us in law enforcement is that
22 came from a law enforcement agency. So

1 whereas, we're used to seeing advocates saying
2 those things, come to us, we'll welcome you,
3 we'll treat you well. Yes, we have examples
4 of agencies all over the country.
5 We are so excited about this Start by
6 Believing campaign, which this Austin PSA that
7 you saw is just a tiny piece of what law
8 enforcement agencies all over the country are
9 doing and changing. Like for example, we
10 typically interview our victims in
11 interrogation rooms. They look like
12 interrogation rooms on purpose. It's no
13 accident. But something as simple as having
14 a couch, and a plant and a carpet and a piece
15 of art. And Caldwell, Idaho has on their wall
16 Start by Believing.
17 I mean so, that's my passion, is
18 changing the criminal justice response. I
19 mean this is all a part of it. We know that
20 there have been incredible changes in the way
21 law enforcement agencies like Austin have
22 changed their community perception of who

1 they're going to be treated based on public
2 service announcements like that.
3 MEMBER BRYANT: Thank you.
4 DR. BUSCH: I can just add one piece
5 from our research. We've asked victims what
6 would make a difference for you to engage or
7 re-engage in the criminal justice system? And
8 it's having an advocate that they felt like
9 they could trust and call any time.
10 Which has been a really important
11 piece of our implementation of the justice
12 advocate who's embedded with law enforcement.
13 Which is different than their community based
14 advocate. If I can make a differentiation
15 between, they have a community based advocate
16 and they also have a systems based advocate.
17 This Justice Advocate is embedded in
18 the investigation unit and really serves as a
19 lead -- so she has the ability to see
20 restricted information and help the
21 investigator with his or her investigation,
22 but also stay in touch with the victim.

1 It's a very interesting and different
2 model. And we are testing that model now.
3 And the reason is that the community based
4 advocate needs to be able to stay at a
5 different place then this justice advocate,
6 who needs to be able to help this investigator
7 move that case along in a different way.
8 So we're actually testing that model
9 to see if it works. And this is what victims
10 have told us empirically that they would
11 engage or re-engage if they felt like they had
12 somebody who they could call all the time.
13 And investigators can't do that. They just
14 can't have the social work perspective, or we
15 can't ask investigators to do that.
16 So that's been our solution and we'll
17 see how that turns out. The interim report
18 has been pretty fabulous.
19 CHAIR JONES: Well I want to thank
20 you very much. First of all, the tremendous
21 amount of work you've all done is incredibly
22 impressive and the insights that you've shared

1 are great.
2 You certainly focused me on the
3 incredible opportunity that we have here in
4 studying the military. And it in fact is a
5 study that could be terrific for the entire
6 country, because there has been an upsurge in
7 reporting.
8 It is chronologically related to a
9 number of initiatives, interdisciplinary
10 initiatives as you've mentioned. And to
11 really drill, seems to be the favorite word
12 these days, drill down into it and see what's
13 effective, what's not. And what are the
14 causes and results, just is a tremendous
15 opportunity for everybody.
16 And we are particularly interested as
17 Congresswoman Holtzman mentioned before, in
18 understanding, hearing from victims and what
19 worked for them. But we need to do it in the
20 right way. And it's my understanding from
21 what I've heard from other military
22 presenters, that they have every intention of

doing this type of survey.

So any additional information, particularly in that area that you could present to us would be terrific. Thank you so much.

DR. BUSCH: Thank you.

CHAIR JONES: Do we want to have public comment?

COLONEL HAM: Ma'am we have two people who requested to make public comments. So if we could take a short break and make sure those people are here and ready.

CHAIR JONES: Okay. Thanks Colonel.

(Whereupon, the foregoing meeting went off the record at 5:29 p.m. and went back on at 5:37 p.m.)

CHAIR JONES: All right, Colonel Ham.

COLONEL HAM: Ma'am, this is Major Melissa Brown.

MAJOR BROWN: Good evening.

CHAIR JONES: Good evening. I think that's where we're at, evening, right?

1 MAJOR BROWN: It will probably be
2 dark when we get outside, yes.
3 CHAIR JONES: Okay. You're welcome,
4 thank you for coming.
5 MAJOR BROWN: Thank you ma'am. I
6 wanted to come and speak today. I knew you
7 guys were coming to Texas. I'm an officer in
8 the Texas National Guard. I've served on
9 active duty. And I recently found the
10 motivation to share my story and for the
11 benefit of others.
12 And so I believe that the public
13 service announcements that we saw from the
14 Austin Police Department are needed. I saw
15 the story of a young private on the Army
16 website and she told her story of sexual
17 assault. And utilizing the military system
18 and felt that if she could do it, then I
19 should do the same.
20 So I began that through my initial
21 commander, and I shared with him my
22 experiences, and asked him to help me in any

1 way that he could to facilitate sharing my
2 story. And improving what I feel is at a
3 point now that it was really being looked at
4 to change. And hopefully we can change it for
5 the better.
6 In June, 2005 as I sat in a parking
7 lot in my car getting sick at 6:00 in the
8 morning when I should be going off to PT with
9 my unit, I was dressed for it. I ready to go.
10 But I started to get sick. And I knew
11 something was wrong.
12 But I didn't have the courage at that
13 point to pick up a phone and call 911 and have
14 police come and get me and take me where I
15 should have gone. Instead, I thought I need
16 to go home and fix this and change my clothes
17 and get to work and do my job, because that's
18 what I'm supposed to do.
19 And I think that that's probably a
20 reason that many individuals don't report when
21 they need to for their cases to be prosecuted.
22 It took me a year and a half, and personal,

1 physical distress, to actually go seek help
2 and then finally report my sexual assault.
3 Part of that was driven by my
4 requirement to deploy. I felt that reporting
5 it would distract my unit and distract me from
6 that mission that I was given. So I ended up
7 spending a year living about 100 feet away
8 from the man that assaulted me and that again
9 probably did more damage than anything else.
10 But when I went and made my initial
11 report, it was well received. The SARC, she
12 took great care of me. She took the report,
13 gave me the information I needed. And about
14 two months later, I was in training, and that
15 same lady walked down an aisle and touched a
16 gentleman on the shoulder and said if this guy
17 did such and such, would you guys think that
18 was wrong?
19 And it just happened that the person
20 she touched was the man that had assaulted me.
21 And it dawned on me at that moment that he
22 could do it again. And I owed to everyone

1 else to get up and say something. So I went
2 back to her and said we need to investigate.
3 And earlier some of you, some other
4 members discussed the fact that the victim has
5 the right to request prosecution. I don't
6 believe that's a true statement, because the
7 commander has that right. The commander will
8 chose who they prosecute based on the
9 recommendation of the legal officer.
10 I've been a commander and I
11 understand that from my own situation. I can
12 want to prosecute something, but having the
13 burden of proof is extremely important before
14 you prosecute. Because if a soldier takes
15 that charge to a court-martial, it can easily
16 be dismissed. So commanders, while they may
17 want to do the right thing, may not be able to
18 because of the report they're given in the
19 investigation.
20 As the gentleman from the Oregon
21 police department spoke and talked about how
22 they have established their system, which

1 allows victims to stop an investigation or at
2 any point along the course. I think it's
3 something that the military desperately needs.
4 Because I wanted to report so that my
5 case was investigated so this person would be
6 stopped. And because of the time lapse
7 between the incident and my report, that
8 didn't really matter. There was no evidence
9 to be gathered, there was nothing to be
10 delivered to that commander so that they could
11 pursue and prosecute.
12 But I believe the military has many
13 other avenues that could be established so
14 that when a case was substantiated that
15 someone had committed a crime, but maybe we
16 didn't have the burden of proof that's
17 required in a criminal case, that there should
18 be other options afforded to commanders. So
19 that they can remove those people from
20 service. So that they can be flagged. So
21 that they're not placed in positions of trust
22 and responsibility where they can continue to

1 victimize and perpetrate.
2 I, like many other people, reported
3 because of my duty to protect and my
4 responsibility. Some of the things you guys
5 have brought up I felt I had some ideas for.
6 Victim advocates, you can't place people in
7 those jobs that don't want to do it. They
8 have to be recommended by, I believe, their
9 commanders and I think they should be
10 endorsed.
11 You know I can look in my military
12 formation and tell you which people I would
13 trust. And which people I would ask to do
14 that job if they were interested. But I think
15 it needs to be a 360 assessment that they're
16 the right person for the job. And they be
17 supported to do it. And not assigned because
18 we need to put a name on the line.
19 Another issue is with a restricted
20 report, there's only three ways to get into
21 the system. Once a victim's assaulted, if
22 they go to anything outside of those three

1 arenas, it becomes unrestricted, and it's
2 everybody's business.
3 If I needed to go to a friend, and
4 that's probably the best place for someone to
5 go, is to someone they trust. Once I tell
6 that soldier, they have an obligation to
7 report it. It's an unrestricted report, and
8 then everything goes out, my privacy goes out
9 the window.
10 So if the military would expand that,
11 that a first responder, if I told my battle
12 buddy or I told my supervisor, and they took
13 me into the chaplain, the victim advocate, the
14 hospital, I think that should be allowed as a
15 restricted report. Because that's the line of
16 security and advocacy that the victim needs.
17 That right now they can't get. If they tell
18 their roommate, their roommate has an
19 obligation to report it and the victim can no
20 longer make a restricted report.
21 So I think expanding some of those
22 restrictions would improve people's, victim's

1 confidences in the system. Because it's also
2 that battle buddy that sees their friend that
3 isn't helped. That doesn't want to encourage
4 anyone else to report it or doesn't do it when
5 they're later victimized.
6 And we have a lot of trust to develop
7 and improve so that we all believe that as
8 things happen, they will be appropriately
9 investigated and referred for action so that
10 these people are removed and our forces are
11 safe.
12 As for measures, I think transparency
13 is the most important thing. We need to
14 report what happens. We need to not hide it.
15 But investigations that are started and
16 completed, those are probably the most
17 important thing, along with the referred
18 investigations.
19 And we should all know how many
20 investigations are dismissed because of lack
21 of evidence or how many people are kept in
22 service that have had substantiated sexual

1 assault charges brought against them. It's
2 certainly not the people that I want to stand
3 next to in a formation.
4 The training that we ask of our
5 military, we're right now at a training burn
6 out. I think about every 30 to 60 days we
7 hear about a new suicide prevention training
8 program, or sexual assault training program
9 and we've got to be very specific about what
10 we add to the plate to ensure that it's
11 supported and it's effective.
12 I know you guys spoke about measures
13 and making sure what we do is gauged for
14 success, to see if it's effective. That's one
15 thing that we're very bad at doing. We
16 implement and implement and implement. And we
17 really do need to test, evaluate, and then
18 apply that across a bigger spectrum.
19 So I do believe some training needs
20 to change. I have started participating in my
21 state. I've gone to our state SARC and given
22 her my name. Talked to her about my story.

1 And she's got me on the billet to talk and
2 participate in our future SARRT training. And
3 I look forward to being able to help our
4 soldiers in any way and make something better
5 out of my situation.
6 CHAIR JONES: You know I have to say,
7 you are the most important type of witness
8 that we could hope to hear from. First of all
9 I think you've hit on a number of things that
10 we've been poking around the edges at. But to
11 have you validate some of these things is just
12 extraordinarily important.
13 I think we all agree the victim's
14 advocates are incredibly important. And so
15 your idea that they should be people who are
16 really excellent and want to do the job right
17 on the money.
18 I think that your notion that perhaps
19 a friend or a confidant should be included in
20 the list of people that you can report to
21 without making it unrestricted, is also
22 something that we've already heard about in a

1 briefing, in terms of the Army's thinking. So
2 this is again another endorsement of an idea
3 coming from exactly the person that knows and
4 can really validate what people are trying to
5 analyze from however many thousand feet up we
6 are.
7 So anyway, I don't know if anyone
8 else has any questions or comments. But I --
9 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: I just
10 wanted to thank you very much for coming
11 forward in this very thoughtful way. I know
12 it was an extraordinarily painful and
13 traumatic experience. But not everybody turns
14 it into helping other people, not to mention
15 helping themselves.
16 So thank you very much for your
17 testimony here. And for your willingness to
18 help other victims.
19 MAJOR BROWN: Thank you ma'am.
20 CHAIR JONES: Thank you.
21 COLONEL HAM: Ma'am, this is Daniel
22 Ross.

1 CHAIR JONES: Mr. Ross, Daniel Ross.
2 Yes.
3 MR. ROSS: Chairwoman Jones and
4 distinguished panelists. My name is Dan Ross.
5 I am an attorney here in Austin. I graduated
6 from the University of Texas, both as an
7 undergrad and in the School of Law. And I
8 have experience representing victims of sexual
9 assault, including children.
10 I have dealt with military
11 investigations in the course of my practice.
12 And so I have some familiarity with the topics
13 that were brought up here today. And I want to
14 tell you I'm very, very glad that this panel
15 exists and I'm hopeful that this will result
16 in some changes being made in the military and
17 its reaction to sexual assault.
18 I want to say that the woman, Ms.
19 Jones who was here, and I forgot her rank, but
20 I just want to say that the courage that she
21 exhibited here today to come and speak up, and
22 the courage she exhibited 15, 20 years ago,

1 or I can't remember what the date was, but the
2 courage that she exhibited in reporting, she
3 has in common with a number of my clients who
4 - it is a very courageous thing to step up
5 and stand up and say that I've been sexually
6 assaulted and I want some degree of justice.
7 I am at the end of the -- I'm the
8 last resort for justice. I'm a civil
9 attorney. I sue defendants for committing,
10 among other things, sexual assault against my
11 clients. I also do a lot of education, or a
12 lot of, I'm sorry, employment law.
13 And I notice that there are a lot of
14 similarities between my work as an employment
15 lawyer and my work as a personal injury lawyer
16 interested in helping victims of sexual
17 assault and others achieve justice. And we
18 are often the last people that can give, that
19 can at least allow them to have their day in
20 court.
21 I am the chairman of the advisory
22 committee of the Institute on Domestic

1 Violence and Sexual Assault, of which Dr.
2 Busch-Armendariz is the head. And it was --
3 I've gotten to know her through my profession.
4 We have done numerous focus groups because I
5 want to know before I walk into a courtroom,
6 I want to know what the people walk in, what
7 they have on their blackboards when they walk
8 into a courtroom.
9 And sexual assault is very hard to
10 even -- and people's opinions about sexual
11 assault, jurors, is very hard to get out of
12 them. So I have to go to focus groups to find
13 out what they think so that I can start
14 understanding who's going to be on my jury and
15 what they're going to be thinking.
16 So asking Dr. Busch for statistics
17 and for research on those topics, I've found
18 that there is a huge gulf. And I'm just
19 talking about in America in general. I know
20 and specifically in Texas based on her
21 research, but in America in general, there is
22 a huge gulf between what people, the average

1 person thinks about sexual assault, and what
2 really, really are the statistics about sexual
3 assault.
4 There are rape myths that exist.
5 Rape myths that are pervasive. And in doing
6 these focus groups I learned that like the
7 most common problem when somebody says they
8 were sexually assaulted, when a victim says
9 it, the most common problem is that that about
10 70 to 80 percent of the people say well, she
11 must have had it coming.
12 It is at least in the focus groups
13 that I've been in, and for whatever reason,
14 they have this negative attribution that they
15 attribute to the victim. And I think that's
16 based on these rape myths that rape is
17 something, or sexual assault is something that
18 occurs in the back alley, or you know, with
19 people that you don't know. When in fact it
20 occurs most often in a person's own home or in
21 the home of someone that they are familiar
22 with.

1 And so it is that -- somehow we've
2 got to catch up people's -- what is on their
3 blackboard, what's on their minds. Their
4 perceptions of sexual assault. We've got to
5 somehow catch that up with the research that's
6 being done, and which are the facts. Because
7 it's very difficult to get around those deeply
8 held beliefs on the part of a juror. So
9 educating people about sexual assault, in my
10 opinion, is of upmost importance.
11 The second thing that I think is
12 important and this is true in the civil work
13 that I do for Title VII cases. Which most of
14 every Title VII case, Title VII is the law
15 that prohibits discrimination based on race,
16 religion, gender, national origin, age,
17 disability, that Federal law and the state
18 equivalents of those laws.
19 And it is hard for me to even
20 remember a case that I have taken that does
21 not involve retaliation for reporting whatever
22 it is. Whether it's sexual harassment,

1 whether it's any sort of discrimination that
2 is protected. And it is the institutional
3 problem in dealing with the victims I think
4 that is certainly a factor, if not one of the
5 larger factors, of why people don't report.
6 Imagine if you will a woman walking
7 to her car after visiting the mall, say, and
8 walking to her car. She unlocks the door and
9 someone comes up behind her, clubs her on the
10 head and just maybe robs her, but she falls
11 down and when she comes to, or when she wakes
12 up, or when she gets her wits about her,
13 what's the first thing she does? She calls
14 the police.
15 Have the same scenario occur and have
16 a sexual assault, and we know from research
17 that only 20 percent, or only well, less than
18 20 percent of people report that sexual
19 assault. If you start looking at it, you
20 start seeing the stigma that's associated with
21 sexual assault and that's what we have to
22 eliminate. And we also have to eliminate the

1 fear of retaliation.
2 To do that, you have to let people
3 know. And not just the victims, but the
4 perpetrators, or the potential perpetrators
5 are aware, that there is a system in place
6 whereby if someone reports a sexual assault,
7 they can go over the heads of their superiors
8 and they can be safe. And that sexual assault
9 allegation will be treated seriously and will
10 not result in retaliation against the person
11 who was assaulted.
12 To me that is the key of increasing
13 the reporting. Once you increase the
14 reporting of the incidence of sexual assault,
15 and once the perpetrators or potential
16 perpetrators are aware of the fact that it is
17 easier and easier to report, and that
18 retaliation is not going to occur for that
19 report. They will become aware that they
20 can't get away with it as easily as they may
21 now, simply because of the numbers of people
22 who do not report.

1 You talked a little bit a while ago
2 about why 40 percent of sexual assault victims
3 were prior victims. I think you looked at it
4 in terms of predictors for sexual assaults.
5 And you know, it can really only be a few
6 things, right? It can only be something to do
7 with the victim or something to do with the
8 perpetrator.
9 But there is something that happens.
10 It could be on a subconscious level. But
11 perpetrators or predators prey on the
12 vulnerable. And they have a way of detecting
13 the vulnerable. People who have been victims,
14 victims of childhood sexual assault, or prior
15 sexual assaults, often put themselves in
16 situations where they are more likely to be
17 assaulted because they don't have the radar
18 that people who haven't been sexually
19 assaulted or, particularly, sexually assaulted
20 as children may have.
21 They're not so aware of the fact that
22 they read or they miscue the cues that they're

1 getting. And I think that is something that
2 ought to be looked at, but I wish I could tell
3 you how to do that, but I can't.
4 I know though that the issue is a
5 huge problem. And what I would ask you do to
6 do is when you do come up with rules and
7 listen to these experts like Dr. Busch-
8 Armendariz, and the people that have spoken
9 today, that you think about the most
10 fundamental thing is to get, and important
11 thing, is to get people to report and to make
12 it so that it is safe to report. Thank you.
13 CHAIR JONES: Thank you very much Mr.
14 Ross. Colonel Ham?
15 COLONEL HAM: Ma'am, does the panel
16 wish to discuss any release of information at
17 this point in time?
18 CHAIR JONES: Yes. Professor
19 Hillman, do you want to go ahead?
20 MEMBER HILLMAN: This is a draft
21 prepared to summarize by our terrific staff.
22 I think -- and it's submitted for the review

1 of the panel before it's released so that we
2 might be able to post this and inform the
3 public more generally about some of the topics
4 that the presenters brought to us today.
5 It has a public education benefit
6 here of sharing what everybody shared with us
7 today to a broader audience and allow us to
8 signal the direction of our work and
9 understanding the issues before us. So if
10 everybody could look at it and see if they
11 have comments.
12 You had a question. Colonel Ham, this
13 is our fourth public meeting, is that correct?
14 COLONEL HAM: That's correct ma'am.
15 MEMBER HILLMAN: Just checking.
16 If there are any typos or small
17 changes that you wanted to submit, I'm sure
18 that our staff could make those changes before
19 we -- if anybody has. I see Colonel Cook
20 looks like a great editor to my right, has
21 made some edits in this.
22 MEMBER COOK: Yes.

1 MEMBER HILLMAN: And that we could
2 make those, but if the overall content looks
3 appropriate, maybe we could approve it once
4 everybody has a chance to read it.
5 COLONEL HAM: I see one place
6 referred to as hearings rather than meetings.
7 Little things like that, ma'am.
8 MEMBER COOK: Colonel Ham, what's the
9 process in turning a spelling error or two,
10 things like that. I think we can do off the
11 record. But to the extent you know, if I'm
12 sitting here looking at this and talking about
13 Mr. Strand's testimony this morning where he
14 talked about he supervises the training for
15 Army personnel. But he also supervises and
16 oversaw some of the training that was for Army
17 and other military personnel from the other
18 services.
19 You know clarifications like that, or
20 things like Major Oakley who is here from
21 Secretary of Defense's Office for Personnel
22 and Readiness. Who talked not just about the

1 act itself, but more relevant for him was and
2 the DoD policy for implementing the legal
3 requirements.
4 Clarifications like that where it
5 doesn't change the substance of what's in
6 here, but it just merely clarifies them in
7 some ways. Does all of those changes have to
8 be on the record in this forum, or can minor
9 modifications like that just be submitted to
10 whomever drafted this particular release?
11 CHAIR JONES: I think we can just
12 make those types of edits. Has everyone read
13 everything for substance? And is there any
14 substantive disagreement?
15 MEMBER COOK: No.
16 CHAIR JONES: All right. Then I
17 think it's approved and we will take some time
18 right now after we leave here so you can all
19 go too. And we'll make a few amendments along
20 the lines that Professor Hillman suggested.
21 CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Just a
22 question, is this going to be on stationary?

Do we have stationary? I mean just for immediate release, but release by whom, and whom do they contact? The press and so forth, that needs to be on here.

COLONEL HAM: Ma'am, on the last day, I'm sorry, on the last page it gives the Deputy Staff Director as the contact.

CONGRESSWOMAN HOLTZMAN: Yes, but it should be on page one.

CHAIR JONES: We can fix that.

MEMBER BRYANT: We should comment I think for those who are present, that we do this without the benefit of a trained public information officer. So we're on our own, breaking new ground here.

CHAIR JONES: Thank you. Thank you Mr. Bryant. I think that was all said. All right. Thanks very much everyone for attending the hearings. And for all of your contributions.

(Whereupon, the above meeting was concluded at 6:07 p.m.)

A

$105,000 196:4
$42.8 444:6
a.m 1:13 5:2 120:6 120:7
ABC 267:11
Abel 25:2,12 30:14 30:20
ability 181:15,17 191:1 196:15 254:2 391:12 392:18,22 401:7 402:16 426:12 472:11 492:19
able 12:10 13:4 64:13 69:10 71:8 83:14 116:13 143:7 154:8 197:6 197:7,8 198:12 209:19 213:3 218:19 240:20 261:4 272:15 277:12,19 287:20 289:5 294:14 297:5,6,10 367:9 372:21 379:15 389:8 392:22 452:3 454:16 456:5 459:5,8 493:4,6 499:17 505:3 516:2
above-entitled 120:5 257:5 353:20
above-mentioned 196:1
abrupt 450:9
absolute 459:7
absolutely 79:15 96:4 268:17 312:13,17 352:20 353:7,12 372:1 412:12 425:20 486:5,9,19
absolutes 459:3
abuse 98:19 123:22 126:7 129:6 131:14 132:10,11 133:8 142:8 186:9 211:20 288:11 300:11,12,13 384:20 390:7 401:10 402:10 409:15 427:18 478:10
abuse/sexual 29:18
abusive 255:4
academic 4:9 10:17 12:7 354:6,8,20 354:22 355:2 384:3 435:12
academics 21:12 24:19 449:19 463:12
academy 200:3 201:18 203:21 247:22 271:2 395:12
accept 41:19
acceptable 53:7
accepted 92:4 97:15 168:19
access 140:7 369:10 369:12 462:15
accessible 6:20 324:6 453:14
accident 50:16 67:12,20 491:13
accommodate 235:15
accommodating 268:21
accomplish 134:9 194:12
accomplished 320:2
account 100:14 244:5
accountability 84:3 135:4 437:8 438:5 454:19 482:3
accountable 116:12 272:20 289:20 387:4 437:16 463:15 480:2 482:4
accredited 263:1,2
accurate 281:15 389:17
accurately 61:3
accusations 40:9
accused 66:22 194:17
achievable 442:9
achieve 240:9 448:14 508:17
acquaintance 43:11
acquaintances 324:17
acquired 255:14
acquisition 170:9
act 5:21 6:9 9:8,18 17:5 18:18 122:13 123:18 195:8 225:9 358:5 518:1
acting 101:13
action 110:20 230:6 230:7 265:12 447:4 463:8 503:9
actions 188:4
activated 127:10
activates 58:1
active 169:5 179:22 192:14 193:21 194:4 248:8,13,14 249:4 436:10 496:9
activities 10:15 256:11
activity 187:8
actor 442:1
acts 25:16 27:22 32:9 116:10 117:14
actual 27:15 152:9 157:4
acute 274:18 349:20
adamant 407:21
add 171:10 178:10 191:19 303:10 308:12 463:19 477:11 492:4 504:10
add-on 248:18,18
added 35:16 95:9 96:19 168:7 211:14 340:9 385:16 404:20 487:22
addictions 476:14
adding 144:4 339:5 385:14
addition 12:18 122:20 202:7,10 202:19 211:14 352:21 384:18
additional 6:5 36:16 86:19 101:19 111:3 118:11 121:10 134:19 141:6,8 147:12 164:11 168:4,6 171:4 178:22 181:21 186:11 195:15,17 195:21 196:13 199:9,21 200:1 201:11,15 202:20 211:11,17 232:14 233:22 274:22 279:15 292:13 299:18 300:7 325:5 365:6 418:21 495:2
Additionally 184:13 195:12
address 6:16 7:2,4 7:5 106:17 135:10 161:5 164:18 165:4 169:2 186:18 189:5,14 224:13,20 251:11 303:18 304:22 305:4 378:13 404:10 433:22 437:1 442:20 458:16 485:1
addressed 134:7 321:22 439:15 476:19,21 486:7
addresses 318:16 319:2 370:18 441:7
addressing 11:6 84:18,21 85:1 186:8 188:15 317:22 375:14 439:3
adequately 89:19
adjudicate 9:11
adjudicated 28:7 444:11
adjudication 434:14 437:5
administering 130:6
Administration 470:16
administrative 146:22 149:15
administrators 440:14
Admiral 1:16 173:18
Admirals 156:1
admissions 25:5
admit 17:22
admitted 25:16,21
admittedly 172:2
adolescents 32:7 53:8
adopted 106:7 113:8,8 161:8 242:3 269:16 416:5
adult 1:3 5:12 9:12 30:16,17 31:16 32:14 43:16 84:13 94:7 119:7 126:11 186:8,20 187:1,3 199:17 244:19
adults 33:1 490:1
advance 170:1 246:21

advanced 131:14 132:1 187:3,4 191:11 195:19 199:16 203:16 211:18 239:7,18 240:17 242:9 243:19 245:1 246:17
advancement 167:10,22
advances 135:8 376:4
advantage 23:11 49:7 83:6,7
advantages 391:5
adverse 77:2,3
advice 128:20 130:16,16 142:9 160:15 229:11 338:5
advise 212:20 215:21 216:6,19 218:5
advisement 225:14 226:1
advising 221:4
advisor 342:3
advisory 6:7,9 130:11 419:1 508:21
advocacy 2:18 120:21 123:14 131:8 132:9 133:7 187:11 259:6 274:14 276:14 278:16 279:13 287:4 305:20 306:3 321:5 325:9 325:11 336:6,13 366:7 379:17 380:6 381:3,9 382:14 383:1 467:12 502:16
advocate 2:9 3:3 88:16 129:15 152:5,13,17 153:6 164:7,10,15 167:1 168:16 169:12,13 178:13 179:9 218:5 260:1 275:6 276:8,12 282:4 348:11 380:4,18 381:17 407:22 408:21 409:3 451:18,21 452:8 467:22 470:12 492:8,12,14,15,16 492:17 493:4,5 502:13
advocates 13:10 88:12 89:4 104:18 104:19 126:13,16 128:12 130:15 132:6,10 134:22 137:6 145:10 160:16 170:4 175:8,10 194:14 194:16 196:16,22 197:1 200:10,12 214:1 273:14 275:4 280:15 299:11,12 327:5 331:7 381:11,12 381:16 382:9 393:4,13 407:16 407:18,19 408:3 416:13 437:13 440:18,18 466:13 491:1 501:6 505:14
AEquitas 150:5
affairs 2:19 123:12 123:13 392:2 414:10 418:4
affect 77:1 173:13 209:5
affiliates 435:17
afford 289:2,5
afforded 288:15 500:18
affords 196:13
Afghanistan 15:19 207:14
afraid 97:13,16 360:10,19 375:16
after-hours 267:13
aftermath 363:6
afternoon 12:15 28:12 120:12 257:9,10 269:22 270:6
afterward 98:7
age 17:15 216:10 511:16
agencies 27:3 127:2 194:18 198:3 202:21 203:3 236:13 246:10,20 246:21 248:7 250:3 306:19 309:7 327:12 328:13 329:12 348:22 376:8 377:13 378:3,4 386:8 389:19 425:10 428:6 491:4,8,21
agency 159:11 193:2 195:2 198:6 248:10 325:18,19 381:7 386:9 396:18 489:6 490:22
agenda 448:1
agent 3:1 44:3,4 57:9 69:19 70:16 70:17 146:20 159:22 186:2 191:17 192:7,13 194:2,19,19 199:7 199:13 200:3 201:4 210:7 211:5 211:16,22 212:2 238:13 244:4,10 252:7
agents 64:6,19 88:1 88:1,6 107:21 114:21 115:4 156:21 185:12,14 185:17,20 186:2 186:13 189:5 193:11,15,22 194:3,5 195:1,7 195:13,19 196:4,9 196:19 197:11 198:2,14 199:21 204:10,12 207:7,9 207:16 208:14,17 208:22 209:6,16 210:13 211:1,10 212:3 214:10 231:7,8 236:18,20 238:20 243:1,20 244:8 246:15 247:20 248:14,16 248:17 249:7,10 251:8
aggravated 126:10 129:5
aggression 36:3,20
aggressive 350:17
aggressively 194:8
ago 75:7 95:3 146:10 171:15 205:5 355:11,18 395:21 413:7 507:22 514:1
agree 96:1 243:17 300:22 344:21 347:6 405:17 406:18 410:1 412:1 470:9 505:13
agreed 306:19 412:2
agreement 223:21 343:16 344:19
ahead 48:2 117:14 141:1 167:6 214:19 234:4 265:15 286:6 307:15 311:3 313:7 326:12 433:19 515:19
aid 259:13,15
aim 441:5
aimed 437:9
Air 2:20 3:5,7 77:18 78:1,22 120:16 121:7 138:8 158:1,11 159:1,11,22 160:14 164:5 166:22 179:3,14 183:13 198:22 199:14,20 200:7,9 201:3 203:4 204:2 218:2 220:6 233:15 238:15 241:9,10 256:17 458:1
aisle 214:6 498:15
al 360:3
Albanese 2:4 257:12,14 258:7,8 261:8,16 262:20 262:22 263:6,8,10 266:4,7,22 267:4 267:22 268:7,9 269:14,17,20 299:14 308:11 309:21 310:9 312:3,11 313:17 315:7,20 316:17 336:5 339:4 340:11,19 344:8 344:12,20 345:9 348:9 350:7,20 351:1,4,8,12 353:12,17
alcohol 150:4 157:11 182:11 225:2 229:21 267:17 283:17 485:18
alcoholic 18:21 46:2
alcoholism 182:7
algebra 72:7,8,11
aligned 184:14
all-hands 197:9
all-male 86:13
allegation 127:15 220:14 513:9
allegations 123:22

200:13 389:19
alleged 22:12 79:18 189:7
allegedly 219:9
alley 41:13 510:18
allocated 162:21
allow 79:22 80:12 80:12 161:13 191:7 335:1 467:1 473:2 508:19 516:7
allowed 91:11 155:10 164:5 265:6 282:22 422:14,16 502:14
allowing 77:8 80:18 192:16 364:3
allows 49:5 181:18 188:12 261:21 500:1
almond 55:5
almond-shaped 55:6
alongside 88:5
alternative 333:20 345:21 455:15
Alternatively 455:16
amazing 419:14
ambiguous 361:11
amen 477:9
amendments 518:19
America 318:19 509:19,21
American 79:17
amnesia 416:5
amount 61:10 94:20 191:15 245:19 323:19 359:15 390:17 493:21
amounts 84:11 229:19
amplify 455:3
amygdala 55:3,4 56:4,5,6,9,10,21 62:16 97:16
analyses 12:22 200:18
analysis 176:3 436:5
analyze 12:2 506:5
analyzing 12:8
and/or 484:9
Andrews 201:3
anecdotal 85:16 94:2 209:16 292:3 347:18
anecdotally 228:14 327:18 425:17
Angeles 2:5 10:11 261:19 267:2 308:12,17 311:2 336:7 350:9
anger 53:4,5
angle 454:8
angrier 419:17
animal 16:16
animals 17:3
Anna 26:4
annals 470:14
Anne 293:13
anniversary 43:2
announcements 492:2 496:13
anonymous 31:18
anonymously 188:13 320:22
answer 54:14,15 59:15 118:17 119:19 131:2 169:21 170:16 171:1 198:15 207:7 253:14 258:21 285:16 286:19 298:20 312:8 334:19 348:8 370:22 396:4 420:7 423:21 442:7 443:8,18 459:7 460:11 461:8 477:2
answer's 433:13
answered 291:18 310:22 362:21
answering 205:21 359:21
answers 59:14 61:17 62:7 68:20 97:19 98:2 181:22 291:12
anti-violence 454:17
anticipation 449:13
anus 261:11
anxious 392:12
anybody 43:13 46:13 47:5 77:14 78:20 80:13 224:14 275:2 282:4 316:14 416:20 458:17 516:19
anybody's 431:15
Anytime 424:5
anyway 225:16 342:21 343:2 428:12 506:7
Anyways 384:7
APD 270:7 271:13 291:7 309:17
apologize 119:6
app 188:18
Apparently 206:10
appeals 316:22
appear 7:1 21:5 121:17 181:7 324:7 454:5
appeared 181:6
appearing 467:20
appellate 151:12
applied 478:17
applies 415:16
apply 15:7 149:7 168:5 358:12 415:11,14 504:18
applying 101:3
appointed 217:7
appointment 280:17
appreciate 86:20 120:1 205:20 407:3 469:7
appreciation 8:1
apprehension 2:14 257:18 270:4
approach 67:10,12 100:16,20 101:7 122:4 188:1 196:7 251:12 259:18 306:10,17 310:14 310:16 330:12 337:2 338:1 346:9 347:2,7 350:16
approaches 445:10 453:18
approaching 250:19
appropriate 90:17 90:18 133:10 158:19 189:4 193:14 196:11 200:22 262:10 327:8 390:4 517:3
appropriately 123:20 270:19 274:9 503:8
approval 212:17
approve 517:3
approved 125:7 161:18 199:20 518:17
approximately 185:11 190:14
Archambault 2:6 28:11 29:1 271:9 277:7 355:10 356:16 367:14 383:18,19 384:1,7 404:13 406:6,11 407:9,13,15 415:12,17,20 429:2,10,14 430:15 431:14,22 432:16,19 433:3,7 433:11,15 463:19 465:15 468:2 477:11 488:3 489:3 490:20
archival 469:15
area 53:11 75:11 172:12 191:10 243:10 407:8 408:15 428:12 461:21 487:7 495:3
areas 129:19 137:14 185:14,15 187:14 190:17 195:11 197:21 267:11 314:20 402:19 406:17 407:6
arena 155:3 170:15 174:18 202:6
arenas 502:1
argue 390:4
argument 253:17 256:22 408:16
Arizona 423:7,14 423:20
arm 192:22
Armed 6:3
Armendariz 8:12 515:8
Army 3:3,8,9 14:8 86:3 88:2 89:9,10 106:20 107:12 113:9,9 115:1,6 121:9 161:8 163:16,21 167:17 168:3,9,21 169:19 170:4,8 172:21 180:6 181:4,15 183:14 187:2 191:12 206:4,21 207:20 210:19 212:7,16 218:1,22 220:4 229:15 245:5 247:14 248:17 332:16 387:13 422:4 496:15 517:15,16

Army's 163:1 195:13 425:17 457:18 506:1
arraigned 266:19
arrangement 252:21 314:22
arrest 95:21 266:10 321:19 322:19,20 346:12,19 350:14 387:18,20,21 388:3
arrested 266:13 316:21 326:6 343:13 345:10
arrive 262:16
art 491:15
Article 11:4 190:8 215:19,20
articles 202:13
articulate 241:14 393:22
ASAP 186:21,22 187:6,13,14 244:10,21,22
Ashland 2:15 258:1
ASI 168:3 211:10 211:16 212:1
aside 158:7 204:16 225:16
asked 27:10 34:19 61:16 64:6,9,12 68:19 75:18 92:9 94:12 95:17 96:2 105:4 161:6 169:17 205:9 225:19 229:10 234:12 267:7 291:11 299:16 330:17 359:8 389:22 406:7 458:6 467:19 472:22 477:12 492:5 496:22
asking 59:7,18 65:3 68:9,10,13,20 97:1 101:14 113:6 154:4 157:14 216:15 274:20 275:12 299:7 300:16 311:19 326:1,17 359:15 366:6 370:12,13 374:10 433:10 460:13,19 461:10 483:8 509:16
asks 235:14
aspect 386:18
assault 1:4,7 2:7 4:3,9 5:13 8:16 9:12 10:1,9,19 11:6,8,12 12:8,20 13:12 19:18 20:3 22:16 24:6 26:10 27:16 28:15 29:18 30:16,17,18,19 31:12 32:14 34:6 35:7,11 36:12 37:1,9 43:9,11 44:4 46:6 50:20 51:14,17,21 52:2 53:15 54:18 55:9 56:12 57:2 58:22 60:21 62:14,19 63:16 66:20 67:3 68:16 69:21 81:11 81:13 82:13 84:12 84:13,14,18 85:9 85:15,18 86:14 91:3 95:6,18 98:19 106:10 107:16 116:17 117:6 118:20 119:3,12 122:1 123:3 124:1,12 126:8,9,10,11 129:4 131:13 132:5 135:19 136:4,8,9 137:1,5 137:10 138:20 142:7 144:9 145:8 150:4,8 157:12 176:2,6,8,14 181:14 186:6,8,8 186:19,20 187:1 189:9,10 190:6,13 192:20 194:10,13 194:21 195:6 196:20,21 197:7 197:13,18 198:7 199:10,22 200:5 203:15,21 205:17 208:1,6,20 211:2 212:5 213:4 214:11,14 216:15 218:4 221:10 224:21 232:12 233:4 234:7 239:3 243:3 244:19 253:22 255:1,3,16 256:12 259:3,6,16 259:17 261:5,20 263:21 264:5,5,10 264:14,16,16,18 265:2,4,5 268:1 269:2 270:10,17 271:3 272:4,5 274:12,13,20 279:12,16 281:20 282:1,10 284:1 285:11,20 286:1 287:12 288:19 291:4,7 292:20 293:5,11,18 296:21,22 300:20 302:16 304:17,18 306:7 307:6 309:3 311:14 313:10 316:1,4 317:12,17 318:1,13,17,21 319:9,12 320:5 324:12 325:11 327:5,6 328:17 330:21 332:6 341:14 349:1,18 350:2 351:2 352:12 354:10 359:20 360:5 362:6,9,19 363:6 364:12 365:7 368:6 371:12 374:16 375:14 376:1,8,21 386:10 387:1 390:20 394:15 397:17 400:22 401:16 402:20 409:13 413:21 424:13 425:8 426:21 429:8,17 430:5,18 434:11 435:2,7,11 436:21 437:4,19 439:13 440:13 441:2,11 442:18 443:10,12,21 444:5 445:16 447:14 449:15,16 450:19,22 451:4 451:12 455:9,13 455:17,19 456:17 461:14 462:11,12 474:5 475:12 476:4 482:21 484:3,6 488:15 496:17 498:2 504:1,8 507:9,17 508:10,17 509:1,9 509:11 510:1,3,17 511:4,9 512:16,19 512:21 513:6,8,14 514:2,14
assault's 429:21
assaulted 31:13 33:19 53:8 216:12 219:10,17 369:22 370:9,16 401:18 431:19 474:7 483:12,14,18 484:20 486:15 498:8,20 501:21 508:6 510:8 513:11 514:17,19 514:19
assaulting 70:10 117:15
assaults 15:2 32:19 43:9,12 84:10 90:17 186:5 188:7 203:7 207:1 210:4 253:3 265:19,21 267:1,16 270:19 270:20,22 302:6 305:16 308:13 317:13 329:14,20 329:22 331:21 349:7 357:11,15 358:16 359:6 384:12 390:13 392:10 393:16 418:5 423:19 427:17 479:6 514:4,15
assess 9:10 200:15 200:18
assessment 443:14 446:12 460:2 501:15
asset 279:14 408:4
assign 234:11
assigned 200:3 226:12 263:1,22 264:4 265:2 276:5 276:9 282:14 298:4 299:15 501:17
assignment 163:20 167:2 265:7 270:3 299:17 300:4,5,18 396:22 403:14
assignments 300:2 478:17
assimilate 277:20
assist 81:22 82:1 201:15 256:3,10 256:15 279:15 451:12 477:6
assistance 93:2 126:17 130:1,11 138:14,19 142:9 163:17 164:15 172:15 178:3 181:5 198:3 219:13 285:14 356:12 381:19 420:12 432:4,20 476:8

assistant 2:16,19 8:9,16 120:22 169:4 178:6 183:20 184:1,6 282:13 313:11 343:21
assisted 287:5
assisting 309:7
Associate 2:11 3:6 8:13 198:21 435:8
associated 131:18 202:12 512:20
Association 109:21 144:12 286:4
associations 66:9
assume 152:2 180:13 252:16 344:16
assumed 251:16
assuming 249:19 471:3
assures 137:9
ate 55:22
attack 367:16
attacked 32:16 33:1,3 59:4 77:14
attempt 323:21
attempted 22:8 25:11 52:3
attend 165:8 187:2 195:17 265:8
attendees 70:4 197:10,13,15
attending 158:22 195:16 386:5 519:19
attention 154:6 268:12 390:1 423:18 451:1
attentions 55:7
attitude 452:16
attorney 169:5 178:7 261:22 263:15 266:18 282:14 294:17 313:11,12 339:9 339:10 340:6,14 344:2 388:5 507:5 508:9
attorney's 177:4 180:14 181:1,10 261:18,18 308:16 321:18 322:19 346:22
attorneys 8:21 66:9 95:11 204:3 238:20 282:15 392:8 440:17
attract 163:14
attracted 39:15
attractive 393:22
attribute 267:8 510:15
attributing 311:7
attribution 510:14
attrition 191:18 244:5 357:5 358:5 365:21 385:19,19 408:12 489:11
audience 86:7 440:21 481:12 516:7
audiences 87:9 359:19 461:21
audio 275:20
audit 393:7,9
auditors 393:12
audits 386:18 393:5
augment 132:15 162:18
August 203:17
Austin 1:12,13 2:12 2:14 5:19 7:19 8:3 10:12 64:21,22 196:12 257:17 270:1 271:19 272:15 273:4,5,16 273:18,20 274:15 278:17 285:19 292:14 302:2 307:3 309:20 314:1,6,13,16 335:7,14 341:7 434:3,6 490:8 491:6,21 496:14 507:5
Australia 27:18,19
authorities 130:17 178:15 245:15
authority 167:2 185:2 187:10 227:8,14,16 228:7 428:10
Authorization 5:21 9:8,18 122:13
authorizations 91:1
authorized 13:16 161:10 207:9 210:14 219:14
automatically 312:9
availability 144:1 144:16,20 191:11 221:3,5 445:2
available 126:1 134:13 143:16 191:15 195:20 206:8 234:15 258:11,14 341:5 387:20 409:18
avenue 482:5
avenues 356:12 500:13
average 489:22 509:22
avoid 205:6 462:4 481:16,17
awarded 191:13
aware 93:16 100:6 104:16 145:9 173:21 225:11 304:17 348:16 472:20 479:2 513:5,16,19 514:21
awareness 189:18 190:6 374:1 444:20
awesome 293:10
awful 344:5

B

B 7:3 365:12
babies 401:12
back 16:17 25:2 28:9 30:14 46:3 46:19 49:15 61:20 66:11 75:20 76:17 78:6 80:22 96:8 137:22 149:1 152:20,20,22,22 153:1,2,12 154:4 154:15 155:12 160:9 161:21 165:13 169:17 171:2 175:20 177:6 211:2 213:16 227:11 231:14 232:6 239:9,21 248:1 270:2,10 271:20 272:7 273:15 275:13 277:9,15 279:22 280:12 290:1 291:21 295:9 319:19 328:13 335:3 337:13 339:1 361:13 362:9 364:7 367:12 369:6 374:9 384:21 385:10 386:8 392:12 393:14 394:5 398:19 408:6 415:3 417:1,4,21 419:10 420:3 432:15 454:1 457:3 458:18 460:6,13 461:19 464:14 465:5,11 466:11,12,14 469:9 480:18 484:4 489:6 495:16 499:2 510:18
background 155:1
backing 239:20
backlash 487:1
backlog 441:4,7
bad 19:21 46:8 50:21 55:17 59:5 61:18 80:13 289:15 395:7 504:15
bag 333:4,14,18,21 334:3,7 426:14 429:22
baggage 209:10
balance 112:9 220:12,12,19 222:6
Balboa 399:19,19 400:10
ball 90:7 376:9 407:11
band 479:8
bang 427:21 430:21 431:9
banging 431:15
Bangor 187:18
bank 116:20,21 117:2 230:3
bankrupt 18:17
banning 96:9
bar 17:21,22 18:1,2 18:3,4,5,6,8 19:6 19:12,13,14 81:4 179:15 421:12
Barbara 1:13,15 6:2
barricaded 99:6
barriers 317:22 318:19 319:1 331:1,3,9
bars 267:13
bartender 18:12
base 100:18 160:6 162:2,3,3 164:8 201:3 210:3 213:20 355:16,21 356:2 359:11 369:6 444:4
based 39:6 60:10 80:5 124:10

125:10,17 132:17 161:22,22 162:7 168:4 169:20 180:14 189:1 192:9 252:10 282:4 287:4 292:4 317:12 336:19 338:7 341:4 369:8 369:16 370:2 371:14,16 380:5 381:9,10,11,16 382:8,14,15 383:1 383:8,13 385:16 387:8 393:4 407:18,18 408:3 410:3 414:7 416:6 416:22 426:6 440:17,18 452:8 481:7,9 485:13 489:20 492:1,13 492:15,16 493:3 499:8 509:20 510:16 511:15
baseline 202:2 470:1
basic 180:7 185:18 199:16 201:17 203:14 208:1 211:9,15 239:19 239:21 240:13,19 240:21 241:5,20 241:20 242:4,4,11 246:7,14,22 247:3 247:5 258:17 275:21 395:11 397:17
basically 27:1 64:20 165:20 207:16 238:4 317:17 364:9 406:22 419:14 432:8
basis 40:17,18 189:16 200:14 201:5 249:12 341:3 415:16
bath 416:14
battery 344:3
battle 464:11 485:19 502:11 503:2
be-all 102:19
beam 110:2
bears 476:2
beat 59:5 305:2
beaten 347:10 402:4
beautiful 7:20
Becky 417:19 468:18 479:16
becoming 366:15 485:22 486:1
bed 70:7
Beech 36:17
beers 281:9,10
began 240:17 272:7 496:20
beginning 59:13,19 94:1 190:4 243:22 254:16 258:18 262:1 291:8 376:11 445:13
begins 81:4,5
begun 198:5
behalf 5:16 7:22 434:1
behave 57:1
behavior 22:10,20 24:4 39:22 40:1 116:4 235:2 324:9 324:11 438:14,19
behavioral 3:7 14:7 370:4
behaviorally 370:1
behaviors 34:3,5,19 40:7,8 50:14 58:2 66:20 81:14 93:13 116:1 117:6,7,13 118:14,22 119:1 119:13 350:13
beings 435:21
belief 30:9 306:12
beliefs 39:8 100:8 288:17,18 511:8
believable 21:3
believe 27:17 28:4 28:5 40:14 43:9 47:9,13,16 49:22 63:1 74:1 77:5,6,7 77:10 78:17,20 79:15 85:13 96:6 96:15 118:9 135:7 147:20 212:12 222:17 228:1 239:5,6 243:5,18 243:21 268:10 272:13 279:21 283:19 291:9 292:1 296:14,17 297:20 299:21 302:20 336:15 344:4 352:10 353:9 354:11 378:17 380:15 395:5 425:20 426:1 431:9 448:8 452:6 479:4 480:22,22 496:12 499:6 500:12 501:8 503:7 504:19
believed 105:12 272:17 290:7 292:21 331:4 367:1 375:19 416:6 439:8
believes 113:19 289:17 311:11 401:17
believing 44:6 259:5 339:7 373:10 402:20,21 423:10 489:8,16 489:17 490:6 491:6,16
bending 23:20
beneficial 222:10 222:11
benefit 157:9 496:11 516:5 519:13
benefits 153:18 224:17 366:12 481:18
benign 39:14
best 13:2,18 15:7 43:16,20 65:6 76:12,16 83:10 96:12 100:15 102:3,5 104:3 109:1 122:5 129:6 134:10 141:12 142:12 154:1 159:12 198:15 200:19 239:10,11 262:5 279:21 286:3,16 287:15 298:19 326:18 330:14,15 335:20 336:3,16 345:4 356:3 380:8 385:7 395:6 408:4 409:2 411:8,18 412:7,14 414:18,20 421:11 421:17 443:2 444:21 473:9,13 474:10 502:4
bestiality 32:8
betrayal 365:10
better 14:19 15:6 41:6,20 45:17 51:2 64:1 66:4 68:11 69:5,6,17 69:17 89:16 90:12 93:8,11,12,14 94:18,22 96:18 101:3 104:10 113:13 119:9 147:9,22 154:11 163:6 176:17,18 178:11 186:18 208:16 209:20 251:11 261:21 281:6 292:19 293:1,20 329:15 334:21 393:10 402:10 406:4 412:11 416:10 424:2 426:9 436:21 456:22 465:6 471:19 472:18 480:8 497:5 505:4
beyond 171:21 226:2 325:7 365:7 384:21 416:10 469:9,11 471:7 479:3
bias 67:17 209:2 239:20 240:21 242:2 243:10 271:6 281:4
biased 466:4 490:4
biases 22:11,22 204:10,15 208:13 209:7 235:7 274:12
bible 45:10
big 9:13 21:8 26:2 28:14 33:15 34:9 81:20 110:3 216:4 250:5 273:3 362:17 365:22 379:17 380:3 395:15 480:6
bigger 89:16 168:11 413:6 456:6,13 504:18
biggest 20:8 21:2 38:17 46:15 47:15 148:12
Bill 5:4
billed 284:19
billet 153:13 190:21 505:1
billets 153:17 166:3 186:6,11,15 190:16 244:17,18
bio 435:21
biographies 41:16
bird 43:19
birthday 43:1
bit 11:10 15:6 24:20 29:8 41:2 67:4 118:7 119:8

145:20 150:21 156:15 172:3 178:11 210:19 218:1 219:2 251:14 303:11 318:13 324:3 384:8 387:10 406:17 452:7 462:19 466:4 474:11 482:2 487:6 514:1
black 61:8
blackboard 511:3
blackboards 509:7
blah 15:14,14,14
blame 21:22 22:2 46:3 50:13 83:13 365:4
blamed 481:2
blaming 23:2
blanche 459:12
blank 305:19
blew 44:2
blocks 234:7 446:9
blood 286:10
blow 429:5
blown 44:7
blue 61:7
blurring 101:18
boa 55:18,20
board 125:21 141:12 142:6 149:7 171:5 172:6 405:8 419:1
boards 155:15,16 170:11
bodies 298:11
bodily 126:8,10
body 58:1 261:11 329:11 330:2 462:20
boil 37:8 360:18
boiled 65:16
book 416:3
booklet 265:13
books 207:9
borne 483:22 488:6 488:11
Boston 54:2 196:10
bother 275:2
bottom 39:5 57:20 57:21 206:13,17 445:21
Boulder 179:4
bound 17:6
boundaries 32:3,4
bounds 279:17
bowling 41:13
box 447:13
boxes 33:6,6
boy 19:4 57:8
boys 31:2,13 53:8
Bragg 162:4
brain 54:20,21 55:2 57:12,14,21 60:21 61:15,15 62:15 114:2
brains 55:5
branch 241:8
Branch(JAM) 2:9
branches 405:7
brand 87:20
Brazzil 8:8,10
breadth 261:4
break 28:13 120:3 274:6 353:19 371:21 439:9 495:11
breaking 372:7 519:15
breaks 26:8 36:6
bridge 104:5,7 105:22 281:13 452:4
bridging 287:6 417:2
brief 99:19 128:4 198:13 205:19 206:17
briefing 106:15 346:3 506:1
briefings 190:6
briefly 87:3 199:11 296:4 399:17
Brig 419:2
BRIGADIER 1:17 1:17
bright 345:20
brighter 100:6
brightest 159:13
bring 23:7 230:16 247:22 271:21 282:22 287:15 339:18 354:19 355:9,15 356:1,10 356:14,22 381:2 385:2 410:16 413:20 427:12
bringing 158:15 208:13 209:9 273:10 277:15 282:16 379:2 481:18
brings 44:20 45:3,3 364:11
broad 99:21 450:10
broaden 453:21 463:6
broader 516:7
brochure 318:12 489:16
brochures 488:4
broken 46:3
Brooklyn 347:18
brother 59:13 244:6 245:5 251:22
brother-in-law 59:3 68:12 96:20
brothers 251:15
brought 76:12 91:18 99:18 165:13 233:12 251:3 412:8 413:18 416:19 488:3 501:5 504:1 507:13 516:4
brown 2:8 7:5 39:14 121:5 146:1 146:2,7 147:14 165:22 166:1,2,8 175:5 495:19,20 496:1,5 506:19
Browne 36:17
Bryant 1:19 86:22 91:17 95:16 98:3 99:12 101:2 114:16,20 115:3 180:19 229:7,8,16 230:9 311:4 312:5 312:22 343:5,8 344:10,14 345:8 345:16 413:18 416:18 428:16,17 428:18 429:3,11 430:6,10,19 487:10,19 488:22 490:9 492:3 519:11,17
buddies 485:19
buddy 502:12 503:2
budget 317:3 421:3 475:19
budgetary 190:22
budgets 90:18
build 41:5 80:9 89:16,16 132:1 133:3 174:11 446:5
building 177:2 228:16
builds 122:5
built 94:3 114:4 156:21 303:22 327:10 446:15
bumps 220:4
bunch 24:18 77:7
burden 163:5 293:19 295:3 389:6 482:21 483:22 485:14 499:13 500:16
burdening 275:9
Bureau 2:5 123:9 263:20 435:15
bureaucratic 247:17
buried 395:3
burn 453:12 504:5
burned 58:16
Busch 433:17,18 455:4 458:18 462:17 468:3,8 469:5 474:11 476:1 477:9 479:12 481:21 486:20 487:18 492:4 495:6 509:16 515:7
Busch-Armenda... 2:10 509:2
Bush 8:11
Bush-Armendariz 10:22
bushes 283:14
Bushon 7:7
busiest 199:19
business 147:5 179:6 190:18 425:14 435:15 502:2
busy 9:2 13:21 14:17 89:14
butchered 8:12
buzz 417:16
bystander 81:3
bystanders 485:15 487:1,2

C

cadet 274:1
cadre 89:16 185:11 186:13 251:7
calculated 443:11
Caldwell 491:15
California 187:17 187:18 268:22 340:13,13 421:6 426:18 427:4 428:15 431:20
California's 432:10
call 41:9 42:12 58:17 61:21 65:2 68:22 90:14 116:5

117:13 151:18 152:11 155:14 158:6 160:9 168:3 186:7 188:11 212:17 259:2 276:16 309:17 312:9 313:13 362:15,15 377:13 429:1 431:16 445:2 492:9 493:12 497:13
called 9:20 28:3 55:3 74:20 77:21 78:6 95:10 150:3 163:17 188:18 201:20 203:18 273:7 274:16 347:13,16 397:12 416:3 421:18 451:21 452:18 454:7 468:10
calling 102:4,4 312:2 378:5
calls 262:8 344:1 398:12 512:13
camp 187:16,17 287:18 474:1
campaign 146:12 189:13 292:9 373:15 374:1 402:22 423:10 479:11 489:7,8 490:5,6 491:6
campaigns 453:20
Campbell 43:17 53:21 417:20 420:17 468:18
Campbell's 479:16
campus 302:6 305:16,21 306:6,9 307:7 311:10,15 311:20,22 434:5
campuses 302:9 312:7
Canada 488:9
candid 130:15 197:9
capabilities 9:21 10:2,3,7 191:8 199:15 256:3
capability 4:4 120:4,15 121:20 124:2 125:15 148:8,18 150:18 155:17 158:15 159:18 160:1,8 161:7 162:11,13 164:12 172:19 174:9,14,22 175:3 175:18 176:13 177:11 178:4 181:21 187:22 200:2,6 201:2,9 211:2
capable 42:18,19 47:13 61:16 124:11 130:6 191:5
capacities 10:15 194:5
capacity 199:1 359:8
capital 164:4 187:20
Captain 2:8,12 121:5,6 146:1 148:2 156:5 166:1 166:10 167:8 168:14 172:8 173:19 178:10 182:9 400:11
captive 481:12
capture 260:17 261:4
car 61:7 396:8 413:2 497:7 512:7 512:8
Cara 2:17 120:19 135:17
card 355:2 384:4 449:18
care 127:3,5 135:13 136:17,22 138:16 379:13 386:19 401:13 427:22 453:10 464:3,7 498:12
cared 419:11
career 29:19 35:18 71:22 78:2 148:20 149:5,13 150:22 152:19 155:5,7 165:5 167:9,22 168:15 171:14 174:4 177:2 180:18,20 356:16 384:21 403:14 411:17 436:12
career-enhancing 153:21
careers 406:22 456:12
careful 19:1 105:21 391:3 393:2 413:4
caring 48:21 300:2
Carolina 187:17
carpet 491:14
carried 163:4
carrier 151:20 152:13,15
carrying 355:2 384:4 449:18
cars 19:5
carte 459:12
case 22:16 23:17 47:11,21 51:5 60:4 62:9 69:19 71:3 117:9 119:7 128:2,13 132:2 133:7 148:16 164:9 165:16 168:16 172:4 176:2,3,7,8 181:14,14 184:19 190:13 191:1 199:9,18 200:18 200:22 204:5,5 207:6 219:8 225:20 249:18,20 249:20 250:1,9 251:12,17,17 254:4 256:10 264:17,21 266:16 274:7 275:16,17 277:18 283:17 284:21 286:11 290:9,12,19 291:3 293:6 295:1,7,8 296:20 299:21 300:8 314:12,15 323:12 332:16 333:22 337:14 339:12,19 340:5,7 340:9,16 341:3,3 341:9 342:11 343:22 345:11,19 346:12 347:8,12 349:3,4,20,22,22 350:1,5,8,22 351:15 352:13,17 353:11 377:1 386:19,20 388:4,7 389:6 391:8 394:15 401:15,16 407:19 431:4,5 446:20 461:16 462:12 468:15 475:14 480:13 493:7 500:5,14,17 511:14,20
caseload 467:21
cases 1:7 10:9 12:9 12:21 24:7 49:14 49:18 62:12,19 64:3 85:17 93:14 95:6 117:15 118:20 119:13 122:10 124:11 128:12,22 129:6 130:1,3,18 131:14 131:19 132:10,16 133:8 134:3 135:2 135:11 142:3,6,16 142:17 147:4,8,9 147:10 150:4,8 153:4 158:2 159:9 160:20 164:3,4,4 165:1,12,14,17 168:11 169:18 171:22 176:14 177:7,8 178:6,15 179:16 182:21 198:2 201:12 208:10,11 213:17 215:1 236:4,6 249:11 250:10 255:6,7,13,14 256:7,14 262:13 264:14 271:18 272:5,12 274:18 274:20 276:14,20 278:15 279:12 282:5,16,21 283:1 283:2,4,12,18 284:7,14,18 285:3 285:5,13 288:13 288:21,22 289:7 292:14 295:7,13 296:13,14,17,19 297:1 300:10,11 301:9 302:17,19 306:17 308:7 310:7 311:18 314:1,7,8,11 315:9,13 323:15 328:12 334:18,20 334:21 335:22 337:7 348:22 351:21 352:14 353:11 359:5 376:1 377:19 388:15 389:4,7 390:15 392:19 393:6 400:16 401:11,17 403:2 416:7 424:9 427:3 427:7 431:18 438:10 445:22 447:1,5,17,18 453:11,12 459:6 467:22 477:16 480:8,9,10 497:21 511:13
Cassia 12:6
cat 333:3,14,18,20

334:2,6
cat's 426:14 429:22
catch 33:20 38:9 408:10 511:2,5
catching 68:4
categories 389:15
category 477:6
caught 25:6 29:15 30:12 33:11,15 35:20,21 36:1 37:6,7 48:15,19 49:10 97:12
cause 95:20 102:11 102:16 280:1 295:1 321:19 388:4
causes 102:8 494:14
Causing 103:21
caution 386:16 387:7
CDC's 27:5
cell 188:14 372:7
center 195:4 201:19 240:16 383:5 413:8 441:14
centered 289:11,14 296:11 301:14 306:10,17 310:16 320:3,7 322:5 323:5 326:14 327:2 330:12 333:10,11,13 337:2 346:9 347:1 347:7 403:21 404:2 406:21 410:18 445:10 453:18
centerpiece 146:15 260:9
centers 325:10,11
central 3:1 58:19 58:20 60:8,12,13 60:16 61:1 187:11 192:9 441:20
centralized 90:13 142:1 147:17 193:2 264:12
centrally 159:10 246:9
centric 196:7 202:3
certain 9:22 56:20 191:15 223:4,5 256:11,12 428:21 428:22 431:17 478:3,11 483:1
certainly 51:8 56:14 138:12 139:17 140:17,19 151:3 181:19 252:15 262:5 268:17 303:17 328:12 360:6 455:21 490:16 494:2 504:2 512:4
certification 129:10
certifications 144:14
certified 128:14 144:11 186:1
certifying 132:21
cetera 363:20 370:6 370:14 373:6 381:20
CGI 192:13
CGIS 193:3,6,11 193:15,21 194:7,8 194:19,22 195:7 195:12 196:5,19 197:11,21 198:2,5
chain 124:7 263:19 264:2 272:22 399:6
chair 1:13,15 4:2 6:2 7:14,15 14:14 34:12,22 35:3 84:6 86:18,22 99:14 106:1 119:22 120:11 121:16 135:14 137:21 138:21 139:5,11 140:14 140:22 142:14 143:3,5 145:5 146:5 147:11 148:2 150:20 151:2,11,22 152:2 153:1,18 154:20 156:3 157:19 160:21 161:3 164:20 165:18 166:1,7,10,19,21 167:6 172:16 179:18 182:2 183:4,19 184:2,3 192:1 198:17,19 206:1,6,15 214:18 223:15 224:10,14 226:22 228:9 229:3,7 230:20 235:19 249:16 250:16 252:13 253:9,12 254:10 257:1,8,16,20,22 258:3,6 261:6,15 266:20 267:3 269:21 294:1,4,8 294:12,16,21 295:20 301:21 305:7,13 308:9 311:3 313:1,4,7 317:5,9 332:10,11 336:21 342:7 353:14,18 354:1 354:15,21 355:7 383:17,21 428:17 433:17 454:22 456:21 465:9 478:20 493:19 495:7,13,17,21 496:3 505:6 506:20 507:1 515:13,18 518:11 518:16 519:10,16
chairman 508:21
Chairwoman 433:20 507:3
challenge 17:17 47:15 90:9 91:13 212:18 232:20 239:17 329:7 330:5 465:8 487:1 487:3
challenges 12:19 15:1 49:13 81:15 101:19 190:7 212:14,15,19 213:2 302:13 310:10 328:22,22 385:7 442:21
challenging 135:11
champions 452:12 453:2,8
chance 26:5 317:6 332:7 345:15 355:5 517:4
chances 25:5 153:8 484:16
change 21:19 30:5 74:4,5,6,13 91:22 100:21 209:1 260:17 271:15,21 271:21 272:2,8,19 273:3,17 278:1 284:9 286:6 292:4 292:5,22 296:5,8 297:11 316:15 317:15 341:17 353:1 408:12 449:11 452:14,15 497:4,4,16 504:20 518:5
changed 95:3 106:20 149:6 255:9 268:18 278:10 285:22 291:21 386:9 425:4 453:1 463:13 464:2 465:7 491:22
changes 136:16 184:15 190:8 272:21 273:2,19 275:7 281:18 285:19 395:9 402:7 421:14 439:10 450:9 463:22 468:12 478:6 491:20 507:16 516:17,18 518:7
changing 100:8,10 112:22 155:10 355:11 464:9,10 465:1 491:9,18
chaplain 502:13
chaplains 88:12 89:4 127:3
character 18:12 22:10,21 24:4 47:15,18,19 73:7
characteristics 376:12 450:12 451:7 463:2 473:17 478:11
characterized 155:20
charge 3:1 184:18 192:8 385:1 428:20 430:12,14 434:10 499:15
charged 343:13
charges 230:17 266:13 322:22 331:15 335:4 504:1
charging 95:21 392:14
chart 472:3
Chayt 206:7
cheating 20:14
check 18:11 386:12
checking 465:5 466:11 467:7 516:15
checklist 396:5
checks 325:8
chief 2:4,4,15,15,20 3:2,7 14:7 89:9 146:21 147:18 159:19 163:20 201:6 257:11,13 257:14,22 258:2,4 258:5,7,8 261:8

261:16 262:20,22 263:6,8,10 266:4 266:7,22 267:4,22 268:7,9 269:14,17 269:20 299:7,10 299:14 300:22 301:11 303:10,13 304:14 305:11 308:11 309:21 310:9 312:3,11 313:1,14,17 315:15,20 316:17 317:5,8 333:15 334:14 335:8 336:5 338:10 339:4 340:11,19 344:8,12,20 345:9 346:4,8 348:3,7,9 349:6 350:7,20 351:1,4,8,12 352:2,20 353:8,12 353:17 372:20 374:8
chiefs 109:21 180:21 181:9 282:19 414:9,13 414:18 423:7
child 30:19 33:1 37:1 65:6 93:18 94:4 98:19 103:9 123:22 126:7 129:6 131:14 132:11 133:7 142:8 186:8 205:5 211:20 288:11 300:10,12,13 325:9,10 384:20 390:7 401:10 402:10 409:15 427:18
childhood 119:3 514:14
children 32:17 33:3 74:19 401:13 507:9 514:20
chill 212:22
chilling 42:17
Chinese 30:1
chip 37:16,18,21,22 38:3,5,8,11,14
chocolate 37:16,18 37:21,22 38:3,5,8 38:11,14
choice 217:18 335:10 337:9 403:16
choose 272:16 373:7 380:2 403:14 489:12
chooses 276:15
choosing 280:5
chose 321:13 328:7 499:8
chosen 273:6 382:20
chronologically 445:15 494:8
church 18:3 41:14 48:10
CID 107:3 108:18 112:9 146:20,20 206:5,19 211:13 212:8,9 217:8 244:5 250:18 252:17 255:10
circle 445:21 446:3 469:9
circles 364:20
circumstance 322:6 352:19
circumstances 56:20 198:11 234:22 259:9,14 462:21 463:2
CIT 240:18
cited 100:4
cities 273:6 310:11
citing 414:3
citizens 285:10
CITP 201:20 248:19
city 7:20 267:1,12 311:2,16,17 329:18 422:11
city-wide 264:6 266:1
civil 354:9 508:8 511:12
civilian 4:3,7,9 8:20 9:14 10:10 11:7 12:4,9,12,17 13:3 13:10,12 14:20 15:3 66:8 82:20 91:1 92:1 108:11 132:14 137:14 150:6 162:20 173:1,2 175:22 177:16 179:2,5,11 179:15,21 180:1 192:15 193:22 194:5 199:21 212:4 214:11 216:5 248:14 249:5,7,12 257:10 343:10 345:22 374:14 376:8 380:18 385:21 387:14 391:4 392:1,14,20 395:11 396:17 400:7 403:9 405:14 406:7 407:21 408:17 411:15 419:4 421:19 422:2 425:9 427:9 428:5 431:20 446:15 450:4 458:7 466:15 475:10 487:4
civilians 162:17
clarification 154:21
clarifications 517:19 518:4
clarifies 518:6
clarify 87:3 144:7 214:21 227:4 291:20 432:12
class 95:10 238:7
classes 203:20 238:2
classroom 241:3
clean 119:5 339:7
clear 52:8 103:4,14 115:10 126:12 134:4 141:4 266:9 266:10 365:5 386:3,10 388:7 474:1
clearance 266:1,3,6 266:8,14 388:13
clearances 387:11 388:12,12,14,21 389:10
clearly 145:10 265:15 436:20
cleavage 23:16,19
Cleveland 192:9
click 291:11
client 93:12
clients 508:3,11
clinical 2:18 120:21 234:19
close 62:5 74:15 81:10 104:19 194:12 206:11 376:6 451:7 472:9 476:6
closed 75:21 295:8
closely 55:20 126:22 200:7 261:17 436:11
closer 73:16 146:6
closes 68:11
closest 219:10
closing 134:21 454:1
clothes 190:10 497:16
clothing 350:11
clout 404:6
clubs 512:9
CMC 132:19
CO's 148:7
coast 3:1 183:12 192:8,18,21,22 193:2,6 194:10,13 194:15 197:19 198:13 232:4 243:11 311:12
cocaine 230:2
code 2:13 11:4 202:3,18
coded 58:11
codified 200:10 221:1 235:17
CODIS 345:10
cognitive 204:10,18 204:20 205:3 235:7 238:21 239:2,2,11,20,20 240:12,16,21 241:1 242:18 243:9 245:22 247:3 411:21 412:17,18,20 413:5
cognizant 105:19 113:15 179:1
cohesive 134:17
coined 259:6
COL 5:10
cold 184:19 206:12 480:7,13
collaborate 109:10 132:4 133:6 196:15 201:14 306:2 325:9 397:16 420:2,15 420:16
collaborated 436:11
collaboration 122:9 127:6 136:1 150:17 194:13 286:21 303:2 314:14 356:21 435:13 442:21 444:18 451:11
collaborations 435:16
collaborative 134:17 444:20
collaboratively 123:21 128:19

204:4 327:11
collaborators 111:22
collateral 212:21 215:3 223:5,19 228:11 392:7 425:8 429:19 462:12
colleagues 168:10 200:8 379:7 436:12 486:11
collect 67:18 133:18 137:2 222:12
collected 386:22 440:10,11
collecting 61:16 65:22 104:13 309:15
collection 133:22 193:9
collectively 241:16
COLLEEN 1:17
college 20:13 34:1 72:9 75:11 302:9 303:14 311:13 312:6
colleges 66:9
colonel 1:18 2:2,20 3:2 5:8,9,13 7:16 9:6 43:19 120:8 121:7,8 141:1 146:18 154:20 157:19,21 160:5 160:22 161:1,4 165:3 166:21,22 167:6,7 168:2,17 168:18 169:16,16 169:21 170:16,20 173:20 178:1,9 179:18,19 181:5 182:5 210:18 214:19 218:18 266:2,5 313:3,5,8 313:22 314:21 315:7 316:12 336:21 342:2,8,9 345:17 346:1 414:5,6,16 416:2 416:9 418:3 495:9 495:13,17,18 506:21 515:14,15 516:12,14,19 517:5,8 519:5
color 413:2 439:10 439:11,19,21
Colorado 179:4
colorless 439:8
combat 50:15 51:16,18 56:19
combating 122:1 188:7
combination 63:12 65:5 190:8
combine 355:17 420:15
combined 212:3
come 26:4 28:9 47:12 48:16 66:18 73:14 80:22 86:8 93:7 95:8 98:5,20 138:3 150:6 154:15 155:6 159:4 164:9 169:17 180:17 207:18 208:11 217:20 225:15 232:15 248:16 253:17 256:19 268:12 272:16 290:6,8 302:6 305:5 314:3,4 315:16 328:1,7,21 331:18 333:17 334:7 339:1 353:2 358:20 366:1,4 368:10 369:6,14 374:9 379:15 396:20 417:20 419:17 423:2 431:12 457:3,12 479:7 482:14 484:12 489:1,13 490:14,18 491:2 496:6 497:14 507:21 515:6
comes 51:1 63:1 80:14 82:22 90:13 102:16 148:20 156:16,22 214:4 227:21 313:12,15 320:14 331:5 352:7 413:21 414:3,4 418:4 431:2 460:13 512:9,11
comfortable 65:9 222:8 234:22 239:13
coming 43:1,2 87:1 112:20 160:13 163:13 197:16 329:21,22 335:3 344:1 364:7 368:16 369:5 378:18 386:15 387:9 412:2 417:19 421:1 461:19 487:16 496:4,7 506:3,10 510:11
command 3:10 124:8 175:15 183:15 190:3 193:14 206:5 223:13 247:14 263:19 264:2 272:22 329:3,5 337:13 399:6 404:4,7 422:6 429:7
Commandant 129:17 132:19 146:3,8
commander 171:22 190:2 227:11 230:15 332:18 333:5 338:1 496:21 499:7,7,10 500:10
commanders 88:12 89:12 128:16 130:16 155:22 193:6 499:16 500:18 501:9
commanding 127:3 210:8 391:16,21 392:17 425:10
commands 190:5 194:16
comment 171:10 178:22 247:8 316:19 343:5 347:5 456:22 495:8 519:11
comments 4:2,10 6:15,17,21 7:1,6,9 7:13 169:3 178:10 191:21 199:11 227:18 385:16 455:1 495:10 506:8 516:11
commercial 23:6
commissions 203:6
commit 19:17 20:2 32:6 48:17,18 85:14 332:6 484:6
commitment 167:4 288:3
committed 29:2 31:4 85:18 193:12 194:8 216:1 241:11,11 350:15 357:15 500:15
committee 6:7,8,9 508:22
Committee's 6:4
committing 54:10 508:9
common 12:19 39:7 129:12 133:13 197:11 317:22 375:9 378:11,12 482:10 482:12 508:3 510:7,9
commonly 185:10 206:5
communicates 379:11
communication 451:11
communications 386:12
communities 203:2 273:10 357:16 368:19,22 371:8 379:18 381:8 386:8 392:9 407:21 411:15 422:18 436:1 440:2 467:6,13,16
community 15:22 48:8 93:17 146:14 151:18 189:13,22 190:3 226:5 264:8 272:15 273:13 281:22 282:4 287:3 289:1 307:2 317:14 329:10 332:1,7 336:3 345:4 369:8,16 371:14 380:5 381:9,10,16 382:8 382:14 383:1,5 392:21 393:4,12 401:17 403:9 404:3,6 405:3 407:17 408:3 411:16 421:19 422:8 424:12,17 427:9 431:3,20 435:16,17 437:14 440:18 452:8 464:10 478:22 479:8 491:22 492:13,15 493:3
companion 125:3
compare 9:14 12:2 12:10 270:9 387:14 406:7 469:12 470:1
compared 101:9 173:1 302:7
comparing 1:6

114:6 268:2 390:19 391:3
comparison 11:9 12:15
comparisons 10:16
compartmentalize 33:5
compassion 411:1
compassionate 118:19
compelled 221:20 225:12
compelling 99:20 173:11
competency 210:10
competent 131:3 134:7 453:14,16
competently 129:22
complaint 259:20 428:7
complaints 285:4 315:14
complement 204:1
complements 406:8
complete 146:12 164:8 187:7 277:16 294:20 320:18 321:13 328:2 339:2 346:16
completed 27:22 185:20 195:13 503:16
completely 44:9 48:14 274:1 307:9 345:12 367:8
completing 156:11
complex 37:9 124:11 142:3 146:16 147:10 158:2 166:5 174:17,18 301:8 396:14 400:22 401:2 436:7 437:15,22 441:22 456:2 459:1
complexities 173:9
complexity 288:8 340:8 350:5 437:1 438:22 449:7 459:5,9,16
compliance 421:18 432:4
complicate 235:9
complicated 57:18 174:3 228:15 229:2,4 234:17 352:6
complicates 215:1
comply 247:13
component 140:16 149:22 187:5 329:8,9 355:16
components 123:11
comprehensive 129:2 130:22 131:5 136:21 258:11 420:12 450:9
compression 101:18
comprise 128:17
compulsive 36:10
concentrate 222:4
concentration 185:15 187:15
concept 57:7 187:6 187:12 292:1 296:21 357:5 488:10
conceptually 377:14
concern 17:4 90:19 145:6 191:10 426:2
concerned 19:6 105:7 222:16 395:16 422:3 424:14
concerning 193:17
concerns 321:22 387:8 410:20 417:15 425:19
concerted 87:22
concluded 519:22
concludes 191:21
conclusion 98:5,21
conclusions 100:15 101:6
concur 247:7
condition 445:5
conditions 441:8 444:19
conduct 51:2 199:2 203:10 205:16 223:19 228:11 229:20 251:5 256:7 262:14 323:10 392:4 443:13
conducted 255:7 275:11 436:19 440:5
conducting 256:10 279:19 280:21 393:5
confer 176:2
conference 58:3 66:12 89:9 265:9
conferences 66:12 85:7 88:10,11 108:12
confidant 505:19
confidence 145:12
confidences 503:1
confident 328:14
confidential 138:18
confidentiality 260:6,9 331:3 382:3
confinement 185:9 419:8
confusing 480:15
Congress 5:19 6:12 9:7,18 207:4 454:16 478:6
Congresswoman 79:9 361:6,10,14 361:16,19 362:4 363:1 376:16,19 415:4,15,19 465:10 467:17 468:5 469:3,6 470:6 472:21 473:10 475:4 477:1,10 494:17 506:9 518:21 519:8
conjunction 225:20
connected 137:4
connects 483:9
consensual 80:21 278:4,6 279:8
consent 261:13 342:10 402:3,4,5
consequences 61:1
consider 83:9 170:5 262:4 313:16 392:1 436:4,15
considered 170:11 170:13
consistency 125:20
consistent 50:4,5 124:13 132:17 142:5
consists 204:2 246:11
constant 244:3,13 245:8,10 464:5 465:8
constantly 312:19
constrained 253:18
constraints 220:17 255:20
constrictor 55:18 55:20
construct 147:6 148:18
constructive 53:13
consult 127:19
consultation 132:15 195:20
consulted 321:8
consuming 330:7 330:12
consumption 225:2
contact 221:4 256:14 259:4 276:4,6 304:20 316:2 321:9 326:10 350:2 358:20 366:1 369:14 370:14 383:10,14 390:2 416:11 519:3,7
contacted 189:4 322:8 416:12
contacts 255:5,6 383:6 417:5
contain 146:18
content 292:16 517:2
CONTENTS 4:1
context 13:4 118:22 119:2 265:14 372:22 435:20,22 444:19 456:6
contextual 453:16
continue 12:22 13:17 82:12,19 89:20 91:8 126:21 132:4 133:9 134:19 136:21 154:18 162:10 168:22 188:5 212:13 220:12 241:19 242:9 337:18 340:7 454:12 500:22
continued 163:8
continues 145:16
continuing 102:13 359:5
continuous 463:11 463:12
continuum 127:5 138:15 442:1 463:16 468:19
contract 78:1,10 150:5 171:6 182:7 182:20
contracting 400:6
contractors 170:9
contracts 137:14

182:10
contrast 12:11
contributes 437:10
contribution 9:4
contributions 519:20
control 188:4 246:12,14,16 247:1,10 338:2 341:18 346:21 425:6 427:9,14 428:22 429:3,12 450:14 455:21
controlled 55:3 56:5,6 62:17 97:17
controls 55:7 320:8 321:10 322:8
convene 123:5
convened 1:11 123:16
convening 130:17 178:14 187:10 227:14,15 228:7
conversation 81:5 262:2 344:21,22 412:17 448:20 455:15
conversations 433:8
conversion 457:21 457:21 458:3,4
conveyed 92:13
convict 419:4
convicted 25:4 30:22 36:22 37:3 37:5,7 316:21 347:15,16
convicting 390:10
conviction 11:22 29:5
convinced 105:11
Cook 1:18 87:1 89:19 91:15 141:2 141:15 154:20,21 167:7 170:7,18 171:7 214:20 215:12,17 216:3,8 216:21 217:16 218:12 220:6 226:11 227:4,15 291:19 293:22 306:9 309:21 336:22 340:1,18 341:6 342:12 380:16 381:2 382:21 383:7,15 404:11,14 406:10 407:1,10,14 430:20 431:21 432:12,17 433:2,5 433:9,12,16 485:11 486:6,12 516:19,22 517:8 518:15
Cook's 169:21
cookie 30:3,4
cool 401:8
cooperate 228:10 269:1 316:9 340:22
cooperation 50:8
cooperative 269:5
coordination 125:5 159:20 201:7 213:15
coordinator 218:4 252:5
coordinators 130:2 132:6 137:5 194:14 196:22
cop 418:12,14 430:3
cop's 417:7
copies 7:12
cops 402:11 418:11 464:18
copy 206:6
core 23:8 39:6,7 148:8,18 200:1 204:21 210:10 244:4 375:17 434:7
Corey 2:15 258:1
corp 191:17 243:1
Corps 2:9,10 81:21 91:20 92:13 95:2 121:6 129:17 132:19 146:3,8,13 146:16 147:19 166:2 168:12 169:6 175:6,14 176:6,10 190:1,3 201:5 248:16,22 249:2 251:9,22
correct 35:5 115:2 139:2,10,19 141:13,21 152:5 174:17 215:6 217:15 218:20 237:5 257:15 307:18 312:13,17 342:4 516:13,14
correctly 182:6
correlate 229:16
correspond 189:6
corroborate 324:9
corroborative 324:19
cortex 54:8,11,22 57:22 62:10
cost 112:8 139:14 196:6 444:13
costing 444:16
costs 109:19 196:2 196:3 443:20,22 444:6,10
couch 70:5 491:14
Council 26:22 329:18
counsel 12:18 13:9 92:6,14 93:1,2 123:10 129:22 130:7,12 132:21 138:2,6,12 139:19 140:1,2,6,16 142:13,16,21 147:8,13,14,19 148:7,14 149:17 149:19 150:10,11 151:6,8,8 156:19 157:3,5,15 158:7 158:8,10 159:5,13 159:16 163:17,22 165:7,21 166:4,5 167:5 169:7 176:5 176:18,19 178:2 178:21 179:12,12 180:9 181:4 217:5 217:20 218:7,9 219:7,10,14 220:20 221:3,15 223:21 224:18 225:5,11 226:13 226:17 228:1 229:6 458:2
counseling 103:5 119:17 287:6
counselors 101:13 103:3 274:17 276:5
counsels 92:17 93:3 93:7 194:15
count 313:9 365:8
counter 205:11
counter-intellige... 244:6,11
counterproductive 457:15
countries 185:13 385:3
country 66:10 273:6 289:4 301:2 311:6 385:4,9 390:22 394:19 404:9 409:10 411:13 413:20 415:2 416:20 417:6,16 421:18 425:11,16 491:4,8 494:6
county 285:15,20 308:6 392:8 465:17,22 466:1 466:22
couple 20:6 40:12 70:13 92:22 102:22 111:22 149:4 240:13,19 241:6 272:10 287:13 289:9 313:5 384:16 425:19
courage 497:12 507:20,22 508:2
courageous 449:3 453:18 454:13 508:4
course 10:1 43:6 48:12 71:6 72:9 88:4 125:8 138:7 138:12 140:5 149:5 150:3,12,14 156:20,22 157:7 157:11 165:9 175:6 180:7 182:17,19 191:14 195:14 200:15 201:20 202:8,9 204:1,8 208:1,20 209:4,13 210:10 210:11,13,16 211:9,9,15,18,19 211:20 218:1,10 234:8 236:19 237:22 238:1 239:21 240:13 244:19 246:8,9 247:4,5,19 248:2 265:4,5 314:2 318:5 393:13 399:3,18 409:4 416:15 445:15 446:14 478:20 484:19 490:4 500:2 507:11
courses 111:14 131:8 157:12 158:22 159:2 182:16 211:15,17 212:1 246:22 248:3
court 93:18 137:4 154:5 178:14 179:12 276:21

282:16 295:5 337:15 340:10 414:21 425:12 436:2 508:20
court-martial 162:1 230:11 499:15
courtroom 130:11 151:17 158:16 159:5,9 176:4 509:5,8
courts-martial 162:5 202:13
cousin 489:20
cover 122:11 125:8 131:15
covered 490:18
coworker 291:14
coworkers 324:17
CPT 146:2,7 147:14 148:3 151:1,7,12 152:1 152:7 153:3,20 155:13 156:13 157:16 165:22 166:2,8,9,12,20 175:5 176:15 177:19,22 182:12 182:14,22 183:3
crafted 128:9
Craig 36:16
crazy 317:3 418:19
cream 37:16,18,21 38:1,3,5,8,11,14
create 83:5 396:5 428:3 464:6 489:6
created 9:9 44:16 88:3 178:2 485:16 485:16
creates 118:10 119:12,13,14
creating 61:18 66:17 68:2 409:17 456:16 490:5
creation 171:13 174:12
creative 15:14
credentialed 192:12
credibility 19:9 45:3 66:21 324:7 404:3,6 484:11,16
credible 21:6 312:1
creeps 24:15
crew 197:4
cried 76:8
crime 22:6 27:7 28:6 184:20 188:13 189:11,12 189:16,20 191:3,4 196:18 197:22 203:1 205:18 207:10 208:2,6 211:18 216:1 249:11 259:19 260:13,20,21,21 266:8,15,21 275:19 288:8 301:7 309:19,20 311:1 312:21 316:4 318:22 340:12 341:2 349:20 351:19 361:17,20,22 362:15,19 389:8 389:21 438:7 439:2,18 440:12 440:14 441:16 442:3,20 449:1 453:21 459:1 463:17 480:20 500:15
crimes 1:4 5:13 9:11 32:6 48:19 51:5 54:10 59:1 67:3 132:8 184:18 186:16 190:17 202:21,22 203:1 203:19,22 250:21 254:3 255:19 265:4 267:15 270:2,7 271:13 276:6 278:8 282:15 285:9,13 288:10,15 291:8 301:3,19 309:22 318:18 328:17,18 350:15 351:20 353:10 384:18 385:1 390:8,18 396:21 402:11 403:12 413:1 428:9 437:2 438:16,17 439:13 443:12,21 465:18 465:20
criminal 2:12,16 3:2,3,6,10 4:6 9:22 11:14 22:7 22:18 24:15 40:13 62:22 67:9 84:17 106:15 117:14 122:6 124:11,20 126:15 127:13 128:8 151:22 155:3 167:12 169:3,8,15 170:15 175:12 183:9,11 183:13,15,21 184:6,9,22 185:4 185:6,18 189:14 190:16 191:2 192:22 193:19 198:22 199:3 201:20 202:1,3,4 202:15,17 206:4 206:21 246:6 250:22 251:1 308:15,20 315:14 319:7 325:7 326:5 331:13 348:21 361:2 366:16 369:9,15 405:3,9 409:11 435:5 438:17 491:18 492:7 500:17
criminalistics 208:4
crisis 274:17 276:4 381:7 383:5
criteria 27:21 34:4 34:5 127:16 129:12 133:13
critical 110:10 135:3 279:10 280:19 300:9 395:9 414:12,15 414:19 416:5 460:8 469:13
cross 104:6 303:1
cross-examination 73:12
cross-training 405:6
crossing 105:21
crossover 30:15 32:12
Crow 2:12 121:6 148:2,3 151:1,7 151:12 152:1,7 153:3,20 155:13 156:13 157:16 166:9,10,12,20 167:8 168:14 172:9 173:19 176:15 177:19,22 182:9,12,14,22 183:3
Crow's 178:10
CRP 189:16,21
crying 76:14 105:3
cues 514:22
culpability 291:16
cultural 208:13 209:2 271:21 297:11
culturally 368:21 453:15,16 456:17
culture 66:17 74:6 74:13 80:1 100:21 297:2 368:17 372:5 403:4 455:12 485:17
cumulative 121:21
current 181:18 253:20 270:3 325:1 433:13 442:19 444:19,19 445:5
currently 90:2 102:10 111:4,9,10 111:20 112:11 124:9 165:12 187:13,14 193:21 195:16 253:1 270:11 338:6 433:1 440:19
curriculum 245:15 246:11
curve 316:11
cuss 41:22
custodial 215:10
custody 216:1,7 266:14
cut 91:8 206:13,16 211:3 345:5,14,15 346:10
cuts 250:18,21 251:2
cutters 198:8
cutting 99:22 421:10
cyber-campaign 146:11
cycles 191:18
cynical 259:8 402:12 426:6,11

D

D.C 160:10 206:10 396:2 405:4 466:8
DA 284:16 314:22 315:3,10,13 343:21 346:18 388:6
DA's 295:2 347:18
Dad 74:21,21 75:4 75:14 76:8 78:8 78:14,21 79:3
Dale 289:10,22
damage 17:6 30:13 364:16 365:11 428:3 498:9
damaged 403:10
Dan 507:4

dance 216:13
danger 18:13
dangerous 33:8 385:10 390:21
Daniel 7:3 506:21 507:1
dark 61:7 356:1 496:2
Darrell 2:16 184:5
data 29:8 133:19 228:14 386:15 387:9 388:19 440:10,11 446:15 463:7 468:3 469:15 480:15 481:7,9
data's 445:20
database 325:16
date 189:8 195:12 203:20 237:7 265:17,17,19 508:1
daughter 74:16,18 364:2,3,6
daughters 31:3,15
David 32:20 53:22 414:5,6,16 416:2 416:9 418:3
dawned 498:21
day 13:21 26:6,15 30:1 74:20 185:22 209:4 212:18 237:2 249:11,12 340:9 341:1 364:17 385:12 425:12 442:16 465:19 508:19 519:5
days 70:13 185:18 185:19 285:22 367:6 377:5 394:5 396:12 423:5 494:12 504:6
DCAP 93:1 147:21
de-susceptify 475:16
dead 401:12 406:22
deal 10:18 30:13 53:12 76:21 77:12 119:15 223:6,13 225:6 303:15 318:20 333:8,11 333:12 334:16 344:18 345:5,14 345:15 470:15 477:7 485:9
dealing 77:13 104:16 398:20 448:3 512:3
dealt 507:10
Dean 2:11 8:10,13 435:8
death 67:10,13,16 67:20 208:4
debate 171:16
Debra 417:20
debrief 64:6,17
debriefings 65:11
decades 29:16,20 39:21 51:13 396:13 412:19 434:22 465:4
deceit 49:9 73:7
DECEMBER 1:9
deception 40:12,20 40:21 43:15
decide 67:19 141:12 241:17 246:10 247:1,2 332:22 380:9 382:18 386:2
decided 89:11 171:19 241:18 286:17 315:3 403:12
decides 269:4 316:8
deciding 200:21
decision 95:22 200:20 224:1 227:12 230:15 275:10 276:16 285:11,12 307:8 336:11,19 337:12 337:13 339:11,21 340:15 361:4 363:8 431:4 441:22 442:2
decisions 131:1 322:1 334:17 335:12 363:5,9 379:21 392:15
declination 314:21
decline 315:4 424:9 425:1
declines 345:3 409:4
declining 254:5 389:12,21
decrease 265:21 266:21 267:5,6 269:11 453:22 472:4
decreases 338:17
decreasing 267:20 267:21 481:4
dedicate 264:20
dedicated 12:15 128:15 132:13 186:7,22 199:13 264:5,10 384:22 400:12 465:18,20
dedicates 189:17
deem 184:11
deep 446:2,18 447:11,15 474:22
deeply 58:16 61:2 288:18 511:7
defend 81:22
defendant 343:12 351:19
defendants 508:9
defended 177:8
defender 8:21
defenders 151:6 177:4
defending 12:20 150:8 179:16
defense 1:1,6 2:19 3:5 5:20,21 9:8,17 9:19 12:17 13:8 15:9,11 71:3 90:4 91:19 92:6,14,19 93:1,1,3,6 95:15 120:18 121:1,4 122:13 123:2 124:18 139:6,19 140:1,1,6,16 147:13,14,19,22 148:19 149:19,22 150:7 151:8 153:12 162:15,22 163:6 169:7 176:17,18 177:3 178:21 179:11,12 180:9 184:16 286:12 344:2 402:5 440:17
Defense's 517:21
defer 139:3 140:8 230:6,19 346:1
deferred 223:20
define 84:4 480:19
defined 123:19 125:14 126:7 185:6 368:22
defining 150:19
definitely 147:4 345:6
definition 260:12 260:15 261:7,9,14 439:4 450:3
definitions 474:13
deflection 454:7
degrading 51:21
degree 42:11 210:21 245:18 450:15 468:15 508:6
delay 7:14 219:19 350:1
delayed 49:17,18 77:4 228:21 229:3
delays 423:5
deliberation 201:12
deliberations 6:12
delighted 355:4 373:9
delivered 500:10
delivering 239:14
delivery 125:21 200:4
demand 145:15,21 186:12
demographic 302:13
demographics 231:3
demonized 79:6
demonstrated 56:4
demonstrates 45:17 436:20
demonstration 37:14
dense 173:11
department 1:1 2:14,15 9:19 13:8 15:9,11 90:4 121:4 122:19 123:8 124:3,16,18 125:22 184:15,16 185:5 188:8 189:15 196:12 257:10,17 259:2 263:18 270:1 276:10 304:6 305:9 311:21 312:8,10 317:7 320:6 322:16 326:16,20 330:16 336:11 356:18 362:16 381:18 383:9 386:22 397:8,14 420:10 421:2 447:9,10 466:10 496:14 499:21
Department's 121:18 122:4 125:12
department-wide 123:6 135:22
departments 4:7 8:20 10:11 66:8 82:1 133:18 250:4 301:2 392:1

396:19 399:5 408:17 464:2
depend 60:20 350:4
depended 275:19
dependent 371:2
dependents 189:19
depending 67:6 88:17 109:17 259:14 337:4 340:2,16 349:13 370:9 429:6
depends 39:22,22 42:11 342:15 343:3
deploy 498:4
deployed 198:8 399:1
deployment 462:4
depression 36:14 36:15,19 119:14
depth 203:8 205:22
Deputy 2:4,15,15 2:16 3:4,9 8:8 120:17 169:12 184:1,5 257:11,14 257:22 258:2,4,5 258:8 261:8,16 262:20,22 263:6,8 263:10 266:4,7,22 267:4,22 268:7,9 269:14,17,20 299:7,10,14 301:11 303:10,13 304:14 305:11 308:11 310:9 312:3,11 313:14 313:17 315:15,20 316:17 317:8 333:15 334:14 336:5 338:10 339:4 340:11,19 344:8,12,20 345:9 346:8 348:3,7,9 349:6 350:7,20 351:1,4,8,12 352:2,20 353:12 353:17 372:20 374:7 519:7
describe 10:14 152:6 197:11 314:7 366:20 441:21
described 72:12 174:12 248:19 293:14 364:5 366:7 371:14
describes 265:13
describing 371:22 372:21 374:8 377:11 413:2
description 198:13
deserve 295:18
deserves 450:22
design 113:13 374:10,21 379:10 397:19
designated 2:2 5:4 6:2 158:12
designating 158:5
designation 127:21 159:7
designed 189:14 208:20 367:8 373:15 374:1,11 375:11 377:6,10 377:21 412:21
designing 380:12
desired 51:11 454:8
desperately 500:3
destined 167:14
destroy 316:18,20
detail 156:15
detailed 126:14
details 58:19,20 60:8,12,13,16 61:2,6 76:3 100:22
detecting 73:6 514:12
detection 40:21
detective 2:5 265:6 269:8 275:18 280:18 315:7 349:8 401:2
detectives 2:5 99:10 257:13 263:22 264:4,10 264:13 270:13 271:22 272:12,16 274:10 276:3 282:22 292:21 323:1 325:15 326:21 395:1
deter 189:19
determination 275:22 295:4
determine 304:21
determined 207:2 210:8 389:5
determining 127:15 391:17
detrimental 341:13 341:21
devastated 105:6 394:9,11
devastates 482:22
devastating 16:2
develop 41:8,9 87:20 123:5 170:17 200:18 246:21 401:7 439:22 441:6 477:6 503:6
developed 13:3 122:14 124:19 136:11 169:22 170:21 369:20 422:11 443:11
developing 154:19 199:14 234:4
development 121:18 151:21 167:3 200:4 245:15,20
deviant 39:11
devoted 186:4
diagnostic 449:4
dialog 448:22 454:13
dialogue 434:17 463:12
dictate 316:18
dictating 363:21
died 266:12
Diego 148:12 153:11 187:18 273:11 356:17 384:10 385:6 388:18 391:7 393:16 394:2 395:12 396:19 399:18 400:6 405:5 408:1 422:12 427:5 465:16,22 466:22
difference 27:8,11 32:2 36:10,12 37:4 87:17,19 103:4,15,22 216:5 273:8 281:19 282:13,18 284:20 297:3,6,22 386:6 389:4 390:16 395:15 396:18 411:6 438:4 488:6 492:6
differences 12:2 36:16 85:9 395:10 442:11
different 21:21 24:8 30:10 45:6,7 53:1 55:9 63:7,14 68:7 72:21 74:9 77:13 79:8 80:3,3 80:10,11 83:20 88:20 93:10 103:11 117:10 148:9 149:9 168:10 169:20 172:3 173:13 175:1 177:8 178:19 179:20 182:16 210:20 219:5 230:4 233:5 238:9 246:1,2 249:22 260:22 268:13 273:11 279:7 303:16 304:1 305:1 310:2 319:1 331:1 337:10 348:15,17 349:21 358:7 360:17 371:3 377:13 379:3 381:13,14 382:2,8 383:9,12 388:17 391:14 403:4 431:5 452:7 461:22 465:21 467:15,15 482:5 486:14,18 492:13 493:1,5,7
differentiate 409:7 473:22
differentiation 492:14
differently 56:22 57:1,1 64:16 74:8 320:6 348:5
difficult 17:10 90:20 115:19 164:9 175:6 176:11 191:16 226:8 227:2 250:10 268:19 276:19 281:1 287:10 298:14 300:4,17 301:9 334:15,16 371:18 403:9 406:17 438:8,10 453:9 465:2 511:7
difficulties 14:22 201:16
difficulty 17:16 191:20 438:12
digital 324:14
dignity 134:6 290:11
dimension 436:3 473:19
dimensional 65:17 65:20 438:1
diminished 336:9
direct 60:9 69:8

73:12 103:3 130:10 286:2
directed 5:19 6:13 9:19 146:12 440:7
direction 30:5 222:17 304:1 437:12 439:11 471:4 487:5 516:8
directions 448:13
directive-type 124:22
directly 178:15 306:7 307:22
director 2:2,6,7,12 2:16,17,21 3:4,6 5:8,14 8:15 120:17,20 183:20 184:1,6,11 193:5 198:21 435:10 519:7
dirty 403:21
disability 511:17
disabled 347:10
disadvantages 391:5
disagree 450:6
disagreement 518:14
disappointed 77:16
disappointing 400:10
disassociated 72:18 151:19 152:12
disbelief 365:4
discharge 219:16
disciplinary 435:12
discipline 193:10 436:7
disciplined 404:1
disciplines 273:11 273:20
disclose 78:15 86:11 365:1 476:7 489:18
disclosed 342:15
disclosing 76:5 104:15 298:6
disclosure 342:21 365:22 369:2 370:12 372:6 373:12
disclosures 364:13 367:18
discourse 434:18 450:5
discovery 434:8 451:1
discretely 438:18
discretion 229:18 235:13 254:22
discretionary 107:19
discrimination 511:15 512:1
discuss 121:18 133:11 135:20 139:22 199:13 200:17 223:19 225:1 515:16
discussed 129:4 255:22 273:12 345:22 499:4
discussing 150:12 203:15 252:21 487:12
discussion 4:9 10:18 93:18 120:2 201:12 226:19,20 354:6,8 391:16 421:21 422:1
Discussion/Delib... 4:11
discussions 89:1 226:4 239:8 282:7 286:21 287:10,11 411:12
disengage 322:17 322:20
dismiss 117:12
dismissed 499:16 503:20
disparities 450:11
disparity 33:17
dispatch 386:12 427:20
dispatched 386:1 386:10
dispelling 274:11
dispersed 197:20
displace 454:3
disposition 11:19 12:8,11
disrespectful 168:14
disrupt 454:4
distance 131:7 198:1
distinct 123:19 135:9 172:1 197:3
distinguish 481:15
distinguished 121:16 192:5 198:20 433:20 434:2 507:4
distract 498:5,5
distress 498:1
district 8:21 66:8 169:5 177:4 180:13 181:1,10 261:17,18,22 263:14 266:18 282:14 294:17 308:16 313:11,11 321:18 322:19 339:9,10 340:6,14 346:22 388:4
disturbing 483:20
ditto 353:13
dive 446:3,18 447:11,15 474:22
diversity 448:16
divided 162:17 358:8
divine 444:18
division 2:9,13,20 3:3,8 14:8 163:3 264:11,18
divisions 184:17
doctor 14:9 43:18 143:7
doctrine 15:13 95:3 106:21,21 247:14
document 320:20
documented 223:11 366:12
DoD 123:3,10 136:3,12 138:4 190:11 191:6 207:2 237:21,22 255:9 256:5 346:2 346:4 396:2 518:2
DoD-wide 135:18
Doe 352:8,11
dog 16:20
doing 23:20 25:12 29:21 30:11,13 33:14 47:14 49:6 65:21 67:15 70:21 71:6,12,14 72:6 73:17 82:9,17,17 87:4,7,16 94:15 96:10 103:17 104:1,5,13,17 136:18,19 144:13 148:11 154:12 157:5 159:9 179:6 182:18 210:4,7 216:19 219:3 235:5 236:15 238:4 241:11,12 253:11 254:18 255:11 256:15 271:13,14,14 272:22 282:8,8 286:9 295:14 297:14 298:21 299:2 304:4,9 327:20 329:15 330:13 338:7 357:20 372:13 375:6 380:18,19 380:20,21 394:13 395:6,8 400:2,5 401:19,21 402:10 405:18 408:10 409:15 410:13 411:11 414:17 417:13 421:22,22 424:6 449:10 458:9,9 461:5,6 462:15 464:8,9,12 465:6,13 466:19 467:10 471:19 472:9 477:19 485:21 491:9 495:1 504:15 510:5
dollar 444:8
dollars 421:2
domestic 8:15 29:17 99:2 124:1 126:8 129:5 131:13 132:9,11 133:8 142:7 186:9 211:21 265:16 288:12 347:8 390:20,21 402:2,3 409:15 427:17 435:10 508:22
Donegan 2:13 257:17,19,21 269:21,22 278:19 279:1 284:10 285:18 290:4 291:19 292:6 294:3,6,10,13,19 294:22 296:3,7,10 297:15 298:13 300:21 302:15 303:5,9 305:14 306:12 307:11,14 307:18,20 308:1,4 309:1,12,16 313:18,22 314:9 315:2,18 335:6 341:7 348:14 349:10,17 353:7 386:5 488:5
Donegan's 487:15
door 42:21,21 75:21 76:2 111:6 378:20 427:21 430:22 431:10,15 512:8
dot 370:3,3,3

doubled 422:17
doubt 50:13
doubtful 100:17
download 188:19
downstairs 70:6,10
downtown 263:22
DPR 123:12
Dr 2:10,17,21 8:10 8:11 10:21,22 12:6 32:20 53:21 53:22 54:2 57:16 99:16 113:17 120:19 121:11 135:14,16,17 144:5 183:5 354:11,13,16 355:1,9 361:9,13 361:15,18 362:1,5 363:2 368:12,14 369:1 371:6,9 372:10 376:18 377:3 381:1,5 383:3,8,16 384:6 392:10 397:12 398:20 408:11 412:19 417:1,6,19 417:20 420:17,17 422:20 430:7 433:17,18 455:4 458:18 460:9 462:17 468:3,8 469:5,8 471:7 473:7,13 474:11 476:1 477:9 479:12 481:21 482:6 486:5,9,13 486:20 487:18 489:8 490:2 492:4 495:6 509:1,16 515:7
draft 515:20
drafted 125:2 518:10
dragging 209:10
drama 18:22
drank 75:13
drastic 90:22 91:1
drastically 319:1
draw 100:15 175:18 286:10 358:17
drawing 305:19
drawn 276:20 358:14
draws 104:12
dress 23:9 44:18,18 44:20
dressed 45:8,9,10 45:11 497:9
drill 494:11,12
drink 50:18 75:14 75:14 271:5
drinking 18:16 216:10,16 223:10 224:20 225:10 229:21 401:20
drive 220:5 317:3 396:8
driven 30:7 183:3 339:6,12 345:3 440:9 444:18 498:3
drives 106:21,22 368:3
dropped 165:17 429:21
drove 64:21
drug 20:12 253:1 255:19 256:1 286:13
drugs 50:18 281:10 286:14 430:2
drunk 20:15 70:4 216:16 291:14
DTM 124:22
DUNN 1:17 478:19 478:21 481:6
Dunn's 487:11
duplicative 133:21
duties 184:8
duty 169:6 179:22 192:14 193:21 227:20 248:8 249:4 293:18 353:9,10 496:9 501:3
dying 396:9
dynamic 100:12 235:9
dynamics 131:13 348:15 371:21

E

ear 43:18
earlier 12:14 129:5 145:7 150:12 169:3 201:1 208:8 235:21 323:3 324:1 389:22 406:1 426:13 451:17 465:11 499:3
earliest 277:3,7
early 101:5 187:10 200:12 220:21 226:6 227:19 264:21 310:17 384:20 393:18 394:13 401:3 402:8
ease 293:19
easier 513:17,17
easily 20:22 388:3 499:15 513:20
east 1:12 311:12
easy 66:14 370:22 409:18 410:16,21 453:11 464:16 465:1
eat 38:3,10
echo 7:16 178:10 227:17 336:5 353:8
echoed 360:4
echoes 231:21
edge 421:10
edges 505:10
editor 516:20
edits 516:21 518:12
educate 329:10,10 329:11,11 346:17
educating 274:4 511:9
education 3:8 14:7 175:12 189:18 267:10 268:8 329:8 485:21 508:11 516:5
educational 92:2 283:9
effect 121:21 271:15 272:19 273:17 471:19
effecting 189:14 272:8
effective 124:4 131:16 161:20 254:13 255:9 369:21 489:1,15 494:13 504:11,14
effectively 130:2 132:5 436:22 487:8
effectiveness 109:8 111:19 122:19 129:13 133:12,14 188:7 437:3,11 487:21
effects 368:8
effort 57:22 87:22 88:7,14 89:7 122:8 141:16 167:19 172:20 390:9,17 481:22 482:2
efforts 12:1,3 66:15 167:20,21 173:18 189:17 336:8 444:20 483:7
ego 47:21
egregious 270:21
eight 195:1,2 202:8 203:12 246:13 254:8 273:6,10 376:7 385:2 393:21 452:1 488:7,8
Eighteen 166:7
either 20:3 23:12 25:10 37:6 53:8 53:15 62:7 66:22 80:7 118:12 119:16 165:13 169:7 171:5 180:9 248:8 249:13 266:9 272:11 315:18 332:17 400:16
elaborate 156:8 214:21
elaborating 156:9
elect 170:12 221:6
elected 329:10 330:1
element 375:18 389:20 448:2
elements 63:15 69:17 72:13 94:22 128:18 131:15 140:2 200:21 216:18 232:10 339:15,16 389:8
elephant 368:6
elevated 190:9
eligible 419:8
eliminate 512:22 512:22
ELIZABETH 1:16 1:18
else's 207:7
email 325:16
emanate 267:15
embark 9:15
embarking 114:12
embarrassing 46:5
embarrassment 331:5
embedded 450:12 451:21 455:17,21 492:12,17
embedding 196:9 450:21
embraced 240:16
emergency 136:22 221:12

emerging 85:22 196:14
emotion 53:4
emotional 76:22
emotions 53:2 58:18
empathetic 48:21
empathy 411:2
emphasis 173:17 459:14
emphasize 458:21
empirical 355:16 355:21 462:9
empirically 452:20 453:1 493:10
employ 306:9
employee 192:15 263:17,17
employee's 264:2
employees 91:12,12 325:1
employment 508:12,14
empowerment 382:15
enable 197:6
enables 124:12
enacted 123:16
enacting 196:7
encode 57:12
encoded 58:10 61:2
encounter 235:1
encountered 234:10
encourage 107:3 152:11 210:1 290:8 291:18 328:16 379:9 453:6 490:17 503:3
encouraged 82:14 236:3 292:10
encouraging 145:11 457:13 489:1 490:17
encumbers 254:2
end-all 102:19
ended 65:7 205:2 400:6 498:6
endorsed 501:10
endorsement 506:2
endure 35:14
enduring 128:21
enemies 16:8
enemy 116:6 410:11
energy 99:17
enforcement 10:8 44:8,10 95:19 98:4,20 127:2 189:22 191:9 194:4,18 195:4 198:3 201:19 202:5 205:12 240:15 246:7 253:11 267:11 269:2,5 278:13 279:17 281:7 293:8 301:10 316:9 317:16 318:2,4 319:3,5 337:17 344:13 345:1,7 356:17 358:21 365:15 370:14 373:18 376:8 378:4 384:14 385:3,8,21 386:1 387:12,19 388:3 396:11,18 402:18 403:20 411:5 412:9 413:8 413:21 420:13 421:4 423:4 424:16 425:10 427:1 428:5 440:15 441:19 444:2 447:2,8 457:13 466:2 467:10 477:13 478:13 488:12 490:21,22 491:8 491:21 492:12
engage 450:5 454:13 492:6 493:11
engaged 29:18 281:11 366:15,16 367:10,10 372:15 372:15 438:3 441:15 482:9,14
engagement 187:10 197:9
engages 463:9
engaging 225:4 460:5
England 19:4
enhance 121:20 437:9 451:11
enhanced 128:15
enhancements 136:16 190:21
enlisted 249:8,14 251:8,15
enormous 359:15
enrichment 265:10
enrolled 398:16
ensure 128:3 129:1 131:22 132:3 134:3 162:12 165:12 167:9 184:14 295:16 504:10
ensuring 129:21 135:5,12 142:6 260:7
entailed 273:9
entails 346:17
enter 18:5 374:14
entered 61:12 343:19
entering 18:9 188:16 194:22
enterprise 251:12
entire 7:22 29:19 35:18 230:10 316:21 385:11 401:17 494:5
entirely 310:21 379:4
entitlement 450:13
entrance 77:20
entry 77:5 195:1 246:7 396:22
environment 41:3 41:5 65:8 239:7 310:4 319:15 321:12 485:19
environmental 169:9
environments 267:14 302:7,8
epidemic 23:18
equal 57:4 456:5,7
equality 450:9
equalized 451:2
equalizer 449:21 449:22 456:4
equalizing 455:2
equally 381:13
equals 50:1
equipped 140:6
equivalent 195:3
equivalents 511:18
era 458:2
error 517:9
escape 49:8 62:8
especially 86:12 91:13 95:17 96:3 166:3,4 232:11 244:20 298:14 302:8 333:20 359:16 403:19 428:14 485:17
essential 122:12
essentially 251:16 303:7 443:13 450:14 481:12
establish 5:20 9:20 95:20 124:19 129:17 130:19 377:6,7,16,18 378:2 406:15 426:8
established 124:3 138:8 186:20 203:17 213:5,21 225:8 389:9 499:22 500:13
establishes 185:3
establishing 121:19 464:22
establishment 123:17 128:11
estimate 27:5 108:6 109:1 443:20
Estimating 443:21
et 360:3 363:19 370:6,14 373:6 381:19
eternal 293:15
ethics 2:18 120:21 344:17 436:8
ethnic 80:11
Europe 162:6,8
eval 477:14
evaluate 110:17 111:12,13 471:15 504:17
evaluated 109:8 487:8
evaluating 122:18 467:11
evaluation 110:5 111:11 156:12 386:17 466:4 469:2 470:19 471:9
evaluations 111:12 465:13 470:8 471:11
evening 18:10 495:20,21,22
event 53:16 98:13 357:19
events 59:2,17 99:2
eventually 32:5 97:12 228:5 343:19 444:11
Everest 374:16
everybody 7:16 18:7 28:17 38:21 41:15 77:11 92:11 121:13 209:19 244:14 301:16 326:16,19 327:1

442:2 463:10 474:9 481:16 494:15 506:13 516:6,10 517:4
everybody's 502:2
everyday 45:1,2 386:13
evidence 51:7,7,8 63:18,18,19 67:14 67:19 69:6,17 72:12 74:3 95:4,5 95:7,10,11 97:10 137:2 172:7 200:20 203:9 213:17 214:13 222:13 259:11,22 262:7 263:13,14 265:1 269:3 286:8 286:14 290:14 292:3 312:15 316:6,13,19,20 321:7 323:12 324:14 339:6,8,13 339:16 340:2,4 341:4 347:12 349:11 351:17,21 352:19 377:7,16 377:17 378:2 389:5 500:8 503:21
exact 144:21,22 312:18 479:22
exactly 346:16 349:3 387:16 415:13 446:14 460:22 461:22 475:5 480:11 506:3
exam 269:3 375:4 399:21 400:7 426:22 447:13,14 466:19
examination 69:8 73:13 259:16,17 286:1
examinations 60:10 136:9 139:13 214:15 262:11
examine 6:13 12:18 94:21 137:10
examiner 394:3 400:13 426:22 427:4 467:11
examiner's 285:20 309:3
examiner-safe 137:10
examiners 137:1 144:10 327:6 435:7 440:13
example 40:22 42:14 43:14 44:17 55:16 69:18 74:15 133:5 150:1 151:13,20 152:13 153:4 162:2 165:6 196:3 204:11 233:12 245:21 278:21 362:8 369:6,8 370:11 373:22 374:6 382:3 385:22 387:17 388:19 389:4 390:2,6 393:5,14 395:12 400:11 403:12 418:11 423:6 426:18 438:11 447:22 458:21 465:18 466:8 469:16 471:14,18 473:3 478:9 488:13 491:9
examples 204:5 212:17 367:19 373:5 389:14 448:6 491:3
exams 400:1,5 466:3
excellent 505:16
exception 54:12 86:8 152:7 165:9
Exceptional 389:10
exceptions 43:10 165:5 221:9 382:5
excited 77:18,18 78:5 461:5 491:5
excitement 35:15 35:19,22
exclude 478:12
exclusive 151:16
exclusively 115:1
excuse 8:12 163:21 186:2 187:13 278:18 329:21 415:4 473:10
excuses 487:17
execute 141:9
executed 140:10
executing 142:11
executive 2:6 193:4 258:13
exemplary 448:14 449:1 451:6
exercises 241:4
exhibited 507:21 507:22 508:2
exhibitionism 31:5
exist 19:13,13 126:2 234:3 456:16 510:4
existed 321:20
existing 126:22 141:10
exists 242:14 382:8 398:2 438:13 507:15
exodus 272:11
expand 181:20 502:10
expanded 88:2 161:21 162:12 233:18 443:22
expanding 374:7 502:21
expansion 445:1
expect 23:14 49:15 60:1 280:18 285:9 326:15,19 362:10 362:11 403:15
expectation 24:10 24:11 250:7,11 306:22
expectations 22:11 22:22 24:9 284:4
expected 47:9 65:20 198:10
expecting 121:2 283:11
expediting 197:21
expeditiously 187:8
expenditures 444:1
expensive 371:19
experience 12:16 57:11 63:13,22 65:16,22 66:1,2 69:10,16 72:21 93:11 96:7 97:4 145:18 146:18 154:11,13,19 168:5 170:2 172:14 173:22 174:2 175:19 176:16 179:15,20 180:14,17 181:11 196:14 201:4 281:16 293:9 308:10,20 314:8 367:4 371:15 385:6 396:21 398:2 402:16 414:7 416:7,16 417:9 424:21 483:3 506:13 507:8
experienced 58:16 128:11 170:6 188:2 282:20 409:21 412:22
experiences 101:16 217:12 256:21 314:10,19 496:22
experiencing 284:7 374:12
experiential 411:20 417:12
experimentation 461:6
expert 12:7 122:9 128:21 130:8 149:10 175:21 177:19 400:17 409:13 436:16
expertise 162:19 172:12 176:13 177:14 213:16 379:19 384:15 420:16
expertly 135:10
experts 21:13,16 128:8 132:15 162:16 208:10 327:7,12 393:4 400:16 404:21 405:13 409:10,17 409:20 458:7 471:15 515:7
explain 28:11 29:7 37:13 47:4 49:16 49:20,20 59:15 122:14 160:3 222:2 225:5,12 226:1 228:2 254:20 266:2,5 372:22 450:18 456:18
explained 221:20
explaining 234:22 346:16
explains 23:4 291:10
explicit 172:5
exploit 20:22 472:11
explore 10:6
explored 442:14
exploring 252:22 441:1
explosion 53:20
expound 41:2 315:21
express 53:2,3,6
expressing 379:22
extend 8:1
extended 89:6

extensively 460:17
extent 106:6 113:7 193:20 234:3 254:2 517:11
extents 419:12
external 386:17 393:5,11
extra 265:11
extraordinarily 505:12 506:12
extraordinary 317:1
extreme 386:16
extremely 9:4 54:15 147:10 270:8 371:20 400:22 499:13
eye 90:7 117:10
eyes 20:10 86:9

F

fabulous 493:18
FACA 6:9,14
face 88:22 100:3 250:18 290:12,20 291:1 318:1 376:2 485:7
faced 250:17
Faces 293:14
facets 287:5
facilitate 132:7 497:1
facilitated 150:4 157:12
facilitators 111:16
facilities 137:17 143:20 144:8 215:17 246:19 400:7
facility 143:12 259:17
facing 220:8 250:20 251:2 253:5
fact 13:15 25:9 48:21 50:2 52:15 55:6 72:20 79:18 79:20 93:6 95:2 176:1 193:11 200:8 225:5 228:2 239:10 246:1 249:19 267:7,15 268:4,6,10,19 281:10 286:12 287:20 295:19 327:1 359:12 376:20 378:5 385:22 386:13 392:11 401:1 403:3 408:11 413:17 414:21 481:11 483:11 488:11 494:4 499:4 510:19 513:16 514:21
factor 118:10 267:17 391:18 512:4
factors 37:10 119:10 173:13 190:15 371:4 437:6 512:5
facts 340:17 511:6
faculty 434:2
failed 44:10 400:21 425:16
failing 55:13
failure 489:19,20
fair 15:12 193:12 429:13 486:4
fairly 169:18 247:9
faith 371:2
fake 19:14
fall 477:5
falling 359:6
falls 2:15 258:1,2,5 299:7,10 301:11 303:10,13 304:14 305:11 313:1,14 315:15 317:5,8 333:15 334:14 338:10 346:8 348:3,7 349:6 352:2,20 372:20 374:8 512:10
false 270:17,20 290:22 368:2,7 369:3 375:15 376:2,9,20,21 377:2,8 378:2,5,8 389:5,19 461:20 462:2
falsely 462:8
familiar 227:5 302:17 510:21
familiarity 507:12
families 16:1 396:12 435:22 441:13
family 75:3 122:2 123:14 132:9 184:18 186:6 187:4 195:10 363:19 364:18 371:3 373:16,20 436:9
fan 177:1
fantastic 297:17
FAQ 291:10
far 26:2,18 41:6 65:7 68:7 69:5,6 77:13 90:13 94:22 96:15 97:10 98:1 102:2 103:2 106:20 111:11,18 113:20 115:7 119:10 129:9 139:18 140:8 144:16 210:22 222:15 223:2,3 301:8 355:20 377:11 400:14,22 407:11 413:18
fascinating 470:5
fashion 227:1
fast 82:18 166:16 250:19 415:21 450:1
father 489:19
fathers 488:20
faulty 114:9
favorite 410:15 494:11
faxed 387:3
FBI 27:2 260:14 261:7 386:21
fear 46:3 63:17,18 72:14,15 188:13 290:6 331:4 360:6 360:20,21 368:2 375:18,18,20 513:1
federal 2:2 5:4 6:7 6:8 185:8 194:4 195:4 201:18,22 202:5,17,21 240:15 246:7 413:8 511:17
feedback 86:6 88:19
feel 14:10 65:8 69:14 75:19 104:10,22 105:6 114:4 145:11 234:21 295:14 298:21 327:20,21 328:19 331:11,18 335:15 351:17 425:6 429:12 482:19 497:2
feeling 75:15,15 408:8
feelings 50:13 58:7 63:11,22
feet 498:7 506:5
felonies 185:10 390:8
felony 180:4 190:10 206:20 207:10 223:7 245:14 246:3 384:12 390:7,13,18 392:10 427:16 428:9
felt 76:21 172:4 221:20 260:19 468:13,16 492:8 493:11 496:18 498:4 501:5
female 17:12 52:1 52:17,18 84:19,19 233:17,18 234:11 234:15,16,21 235:4 348:12 372:4,5 401:5 410:6,9,19,20
females 84:12
fence 80:17,18,19 180:12
fenced 90:14,16,20 161:16 164:21 166:6
fences 80:9 475:18
fencing 165:4
FERNANDEZ 1:19 143:4,6 145:3 254:19 298:1 299:4,9,12 332:11 334:13
FETI 65:2 66:5 69:8 91:18 96:19 97:5 98:18 109:22 113:13 204:20 209:14 210:2,7 411:19 412:6,12 413:5 417:11,11
fewer 154:12
field 78:3 159:18 186:1 188:2 189:4 189:5 191:17 194:1 201:9 207:6 207:9,11 218:15 218:17 219:3 248:21 249:1 327:7,12 396:14 409:12 412:8 434:21 435:6 454:8,18 461:9 483:20 487:3,4
fielding 122:17
fields 122:6
fierce 82:18
Fifth 132:12
fight 49:15 362:9
fighting 91:6 206:9
figuratively 302:3

figure 47:2 285:8 363:12,16 446:20 488:4
file 339:12 462:3
filed 266:17 315:14
filing 265:22 266:16
fill 298:11 466:21 467:3
filter 204:12
filtered 297:1
filtering 208:15
final 99:14 125:5 330:5
finally 70:13 76:11 171:19 188:22 351:14 402:15 498:2
find 22:2 38:7,14 40:6,8 109:18 114:8 116:6 119:9 145:1 175:4 220:17 256:18 303:19 310:15 311:5 312:1 326:4 350:14 359:18 362:7 369:13 371:12,15 383:1 417:4 425:20 426:9 453:7 466:17 469:15 471:3 472:11 475:2 509:12
finders 72:20 193:12
finding 35:20 37:4 39:21 63:20 68:6 235:6 444:3 470:13
finds 229:11
fine 216:13 471:4 476:10,12
fines 421:8
finesse 281:16
finger 70:11
finish 59:3 165:14 354:4
finished 114:16
Finn 7:7
first 5:16 14:5 15:8 15:15 16:12 18:10 20:6 21:9 40:8 41:11,15,16 42:5 42:10 43:15 45:14 46:17 54:7 64:7 64:14,20 65:1 72:14 76:5 92:7 92:12 99:17 100:4 102:2 113:12 120:16 125:14 129:20 138:7 169:6 181:1,14 214:21 220:5 221:4 230:8 235:22 238:9 253:16,19 259:1 274:4,13 275:5 290:19 294:18 295:18 309:15 319:13,19 329:16 331:10 338:12 357:1 358:17 359:7 367:13,17 373:11 379:8 394:8 395:16 396:3 398:13 413:19 426:2 437:14 440:15 445:14 451:8,9 458:19 476:20 479:16 480:20,21 489:5,6,9 493:20 502:11 505:8 512:13
fiscal 4:5 195:18 206:20
fiscally 253:18
Fisher 412:19
fit 33:6 446:13 448:15
fits 12:1
fitting 434:15
five 5:22 6:21 7:9 20:1 26:5 34:9 52:2 53:19 88:14 89:7 129:19 162:17 169:6 180:10,16 203:20 209:3,3 243:13,14 243:15 281:10 288:20 338:19 423:5 458:13 465:4 489:21
fix 242:15 410:17 497:16 519:10
fixes 410:21
flagged 500:20
Flagstaff 423:6,8 423:15,18
flashbacks 63:21
flavor 45:7 461:22
fleet 185:15 187:15
FLETC 203:20 245:17,18 246:18 246:18 247:6,19 413:7
flexibility 125:16 191:7 251:14 252:12
flip 45:5 366:3
floated 169:14
floating 227:20
floor 77:22
flops 45:5
flow 181:16 462:6
fluctuates 231:11
FNSV 186:7,11,14 190:19,22 191:11 244:16,18,21
focus 22:8,9,13 24:3 49:12 51:12 60:19,19 61:5 98:8,9 108:14 110:1 113:9 131:12 154:17 270:18 272:2 306:20 320:4 324:5,22 326:15 364:11 407:4 440:10 448:8 467:9 468:14 486:4 509:4,12 510:6,12
focused 44:22 129:19 154:7 323:7 424:10 448:7 454:7 494:2
focusing 22:20 108:13 115:13 196:6 379:7
folks 7:3 69:1 86:3 99:3 100:1 101:19 104:14 105:14 158:6,14 160:10 173:7 201:9 205:7 214:2,13 242:11 346:2 365:22 369:13 370:15 371:15 379:2,12 379:14 398:4,4 409:11 461:13 471:12,13 477:18 477:20 478:12 482:14,21 483:22 484:19
follow 74:10 136:22 141:2 202:8,9 203:13 246:13,14 246:21 247:5,18 248:3 267:18 298:2 307:4 310:2 326:16,20 327:2 334:9 335:3 353:11 400:2 415:6 463:4 472:22
followed 10:13 195:2 255:10 311:15 313:21 315:10 399:11
following 25:22 93:7 114:20 276:2 414:19 461:13 463:8
follows 261:9
fooled 44:1,12,14
foot 442:15 460:7
force 2:20 3:5,7 63:17,18 77:18 78:1,22 120:16 121:8 138:8 158:1 158:11 159:2,11 159:22 160:14 164:5 167:1 179:3 179:14 183:13 190:15 193:8 198:22 199:14,20 200:7,9 201:3 203:4 204:2 210:17 218:2 220:7 231:9,21 233:16 237:10 238:15 241:9,10 252:14 256:6,17 303:7 307:17 335:13 341:21 424:11 428:10 430:22
Force's 458:1
forced 279:5,6 298:15 301:4,12 326:17 339:3 431:10
forceful 390:3
forces 67:18 70:2 73:1 185:16 255:8 255:12,22 308:20 308:21 478:2 503:10
forcible 26:14,16 26:17
forcibly 34:20
forcing 341:11 425:14
foregoing 495:14
forehead 18:13,22 19:11,15
foreign 198:9
foremost 260:6
forensic 65:6 93:19 103:8,9 136:9 137:1,10 144:9,12 214:13 259:22 286:4 394:3 399:21 400:7,12

411:20 421:18 426:21 432:4 466:3,19 467:11
forensics 309:10
forever 56:2 317:4 378:7
forget 97:4,7 400:18 413:12
forgiving 411:9
forgot 507:19
forgotten 413:22
form 97:20 189:1 387:1 467:3
formal 354:5 366:11
formally 125:7
formation 80:15 85:3,4 501:12 504:3
formations 15:20 86:13
former 177:16 325:1
formerly 54:1 190:9
Fort 56:15,16 64:5 64:5 143:9,20 156:20 162:3,3 164:9 195:14 213:12 219:8,11 287:17,19 314:3 314:22 315:4 332:15 393:6 399:3
forth 177:6 185:1 213:16 519:3
forthcoming 440:1
fortunate 272:14 272:14
fortune 30:3,4
forum 518:8
forums 243:9
forward 66:18 73:14 124:13 138:10 140:7 189:1 197:16 200:19 205:15,21 224:7 282:5,16,21 283:4 284:14 285:3,14 288:1 289:7 290:6 293:2 293:6 295:5 314:15 323:14 328:7 331:18 333:17,22 334:2,7 335:14,16 339:18 340:7,16 341:3,9 342:6,11,12,16 343:1,9,12,15 351:16 352:1,7,9 352:16 353:2 407:12 409:7 415:8 423:2 431:2 436:6 440:3 448:1 450:1 452:5 454:12 457:12 470:20 479:7 482:14 484:12 489:2 490:14,18 490:19 505:3 506:11
foster 319:14
found 25:4,13 27:7 27:20 29:1 30:21 32:21 34:1,10 35:7 36:11,12,17 94:16,17 209:3,5 311:13 331:6,16 445:4,6,13 451:6 452:12 480:12 496:9 509:17
foundation 114:5 256:17 397:17
founded 356:15
founder 293:13
four 6:5 29:16,20 74:19 125:13 128:18 155:22 211:22 250:3 395:13 444:17
four-hour 197:2
four-year 163:11
four-year-old 71:21
fourth 9:5 126:14 132:3 516:13
frame 30:16 99:10 229:9 236:11,15 259:7
framed 185:8
framework 442:5 443:19 448:12 454:10
frankly 204:6 412:15 463:14
frantic 99:7
fraternization 392:4 430:2
fraud 191:3
free 398:7
freedom 434:8
freeze 56:18
frequency 439:12
frequently 225:8 291:11 485:18
fresh 259:20
freshmen 422:12
friend 18:18 43:16 43:20 70:14 76:12 76:17 364:7,8 486:11 502:3 503:2 505:19
friends 19:3 75:2 75:10,18 78:19 104:4 206:11 324:17 363:19 364:18 373:16,19 396:11 477:18
frightening 375:2
front 8:18 66:2 71:10,10 101:20 158:18 174:21 181:6,7 226:7 330:3 346:6,15 347:3 442:8 468:4 472:14
frustrated 29:16 30:2 68:15,18 96:22
frustration 397:11 488:11
FSVI 195:8 196:3
Ft 43:17
full 43:19 54:11 197:3 246:12,14 246:16 261:4 443:14 446:11 464:20
full-time 384:22
fuller 140:21 284:17
fully 134:12 140:6 194:6 247:1 441:21 450:18
function 139:7 162:22 163:1 164:1 264:12
functional 40:1
functions 184:22
fund 7:8 174:11 420:6
fundamental 469:20 515:10
fundamentally 382:15 483:21
funded 148:1 162:15 163:6 181:19 397:8,13 420:9 421:6 440:22 447:3
funding 90:3,5,6,11 90:11 109:18,18 111:10 181:22 191:13 245:6 250:22 405:12 418:21 421:1
funds 90:14 191:11 237:22 238:1
funnel 357:10 358:14,17 365:21 367:12 379:8 408:12 489:11
funny 75:15 354:18
further 7:13 132:15 134:11 342:10 384:6
Furthermore 124:15
future 118:4 213:20 222:14 239:6 448:13 474:5 505:2
FY2013 122:13 123:16 133:17 140:3
FY2014 250:19

G

G-3 3:9
Gail 283:5
gained 96:13,14
gal 117:11,11
gang 401:2
gap 242:12,14 281:13 382:8
Garin 161:19
Garin's 212:6
gate 353:6
gatekeepers 373:17 373:19 488:19
gather 164:20 213:17 259:10,11 263:13 264:21,22 286:8 292:8 319:20 323:11,17 323:18 339:8
gathered 500:9
gathering 262:6 324:21
gauged 504:13
geared 127:6 202:9
gee 110:14
gel 209:20
Gelb 27:17
gender 17:11 53:1 53:3 85:9 136:21 231:2,3 232:9 233:17 235:14 260:3,5 348:10 404:22 409:22 410:3,22 450:10 455:19,20 511:16
gender-specific 197:4
genders 481:15

Gene 25:2 30:14,20
general 1:17,17 3:3 41:13 98:10 123:10,10 124:19 129:15 167:1 179:9 186:16 190:17 210:8 248:12 249:11 250:21 251:1 272:6 316:19 348:21 367:15,20 371:21 376:4 454:20 487:11 509:19,21
general's 43:19
generally 21:4 22:6 53:2,3 54:22 57:3 59:21 94:7 152:4 210:4,6 347:6 370:17 516:3
generate 163:12
generated 317:18
genesis 415:10
gentleman 498:16 499:20
gentlemen 183:6 257:2 354:2
genuinely 49:4
geographic 148:18
geographically 148:4 153:10
Georgia 195:5
Germany 69:19 70:2 160:6 207:13 214:9
gestured 231:4
getting 64:18,18 66:4 69:15 76:4 81:3 90:16 91:8 92:15 93:9 94:19 94:21 101:2 171:20 216:14 220:10 222:19 224:6,11 236:6 238:17 250:12 268:3 275:21 281:14 312:16 327:18 329:15 376:4,6 423:16,17 463:7 497:7 515:1
Gilliard 2:16 183:17,18,22 184:4,5 192:2 222:15 224:6,9,12 233:1,3,10,14 235:11 243:17 247:7 248:10,12 249:17 250:20 252:21
girl 74:20
girls 31:1,11
give 9:2 11:2 42:14 44:17 61:17 69:18 78:2,4 121:3 156:14 162:19 199:6 206:17 209:16 211:10 224:4 225:17 236:11 237:7 251:18 265:12 277:14,19,21 278:20 318:5 320:16,19 328:1 335:11,12 338:22 344:2 346:14 367:18 380:7 382:16,17 388:19 390:1,11 391:8 409:16 446:16,17 457:11 463:21 465:17 482:10 483:16 484:21 489:15 508:18
given 9:7 19:17 20:2 47:20 56:20 84:9 101:7 141:7 166:17 207:8 228:8 229:11 298:10 318:12 322:12 348:20 355:13 448:16 466:20 481:10 498:6 499:18 504:21
gives 16:20 100:1 265:14 277:16 447:1 519:6
giving 64:1 69:17 336:14 380:1 433:21 460:7
glad 415:1 424:10 468:8 469:5 507:14
glean 189:6 325:13 326:7
global 101:6 175:2
globally 126:2
Glynco 157:1 195:5
go 14:1 18:1 21:22 23:9,10 45:14 46:6 48:2 50:18 59:19 66:11 70:4 70:6 75:9 76:3 92:19 93:4 96:7 97:13 102:7 137:22 140:7 141:1 145:17 149:3,4,12,14 151:20 152:4,18 153:5,6,10,11 154:4,8,8,14 155:8 164:2,16 167:6 168:22 169:8 175:10,16 181:11 185:17 202:1 214:19 223:9 224:7 227:11 228:6 235:20 238:22 271:20 276:1 279:22 280:12 281:2 283:8 284:14 285:13 286:6 290:21 298:11 300:7 301:4 302:3 307:14 308:2,4 311:3 313:7 315:13 319:6 323:13 332:22 333:22 337:14 342:5,11,12,16 343:9,12,15,21 346:19 347:20 351:16 352:16 357:1 361:13 366:8 371:13 390:17 398:10 399:9 400:3 401:10 404:12 415:3 417:4 419:10 420:3 421:5 422:13 424:12 428:2 430:21 433:19 441:5 446:8 454:1 455:11 458:18 466:13 476:11 477:14 483:1 484:4 489:6 490:19 497:9,16 498:1 501:22 502:3,5 509:12 513:7 515:19 518:19
goal 95:18 134:2 135:8 142:4 145:10 212:2 238:9 318:4 338:15 437:12 441:20 443:5 458:7,11,13 486:10
goals 197:5 307:2
God 347:17
goes 32:3 56:2,3 62:17 117:5 211:22 221:21 227:13 230:9,10 265:3 277:9 307:21 311:10 322:18 337:13 338:4 346:12,20 375:3 384:21 408:6 426:21 427:13 428:20 450:4 457:17 470:20 478:1 479:3 502:8,8
going 12:10,18 13:15,22 14:11 16:6,15 17:8 18:5 18:6,7,7,9 20:5,7 21:9,11 23:15 24:2,17,19 28:10 28:11,12 30:14 38:3,7,10,13 39:4 43:5,7 44:8 45:14 46:18,19,21 48:13 48:14 49:12 50:6 51:9 53:18 54:3 55:17 57:5 58:7,8 59:15 62:5 64:15 64:15 65:4 69:4 71:20 72:15 74:11 74:11,15 77:22 78:2,4,7,8 83:13 87:5 90:1 91:2 92:1 96:18 98:1 98:16 100:19 107:5 111:5,17 114:14,18 117:3 120:2 135:20 139:14 143:7 144:11 145:8,13 145:15,21 149:13 152:19 153:9,12 155:19 158:14 159:9 175:14,16 177:6 178:9 181:20 204:7 210:9 211:3 213:19 222:2,6,7 224:19,22 225:6 225:15 226:9,13 226:15,18 228:3 229:12 230:12,16 230:18 233:21 234:17 236:9 237:13,14,15 238:12 240:9 243:7 247:3 250:7 250:8,9,18 253:22 254:1 255:19 257:9 266:17

269:7 272:1,2 274:6 276:3,9 278:3 283:10,16 283:17 285:13 286:17 289:2,10 289:13,19,22 290:21 297:21 298:16 300:10 301:5,17 305:8 306:6,21,22 307:1 311:1,11 312:20 313:20,20 314:18 319:22 329:1,19 329:20 332:17,18 332:19 333:6,7 334:2 336:22 337:14 338:4,18 339:20 341:8,18 342:20 343:9,12 343:15 345:4 346:18 349:10,21 352:9 354:12 357:1,3 358:7,19 360:21,22 362:15 362:21 366:4 367:16,18 369:10 369:11,15 370:10 371:11,17 372:17 374:4,18 375:8,17 380:7 382:2,4,16 382:18,18,19 383:3,13 385:5,14 391:18 392:11,11 393:13 396:5 399:9 407:7 408:9 410:8 413:7 414:15 415:8 419:10 425:22 427:4 428:1,2,3 429:1,4,5,20 431:9,10 445:20 446:8,11,20 449:9 451:5 452:1 460:3 464:14,14 465:5 465:10 467:2,6 470:3 471:16 474:3,9 475:2 479:18,19 481:21 484:4,8,9,10,17 485:2,8 487:4,4 487:13 488:13,14 489:4,21 492:1 497:8 509:14,15 513:18 518:22
gold 369:17
golden 39:13
good 5:3,11 7:15 14:1,2,14 18:8 19:3,16,18,19,22 23:10 26:20 37:16 37:17,19 48:4 67:8 70:17 78:1,2 82:19 84:2 91:5 94:3 102:15 103:12 110:13 120:11 121:15 135:16 145:9 161:1,3 175:13 184:1,3 192:4 193:9 209:22 236:3 253:17 257:8 269:22 345:15 383:19 391:10 399:4 400:12 413:15 424:7 439:1 445:17,18 464:1 467:14 468:6 469:1 485:7 490:3 495:20,21
goodies 462:5
goodness 47:8 71:15
gotten 8:5 99:11 176:8 509:3
governing 329:11 330:2
government 6:10 382:1
grabbing 350:12 384:2
grad 165:8
grades 148:10
graduated 507:5
grand 283:1,6,7 284:7
grandiose 230:22
grant 228:8 420:12
granted 164:16
grapples 90:9
gratification 31:7 350:11
great 8:4 30:13 34:16 53:17 87:17 87:21 88:15 92:16 93:3 102:1 105:20 110:15 115:17 118:6 119:20 154:16 183:19 209:15 258:6 291:10 303:12 355:8 376:4 388:8 449:20,21 456:4 458:1 469:7 494:1 498:12 516:20
greater 122:8 143:22 203:8
greatly 336:9
Greek 55:6
green 418:18
Greenspan 277:5
grievant's 126:10
grievous 126:8
grooming 116:3
groping 190:10
Grossman 414:5,6 414:17 416:9
Grossman's 416:2 418:3
ground 519:15
grounded 125:13 355:21 375:20 436:8 453:16
group 38:19,19 68:1 79:9 123:5,7 123:15,19 135:9 139:21 158:6,7 200:9 273:15 281:21 285:9 287:4 306:3 384:3 403:5 440:10 476:11 485:19
groups 80:10,11 259:6 336:7,7,13 509:4,12 510:6,12
grow 242:11
growing 112:22 142:15
guarantee 80:15 410:6,7
guard 3:1 117:5 123:9 183:12 192:8,18,21 193:1 193:3,6 194:10,13 194:15 197:19 198:13 232:4 243:12 496:8
guess 92:12 120:12 145:5 230:14 241:6 311:4,19 342:16 404:17 405:16 449:2 459:9,17 463:5 473:15
guidance 128:21 172:9 254:14 472:19
guide 136:1 448:13 461:3 462:16
guided 136:3
guiding 356:2
guilt 193:17 331:5
guilty 28:8
gulf 509:18,22
gun 116:20 117:3
guy 3:9 18:16,20 19:3 71:21 117:11 117:11 206:3 283:14 416:1 498:16
guys 212:7 224:1 237:1 274:13 384:5 477:19 479:5 496:7 498:17 501:4 504:12

H

Hagel 5:22
hair 394:20
hairs 394:4,5,7,14
half 25:9 157:6 210:17 228:12 239:4 355:15 463:18 497:22
halfway 219:11
Hall 1:12
hallmark 128:9 209:13
Ham 2:2 5:8,10,14 9:6 120:8 266:2,5 313:3,5,8,22 314:21 315:7 316:12 342:2,9 345:17 346:1 495:9,17,18 506:21 515:14,15 516:12,14 517:5,8 519:5
Ham's 7:16
hammers 59:5,12 97:8
hand 104:21 300:6 366:7 382:7 418:8 418:9,15,15
handle 146:22 199:18 201:10 203:9 207:9 261:2 264:13 290:15 308:13 314:18 468:1
handled 203:2 263:18,20 264:17 265:18 303:3 311:1 339:19 349:5,7,8,9
handles 303:7 309:22
handling 4:9 10:20 122:10 124:11 220:9 243:3 343:22 354:9
hands 31:1,11 251:13 301:10
hands-on 27:22

handy 95:8
happen 13:11 23:14,15 37:20 43:7 46:6 63:6 77:9 80:1 140:14 237:13 289:18 319:8 334:4 347:18 377:18 426:10 455:8,9,13 464:16,19 480:2 482:11 484:22 503:8
happened 63:5,6,7 63:14 70:18 78:9 82:10 89:8 109:12 109:13 118:21 119:7 219:22 220:17 221:10 275:5 277:20 281:12 314:13 317:20 342:22 355:13 362:14 363:12 376:22 377:16 387:4 398:19 401:22 406:2 461:15 468:14 498:19
happening 26:19 116:15 228:4 273:13 275:20 386:14 406:3
happens 11:20 22:15 48:1 62:18 143:22 152:3 223:18 309:18 334:12 344:4 363:22 364:14 366:19 398:3 424:12 425:7 469:21,22 482:17 503:14 514:9
happy 102:21 237:11 383:21 394:17
harassment 116:2 116:3,4,11,17 511:22
hard 7:12 14:12 76:4 81:2,6 113:21 166:16 180:18 271:11 380:13 393:17 394:9 395:2,4,7 411:8 459:20 466:17 509:9,11 511:19
hard-liners 180:20 181:9
hardship 234:10
harm 17:1 102:9,9 102:11,16 103:21 126:8,10 486:14
harmful 102:18 114:9,12
harms 16:21
Harvard 54:3 113:18
HARVEY 1:19
haters 38:4,5
He'll 181:7
head 50:16 72:7 97:7 180:20 394:4 394:6,20 453:19 480:21 509:2 512:10
headed 30:6
headquarters 1:1 2:10 153:6 164:17 193:3
heads 242:21 513:7
heal 485:6
healing 366:14 382:12
health 2:18,19 120:20 123:12 127:2 135:18 365:15
healthcare 135:21 136:3,10
healthy 389:9
hear 10:10 11:20 14:1,4 21:11 84:11 147:21 183:19 207:4 263:11 278:5 279:8 299:4 317:19 340:19 342:8 355:5 356:18 392:12 395:7 406:14 424:21 427:6 461:21 462:1 504:7 505:8
heard 21:12 74:22 79:1 117:18 121:10 159:1 173:4 182:6 201:1 204:20 217:3,4 228:15,18 249:21 291:17 296:6 297:8 298:3 310:17 323:22 324:1 331:2 332:14,21 355:18 355:20 358:3,22 365:13 366:6 372:11 374:7 378:15 379:11 385:17 394:8 399:18 402:8 405:7 409:22 413:3 416:8 420:8 431:11 438:9 442:16 445:8 449:8 460:4 468:14,16 472:16 494:21 505:22
hearing 21:14 31:17,18 91:20 204:13,16 217:2 278:14 354:4 378:22 408:16 430:20 432:14 433:10,13 434:16 439:17 457:20 494:18
hearings 173:6 217:4 467:20 517:6 519:19
heart 46:4
heartfelt 282:7 287:11
hearts 242:21
heavily 114:3 267:12
heinous 278:8
held 100:8 181:8 246:1 269:3 357:18 370:6 480:1 511:8
hell 366:8
help 8:5 64:2 69:9 71:7 75:6,6 84:3,3 94:21 104:21 110:4 112:2 113:13 119:15 160:10 167:17 170:9 175:20 214:2,7 217:9 228:2 251:20 280:22 335:10 356:13 366:13 379:21 380:9 382:10,11,19 387:14 414:17 417:20 422:22 423:22 461:19 470:11 476:7 485:6 492:20 493:6 496:22 498:1 505:3 506:18
helped 44:14 54:5 72:13,19 236:3,4 236:5 331:8,8 446:7 503:3
helpful 40:10 225:22 257:2 284:4 289:6 353:16 366:21 407:14 456:20 458:15 471:6 472:13,18 474:6
helping 14:19 66:18 73:14,15 86:15 118:3,21 214:10 221:17 424:2 506:14,15 508:16
helps 51:1 83:11 93:10,11,13 119:8 213:15 245:7 277:15 436:5 479:7,8,17
hematoma 401:11
hemorrhaging 401:12
hero 79:13,18
heroes 79:14,15,20 79:21,22,22
hey 42:22 119:18 295:10 479:4
hidden 42:3 385:19 388:15
hide 48:13,15 387:12 503:14
hiding 48:4
hierarchal 481:10
hierarchy 288:10
high 75:8 82:6 91:6 164:3 169:18 187:9 196:17 198:10 402:6 409:9,20 418:13 421:13 422:11 466:6 467:5 477:16,17
higher 36:5,14 54:8 109:3 137:16 164:17 292:17 295:2 423:12 458:3
highest 133:1 296:17
highlight 159:15 199:12
highlighted 346:4 446:19
highly 53:15 105:16 132:14 161:20 162:16 175:21 177:19 208:10 409:12
Hillman 1:18 99:15 99:16 172:17

230:20,21 231:12 231:17,20 232:2,5 232:8 233:2,6,11 267:18 268:5,8 302:1 303:3,6,12 342:14 343:7 368:11,13,15 370:21 371:7 372:9 457:1 471:22 515:19,20 516:15 517:1 518:20
hinder 437:7
hindered 197:22
hinterlands 42:10
hire 91:11 238:5
hired 162:18,18 177:15 212:5 466:12
hiring 163:10 199:20 409:20
historical 436:4
historically 148:15 149:2 275:15 439:14
history 24:21 52:1 82:10 287:16 325:3,7 326:5 384:17
hit 59:11 64:16 505:9
hitting 97:6,8
hold 116:12,13 272:20 289:19 437:16 438:22 449:7 459:5
holding 366:7 482:3
holes 45:18,22 46:11 290:16
holistic 100:20 101:12
HOLLY 1:18
Holtzman 1:16 44:21 106:2,3 107:9,17,22 108:3 108:13,17,19 109:4,7,11,15 110:1 111:2,5 112:7,15,21 113:4 114:17,18 115:7 117:16 118:1 119:21 156:4 157:14,18 160:3 177:17,21 182:3,4 182:13,19 183:2 235:20 236:22 237:5,12,17,20 240:2,5,8 241:7 241:10,14,22 242:13,16 243:11 243:15 245:11 262:18,21 263:4,7 263:9 269:12,15 269:19 278:18,20 284:6 285:17 295:22 296:4,9 297:12 307:4,13 307:16,19,21 308:2,8,18 309:10 309:14 347:4 348:6,8,19 349:15 350:18,21 351:3,6 351:9,14 352:4 361:6,10,14,16,19 362:4 363:1 376:16,19 415:4 415:15,19 465:10 467:17 468:5 469:3,6 470:6 472:21 473:10 475:4 477:1,10 494:17 506:9 518:21 519:8
home 70:5 207:15 264:15 381:6 416:12 497:16 510:20,21
homes 33:4
homicide 67:11,16 264:11,18 288:10
homicides 22:8,9
homogenous 38:19
honest 250:15 287:11 391:6 419:2 448:21
honestly 299:20 336:8
honor 14:16 121:17 156:13 317:10 354:17 384:8 409:5
Honorable 1:13,15 1:16 6:2
Hood 56:15,16 64:5 64:5 143:9,20 162:3 164:9 213:12 287:17 314:3,11,22 315:4 332:15 346:3
hope 71:15 100:2 116:12 117:14 168:13 181:22 198:12 253:12 305:2 355:3,14 356:22 440:1 505:8
hopeful 507:15
hopefully 291:17 293:2,19 497:4
hoping 370:19 459:3
Hopper 54:2 57:16 113:17
horizon 174:21
hormones 54:21
horrible 64:8
hospital 59:6 64:22 221:11 316:1,7 399:19,19,20 400:4 440:14 479:20 502:14
hospitality 5:18
hospitals 399:22
hostage 99:4,5
hostile 36:7
hostility 36:5,19
hosting 7:18
hot 401:8
hotline 188:10,12 480:7
Houck 1:16 171:8,8 173:18
hour 26:15 355:15 415:7
hours 98:7 127:15 127:20 207:22 208:2,4 211:19,20 226:18 265:4 276:2 277:3,7,14 286:2 413:18 415:7,9 416:18
house 6:3 70:3 216:6 444:10
houses 423:19
Houston 287:18 440:20 447:3,9 451:20 452:9 453:3 463:14 468:17 480:5
HQE 176:3 177:17
HQE's 177:15
HQEs 409:9
huge 27:13 40:15 52:19 55:18,19 118:9 278:1 407:5 423:14 509:18,22 515:5
hugely 340:20
human 52:10 435:21 475:20
hundreds 48:22 206:11 409:16
hurt 15:20,21 16:10 16:12,15 40:13 50:10 56:7 79:4
hurting 16:6
husband 71:15,17 71:18 72:15 73:2
hypotheses 456:14
hypothetical 344:7

I

ice 37:16,18,21,22 38:3,5,8,11,14
Idaho 491:15
idea 11:3 42:17,18 42:19 43:7 112:8 210:12 224:4 262:16 373:21 505:15 506:2
ideally 212:3
ideals 434:17
ideas 82:20 163:13 471:9 472:8 501:5
identification 172:14
identified 63:15 128:22 129:11 161:11 175:10 328:4,6 332:8 335:22 343:18 441:15
identifier 168:4,6 170:8,14 171:4 211:11
identifies 352:8
identify 95:19 115:14 168:21 169:22 170:21 197:7 323:20,21 324:8,10,13,15 330:10 331:21 353:4 370:8 478:8 478:9
identifying 17:20 115:22 116:1 134:18 171:11 324:22 370:15
idiots 92:10
IDVSA 435:11,18 440:6
IG 237:21 256:5
ignorant 21:17,21
illustration 445:14 446:22
image 454:4
images 58:1
imagine 380:13 383:12 423:15 484:2 512:6
immediate 259:1 259:14 519:2
immediately 24:3 101:3 227:21

254:18 272:7 291:2 303:19 305:6 364:10 373:1 476:19
immobility 49:16 61:22 62:1,7,18 72:16
immunity 223:20 226:5,21 227:9 228:5
impact 63:12 64:18 65:10 76:22 77:1 85:10 91:2 99:21 119:20 129:13 131:17 133:14 134:16 255:17 293:12,12 364:15 365:6,8 367:13 375:11 437:21 459:19 483:4
impacted 75:2,3
impactful 88:21
impairment 224:22
impartial 193:13
imperative 330:1
imperfect 481:9
impersonal 280:9
implement 124:17 128:5 136:15 141:10 162:10 504:16,16,16
implementation 123:6 124:14 125:17 144:22 449:4 492:11
implemented 144:17 149:1 162:9 168:3 254:14 329:2,6 423:10 442:6 451:19
implementing 125:12 218:21 518:2
imply 482:15 485:4
importance 274:5 336:6 511:10
important 24:5 34:11 35:16 58:21 60:7,13 67:13,14 90:6 115:9 137:19 147:10 191:19 205:14 258:15 262:13 276:13 280:6 286:7 289:1 297:19 299:2 331:13 336:13 361:3 367:5 381:13 384:13 394:22 403:1,2 404:9 410:14 424:19 434:1 446:4 451:15,16 452:13 453:17 460:4 467:8 470:7 481:5 492:10 499:13 503:13,17 505:7,12,14 511:12 515:10
importantly 288:4
imposed 220:18 301:15
imposing 379:22
impossible 226:8 425:20 426:7 471:20
impressive 493:22
improve 273:21 282:10 367:17 375:22 404:16 434:13 471:5 502:22 503:7
improved 147:4 442:4
improvement 154:17 394:10
improvements 134:19
improving 373:11 465:4 497:2
impulsive 36:8
impuslivity 36:6,20
in-law 59:14
in-residence 131:7
inability 62:8
inaccurate 318:2,8
incapable 73:3
incapacitation 63:22 72:17
incarcerated 25:20 30:21 33:10,12
incarceration 29:6
incentive 462:7,7
incentives 462:2
inception 11:19 165:16
incest 32:8 33:2
incidence 27:16 326:4 513:14
incident 81:5 350:19 414:12,13 445:16 500:7
incidents 50:15 126:4 197:17 198:8 267:21 414:15,20 443:12
include 10:21 123:12 129:12 130:10 131:6 137:19 184:8 257:11 321:16 325:4,8 357:6 392:6 393:11 405:14
included 123:7 136:12 140:4 394:17 444:22 505:19
includes 115:5 135:18 136:7 185:22 189:21 221:4 261:7
including 10:1,11 84:18 124:12 152:20 259:20 368:9 405:22 435:5 440:13 507:9
inclusion 445:9
incomplete 318:3,8
inconsistent 50:1 57:4
incorporating 109:22
increase 144:19 148:13 188:3 189:18 269:10,11 284:18 294:2,15 319:13,18 323:8 327:15,16 329:12 359:3 422:5,9,22 423:9 424:4,6 472:5 513:13
increased 87:8 91:9 147:2 154:11 175:11 190:13 191:1 251:11 331:20 337:4,7,21 372:18,19
increases 338:16 422:19
increasing 139:16 139:17 249:18,21 250:8 305:12 481:4 513:12
incredible 278:12 293:17 393:18 419:1 421:14 423:8 490:21 491:20 494:3
incredibly 276:13 297:19 299:2 341:20 493:21 505:14
incrementally 450:4
incriminating 216:15
inculcate 80:2
incur 196:2 281:5
indecision 442:3
independent 130:16 138:19 193:1 386:17 393:8 434:10
independently 303:4
indicated 295:22
indict 284:8
indicted 315:14
indictment 437:5
indifferent 484:7
individual 37:10,12 38:17,21 100:22 141:7 296:16 350:8,9,14 424:18 440:10 450:7
individuals 36:22 101:15 158:21 201:13 244:21 362:20 497:20
indulgence 14:13
industry 281:11
influence 245:19 248:2 278:13 286:13 392:18 398:6
influenced 205:8
inform 248:6 355:16 516:2
informal 366:11
informants 401:4,7
information 9:3 13:1 25:19 51:6 60:11,17 61:18 64:2,13,19 67:14 69:6 74:3 86:19 93:10 94:19,21 96:12 99:9 100:7 100:18 104:7,13 133:22 137:20 140:21 144:6 145:2 188:20 189:2,7 202:4 204:12,13 209:17 216:14 221:13 222:9,10,20 224:7 225:15 229:9 239:16 248:5 249:22 265:14 275:22 277:5,11 277:22 280:10 281:15 284:16 298:6 307:1 315:12 318:3,9

319:18,20 320:16 320:20 322:11 323:9,11,18 324:21 325:12,19 325:22 326:1,2,7 328:1,13 331:12 332:3 335:13 336:20 339:1 341:5 342:18,21 345:18 346:15 355:12 380:1,8 382:17 385:17 386:22 405:19 414:3,4,20 447:1 466:20 471:2 483:17 492:20 495:2 498:13 515:16 519:14
informed 73:11 204:7 323:2 335:10 336:11,18 417:13,16 420:20 420:20
informing 87:2 447:3
infrastructure 246:19
ingrained 288:17 288:18
ingrains 32:10
initial 102:21 127:12 139:22 160:14 198:4 200:12 201:19 221:13 274:5 275:20 281:14 346:3 352:10 365:22 372:17 496:20 498:10
initially 96:6 213:6 335:5 338:12,22
initiate 448:20
initiated 188:11 220:3
initiative 189:13 485:12
initiatives 131:20 196:2,6 494:9,10
injury 50:17 283:13 508:15
inmate 219:9
innocence 193:17 220:15
Innocent 7:8
innovations 188:10
innovative 451:10
innuendos 116:11
input 89:2 225:17
insecure 18:18 404:4
inside 30:8 51:21 76:21 389:15
insider 15:17,18 16:2,3,7,7
insight 99:18 147:22
insights 43:3 493:22
Inspector 123:10 124:18
installation 178:17 252:8,15
installations 190:2 203:5 238:15 250:1
instance 160:7 309:11
instances 95:7 190:12 200:14 201:10 221:18,18 233:19 312:13 432:22
institute 8:15 397:8 397:15 398:17 435:10 440:22 508:22
instituted 13:7 292:2 405:21
institution 359:2 435:12
institutional 512:2
instructed 276:3 290:18
instruction 136:4 171:5 184:21 190:11 191:7 234:8 247:16 252:11
instructions 218:21
instructors 238:6 247:21
intact 54:11
integrate 221:3,7 221:14
integrated 131:6 194:6 205:4 439:22
intelligence 3:9 193:8 323:17 324:19
intend 89:14
intended 133:3,20
intensity 261:3
intention 494:22
intentionally 163:12
inter 435:11
inter-personal 203:1 434:21
interact 358:6
interacting 131:21
interaction 37:10 274:5 280:13 287:7
interactions 101:1 478:21
interactive 196:8
interconnected 135:3
interdisciplinary 439:22 440:20 451:14 494:9
interest 184:12 204:16 207:15 283:3
interested 13:17 389:3,11 400:5 414:14 494:16 501:14 508:16
interesting 98:17 328:9 359:13 493:1
Interestingly 13:6 93:17 94:6 98:3
interim 493:17
internal 161:11 212:15 256:19 392:2 414:10 418:4 439:6
internally 161:9
International 2:7 2:21 109:20 144:11 271:10 273:5 286:4 356:6 373:14 432:3 466:7
interpersonal 31:22 41:6
interpretation 60:21
interpretations 219:6
interrogation 215:10 491:11,12
interrupt 361:8
intersection 418:17
intervene 197:7 358:2
intervention 81:3
interview 64:9,12 64:21 65:6 83:17 83:18,20 91:21 92:5 94:7 96:21 102:17 106:21 204:21 209:14 217:8 218:11 223:12 226:10 234:16 238:21 239:3 262:12 275:20 277:2 279:19 280:21 281:14 324:16 407:22 411:20 414:19 416:11 417:12 491:10
interviewed 64:10 96:20 441:17 480:10,13,18
interviewer 235:3
interviewing 68:6 69:21 70:17 131:16 196:9 204:18 205:4,5,11 224:5 239:21 240:12,16 241:1 277:8 321:16 323:2 411:22 412:18,18,20 413:5
interviews 73:11 91:19 93:19 94:4 103:8,9 107:6,7 111:15 203:10 205:16 228:16 279:20 326:10 417:17 420:20 466:14
intimate 30:18 51:20 371:1
intrigued 115:12
introduce 246:16
introduced 189:12
introducing 102:3
introduction 434:20
intuitive 205:12
invasion 264:15
invented 439:7
inventory 443:10 446:6
invert 454:3
invest 167:20
investigate 9:11 11:15 22:7 67:2 105:15 123:21 185:4 186:4 190:12 194:20 220:14 223:8 260:18 272:3 290:13 304:20 306:16 307:9 324:12 434:11 435:19 499:2
investigated 126:4 255:4 275:14

340:4 384:11 393:21 500:5 503:9
investigates 301:18
investigating 9:21 15:1 103:5 160:19 194:9 199:16 252:4 296:13 302:14 416:7 427:16
investigation 1:6 3:7,10 22:14 65:17 122:6 127:9 139:9,12 160:11 173:14 183:14,15 187:9 195:7,22 200:15 206:4 216:22 225:7 236:4 246:4,6 256:8 260:22 275:11 290:16 294:20 309:8 310:19 320:17,18 321:3,14,15,17 322:9 323:11 324:8,20 330:13 335:17 339:2 346:17 348:1,2 349:14 352:11 357:17 375:22 380:19 388:6 400:2 405:3 408:1 425:1,19 428:8,11 429:16 430:17 432:7 434:14 445:1 452:5 457:8 458:20 459:6 470:11 492:18,21 499:19 500:1
investigation/pro... 389:13 490:11
investigations 2:8 3:6 22:15 40:4 61:5 62:22 106:11 110:16 158:18 174:3 184:6,9,11 185:18 186:19 187:1 188:6 190:16 191:19 196:18 198:22 199:22 201:21 203:19 206:21 208:5 239:3 242:22 243:4 251:1,2,6 252:5,7 254:1,12 255:2,3 255:13,16,19 256:1,13 265:3 285:2 289:12,15 292:17 293:2 296:11 297:14 303:16,22 304:9 308:15,21 314:5 317:21 323:7 325:4 326:3,22 328:2 331:14 357:7 387:13 400:9,15 401:1 402:2 409:13 415:9 417:14 420:21 471:20 503:15,18,20 507:11
investigative 2:16 3:2,9 4:6 11:14 84:16,22 106:16 121:22 124:16,20 126:15 127:12,13 132:13 183:9,12 183:13,21 184:13 185:1 187:7 188:4 192:8,18,21,22 193:2,7,13,19 198:10,14 199:3 203:22 209:14 232:21 250:3 256:11 262:4,9 320:9,14 323:19 390:9 451:22 471:12
investigative-wise 324:4
investigator 146:21 157:8 195:14 213:1,6,8 219:20 234:11 235:15 280:13 284:15 285:1 301:6 344:19 348:16 397:2 401:9 492:21 493:6
investigators 4:8 10:10,14 69:7 84:17 87:10,11 92:8,10 101:12 112:10 126:12,16 127:20 128:2,16 128:20 130:12 134:22 150:13 156:6 157:9,15 158:17 160:1,15 195:8 196:16 200:11 202:1,17 203:8 204:2 205:13 212:5 214:1,5,11 216:13 221:2,19 222:3,5 222:8 225:6,12,19 225:22 235:4,8 243:2 249:9 252:8 255:8 256:6 279:11 281:17 288:6 290:18 295:16 299:13 330:9 348:4 395:5 396:16 398:14,16 398:21 399:9,14 404:20,22 405:9 408:2 409:22 410:3,10,15,19 414:10 425:22 440:16 451:18 452:6 493:13,15
investment 238:16
invisible 439:14
invited 75:9
inviting 88:5 354:17
involuntarily 430:9
involve 142:7 204:22 376:1 393:3 511:21
involved 47:12 88:8 98:4,21 110:16 135:2 165:15 171:13 223:21 227:6 229:18 279:12 284:22 306:7 321:11 347:9 350:3 351:20 352:14 409:19 414:11 418:6,13 419:12 463:10 479:2 486:3
involves 241:2 349:4 411:7 449:3
involving 9:12 126:7,9 132:10 194:10 195:9 198:7 273:4 306:6 314:11
inward 53:5
Iraq 15:19 152:17 207:14
ironed 45:19,19
isolated 51:5 197:21
issue 21:8 52:8,9,10 52:12 140:19 171:10,11 189:5 212:19 220:8 224:20,22 225:7 228:11,20 232:12 235:21 251:11 256:4 260:12 275:5 286:18 289:3 297:13 303:14 311:4 351:15 391:20 400:8 411:16 420:19 425:7 431:6 433:1 441:21 451:4 455:17,18,19 456:2 470:7 476:4 476:19 501:19 515:4
issues 6:12 23:8 39:6,8 129:3 131:18 190:22 223:5,5 226:5 270:14 273:16 287:6,22 298:10 304:13 305:5 306:6 318:16 378:10 385:15 397:18 399:18,20 429:20 434:11 438:10 462:13 470:14 516:9
Italy 207:14
item 422:1
items 345:6
IX 303:15,16 304:2 304:6,12,15 305:3

J

J 2:17 120:19
Jacinto 1:12
jacket 46:19
Jacksonville 148:13
jaded 402:12
JAG 91:19 92:13 168:11 169:6 200:7,8 201:5 226:4
JAGs 108:18 420:5
jail 26:6 326:6 347:16
JAMES 1:16
January 190:4 254:13,22 255:9
Japan 187:19,19 207:12
Jason 2:8 121:5
jealous 420:22
jeopardize 191:1
Jim 171:8
JLQ 149:17
Joanne 2:6 271:8 277:6 356:16 358:8 451:16
job 9:13 88:16

131:9 155:9 165:8 208:16 220:16 222:12 292:19 329:15 382:9 388:8 397:3 410:13 424:2,7 497:17 501:14,16 505:16
jobs 155:20 163:9 176:21 375:6 478:5 501:7
John 42:22 352:8 352:11
join 77:17,17,22 78:21
joined 77:4
joining 478:13
joint 213:19 229:22 314:5 391:7
Jones 1:13,15 6:2 7:15 14:14 34:12 34:22 35:3 84:6 86:18,22 99:14 106:1 119:22 120:11 135:14 137:21 138:21 139:5,11 140:14 140:22 142:14 143:3,4,5 145:5 146:5 147:11 148:2 150:20 151:2,11,22 152:2 153:1,18 154:20 156:3 157:19,22 160:21 161:3 164:20 165:18 166:1,7,10,19,21 167:6 172:16 179:18 182:2 183:4,19 184:3 192:1,5 198:17 206:1 214:18 223:15 224:10,14 226:22 228:9 229:3,7 230:20 235:19 249:16 250:16 252:13 253:9,12 254:10 257:1,8,16,20,22 258:3,6 261:6,15 266:20 267:3 269:21 294:1,4,8 294:12,16,21 295:20 301:21 305:7,13 308:9 311:3 313:1,4,7 317:5 332:10 336:21 342:7 353:14,18 354:1 354:15,21 355:7 383:17,21 428:17 433:17,20 454:22 456:21 465:9 478:20 493:19 495:7,13,17,21 496:3 505:6 506:20 507:1,3,19 515:13,18 518:11 518:16 519:10,16
judge 2:9 3:3 47:3 47:14,18,19,20 126:13,16 128:11 129:15 130:14 134:22 143:4 152:12,17 153:5 153:14 154:8 157:21 160:15 164:7,10,14 167:1 168:15 169:11,12 170:4 175:8,9 178:12,12 179:9 179:13 192:5 194:16 197:1 200:10,12 408:9
judges 92:3 151:9,9 151:12,13 153:16 162:18
judging 73:7
judgment 18:11
judgmental 235:2
judgments 18:2 19:9,10
judicial 229:13,13 276:17 293:7
July 398:12,14 399:8,12
jump 460:9
jumped 294:11
jumping 283:14
June 79:10 86:2 87:15 89:8 497:6
junior 8:2 130:7 160:15 175:19 282:17
juries 278:14 283:7 284:7 390:10
jurisdiction 314:6 328:11 344:15 391:7,8 447:6,7
jurisdictions 12:9 12:12 173:1,2,5 315:11 344:5 390:6 465:12 490:16
juror 511:8
jurors 509:11
jury 66:3 71:11 283:1,6 339:18 488:13,15 509:14
justice 2:8,9,20 11:5 12:3 22:7,18 24:15 40:13 67:9 122:7 127:8 129:8 130:13 131:2 132:18 135:4,11 148:20 149:18 150:21 153:22 155:17 157:13 169:15 171:14 178:16,20 179:16 182:15 202:16 221:22 293:4 319:7 346:4 348:22 361:2 366:16 369:9,15 397:9,14 409:12 420:10 435:6 438:17 440:22 451:17,21 454:18 468:11,13 491:18 492:7,11,17 493:5 508:6,8,17
justify 91:9
juxtaposition 456:10

K

Kaye 397:12
keep 44:11 137:6 154:4 170:9 173:12 237:14 276:22 279:18 297:10 318:5,6 330:6 333:12 357:9,21 367:5 443:6 453:6 460:19 485:22
keeping 142:17 396:10 453:5 460:10 465:2,3
keeps 360:19 368:16 460:6 483:10
Kentucky 43:17
kept 68:13 89:13 97:1 152:22 391:10 503:21
Kevin 3:6 198:20
Kevin's 227:18
key 125:13 129:19 131:1 135:1 209:12 363:20 365:19 366:5,15 366:21 513:12
kidnaping 264:15
kids 426:4
kill 71:20
killed 105:4
Killology 416:4
Kilpatrick 360:3
Kim 2:21 10:22 384:4 385:9 414:1 464:14 480:19
kind 18:6 23:4 24:20 32:1,9 48:21 70:11 90:7 103:18 106:16 115:11 149:2 152:8 174:22 177:3 205:11 221:12 226:18 236:1 245:20 251:13 277:14 279:16 280:17 287:15 291:10,12 306:5 344:19 350:22 351:22 365:11,16 371:10 372:13 380:14 397:5 415:3 427:13 428:8 435:12 467:18 470:8 472:19
kinds 64:18 88:20 101:14 118:1 143:18 205:8 235:2 254:3 267:13 370:6 381:20 430:4 477:15
Kirk 2:4 257:12
kits 243:6 441:2,9 441:11 447:21
knew 75:11 208:15 274:21 283:11 290:5 416:16,16 417:8 418:1 488:16 496:6 497:10
knocked 42:21
knocks 378:20
know 16:15 21:10 21:11,16 24:1,19 24:22 27:12,15,17 33:17 40:12 41:15 41:20 43:13,13 48:2,3,16 49:19 49:19 51:14,22 52:6,7,15 53:14 53:16 56:9 62:6 64:16 65:12 67:22 68:20 70:22 71:2 71:2 73:19 75:19 76:10 78:13 79:9 81:12,18 84:7

85:16 87:16 97:2 97:2 102:10,15,18 108:5 110:11 114:10 115:5 117:18 118:16,17 118:17,18,20 121:13 140:14,18 143:18 144:2,21 152:9,15 154:15 155:21 165:19 166:11 167:12 172:12 175:9,13 177:11 180:1 181:13 212:16 217:10 220:16 224:19 225:3 230:3 231:1,1,2 231:15,15 232:9 245:17,22 248:5 250:4 252:19 260:13 267:8 268:1 271:4 275:1 275:1 277:4 280:17 281:3 283:12 284:11 285:1,3,7 290:10 290:14 291:1,14 291:15 292:7,12 293:3 295:5 296:10 297:15 298:19,22 299:1 304:14 306:5,16 309:16 310:9 312:20 318:17 332:15,19,20 333:2,6 334:10,19 334:19 335:17 337:19 338:13,19 339:5,19 340:11 343:11 344:10 346:11 347:2 348:14 355:10 357:4,14 358:2 359:1,4,10,18 360:13,15 362:1,6 362:7,8 363:18 364:10 366:3,10 369:9 371:14,21 372:3 373:2,6,17 374:20 375:6,9 376:14 377:12,15 377:19,20,20 378:1,6,6,19,22 379:18,22 380:4,5 380:21 384:2 388:21 389:12 392:3 393:6,7 395:1,6 397:16 398:2,21 400:16 401:2,3,4,12 402:13 406:15,19 408:5,6 409:10 410:7 411:6,12 412:10 413:2,7,17 413:17,19 415:20 416:9,14,15 417:2 417:8 418:8,12 419:18,21 422:18 423:13,17,21 424:15 425:5,21 426:7,14 427:1,8 428:5 429:15 438:2,11 439:9,13 441:7 442:17 443:14 444:3 445:4,19,21 446:1 447:12 452:1,13 452:17,18,19,20 452:22 455:4,7 459:17 460:1,12 460:19 461:1,2,11 461:15 462:19 463:5 465:6 468:2 469:17,19,19,22 470:5,22 471:10 471:11,18 473:12 473:18 474:3,6,15 474:19 476:17 477:13 478:8 479:4 480:5 482:8 482:18 483:4,13 485:3,10 487:7 489:9 490:2,14 491:19 501:11 503:19 504:12 505:6 506:7,11 509:3,5,6,19 510:18,19 512:16 513:3 514:5 515:4 517:11,19

knowing 230:11 261:22 337:20 347:2 387:16 389:3 423:1

knowledge 58:15 138:22 343:14 356:2 371:5 408:22 452:15

known 6:9 186:21 206:5 322:11 392:13 437:2

knows 9:1 81:9,16 81:17 211:6 331:17 506:3

Korea 207:12 405:4

Koss 417:6

Krulewitch 2:17 120:19 121:11 135:15,16,17 144:5 183:5

Kuwait 207:14

L

L 2:10

LA 315:7

lab 113:22 309:13 309:13 440:14 463:17

labeling 362:18

lack 49:13 50:8 324:7 438:15 480:8 484:16 503:20

lacks 484:11

ladies 19:2 354:1

lady 19:7 498:15

lag 219:3

laid 76:1,7

Lamborghini 8:9

landmark 209:12

lands 42:9

lane 344:9,15

language 155:14 278:2,4,22 279:8 279:9 381:10

LAPD 247:20 257:12 260:17 263:1 265:3,17 299:16 311:2 312:2

lapse 500:6

large 55:19 162:4 168:20 173:3 187:15 253:6 363:21 440:7 441:18 447:7

largely 64:4 202:2 228:17 268:2

larger 162:4 173:5 221:21 231:21 490:7 512:5

largest 17:17 292:22

laser 110:2

lasted 61:10

Lastly 10:17

late 46:17 83:16 85:2 186:3 218:1 312:14 406:3

lately 150:17

latent 445:7,9

latitude 217:1

laughing 470:17

launch 399:15

launched 397:7 398:11

launches 432:7

law 2:12 3:3 6:10 10:8 38:2,6 44:8 44:10 95:19 98:4 98:19 124:15 127:1 128:8 149:15 155:20 167:13 170:15 171:6 175:12,12 189:22 191:8 194:4,17 195:4 198:3 201:18 202:5 205:12 240:15 246:7 253:11 268:22 269:1,5,12 278:13 279:17 281:6 293:8 301:10 316:9 317:16 318:1,4 319:3,4 322:7 337:17 344:12,22 345:7 356:17 358:21 365:15 370:14 373:18 376:8 378:3 384:14 385:3,8,21 386:1 387:12,19 388:2 396:11,17 402:18 403:20 411:4 412:9 413:8,20 420:13 421:4 423:3 424:15 425:9 426:22 428:5 435:14 440:15 441:19 444:2 447:2,7 457:13 466:1 467:10 477:13 478:13 488:12 490:21,22 491:7 491:21 492:12 507:7 508:12 511:14,17

laws 316:18 464:21 511:18

lawyer 142:18 157:10 508:15,15

lawyers 15:8 84:17 89:5 151:3,5 214:1 215:15

lay 75:19 359:18

laying 73:1

lead 201:2 492:19

leader 85:7

leaders 79:10

leadership 133:1 140:13 167:15

241:17 243:7 440:16
leading 417:5
leads 198:10 319:19
league 118:7
learn 308:22 310:6 438:22
learned 11:11 204:9 317:21 438:7,11 475:7 488:17 510:6
learning 88:18 102:8 131:7 204:8 434:8,17 461:3
leave 62:11,12 105:2,7 112:17 180:18 225:22 236:21 300:17 302:2 518:18
Leavenworth 219:8
leaves 46:18 55:1
leaving 78:7
led 189:21 193:3 218:2 421:17 443:20
left 39:7,10 47:1,2,3 47:19 61:13 62:11 76:7 169:2,3,8 316:22 384:6 395:19 398:15 418:9,15 441:9,11
legacy 133:4
legal 3:4 93:16 120:17 121:22 122:12,22 123:13 124:17 125:1,4 127:14,18,22 128:6,10,17 130:9 130:15,20 131:18 132:4 133:2,5 134:10 137:7 146:13 148:5 152:14 159:11 187:11 193:14 212:19 214:2 219:12 342:3 428:10 474:13 499:9 518:2
legally 220:18
Lejeune 187:16
lend 335:9
lends 278:7
Leonard 156:20 195:15 287:19 393:6 399:3
lessen 437:21
lesser 345:21
lessons 310:3,6
let's 28:9 31:8 37:21 107:10 110:1 119:18 352:4 427:5
letting 48:11 406:18
level 54:8 141:5 143:2 148:13 168:5 190:10 195:1 223:7 225:2 240:18 245:14 246:3,7 260:22 295:17 296:17 297:10 298:16 329:3,5 358:10,12 359:7,13 365:10 368:5 371:22 378:7,14 390:18 396:22 402:6 432:21 444:4 461:7,17 483:21 490:7 514:10
leveled 450:14
levels 35:15 36:14 91:6 116:10 154:11 162:7 170:2 191:18 358:6 372:16 388:17 391:22 404:5 463:10
leverage 191:8
Lewis 2:20 121:7 157:20,21 160:5 166:22 178:9 182:5
Lewis-McChord 213:20
liaisons 128:14 135:1
liar 46:2
licensed 435:2
lie 40:15,18 50:1 57:5
lied 40:16
lies 40:13 63:4 265:15 438:12
Lieutenant 2:20 121:7 146:18 168:17 169:16 171:21,22 181:5 414:5,6,16 416:2 416:8 418:2
life 43:20,21 48:17 71:22 72:1 283:15 360:12 363:10 390:14 461:17 482:22
life-long 293:12
light 50:21 116:15 418:17 439:5,8,9 439:18
liked 394:1
likelihood 118:4
likes 408:7
limitation 156:1
limitations 73:6 323:16
limited 191:12 199:4 256:11 285:10 348:20 373:7
Linda 8:16
line 15:11 39:6 101:20 206:13,17 230:1 237:20 345:20 374:22 380:12 472:3,14 475:5 490:9 501:18 502:15
liners 180:19
lines 122:16 487:10 518:20
linked 137:7
Lisak 32:20 54:1 490:2
list 43:19 170:3,5 459:11 505:20
listed 140:2
listen 217:11 385:11 435:4 515:7
listened 394:11 468:16
listening 171:9 394:21
lists 326:12
lit 229:22
literally 54:20 106:20
literature 462:20 468:9
litigation 130:10 132:1 148:21 149:3,14,18 150:22 151:7,14 152:20,20 153:9 153:13,17 154:3,9 166:3 169:1,2,4,8 169:10
litigator 146:19 168:6 169:9
litigators 161:12 168:22 170:1,6 173:22 179:14
little 11:10 15:6 19:5 23:16 24:20 28:12 29:8 31:1,2 31:11,13 33:5 40:22 41:2 55:4 57:8 66:4,4 67:4 84:14 101:8 118:7 119:8 145:19 146:6 150:21 156:15 163:5 168:9 169:19 172:3 175:6 178:11 179:20 210:19 218:1 219:2 220:7 234:17 235:1,6 251:14 264:3 303:11 305:1 318:13 320:8 321:11 324:3 344:9 361:11 384:8 387:10 406:17 437:2 452:7 466:4 482:2 514:1 517:7
live 456:8,10
lively 354:7
lives 9:2 367:4 435:21 456:9
living 498:7
Liz 2:13 257:17 299:22 465:9 489:4 490:7
load 190:13 199:18 251:17,17 254:4 300:8
loads 191:1 249:18 249:20 250:2,9 251:12
local 126:12 127:1 130:12 185:8 194:17 198:3 203:3 307:7 311:17 312:7,9 327:4
locate 259:19
located 143:12 146:17 185:14 187:14 197:20
locating 325:5
location 160:17 213:9,14,22 394:7 405:2 431:17
locations 199:19 238:14 324:14
lock 419:15
locked 63:9 75:22 76:2
lofty 442:9
lonely 14:5,11
long 33:13,22 70:21 81:4,4 87:6,16,18

91:5 103:8 142:18 146:9 171:16 174:2 177:12 182:17 214:16 316:12 338:15 397:4 402:14 403:10 417:22 420:1,3 442:16 460:5 463:21
long-standing 95:5 142:1
long-term 111:18 287:5
longer 102:7 154:7 278:3 282:17 340:5 394:19 459:7 502:20
longevity 453:4
longitudinal 449:3
Lonsway 2:21 10:22 28:10 29:1 354:11,13,16 355:1,9 361:9,13 361:15,18 362:1,5 363:2 368:12,14 369:1 371:6,9 372:10 376:18 377:3 381:1,5 383:3,8,16 384:6 408:11 414:1 417:1 422:21 430:7 460:9 469:8 471:7 473:7,13 482:6 486:5,9,13 489:8
look 13:18 16:3,12 16:17 17:5 18:6 18:17 22:2 23:3 25:15 26:12 27:1 28:10 30:10,15 31:8 33:8 34:9 40:19,20 44:19 51:9 53:12 55:19 59:10 60:6,14 63:10 67:6 73:16 74:11 83:17,19 85:17 92:10 96:15 105:17 107:10 117:9 179:4,9 205:21 214:14 250:4 251:12,19 252:8 253:19 256:17 271:11 288:13,14 294:14 351:21 353:3 361:1 366:17,18 366:19 367:7,11 370:19 374:19 376:13 388:8 389:14 391:14 393:6 397:13 407:7 410:18 416:2 418:14,19 429:18 436:2 445:20 454:11 455:16 467:15 468:8 477:4 478:11 484:4,8,10 491:11 501:11 505:3 516:10
looked 27:18 54:4 76:13,17,17 79:5 79:10 112:3 208:9 268:14 388:18 396:20 475:21 497:3 514:3 515:2
looking 13:1 14:5 15:7 21:8 25:3 27:11 32:14,18 74:7 111:21 140:15 148:13 223:7 288:20 290:15 341:10 343:4 352:15,18 358:13 367:12 376:1 386:18 390:14 392:5 399:12 408:8 447:12 457:4 471:17 472:20 478:2 484:14,15 512:19 517:12
looks 18:20 25:17 28:18 468:19 516:20 517:2
looping 460:6
Los 2:5 10:11 261:19 267:1 308:12,17 311:2 336:7 350:8
lose 276:18 359:5 425:22
losing 357:10 358:15 365:21
loss 360:12
lost 228:9,19
lot 9:7 16:19 18:1 21:12,15 23:19 27:13 30:15 50:18 54:3 58:5,6,7,8 64:6 73:20,22 75:12 82:8 85:14 93:18 94:2 103:1 103:12 150:16 154:6 172:14 175:11 180:15 182:15 202:19 208:12 209:20 213:15 228:2,9 241:3 249:21 255:14 262:13 277:9 280:9 288:2 297:8 305:15 309:2,6 324:1 329:20,22 330:8,8 334:1 344:5 358:22 359:10 362:12 366:6 368:18 376:14 377:19 385:19 388:10 392:5 395:19 397:2,3 398:3,5 402:9 404:2,3 406:13,19 408:16,18,19 409:8 410:5 411:4 411:19 412:6,15 413:14 420:7 421:9,20 430:12 452:13 462:16 464:5 466:9 467:6 467:9 474:18 481:22 497:7 503:6 508:11,12 508:13
lots 291:13 363:8 384:17 403:17 457:1
lousy 457:10
love 13:11 45:10,20 154:2 177:6 363:15,15 365:1
loved 75:2 365:17
loves 81:10
lower 35:15 116:10 196:6 231:22 232:3 391:22 404:5
LT 157:21 160:5 166:22 178:9
lucky 12:5 163:19
Luis 8:10
lump 390:6
lying 40:15 76:19

M

ma'am 34:16 35:5 42:15 44:17 45:1 84:15 87:21 111:9 138:6 139:2,10,18 140:19 141:14,21 143:2 146:2,7 148:3,3 151:1 152:1 155:13 161:2 164:18 165:3,22 166:8,9 166:20 176:15 177:20 179:19 183:18,22 206:3 206:15 214:17 215:11 220:3 224:12 227:14 231:14 237:4 243:13 257:19,20 258:2,5 267:2 278:19 285:16 294:22 296:3,9 307:15 326:17 361:15 376:15,18 495:9,18 496:5 506:19,21 515:15 516:14 517:7 519:5
macho 402:12
Madam 7:14 121:16 184:2
Madame 198:19 206:15 317:9 332:11
MAI 1:19
main 11:5
maintain 129:18 174:22 297:7
maintaining 400:14
maintains 187:21
maintenance 193:9
major 3:4 7:4 91:22 120:15 121:11,12 121:15 138:1,5 139:2,10,18 140:17 141:3,13 141:21 143:1,20 184:15 185:4,6 238:15 265:4 275:7 312:12 437:12 448:9 495:18,20 496:1,5 506:19 517:20
majority 19:19,21 25:9 33:10 34:7 35:8,11 40:16,17 49:18 52:11,12 62:12 63:15 103:7 149:13 152:19 249:13 271:17 390:21 394:18
makers 437:13 440:19 444:5,14
making 19:8,9 33:7 65:7 81:6 87:17 134:16 136:15 158:17,21 159:4 160:17 205:15 234:15 239:19 260:10 262:1

268:18 273:7 276:6 278:7 281:19 282:12,18 284:20 289:6 312:19 322:1 336:10 361:4 363:5,8,8 385:10 386:6 395:9 398:13 404:15 410:21 419:16 426:10 441:22 459:12 474:20 488:6 504:13 505:21
male 17:13 19:17 20:2 52:3,13,17 84:14,19,19 85:8 85:8 232:12 233:1 233:1,19,21 234:7 235:1,8 348:2,5 348:17 372:4
males 84:10 85:11 86:7 234:6 410:15
malice 411:7
MALINDA 1:17
mall 512:7
man 19:7,21 43:21 70:10 233:8 498:8 498:20
manage 173:3 211:11 232:11 245:4 296:15
managed 148:6 159:10 193:3
management 132:2 288:7
managers 128:13 132:9
managing 101:21 244:3
mandate 245:22
mandated 141:17 265:9 426:18 427:12,19 428:13 432:1,6,11,22
mandates 210:2
mandatory 107:18 107:18 108:1 387:2 398:13 422:10
maneuver 276:19
manner 39:2 131:4 134:8 158:19 260:18 267:10 277:13 284:22 291:5 323:3
manning 191:18
manpower 141:6 289:5
mantra 49:22 67:9
Manual 202:12
map 446:8 448:4 449:9,10
mapped 152:9
March 136:2,6 190:4 254:6,13,15
Marine 2:9,10 121:6 129:17 132:19 146:3,8,13 146:16,20 147:19 166:2 175:5,14 176:5,10 185:15 190:1,3 248:16,22 249:2 251:9,22
mark 180:10,16
marketing 481:5
marks 296:1
marriage 450:3
Mary 417:6
Marzloff 3:1 192:3 192:4,7 198:18 232:3 234:9 243:13 247:18 249:3
mask 116:21 117:3
mass 272:11
Massachusetts 54:1
massive 85:3,4
master 175:12
masters 49:9
match 179:13
matched 382:22
materials 6:18 15:13 199:6 231:5 374:5
matter 17:11,13,15 79:19 120:5 200:17 223:16 224:3 257:5 261:10 286:16 295:19 351:13 353:20 362:19 378:17 380:6 393:4 403:18,19 405:13 500:8
matters 146:22 193:17
maximum 193:20 390:12
Mayberry 287:18
McGUIRE 1:17 245:13 248:4,11 249:15 304:10
MCIO 251:5 252:2
MCIO's 251:20 255:12
MCO 128:20
McWhorter 490:3
mean 38:10,12,12 49:2 67:16 89:22 91:4 102:11 103:6 105:2,9 110:10 145:13 153:2 155:6 164:22 223:22 231:22 233:1 236:12 253:6 284:11 294:7 295:14,15 298:15 300:21 302:20 306:2,5,13 307:19 309:14 329:13 337:6 338:7 341:15 342:15 343:20 349:16,17 352:3 353:8 361:7 362:3 369:2 383:4 395:18,18 407:16 430:3 431:1,7,11 453:19 458:8,13 467:1,22 470:13 472:22 473:17 475:5,20 477:15 477:22 478:2,3 479:10 486:22 489:9 490:3 491:17,19 519:1
meaning 39:11 50:22 59:7 389:20 432:8 452:21
meaningful 133:21 454:17
means 57:21 95:13 95:13,14 160:4 266:10 267:19,20 320:5 332:18,19 342:16 373:1 387:17 423:11 426:20 445:7 448:21 459:19
meant 155:3 171:20
measure 188:6 372:16,17 387:19 387:21 438:18 444:9 457:8,11 468:10,17,19 483:15
measures 133:12 134:3 468:11 471:17 503:12 504:12
measuring 129:12 133:14 369:21
mechanism 448:14
media 378:12 387:17 393:22 423:17 424:3
medical 2:18 78:3 120:20 127:2 136:7 137:8,13 144:9 214:2,12 259:13,15 321:4 399:21 426:18,21 428:13 431:22 432:5,10,22 470:11
medics 214:10
meet 18:11,15 19:8 40:2 122:15 127:19 128:1 144:14 162:13 186:12 200:12 280:15,18 282:6 398:5 437:15 442:18 443:9
meeting 5:6,7,12 6:22 9:5 39:18 191:5 495:14 516:13 519:21
meetings 6:11,17 6:19,20 517:6
meets 40:1 127:16
Melissa 7:4 495:19
member 20:15,16 44:21 87:1 89:19 91:15,17 95:16 98:3 99:12 106:3 107:9,17,22 108:3 108:13,17,19 109:4,7,11,15 110:1 111:2,5 112:7,15,21 113:4 114:16,18,20 115:3,7 117:16 118:1 119:21 141:2,15 143:4,6 145:3 154:21 156:4 157:14,18 160:3 167:7 170:7 170:18 171:7,8 172:17 177:17,21 182:4,13,19 183:2 187:2 192:14 214:20 215:12,17 215:21 216:3,8,21 217:16 218:12 220:6 226:11 227:4,15 229:8,16 230:9,21 231:12 231:17,20 232:2,5 232:8 233:2,6,11 235:20 236:22 237:5,12,17,20 240:2,5,8 241:7

241:10,14,22 242:13,16 243:11 243:15 245:11,13 248:4,11 249:15 254:19 262:18,21 263:4,7,9 267:18 268:5,8 269:12,15 269:19 278:18,20 284:6 285:17 291:19 293:22 295:22 296:4,9 297:12 298:1 299:4,9,12 302:1 302:22 303:3,6,12 304:10 306:9 307:4,13,16,19,21 308:2,8,18 309:10 309:14,21 311:4 312:5,22 332:11 334:13 336:22 340:1,18 341:6 342:12,14 343:5,7 343:8 344:10,14 345:8,16 347:4 348:6,8,19 349:15 350:18,21 351:3,6 351:9,14 352:4 368:11,13,15 370:21 371:7 372:9 380:16 381:2 382:21 383:7,15 404:11 404:14 406:10 407:1,10,14 428:16,18 429:3 429:11 430:6,10 430:19,20 431:21 432:12,17 433:2,5 433:9,12,16 457:1 471:22 478:19,21 481:6 485:11 486:6,12 487:10 487:19 488:22 490:9 492:3 515:20 516:15,22 517:1,8 518:15 519:11

members 1:14 6:1 6:4,5,6,14 7:12 14:16 121:16 136:13 178:14 179:14 184:4 186:22 189:19 192:5 197:6 304:5 317:9 327:6 363:19 364:18 373:16,20 393:12 433:21 436:9,10 437:14 499:4

memorandum 124:22

memorandums 306:18

memories 55:8,10 55:12,15 57:2 114:1 277:16

memory 55:8 57:7 57:10,13,18 58:16 58:17 59:20,21 60:5 65:12,12 96:14 131:17

men 19:19,22 20:2 26:10,17 30:22 34:2,7,10 52:11 52:22 53:3,7,9 68:2 97:12 126:3 401:18 441:15 474:14 482:1,1,3 482:3

men's 52:9

mental 127:2 365:15

mention 506:14

mentioned 9:6 12:14 98:8 141:22 145:7 156:4 167:8 172:9 182:6 231:5 373:10 380:16 457:5,7 471:22 485:12 494:10,17

mentor 147:8

mentoring 186:1

merely 222:12 246:18 518:6

message 24:13,14 332:5 459:4

met 27:21 34:3,5 39:19 40:7 49:2 128:3 339:16

metaphor 439:1 440:4 454:2

method 317:16 323:2

methodology 122:18

methods 131:21 239:10,11

metric 457:14

metrics 133:13,20 457:4

Metropolitan 466:9

Michael 3:2 121:8

Michigan 53:22

microphone 146:6

mid 186:3

middle 70:8 368:7 446:19

might've 42:20 63:7

Mike 2:20 121:7

military 2:8,9,20 3:8 4:3,6 9:14 10:13 11:4,13,14 11:17 12:3,16 13:14,18 14:8,20 15:3 30:8,9 35:9 35:10 52:14,15 68:3,4 74:13 77:4 77:6,6,17,19,20 77:22 79:5,6 80:9 80:15 81:7,9 82:3 82:20 83:1,2 84:1 90:9 91:7 92:1 106:7,9,13,15 108:14,15 110:2 112:17 115:8 116:5 122:7,17 123:8 124:3,7,9 124:20 125:16 126:15 127:8,13 129:1,8,16,20 130:13 131:2 132:18 133:17 135:11 137:13,16 139:3 140:10,11 144:7 146:19 148:20 149:17 150:21 153:14,22 154:8,22 155:17 170:10 171:14 173:15 174:10 178:12,16,19 179:10,12,16 183:8 189:18 192:14 202:15 203:4 207:17,18 207:20 215:5,7 221:21 247:10 248:9,15 249:13 253:7 270:11 287:22 296:2,8 299:1 302:8 310:4 314:1,14,17 337:10 338:6 343:10 368:16 374:15 384:16 385:8,20 387:10 388:20 389:18 391:4,6,9,12,13 391:15 392:6,21 395:11,17 396:17 397:1,16,18,20 398:16 399:5,13 399:22 403:3,8 404:16 405:14,20 406:8,9,20 407:5 407:19,20 408:20 411:16 414:5,7 416:21,22 419:10 419:11 420:15 421:1,15,17,19,22 424:1,22 425:5 427:2,4 428:20 429:6,12 430:13 431:2,16,19 432:9 434:12 436:10,12 436:15,16 442:12 443:15 446:14 448:18 449:16,20 450:1,8,10,15 451:2 454:20 455:2,10,12 456:3 456:5,9,10,16,18 461:21 464:1 467:19 469:18 470:15 475:9,12 477:3,17 478:16 481:11 485:17 494:4,21 496:17 500:3,12 501:11 502:10 504:5 507:10,16 517:17

military's 12:11 337:22

million 27:6 112:12 363:5 444:6

mind 69:5 98:1 156:9 164:9 258:20 259:7 285:7 316:16 341:17 353:2 357:10,21 367:5 368:16 460:10

Mindful 199:4

minds 511:3

mine 300:12 406:8

minimize 167:10 167:18

minimum 124:2 129:10 131:15 395:11 419:7 421:12

minor 430:1 518:8

minority 6:4

mint 37:15,17,20 37:22 38:3,5,8,10 38:13

minute 26:14 43:1 65:5 120:3 347:15 353:18 355:12 448:11 469:21 480:15

minutes 71:2 99:11 143:14 144:2 418:9

minutiae 296:19
Miramar 419:2
Miranda 215:9
mirrors 439:7
misconceptions 197:12
misconduct 212:21 462:13
miscue 514:22
misdemeanor 180:3 190:9 390:11
misdemeanors 390:18 391:1
miserable 483:2
misinterpret 337:1
mismatch 438:20
missed 105:13 242:5 294:1 404:18
missing 208:12 417:10
mission 125:17 191:6 199:3 244:7 341:13,21 498:6
missions 184:22 199:7
Missouri 195:15
misstep 450:19
mistake 38:18 387:22 411:6 459:15
mistakes 36:2
misunderstand 388:11
misunderstood 183:2
mix 249:8
mode 150:17 237:4
model 164:5 441:6 442:10 446:13,17 451:20 452:8 460:22 463:8 493:2,2,8
models 467:14
modifications 518:9
module 398:13 420:19
modules 397:20
molested 31:2,2,3 31:14
molesters 33:1
mom 104:3
moment 5:7 49:17 49:21 50:7 51:10 59:16 61:21 76:20 110:3 276:15 332:13 355:11,18 367:19 374:2 378:19 484:2 498:21
money 89:22 90:15 111:3 112:8 113:1 141:8 212:4 238:2 414:22 421:8 444:8 505:17
monitor 160:13 188:5
month 185:21 191:15 218:15 238:3,7 282:6
monthly 128:1
months 146:10 166:6 189:10 240:22 254:8 276:20 283:7 395:13 452:1 458:3 498:14
morals 22:11,22
morning 5:3,11 7:16 14:22 120:12 121:14,15 135:16 161:1,3 184:1,3 192:4 211:4 217:11 357:3 364:1 385:17 405:9 410:1 413:16 420:8 484:5 497:8 517:13
morphing 89:1
Morris 181:6
mothers 488:20
motivation 479:22 482:13 486:14 496:10
motive 324:19
motto 81:21 291:9
MOU 312:6,7
MOU's 312:12
Mount 374:16
mountain 374:19
mouth 279:6
move 72:3 90:20 124:13 146:5 153:10 166:14 167:2 183:7 213:3 226:2 282:5 283:4 285:3,14 287:21 289:7 293:6 295:5 314:15 335:14,16 339:17 341:2,8 409:6 448:1 452:5 493:7
moved 165:2,10 166:12 205:15 286:2 404:1 407:11
movement 173:16
movements 165:11
moves 200:19 436:6
moving 56:1 138:9 150:17 166:15 212:10 282:20 293:2 328:2 342:22 443:6
MP 81:21 88:8 95:2 252:14 395:14
MP's 252:14 253:1
MPs 395:17 396:3
Mulligan 3:2 121:8 160:22 161:1,4 165:3 167:7 168:2 170:16,20 173:20 178:1 179:19 210:18 218:19
multi 437:22
multi-disciplinary 136:12
multi-discipline 213:21
multi-layered 456:1
multi-lingual 466:13
multi-loop 449:4
multiple 32:14 161:14 358:1 390:14 401:13
Multipurpose 1:11
murder 264:16
murderer 47:6
muscular 62:1
music 89:6
myths 274:11 510:4 510:5,16

N

name 8:13 143:8 184:5 198:20 311:8 383:20 501:18 504:22 507:4
named 325:16
names 311:8
Nancy 8:8
napkin 387:3
narcotics 191:3
narrative 59:22 60:2,3
narrow 110:4 454:8
narrowing 454:11
nation 435:13 441:10
national 5:21 9:8 9:17 26:22 27:6 103:13 122:13 123:9 144:15 184:20 187:20 360:2 393:19 432:3,21 441:6 450:5 496:8 511:16
national/internat... 356:7
natural 67:13,20
nature 51:17,20,20 60:20 311:1 313:19 481:10,10
nauseous 75:16
Naval 2:16 157:13 182:15 183:11,20 184:22 190:2
navigating 129:7
Navy 2:13 121:6 148:4,19 149:1 153:19 166:12 167:8,9 171:15,17 173:19 182:14 184:16 185:5,16 188:8 189:15 190:1 222:15 251:22 420:2
NCIC 325:8,14,16 343:19
NCIS 114:22 115:4 146:21 150:14 156:21 157:17 184:7,14 185:11 185:17,19,20 186:3,6,10,20 187:21 188:2,4,5 188:11,13,15,16 188:21 189:1,12 189:21 190:5,12 190:13,15 201:18 247:19 248:11 250:20 251:21 254:6 255:10 427:5,7,11 431:16 432:1,6,6
NCIS's 185:1,3
NCO 70:2
NCOs 88:13
NDA 123:16
NDAA 4:4 125:11 133:16 140:3 175:3
Neal 3:1 192:7
near 213:20
necessarily 15:10 268:1 284:11,22

292:15 322:15 329:13 330:15 337:6,21 338:8 348:17 378:9 398:5 415:11
necessary 127:4 128:1 138:22 145:22 194:20 226:2 262:15 330:19 331:12
need 9:3 16:2 19:20 24:13 39:1 40:1 51:9 52:20,22 59:18 60:6 69:2 70:14 73:7,10 74:4 75:6 82:11 82:19 86:12,16 96:11 100:20 102:6 104:21,22 105:16 109:18,19 113:15 114:13 115:21 116:18 135:13 144:1 155:16 172:11 201:11 204:15 222:4,8 223:4 225:1,6 226:1 237:18,19 241:20 245:6 251:14 255:21 258:19 259:11 264:22 275:22 276:22 277:22 280:1 285:3 289:20 295:10,10 296:18 298:20 299:3 318:6 321:5 322:12 333:21 334:22 350:13 357:8,9,21 367:6 367:9 372:11,14 375:21 376:13 379:1 380:2,13 382:10 405:17 412:15 413:14 417:18 418:4 420:6,7 428:15 429:18 436:21 448:8,9 451:8 453:10 457:11 459:4,8 460:19 463:15 467:11 470:8 471:3 474:22 476:8 479:7 482:18 494:19 497:15,21 499:2 501:18 503:13,14 504:17
needed 134:14 137:4 172:5,6 195:21 199:2 208:15,16 209:5 213:17 228:6 241:4 259:13 271:16 317:15 319:11 389:6 412:3 445:6 496:14 498:13 502:3
needs 39:8,18,19 40:2,6 87:20 128:3 134:7 140:15 175:20 181:16 238:1,5 241:19 289:13 329:7,9 372:21 424:1 437:15 442:18,20 443:9 443:14,19 444:21 452:4 470:9 477:4 493:4,6 500:3 501:15 502:16 504:19 519:4
negative 154:7 171:6 364:15 365:4,6,12 403:22 422:20 423:17 424:4,5 510:14
neighbor 42:19
neighborhood 16:1 28:20 109:2 401:6
neighbors 488:21
Neither 368:18
networks 324:13
neurobiology 53:21 54:4 277:10 412:8
neuroscience 53:17 53:20 57:17 73:5 73:8 74:2 94:4,17 96:16 101:9 113:19
neuroticism 37:2
neutral 193:11 380:14,17
never 7:19 27:15,16 29:15 33:11 48:19 49:9 51:4 52:9 68:9 69:1 74:22 75:5 76:18 82:9 86:8 92:8,9 104:6 105:7,9 116:17 236:20 245:3 250:5,5 261:1 263:12 311:14 316:20 374:18 376:21 377:20 378:6 382:4 394:13 419:9 464:16,19 488:13 488:14
new 59:4 74:3 87:20 92:11 94:13 112:19 113:7 158:5,20 163:13 163:14 213:2 218:14 222:16 237:1 239:2 260:12 261:8,14 269:12 338:18 345:17 412:7,13 443:22 460:6 488:17 504:7 519:15
newer 26:8
news 19:16,18 47:5 311:7 394:2 466:9
nice 23:9 36:9 44:19 48:20 49:4 473:8
nicely 452:4
nicest 49:2
night 70:9 75:14 78:6 221:10 483:11
NIJ 447:3
nine 6:6 148:5
nine-member 6:1
no-pressure 321:12
nodding 180:19
Noel 8:11 10:21 426:16 482:7
Noel's 417:19
non 37:2 229:12 310:4
non-consensual 279:9
non-consent 63:17 63:19
non-consenting 39:17
non-perpetrators 35:12 36:13,15
non-profit 356:7
non-reporting 359:1
non-sexual 36:20
non-stranger 43:8 96:5 270:20 271:18 272:3 274:3 283:17 296:22
Norfolk 148:12 153:11 187:16 244:10
normal 308:21
normally 227:18 247:17 251:18
norms 468:1
North 187:17
nose 43:18
note 263:16
notes 385:10
notice 399:11 508:13
noticed 267:6
notification 131:1
notified 311:17
notify 127:14 316:14
notion 505:18
November 26:21 26:21 192:12 218:13 220:3 265:18 267:5
nuanced 438:16
nuances 160:18 285:2 304:12
number 28:1 33:19 80:6 108:20 110:19 117:20 158:22 173:12 206:22 207:2 231:7 236:12 267:9 285:22 290:5 316:5 317:2 386:20 410:19 426:15 443:8,18 457:16 474:15 488:2 494:9 505:9 508:3
number-wise 52:17
numbers 27:1 108:5 137:16 144:21 147:3 256:21 315:19 376:5 388:10,13 389:16 465:16 470:4 513:21
numbers-wise 52:19
numerous 48:20 509:4
nun 20:12
nurse 143:12,19 285:20 309:3 327:6 435:7 440:13 447:14 463:17 468:20
nurses 113:11 144:8,12
Nursing 286:4 435:14

O

o'clock 211:4

Oakley 3:4 120:15 121:11,12,15 138:1,5 139:2,10 139:18 140:17 141:3,13,21 143:1 517:20
object 261:12
objected 347:13,13 347:13
objective 106:8,9 156:11 172:7 240:5 241:12,15
objectivity 193:19
objects 454:5
obligated 304:19
obligation 502:6,19
observation 185:22
observed 179:11
obtain 13:1 202:3 202:10 221:13 222:9 229:5
obtained 331:12
obtaining 325:6
obvious 337:3
obviously 95:16 151:3 179:1 209:12 213:15 229:19 237:9 252:16 259:22 338:8 369:15 470:9 485:7
occasion 149:4 297:16
occupation 45:9
occur 26:14 418:10 512:15 513:18
occurred 28:6 93:13 119:1 310:20 427:8 477:17
occurrence 450:18 450:22
occurring 298:22 329:14 434:12
occurs 53:15 54:18 510:18,20
October 123:1 222:18 420:11
offend 38:21 48:20
offended 50:11
offender 2:13 17:9 19:15 20:11 22:12 22:12 24:10 32:22 46:1,18 51:12 54:9 55:11 81:17 83:1 84:3 115:14 117:6 135:4 230:7 257:18 270:4 320:3 323:7 325:13 326:15 419:13 437:6,7 438:13 478:8 480:1
offender's 438:14
offender-focused 22:14
offenders 15:17 17:12,13,18 20:9 20:19,20,21 21:4 25:1,3,4,13,14,16 25:17,20 28:17,18 28:19 29:10,13 30:21 31:9,19 32:7 33:2,10 35:9 36:4,18,21 37:3,5 37:11 38:19 41:3 41:4 48:2,22 54:14 55:10 67:5 67:5,8 83:6 319:18,20 323:9 323:18,21 324:1 332:2 390:14 419:5,17 437:16 438:6 444:12 454:19 473:3 488:1
offending 83:3 473:20
offends 490:1
offense 22:1,3 80:21 127:11,17 189:7 199:18 215:8 223:8 402:3
offenses 9:22 10:4 11:21 12:12 48:18 83:19,22 84:2 126:6,11 131:16 185:4,6 190:9 199:17 215:3 310:5
offensive 48:3,4,6,7 79:16 396:7
offer 204:17 225:17 233:16,17 260:1,1 260:2 343:16 345:14 348:10 442:3,5,10 450:20 451:5 455:15
offered 420:14
offering 193:16 233:19
office 2:19 3:3,4,4,6 105:3 120:17,18 120:22 123:4,9,11 123:13 125:1,1 147:17 160:9 180:1 181:2 183:14 189:4,5 193:14 211:13 212:8,9 248:21 249:1,1 261:18,19 285:6,15 295:2 308:6,16 309:4,22 310:7 313:13,15 321:18 322:19 341:8 346:22 347:19 381:19 397:9 420:10 465:19 467:12 517:21
officer 2:2,8 5:4 59:7 68:13 98:4,6 98:12,13,21 146:21 152:14 170:12 183:3 249:8 260:3,4 269:8 276:11 375:1 410:6,13 414:11 415:10 418:6 421:7 427:21 496:7 499:9 519:14
officers 103:7,11 127:4 148:5 152:3 167:20 170:22 175:8 194:4 207:18 249:14 282:2 391:16,21 392:17 414:19 425:11 466:5
offices 8:21 130:9 177:5 180:14 181:11 185:13 188:1,2 194:1,2,2 194:7 207:12 325:10
official 44:10 159:19
officials 329:11 330:2 344:13
offline 325:8,14
oftentimes 36:1
oh 71:15 96:4 110:14 362:4,13 415:12 432:17 464:16,18 477:10
Ohio 192:10
okay 14:9 18:14 34:22 35:3 37:16 37:19 83:13 107:22 110:5 119:21 139:5 143:3 152:2 157:18 177:21 206:12 216:3,21 224:14 231:12 232:5,8 237:12 240:2 242:13 243:11 250:16 257:22 263:9 271:1 273:16 278:3 286:5 295:4 308:8 335:16 339:1 340:1,18 341:6 342:13 345:8 348:6,19 351:14 362:4 375:4 383:7 389:9 406:10 407:1,9,15 415:19 430:6 432:18 433:16 477:10 495:13 496:3
Okinawa 187:19 207:13
Oklahoma 180:2
old 480:10
OLTI 398:7 399:10 399:14
omitting 281:9
onboard 151:20 152:13,14 330:2
once 72:6 169:16 185:20 191:14 211:22 223:21 225:8 244:8 265:9 280:16 282:6 304:16 321:10 330:1 334:2 338:1 341:19 342:17 346:11,20,21 364:14 408:17 422:15 427:6 429:22 470:14 501:21 502:5 513:13,15 517:3
one's 371:2,3,3 482:22
one-dimensional 65:17
one-third 249:4,4,4 249:5,6
ones 20:21,22 21:5 32:18,20 33:15 35:20,21,21 39:15 75:2 210:4 313:6 377:22 378:1 391:10
ongoing 136:18 145:14 344:22 367:22 400:8 470:18
online 321:1 324:13 397:7,15 398:17 420:18

onset 261:17
open 5:6 6:11 65:7 205:1 254:7,11 255:13 256:8 378:7 448:21
open-ended 204:19 205:10 236:1
opened 255:1
opening 4:2 254:5 254:17,20 255:15 447:16
operate 439:6
operating 6:8 90:18
operational 149:15 152:16 155:20 176:21 253:7
operations 3:9 159:11 184:7,10 184:19 186:16 190:18 193:8 194:6
opinion 37:20 45:7 90:12 163:5 391:20 398:18 429:18 511:10
opinions 15:10,12 193:16 380:1 450:7 509:10
OPM 193:4
opportunities 92:21 93:3 165:5 232:19
opportunity 82:19 87:18 117:1 192:17 197:10 205:20 286:8 331:21 433:22 454:15 461:8 472:10 494:3,15
opposed 72:22 91:12 113:21 215:9 253:11 255:7 317:20
opposite 103:21 220:15 268:20 367:8 415:13
option 107:2 320:16,18 374:7 432:10
options 179:10 320:13,13,15 321:21 332:4 338:11 500:18
oral 261:12 278:6 279:4 430:3
ORB 168:8
order 96:10 100:13 121:20 143:14 193:9,18 209:6 238:11 247:15 266:9 277:21 399:8,11,12 472:9
ordered 399:15
ordinary 284:3
Oregon 10:12 258:1 302:3 303:11 499:20
organ 261:12
organically 363:10
organization 15:22 126:16 159:10 175:17 246:3 301:16 329:1,2 336:2 356:8,9,15 382:14 443:19
organizational 199:8 442:19
organizations 4:6 8:22 11:14 48:11 80:6 83:8 103:13 106:16 124:21 127:4,13 133:10 183:9 408:8
organized 147:18 147:20 148:1 193:1 385:13
organizing 122:16
orientation 80:17 378:21 379:1 450:3
oriented 157:8
origin 511:16
original 57:11
originally 161:18 327:22 338:3 452:6
OSD 141:4,18 143:2
OSI 159:22 198:22 199:6 200:8,9 255:10
ostracized 81:1
ought 404:16 515:2
outcome 345:11 443:6,7 446:2 448:12 449:11 461:16,16 462:11
outcomes 51:11 389:1 442:22 443:1,4 445:12,19 448:19
outcry 437:4
outlined 100:10
outreach 189:13 373:14
outset 122:11 296:1 367:21
outside 30:9 33:3 35:9 46:10 68:3 99:7 118:7 220:16 235:11 244:22 279:17 291:3 323:15 328:10 350:11 351:22 393:3 408:7 496:2 501:22
outstanding 420:4
outward 53:6
overall 121:21 138:15 145:6 305:3 517:2
overarching 128:9 134:2
overcompensating 118:12
overemphasize 24:6
oversaw 517:16
oversee 199:1 200:4 252:7
overseeing 178:13 178:16 184:8
overseen 140:12
oversight 122:9 184:10 252:1,2
overview 4:3 11:3,7 121:3 122:4,20 128:5 199:6,15 205:19
overwhelm 264:20
overwhelms 118:15
owed 498:22
ownership 299:20 299:22 314:17

P

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-... 5:1
p.m 257:4,6,7 353:21,22 495:15 495:16 519:22
page 304:8 519:6,9
painful 506:12
paints 279:7
pair 454:6
paired 159:21
Palms 395:22
pamphlet 265:16
panel 1:4,11,13,14 4:2 5:5,6,9,13,15 5:17,20 6:1,6,13 6:16,16,18 7:2,4,5 7:11,22 9:1 10:18 10:21 13:21 14:16 44:17 58:4 65:20 66:3 71:10 84:12 120:4,14 121:17 122:3 125:6 129:5 140:21 181:6,7 183:8 184:4 192:6 192:17 198:13,20 199:5 217:4 248:6 258:12,16 317:9 342:3 379:12 413:16 424:10 431:13 433:20,22 434:10 449:13 454:14 507:14 515:15 516:1
Panel's 7:10
panelists 507:4
Panels 92:3
paper 219:16
paradigm 36:6
paralegal 126:18 128:13 147:1
paralegals 134:22
parallel 300:19
paraphilia 39:16 39:16
paraphilias 39:12 39:13
park 376:10
parking 497:6
part 9:13 61:14,15 62:15,17 67:8 77:10 80:1 83:2 90:22 96:17 102:20 104:12 109:22 112:5 135:17 137:3,19 139:7,20 172:1 222:7 235:2 240:12 241:18 242:3,6 260:20,21 261:11 262:2,8 297:2 306:13 330:17 346:8 347:1 354:17 380:19 403:4 407:22 426:11 434:19 446:4 459:22 465:1 469:14 472:14 481:3 485:11,14 490:5 491:19 498:3 511:8
partial 320:17 321:3,15
participate 273:7 320:9 337:5 340:6 342:10 389:13 425:15 505:2
participates 431:5
participating

196:20 386:7 504:20
participation 228:19 342:5 425:1
particular 8:7 10:7 10:21 12:19 18:4 27:20 31:10 34:2 57:15 69:14,15 119:4 131:11 140:12 142:17 160:8,17 164:8 200:17 243:10 251:21 296:20 302:12 311:8 349:13,22 352:1 369:2 371:8 407:10 452:3 477:20 518:10
particularly 129:13 133:15 143:20 164:8 448:16,17 453:2 494:16 495:3 514:19
partner 30:18 201:1 246:10 414:8
partners 82:20,21 109:10,19 139:4 190:1 191:9,12
partnership 303:21 356:19,20
partnerships 327:4
parts 45:20 55:2 58:15 113:20 114:2 178:19 473:15
party 70:3,4 75:8,9 76:11,13 222:10 222:11 321:2
partying 401:20
pass 379:6 385:15 426:16
passing 213:16
passion 288:3 491:17
passionate 272:18 300:1
path 212:10 290:20 379:3 403:14 479:11
paths 380:2
patience 121:13
patient 2:18 120:21 334:21
Patricia 2:2 5:8,14
patrol 396:8
patrolmen 252:15
Patterson 417:20 420:18
Paula 7:7
pay 148:9
PCS 191:18 244:5
PD 279:14 286:5 305:17 306:3 309:20 384:10 385:6 388:18 391:7 394:2 395:12 396:19 408:2 465:17
pedestrians 418:18
peer 239:12
peers 78:18 81:1 82:15
pen 78:10
Pendleton 187:17
penetrate 406:16
penetration 54:20 256:14 261:10,12 349:5 390:3
penile/vaginal 390:3
penis 279:5,6
pension 155:9
people 17:2,2 18:1 18:2 19:14,19,22 28:16 29:9,14 30:8 32:6 33:5,11 33:14,20 34:13 36:8 37:14,15,16 37:17,17,19 38:20 40:16,17 41:7,13 41:19,20,20 42:8 47:7,12 49:2,4 50:17 56:6,16 59:4 60:1 63:2 64:19 66:13 68:1 75:12 79:12,17,19 80:10,11,11 85:14 87:5 89:3,17 90:14 91:6 103:15 104:15 106:8 108:3,11,16,20 110:15 111:6 112:9,17,20 113:2 113:5 134:10 147:3 152:22 153:8 154:12 156:10 161:13 163:15 170:5 171:20 172:11 180:8,17,22 210:3 215:4 227:5 242:4 242:6,18 259:7 264:9 268:11 288:5 296:12 297:9,14,17 298:5 317:3 318:5,7 319:15,21 328:16 346:2 359:19 360:11,19,20 362:10,11 363:15 366:12 372:22 374:2 375:17 380:1 384:14,16 388:10 392:5 396:2 398:22 399:22 400:10,20 402:9,20 403:17 404:1 405:12 406:20 407:20 408:7 409:19 410:2,17,21 411:21 413:22 415:2 419:6,9,15 419:22 421:20 422:6,22 423:22 424:2 426:2 428:7 444:10 452:15 453:2,12 455:11 456:4,8,15 459:2 459:4,8 462:6,18 462:21,22 463:14 464:20 467:9,19 470:14 474:4 475:21 476:5 477:5 478:10 480:22 483:5,6 485:6 486:3 489:1 495:10,12 500:19 501:2,6,12,13 503:10,21 504:2 505:15,20 506:4 506:14 508:18 509:6,22 510:10 510:19 511:9 512:5,18 513:2,21 514:13,18 515:8 515:11
people's 364:20 502:22 509:10 511:2
perceive 80:20
perceived 66:21 468:21
percent 19:16 20:1 25:6 26:5,9,10 28:2,7,7 30:22 31:2,3,4,4,5,6,10 31:12,14,15,16 32:15,16,22 33:2 34:2,4 49:11 53:10 62:18 109:4 110:15 190:14 210:9,12 231:11 237:10 239:15 244:15,16,17 245:3 248:13 265:20,22 266:1 266:21 267:2,16 271:19,19 288:21 288:21 327:16 376:7 422:4 423:2 424:4,8 425:18 427:8 445:22 447:5,10 455:6 457:19 458:11,13 459:19,20,20 475:11 479:13 480:4 489:12 510:10 512:17,18 514:2
percentage 52:18 108:4,6 231:8 248:7,15 315:9,12 315:13 474:17
perception 62:8 395:19 425:2 428:19 431:8 464:11 491:22
perceptions 430:11 464:10 511:4
percipient 400:17
perfect 377:8 461:2 470:3 471:17 474:8 483:15
perfectly 363:2
perform 159:14,17 400:1
performance 133:12
performed 278:6 279:3 447:13,14 447:16,18,19
period 82:7 166:6 185:21 186:1 242:10 336:4 429:12
periodic 128:2 131:9
periodically 200:13
periods 397:4
peripheral 60:10 60:18 61:6
perishable 154:14
permanent 13:16 91:12
permission 248:1
permit 10:15
perpetrate 462:18 462:21,22 463:1 501:1
perpetrated 351:19
perpetrating 441:16 463:3

perpetration 326:9 338:17 448:10 473:14 474:13 483:12 484:1 485:1,10
perpetrator 95:19 303:20 304:20 319:6 325:17 333:7 335:18 349:19 353:5,9 360:7 486:1 489:22 490:1 514:8
perpetrators 31:22 34:15,17,18 35:6 35:7,11,14 36:3 36:13,14 52:11 272:20 289:20 323:22 324:2 328:4 330:11 472:3,6 486:22 513:4,4,15,16 514:11
person 18:11,15 20:19 34:21 42:4 43:12,14 47:8,13 48:8,9,9,12 60:7 81:13 82:22 99:5 153:4 172:7 182:8 216:6 260:2 261:13 313:15 322:9 343:18 348:10,11 353:5 363:21 365:3,3,14 369:19 381:20 399:2 409:1 411:1 413:19 416:21 431:19 451:20 452:3 469:16 485:3 486:17,21 489:5 498:19 500:5 501:16 506:3 510:1 513:10
person's 510:20
persona 41:10,11 41:15,17,18 42:1 42:2,3,3,5,6,7,8 42:10 44:15 45:14 45:15 46:4,7 83:11
personal 51:17,20 74:14,16,17,18 81:8 176:16 360:12 429:17 497:22 508:15
personality 34:9 36:11 473:16
personally 49:1 144:5 177:1 412:5 416:22 430:14
personas 41:10 42:4,5,12
personnel 3:5 8:6 10:8 89:22 90:22 122:22 123:2,20 126:14,17,18,21 127:22 128:17 129:2,9 130:21 132:4 133:7 134:8 134:11 135:2,10 138:15 139:16 140:9 147:1,7 151:17 154:17 187:11 194:11 250:13 265:6 391:13 403:7,10 411:14 432:9 440:14 478:16 517:15,17,21
persons 39:17 188:12 472:11 485:2
perspective 121:4 129:14 133:15 157:2 222:3 336:15 356:14 361:2 417:8 426:7 493:14
perspectives 355:17,20
pertain 199:9
pertaining 189:9
pervasive 510:5
pervasiveness 437:1
pet 73:18
phase 94:1 449:5
phases 197:3 449:5
PhD 356:5
Philadelphia 196:11
philosophy 292:5 301:15,17 302:21 303:17 305:2,4 326:20 327:2 333:11,13,16 334:5 335:7 375:12 380:5 382:13,16
Phoenix 196:11
phone 96:20 188:14 212:17 262:8 276:16 344:1 466:14 497:13
photos 259:21
phrase 259:5
physical 49:14 95:4 95:7 186:9 498:1
physically 362:8
physiological 95:10
pick 16:11 17:9 20:19,20,21 44:6 172:11 272:16 294:18 497:13
picking 17:19 159:12 256:1 280:5
picks 20:17 344:1
picture 16:11 17:3 17:10 29:9 277:17 279:7 284:17 342:19 357:9 448:4
piece 101:12,21 137:20 138:4,6,11 279:10 280:19 283:9 289:22 362:17 365:12,22 367:14 373:11 379:8,17 380:3 446:10 447:1,7 469:13 474:2 485:10 487:15,22 490:15 491:7,14 492:4,11
pieces 72:12 178:19 247:16 289:9 364:15 366:22
pilot 13:14 138:7 145:14 161:17 203:18
pivot 448:9 454:18 472:2 482:2
place 134:1 174:10 190:21 211:13 212:9 235:7 274:14,15 276:8 276:16 278:16 283:5 287:3 288:5 293:20,20 296:12 297:5 301:3 305:16 307:6 309:5,15 314:2 350:10 421:15 434:16 456:11 470:22 482:4 493:5 501:6 502:4 513:5 517:5
placed 500:21
places 126:3 207:15 358:1 478:18
plan 110:9,20 124:14 125:13 128:5 146:11,12 240:9 463:9
planning 87:13
plans 122:16 123:5
plant 491:14
plate 504:10
play 135:3 289:10 289:22 336:13
playing 23:5 24:12 41:1 42:16 48:5 66:6 373:20
plays 290:3 336:11 363:21
plea 97:14 343:16 344:19
pleaded 75:6
please 120:9 177:18 266:3,6 361:9 368:14
pleased 434:4,19
pleases 206:5
pleasure 14:15
pled 97:14
pluck 394:20
plucking 394:4,6
plug 245:5
plugged 248:21
plumber 23:18
plumber's 24:1
plumbers 23:21
plus 15:12 108:11 238:8 280:12
point 43:20 70:20 103:2,19 109:5 112:4 115:9 116:22 117:16 155:8 159:15 167:14 175:15 214:22 217:6 222:14 226:12 233:13,17 239:9 289:8 292:2 296:5 333:3 352:15 357:11,18 362:13 364:21 373:4 415:18 418:20 432:7 437:4 446:16,17 458:10 459:17 463:7 465:11 483:1 497:3,13 500:2 515:17
pointed 79:11 173:18 210:19
points 105:20 347:20 358:5 385:14 472:10
poke 290:16
poking 505:10
police 2:5,14,15,15 3:8 4:7,9 8:20

10:11,19 14:9 27:3 28:2,2 29:4 59:7 60:9 66:8 68:13 70:15 78:19 81:22 96:21 98:3 98:11,13 103:7,11 109:21 196:12 203:3 207:17,20 247:10,21 250:4 252:14 257:10,17 258:4 259:2 263:17 264:7,8 269:8,8 270:1 273:12 276:10 277:13,21 279:2 287:8 301:2 303:6 304:5 305:8 307:7 307:17 308:20,21 311:11,15,16,17 311:21,22 312:7,9 316:2 322:16 325:18 326:16,20 330:16 336:11 354:9 356:17 362:16,19 381:17 383:9 392:1 399:4 408:17 414:9,11 414:13 415:10 421:7 423:8 447:9 464:1 466:10 478:9 479:19 496:14 497:14 499:21 512:14
policemen 207:18
policies 124:17 125:4,12 135:22 142:20 143:18 174:13 200:11 202:4 221:2 470:21
policing 275:10,15 276:16 288:9
policy 2:18 3:4 107:1,3,12 120:17 120:22 121:19 122:14,22 123:13 124:19 125:2,3 128:6,9 129:9 135:7,18 136:16 138:4 140:4,10 141:19 142:4,5 151:14 159:20 163:1,7 165:9 184:14,14 199:1,7 199:12 201:6 210:2 226:16 229:15 230:5 233:16 236:13,17 236:18 255:10 304:21 327:1 346:2,5 352:17 386:9 392:3 397:22 398:4 406:14,15 425:4,4 437:12 440:19 444:5,13 464:3,6 464:17,22 518:2
poll 471:11
polygraph 25:22 262:11 263:2
Polygraphers 262:22
polygraphing 262:19 263:5
pool 68:2
poor 228:16
Poorman 3:6 183:10 198:18,19 198:21 206:1 208:14 220:19 224:15,16 226:15 227:1,3 228:13 229:1,5 231:10 232:1 233:15 234:14 238:8 240:4,7,11 241:9 241:13,15 242:8 242:14,19 246:5 249:6 253:14 254:12,21
popped 325:18
popular 314:2
populated 267:12
population 19:17 20:2 168:21 310:12 405:15 419:4,10 422:2 423:15 466:15,16 473:20
populations 162:20 203:5 472:12
port 186:16
portfolio 135:17
portfolios 253:20
portion 30:12 86:4 89:10 137:8 274:8
ports 198:9
posed 191:2 256:4
poses 101:18
posit 83:9
position 181:8 192:11 244:9,11 298:14 299:3,6 374:3 461:3
positions 91:10 298:5,7,12 300:15 301:13 403:8 419:22 477:20 500:21
positive 134:16 247:9 293:9 328:3 328:19 366:13,18 392:16 423:1
possess 132:22
possesses 194:20
possession 430:1
possibilities 112:1 250:12 252:18,20
possibility 112:5
possible 38:16 167:22 193:20 226:3 227:19 251:20 253:2 311:20 334:11 408:14
possibly 353:1 388:1 423:16
post 421:6 516:2
post-polygraph 262:12
post-trial 127:9
posted 7:9
potential 67:3 217:7 324:13 335:18 341:16 360:7 471:9 473:3 482:16 486:21 513:4,15
potentially 230:11 256:5
power 335:11 450:13 455:20 478:10
powerful 97:10
PowerPoint 384:3
PowerPoint's 433:18
Powers 8:2
practical 196:13 223:15 224:3 241:4
practice 13:7 279:21 286:16 287:16 298:19 356:22 358:11 406:15 417:3,3 425:4 452:19,22 465:2 488:16,17 507:11
practices 13:2,18 15:7 83:10 102:3 102:5 122:5 129:7 262:6 286:3 356:3 385:7 409:2 411:19 421:11,17 443:2 444:22
practitioner 355:17 435:3,17
practitioners 155:18 356:11 435:4 437:13 463:9
pre 117:13
pre-lim 345:13
pre-set 155:14
pre-text 212:16 262:8
precious 84:14
precisely 440:5
precursor 350:13
precursors 189:20
predator 334:11 345:2
predators 16:9,10 16:14 318:6 331:22 332:1,6 514:11
predict 474:3
prediction 474:8,10
predictor 51:15 473:9,14
predictors 514:4
prefer 106:18
preferred 442:22 443:1,3,6,7 445:19 446:2 448:12,19
prefrontal 54:8,11 54:22 57:22 62:10
prejudice 281:4
preliminary 416:11 452:2
premise 437:18,19
premium 241:5
preparation 6:19
preparatory 71:6 116:1
prepare 93:13 117:8 200:20
prepared 134:12 170:22 201:10 206:14 329:21 374:3 422:7,20,21 515:21
prepping 116:4
prescribe 124:16
presence 48:9 450:17
present 1:14 2:1 14:12 51:2 143:19 242:16 283:1,6 313:10 339:8 389:6 495:4 519:12
presentation 87:2

89:10 99:19 120:2 173:10 405:22
presentations 197:2 258:10 354:5
presented 36:18 37:1 65:19 179:8 197:3 283:15 310:15 315:8,9 340:3 480:19 485:13
presenter 14:5 120:16,19 235:22
presenters 8:19 121:3 236:8 395:14 494:22 516:4
presenting 66:1 284:15,21 374:15 374:17
preserve 193:18
preserved 132:1 321:7
President 2:7 8:2,8
presiding 1:13
press 457:14 519:3
pressure 269:6
pressured 320:10
presumably 365:1
presumption 220:15
pretty 14:2 171:16 218:14 272:11 369:21 376:6 383:19 396:7 418:22 421:11 477:17 493:18
prevalence 24:22 27:12 29:17
prevalent 283:18
prevent 116:14 117:4
preventing 47:21 486:16
prevention 115:15 123:4 136:5 196:20 485:8 504:7
previous 118:10 119:11,20 207:7 270:15 284:19 436:17 438:9 457:20 483:9
previously 280:7 292:18 328:6 458:6 475:13
prey 514:11
primarily 68:1 238:13 356:8
primary 197:5 270:18 314:6 480:3
primitive 55:2 57:21 61:15
principles 73:8 125:13 436:8
printouts 386:12
prints 259:21
prior 99:11 136:2 188:16 270:3 280:21 281:14 282:18 300:11 322:1 324:11 326:4 343:17 346:18 361:11 379:12 467:20 473:14 514:3,14
priorities 475:3
prioritization 238:12
prioritize 348:22 351:10
priority 253:8 426:5
prism 439:1,4,7,20 454:2,4
prisms 439:5,9 454:3,6
prison 28:8 419:16
prisons 444:10 464:20
privacy 360:12 502:8
private 42:14 496:15
proactive 255:18
proactively 383:10
probability 233:20
probable 95:20 280:1 295:1 321:19 388:4
probably 20:7 45:17 62:10 108:9 117:19 156:14 166:13 175:14 213:12 225:15 229:1 233:20 237:15,19 238:1 244:14 245:3 248:13 250:14,18 272:10 292:22 315:16 348:21 352:13 355:2 376:9 409:11,20 429:11 442:15 475:3 496:1 497:19 498:9 502:4 503:16
probation 390:12
probationary 185:21
probe 116:6
probing 116:5
problem 4:3 19:6 20:1,18 21:2,7 24:3 26:11 27:14 28:14,15,22 29:1 29:11,12,14 33:6 33:7,16 46:13,15 47:14 50:5 52:20 54:17 58:21 60:5 77:11 81:20 83:4 84:4,10 85:20,22 85:22 86:1,14,15 91:10 101:7 116:16 118:18 146:4,9 234:3 268:16 272:5 332:12 390:10 402:19 409:14 410:9 411:14 421:9 437:20 443:17 444:14 448:5 454:14 464:3,7 488:18,19 510:7,9 512:3 515:5
problematic 241:2 312:14 339:22 340:21
problems 20:8 72:11 142:14 302:11 303:18 332:22 368:4 390:5 406:13,19 435:19 436:3 477:7
procedural 468:11 468:12
procedure 233:7
procedures 136:5,7 202:5,11 226:16 247:15 310:2 470:22
proceed 7:14 225:18 322:21 331:15 332:16 341:10 342:1 375:9
process 66:14 69:4 91:21 92:2,12 127:8 130:13 131:2 134:5,17 142:2 149:8 163:10 175:2 178:13,16 180:5 193:20 200:19 208:6 215:2 217:21 221:8,15 221:21 222:22 228:4,16 230:11 232:21 247:17 260:16 276:17 310:6,7 320:9,14 321:12 322:18 323:6 328:15 333:1 337:6 339:14 341:12 358:16 366:9,14 371:13 381:3 382:12 439:2,16 449:2,3,6,11,12 460:5,6 470:12,18 470:20 475:8 486:4 490:11 517:9
processed 58:19
processes 202:11 233:3 432:14 444:21
processing 77:20 77:21 208:3 211:18
procurement 191:3
product 243:18
products 193:13
profession 17:14 509:3
professional 151:21 167:3 263:20 359:8
professionalism 132:22
professionals 73:5 281:22 360:11 364:19 373:15 435:6 436:20 438:2 451:12 452:11 453:7 468:22
professor 1:18 2:10 20:13 54:1 99:15 172:16 230:20 515:18 518:20
profile 38:13,15 164:3 169:18 326:9 473:5,8,11 473:16 477:16
profiles 33:8
profiling 477:13
program 13:14,17 25:21 109:7 110:13,15,17 123:14 130:1 132:9 136:5,17

138:3,7,8,17 139:1,8 141:10,20 156:12 158:1,4 161:18 163:18 169:22 172:8 178:3 181:5 186:11,20 189:17 201:21 203:18,19 203:22 246:6 252:5,9 285:19,21 291:21 309:3 317:12 318:12,14 318:16 319:2,12 320:1 327:3,10 328:5,21 329:5,8 329:19 338:18 373:12,13 374:8 386:6 400:13 414:9 419:9 422:10 479:3 504:8,8
programs 2:18 84:8 93:2 118:2 120:22 122:1 128:10 131:5,6,11 142:1,12 145:14 145:20 189:11 252:3 375:11 419:13 444:1,2 470:9,21 477:6
progress 155:11 220:2 304:3 457:9 457:11
progressive 397:4
prohibited 193:15
prohibits 511:15
project 273:7,8,9 281:19 282:13,19 284:20 285:21 293:14 305:19 440:22 447:3,4 480:6
Projects 488:7
promise 224:2
promises 354:7
promising 15:6 83:9 102:3,5 213:10 239:9 241:19
promote 131:20 153:22 437:6 466:7
promoted 155:11 161:15 171:21 403:15,18
promotion 155:4,8 155:12,15,16 165:7 170:11 171:12 403:13
promotions 170:20
promptly 127:19
promulgated 451:4
pronounced 61:22
proof 63:16 69:18 72:13 131:15 200:18 216:18 295:3 499:13 500:16
proper 92:4
property 191:3 441:11
proportion 475:11
proposal 110:8 111:21
proposed 419:20
prosecute 9:11 22:8 123:22 128:12 129:22 147:7 169:17 174:19 176:6 182:20 230:16 275:8,13 331:22 337:9,18 339:12 347:12,14 350:15 374:19 424:11 499:8,12 499:14 500:11
prosecuted 11:21 29:5 126:4 134:4 177:7,7 230:13 236:6 390:22 391:19 497:21
prosecutes 261:19
prosecuting 9:22 12:20 15:2 147:3 147:8 150:3 153:3 157:11 160:19 302:14
prosecution 1:6 65:18 91:22 95:14 133:9 139:9,12 148:6,19 149:21 150:2 157:2 173:14 182:10,21 182:22 200:22 213:18 315:4 337:22 338:16 345:1 351:22 357:17 375:22 380:20 388:6 391:4,4 392:6 424:9 425:2 430:17 434:14 444:21 445:3 499:5
prosecutions 174:4 182:13 337:7 357:8 389:22 391:15 392:8 417:14 420:21
prosecutor 71:4 142:10,18 165:15 169:7 175:20,22 176:1,17,19 177:2 177:13 178:21 179:21 180:9 223:22 227:8,10 284:21 307:22 311:18 343:15 344:17 345:3 346:12 389:7 420:4 463:18 468:21
prosecutor's 285:6 285:15 308:6 309:4 341:8 381:18 467:12
prosecutorial 125:3 128:7 130:8
prosecutors 12:17 69:7,9 87:12 88:5 92:19 124:10 130:5 131:12 138:14 141:5 142:2 146:19 147:16 148:9 150:6 156:17,18 157:9 158:3,9 161:9 163:4 165:1 167:5 173:4,7,8 174:5 176:12 177:16 179:2,5 180:7 196:17 213:14 227:7,19 273:14 278:14 282:3,20 297:8 392:14 397:6 410:20 424:15 440:17
protect 16:18 81:22 82:1 91:4 118:3 165:20 260:10 475:17 477:4 501:3
protected 90:21 135:6 512:2
protecting 486:10 486:13
protection 193:8
protective 118:14 118:14 119:10
protocol 144:15 239:22 344:16
proud 401:3 436:8 465:16
prove 85:13 216:17 352:13 377:1
proved 161:19 290:14
proven 28:8 67:11
provide 10:3 64:13 104:17 122:3,7 124:4 125:6,15 127:5 128:4,20 130:21 132:12 133:1 134:13 137:2 138:15 147:9,21 176:13 187:6,8 190:6 198:4,12 199:15 202:9,19 204:9 205:20 227:9 273:1 283:9 320:12 324:18 349:2 367:20 408:13 427:2 437:12 469:4
provided 6:18 7:12 126:22 136:17 199:5 206:6 248:5 265:5 321:4 332:4 405:20
provider 135:21 137:11 432:4,21
providers 127:3 136:10 137:12,14
provides 159:22 197:10 246:18 247:6 331:21 454:10
providing 122:20 126:11 127:7 130:8 132:20 135:8 138:2,18 160:14 184:10 193:7,12 279:15 295:17 451:15
provinces 488:8
proving 94:22
provision 11:6 130:15 147:11
provoke 456:14
PSA 290:1 491:6
psychiatric 477:14
psycho 95:10 435:22
psychological 77:1 115:18 468:12
psychologists 234:19
psychology 284:1 356:5
psychopathy 36:19
psychosexual 39:10
psychosocial 39:9
PT 497:8

PTSD 51:15
pubic 394:4,4,6,20
public 4:10 5:11 6:11,14,15,17,20 6:21 7:9,13 8:21 9:5 41:12 42:13 98:10 177:4 217:3 267:10 350:9 373:14 374:1 434:16 441:3 479:11 481:19 487:15 492:1 495:8,10 496:12 516:3,5,13 519:13
publicized 269:13
published 146:10 218:22 219:1 222:17
pull 164:12 335:5
pulled 412:13
pulling 442:15
punch 75:13
punishable 185:7
punishment 193:18 229:13
punitive 202:13
pure 339:14
purpose 11:8 31:6 138:18 170:15,18 491:12
purposes 9:21
pursue 338:4 357:16 431:4 500:11
pursuing 196:5
pursuit 135:4 418:7 418:13
push 164:13
pushback 93:16
pushed 76:20 164:12,17
put 33:5 46:18 70:5 78:10 116:14 121:9 141:16 154:1,18 155:2 172:20 227:11 238:6 240:18,21 245:5 247:16 265:14 274:14 281:5 300:14 340:9 342:16 372:21 397:14 398:8 414:8 415:22 420:18 433:19 470:21 482:20 483:6 485:14 501:18 514:15
puts 21:20 50:21 259:7
putting 101:20 157:6 288:5 400:12 453:19 480:7

Q

qualifications 149:11
qualified 129:2 132:14 149:18 162:16 172:8 175:21 177:19 195:8 208:10 404:21
qualifying 126:6 127:11
quality 94:18 121:21 133:1 184:9 186:18 187:9 409:9,20 471:10,15
quantitatively 440:9
quarterly 189:16 265:8
queen 18:22
queries 443:18 444:17
question 34:16 68:19 69:2 87:21 92:9,12,16 97:21 99:14 101:11 106:5 115:12,17 118:6,8 139:6 141:3 143:6 162:14 164:19 169:21 170:17 171:1 172:17 182:1,5 207:8 219:15 238:22 245:13 249:16 253:15,15 254:1 263:11 274:22 285:16 301:22 302:2 310:22 311:19 315:21 334:15 343:8 352:5 359:14,21 363:4 368:2,7,15 375:14 376:2,17 378:12 379:9 389:22 428:16 443:8,18 453:15 453:17 455:1 457:17 458:19 461:20 462:10 467:19 477:12 478:19 483:9 516:12 518:22
questioned 94:10
questioning 108:21 204:19 205:2 236:1
questionnaire 326:9
questions 27:10 54:13 59:8,12 60:9 62:5 65:4,7 84:5,7 94:9 96:2,8 96:9,19 97:1,5 99:16 100:2,4 101:14 102:1,17 102:18 103:6,8 107:10 113:14 121:10 131:3 160:21 161:5 183:4 198:16 205:9,21 214:19 216:16 222:19 225:13,18 229:10 230:21 241:22 258:21 280:2 281:1 291:11,12 291:16 295:9,21 313:2 321:21 326:13 353:14 370:2,7 387:11 413:16 420:8 442:7,8,13 454:22 457:2 461:8 469:20 480:11 487:11 506:8
queue 57:13
quick 188:9 313:5 410:21 444:3 463:20
quicker 405:13
quickly 24:18,18 49:12 53:18 57:6 201:14 213:3 221:7 225:1 226:3 238:17 243:5 248:4,6 277:18 400:19
quit 44:8 236:21
quite 145:15 173:3 225:16 239:13 299:20 336:8 438:20 462:19 463:14 487:6
quote 236:7 346:5

R

race 450:2 511:15
racer 19:4
races 19:5
racial 80:10,14
radar 514:17
railroad 63:2
raise 300:6 343:2
raised 82:6 242:1
raises 107:9
rampant 77:8
ran 78:11,12,22 315:5 325:17,20 326:2
range 148:9 437:3
rank 168:16 171:21 428:21 507:19
ranked 161:14
ranking 6:4 477:18
ranks 161:13 404:5 428:22 434:6
rape 25:10,11 28:15 31:1 34:4 35:14 36:22 79:2 79:2,2,14,16,22 80:22 96:3 260:13 260:15,20 288:11 339:15 340:12 347:8 362:14 381:6 383:5 390:2 469:21 475:11 482:1 510:4,5,16 510:16
raped 23:21 31:16 76:2,6,16 79:18 291:13 364:6,8 370:1 462:4
rapes 23:18 26:14 26:16,17 27:4 29:2,3 32:19 203:6
rapidly 124:13
rapist 19:11 45:22 47:6 335:19
rapists 26:5 32:16 35:10,13,18 36:4 77:8
rapport 281:16
rare 322:6 357:19 382:5
rarely 62:9
rate 11:22 145:16 237:15 242:17 265:22 266:1,3,6 266:8 292:17 387:21 458:4,4 467:5
rated 466:5
rates 29:17 82:4,6 145:7 155:12 387:18,20 423:12 457:21
ratio 249:3

rational 273:1
re-engage 492:7 493:11
re-established 213:7
re-interviews 262:14
re-leverage 255:21
re-programmed 186:10
re-purpose 253:21
re-purposing 256:2
re-serviced 249:5
re-victimize 220:11 220:13
re-victimizing 68:22 102:16 217:14
reach 147:7 175:20 211:1,1 325:6 364:22 365:14 366:12 380:22 383:3 443:4,5 445:19
reach-back 159:18 160:1,4,5 175:18 177:13 178:4 201:8,13
reach-backs 164:6
reached 190:20
reaching 364:21 365:2 383:13
react 56:22
reacted 119:4
reaction 507:17
reactions 85:12 458:14
reactive 186:15 190:17 254:4 255:18
read 206:14,15 215:2,7,12 223:4 295:7 402:16 514:22 517:4 518:12
readily 134:12
Readiness 3:5 123:3 517:22
reading 217:17
ready 7:14 45:21 78:15 86:10 322:10,21 333:17 339:2 354:2 495:12 497:9
real 21:7,7 91:13 103:18 188:9 237:11 239:17 253:17 283:15 288:18 391:20 444:7 460:2 469:19 486:22 487:2
realities 197:12
reality 73:15
realize 481:8
realized 44:13 70:9 71:14 72:2,6 208:12 317:15 319:11
realizing 234:2
really 16:4 17:4,15 19:2,18,20,22 22:3 23:6,7 24:17 26:19,20 30:2 34:10 38:1 39:22 40:9,9,21 43:13 50:4 51:4 52:20 53:10,17 54:5,15 55:19 57:5 59:5,5 61:7,9,11 63:16 64:17 65:5,13 66:10,13 68:21 73:13 74:6,7 75:6 77:1,16 81:2,6 84:2 86:12 89:13 91:5 94:18 100:17 100:19 103:10 104:22 105:20 110:4 115:19 120:1 137:18 140:9 144:3 149:16 150:18 152:21 154:2 158:20 160:12 172:20 218:16 250:2,8 273:19 278:7 279:10 280:8,20 281:5 282:7 287:10 288:12 289:19 293:16 298:17 300:13 306:2,14 306:20 308:19 311:9 317:20 329:2 331:7 341:12 352:2 356:1,20 357:19 359:15 366:21 367:5 369:16,20 372:14 373:19 377:14 378:13 384:13 385:7 386:18 388:9,9 389:9,15 391:21 393:16 394:1,5,22 395:2,4,8,15 396:6 397:15 400:9 401:8 402:5 402:5 403:5 404:9 406:16 407:3 408:7 409:14 410:22 411:8 412:4 413:6,15 415:21,21 416:20 417:11 421:16,21 422:7,20 423:1,9 423:22 424:10,14 424:19 427:14,14 437:22 438:8,8,22 441:6 442:15 443:2,13,16 445:5 445:12 446:7,11 446:16 447:11 448:2,6,7 449:6 449:14,17,21 451:14,16 452:4 452:12 453:3,17 454:5,14 455:6 456:14,15 458:21 459:1 460:4,8,13 463:9,20,22 464:15 465:2,7 467:5,5,8,10,14 472:7 474:22 481:4 483:8 492:10,18 494:11 497:3 500:8 504:17 505:16 506:4 510:2,2 514:5
realm 148:17 282:1 291:3
Ream 293:13
reason 36:1 38:4 97:19 251:3 264:19 268:11 290:4,6 312:2 323:16 325:21 330:17 345:2 347:11 360:8 391:11 409:21 410:16 411:10 421:4 444:14,15 445:18 479:21 480:1 482:10,12 489:4 493:3 497:20 510:13
reasonable 174:19
reasons 28:5,6 38:22 48:20 167:3 207:5 339:21 357:12,22 374:13 390:19 441:1 449:14 463:21 479:14,15 480:3
reassign 190:15
Rebecca 53:21
recalcitrant 337:16
recall 277:5,12 364:6
recant 105:13 334:3
recantations 105:11,15,17
receipt 189:3
receive 111:10 126:19 129:2 135:13 136:21 137:9 142:9 159:7 195:1 200:1 245:21
received 6:21 8:4 93:4 136:20 189:8 190:20 195:10 197:14 270:16 498:11
receiving 318:2
recessed 353:21
reckon 232:20
recoding 260:16
recognizable 123:19 135:9
recognize 73:6 86:1 134:21 209:7,8
recognizing 232:13
recommend 409:12 459:22
recommendation 459:10,14 463:6 475:1 499:9
recommendations 13:5 66:19 74:10 110:12 173:6 179:8 193:16 358:11 373:6 404:15 434:13 448:15 454:16 457:6 459:11 474:20
recommended 174:7 405:22 501:8
recommending 356:3
record 120:6 140:18,20 206:16 257:6 343:17 495:15 517:11 518:8
recorded 28:3
records 325:6
recovered 316:6
recovery 132:8 312:15 366:14 382:12

recreate 114:1
recruited 477:5
recruitment 452:10 473:4
recurring 196:5
red 418:17
reduce 50:19 118:4 437:20
reduced 445:1
reduction 50:13 189:11,12,17 255:18
reductions 90:10 90:10 91:1,2,14 253:6
reductive 119:12
refer 104:20
referred 185:10 503:9,17 517:6
refers 427:2
reflect 358:18 359:22
reflected 125:11 358:3
reflection 439:6
reflective 454:3
reflects 356:20 367:3
refract 439:18
Refraction 439:10
refracts 439:5
refresher 131:9
refrigeration 317:2
refusing 284:8
refute 286:15
regard 10:9 12:5 260:11 262:11,14 278:22 308:17 312:18 336:17 339:17,19 351:15 454:9
regarding 162:14 192:18 205:22 321:9 434:13
regardless 63:4,4 66:20 178:20 259:8 323:13 341:17 387:5 426:17
region 3:1 148:5 187:20 192:9
regional 147:6 194:1 252:4,4
regionally 124:10 146:17 161:22
register 28:18
registered 28:17,19 29:10
registration 2:14 257:18 270:5
regular 40:17,18 201:5 203:13
regularly 143:13 196:19 201:14
regulation 164:2 235:18
reinforce 181:16
reinforced 181:17
reject 388:6
relate 229:14 440:4
related 6:22 101:9 182:7,11 231:2 267:11,17 494:8
relates 139:6 260:7 260:8 262:6 263:16 310:10 312:21
relationship 212:22 213:5 302:5 331:7 438:12 453:4 463:15
relationships 324:18
relative 229:19
relatively 213:3 234:1,2 239:1 450:8
release 345:13 515:16 518:10 519:2,2
released 26:21 124:21 516:1
relevance 452:21
relevant 270:8 363:3 518:1
relieving 221:19
religion 511:16
reluctant 319:10 374:14
remain 367:10 372:15 378:7 482:9
remaining 366:15
remark 455:3
remarkably 220:21
remarks 258:12
remedy 251:20
remember 56:22 58:3,4,5,6,7,8,9 59:2 65:13 69:10 71:9,11 97:1,3 231:19 395:21 413:6 508:1 511:20
remembered 61:3
remembrance 57:15
remind 357:6
reminded 412:1
reminds 358:1
remiss 368:1 474:20
remote 187:22
remove 500:19
removed 503:10
removing 380:3
rental 317:2
reoffend 49:10
reorganization 146:13,16 147:12
repercussions 254:17
replace 399:2
report 11:12,18 25:18 26:20 34:8 53:9,10 80:22 82:4,14 85:11 118:19 127:11 133:18 145:11,12 188:13 197:8,17 222:13 223:12 232:16,17 268:19 270:21 290:8 294:17 305:15,17 313:9,16,19 316:4 319:6,10,15,21 320:21 321:1,2 322:10,13 328:8 328:16 329:16 338:22 341:16 359:12,14,20 360:6 362:10 378:8 386:2,4,11 386:19 387:2,5,6 422:8,19 424:3 426:22 427:5,7,11 427:12 430:8 431:17 432:1,6 446:1 458:17 461:14 462:3,8,8 469:21 479:1,14 479:14,15,17,18 480:16,17 482:8 486:21 489:2 493:17 497:20 498:2,11,12 499:18 500:4,7 501:20 502:7,7,15 502:19,20 503:4 503:14 505:20 512:5,18 513:17 513:19,22 515:11 515:12
reportable 207:3
reported 11:13,21 22:1 24:9,10 27:4 28:2 29:4 34:3,3,4 49:8 116:18,18 194:21 219:20 265:18 266:8 267:1,16 292:14 304:17 308:13 315:22 317:13 320:4 329:22 337:11 386:21 441:18 446:20 447:2,5,10 479:7 501:2
reporting 34:13 49:17 82:6 87:8 145:7 213:4 260:8 260:14 261:3 268:11 269:10 291:18 292:10 294:2 312:14 318:1,19 319:14 327:15 328:10 329:12 331:20 332:5 337:4,21 350:1 359:1,3 361:3 363:4 367:21 368:2,8 369:3 372:18,19 375:15 376:2 379:8 421:20 422:5,16 423:1,5 423:12 424:6 425:17 426:19 427:3 428:13,14 432:9,11 433:1 438:15 461:20 462:3 487:12,19 494:7 498:4 508:2 511:21 513:13,14
reports 4:9 10:20 10:20 11:16 13:4 27:12 35:2 66:19 67:2 82:13,14 160:13 192:19 194:9 195:9 198:7 266:21 267:19 268:4 270:17 272:9 278:11,12 279:2 280:8 290:22 304:18 311:7,10,14 354:10 376:7,9,20 376:21 377:15,15 377:17 378:5 423:9 427:19 432:5 449:15 455:5,6 458:5 462:10 471:12 513:6
representation

39:4 133:2
representative 127:18 307:2 440:8
representatives 123:8 127:14 133:6 183:11 190:5 257:11
representing 507:8
reprisal 188:14
reputation 66:21
request 6:16 218:6 227:11 228:6 323:10 378:11 499:5
requested 7:1,3,5 495:10
require 73:10 92:2 130:20 151:4 181:21 232:14 390:8 437:22 478:6
required 11:13,18 93:20 123:17 124:6 128:18 171:18 187:2 254:7,11 299:18 304:8 500:17
requirement 10:5 200:11 255:11 498:4
requirements 122:12,15 125:10 125:18 133:22 191:6 251:4 432:11 518:3
requires 6:11 124:15 170:2 190:11 215:20 251:5 253:16
requiring 245:20
requisite 176:9
research 2:11,21 8:13 15:5 21:18 24:19 25:4 26:3,7 26:13,22 27:13 29:7,12 32:12,21 32:22 39:21 40:19 52:16 67:6,8 74:2 85:19 94:1,3 102:6,12,15 109:19 111:18 112:5 113:16 114:5,7,11,14 118:9 239:13,14 355:15 356:9,11 356:21 359:11,22 365:5 369:6 377:5 377:6 402:17 412:7,15,16 413:15 417:2,3,4 417:10,18,18,19 417:21 418:21 420:7 435:9,15 436:19 437:9 440:3,5 441:14 444:17 446:5,10 447:4 448:1 452:2 452:14 463:9 474:12 475:6,21 476:1 479:13,16 489:20 490:4 492:5 509:17,21 511:5 512:16
researched 12:13 93:22
researcher 392:14
researchers 35:19 37:9 417:6 420:17 435:18 463:11
reserve 123:12 193:22 194:3
Residence 1:12
resident 194:2
residents 325:1
resistance 49:14 408:20
resonated 293:16
resort 508:8
resource 195:21 281:21 302:16 380:15,17 382:6
resourced 89:20
resources 111:1 132:14,16 139:1 139:15 141:11 143:21 145:22 164:11 174:20 181:16 197:21 199:2,13 232:15 250:6 253:16 255:21 264:19 271:17 279:15 288:14 289:2,5 309:2 318:6 321:5 323:20 330:8 334:22 348:20 349:21 350:5 351:11 382:17 390:17 397:19 420:16 475:1,2 485:6
respect 44:18,20 80:8 134:6 139:14 232:11 290:11 402:9
respected 20:13 43:22 131:22
respective 194:7 200:10
respects 20:16 101:13
respond 56:13 174:16 191:2 270:18 272:3 274:9,17,19 275:18 283:19,21 293:10,21 316:3 342:20 359:9 360:11,22 365:18 374:4 375:17 423:17 482:6
responded 64:7 270:9 272:8
responder 275:6 502:11
responders 64:7 113:12 274:4,14 290:19 295:18 395:17 437:14 440:15 452:11 453:7
responding 84:13 192:19 243:3 291:6 292:20 317:17 330:21 465:21
responds 365:3,17 409:3
response 1:3 4:9 5:5,9,12 10:19 55:3 56:5,6 97:17 98:15 100:10 101:2 123:4 127:12 132:5 136:5 137:5,9 187:7 194:14 196:21,22 198:4,6 218:4 232:17 259:1 273:1,21 281:20 282:10 301:5 302:16 319:3,5 320:4,7 322:5 326:15 327:5,8,19 330:7 354:9 364:12,16 364:17 365:5,12 366:18 367:15 369:1,2,10 372:13 397:21 427:16 436:21 438:1,3 440:1 442:4 463:16 468:20 491:18
responses 236:5 359:22 367:17 368:9,21 370:13 371:1 449:1
ResponseSystem... 7:11
responsibilities 185:2
responsibility 22:10,21 185:3 195:11 271:4 293:10,17 300:11 424:16 434:9 500:22 501:4
responsible 129:21 130:9 132:20 256:9 308:14 352:12 353:10 357:18 486:16
responsive 89:21 134:18 136:22 209:19
rest 60:4 91:7 173:21
restaurant 30:1
restoration 437:7 445:17
restraints 304:2
restricted 214:5 332:17,18 338:3 421:20 427:3,10 428:13 430:8 432:8 457:22 458:4,12 492:20 501:19 502:15,20
restrictions 502:22
result 29:5,6 188:1 204:7 255:15 258:18 259:12 261:21 281:19 282:12 285:21 286:3,11,20 287:9 403:11 507:15 513:10
resulted 197:15
resulting 128:14 337:3
results 101:3 102:22 321:17 494:14
resume 168:7 257:3
resumed 120:6 257:6 353:21
retain 167:21 316:13 405:1,2
Retaining 403:7
retainment 452:10
retaliation 511:21 513:1,10,18
retention 411:14
retinal 401:12

retired 1:16,17,17 1:18 162:18
retiring 168:18 384:10
retrieval 57:14
retrospect 48:1
return 120:3 238:16 467:4
revamped 274:1
reveal 36:5
revealed 229:10
revenues 444:1
reverse 96:10 348:13
review 9:10 184:13 239:12 294:18 515:22
reviewed 208:11
reviewing 111:16 111:17
reviews 128:2 133:7 393:10
revolutionary 453:20
rhetoric 455:8
Rice 283:5
rid 275:16 290:17
ridiculed 50:11
ridiculous 418:10
right 6:15 16:13 18:12 20:20 21:14 35:5 39:10 41:11 42:6 59:22 60:2 84:9 86:21 87:9 89:21 90:16 100:18,22 107:2 107:17 109:6 110:4 111:1 112:21 113:1 120:11 137:21 138:21 139:8 140:22 151:6,11 151:15 154:18 157:19 160:8,22 162:7 170:19 171:3 174:10,20 178:8 182:8 183:7 183:8,10 186:12 187:15 210:14 218:6 221:16 226:22 227:14 230:2 238:4 239:5 243:16 248:11 251:13 252:10,13 253:9,12 257:8,13 257:20 258:3,4,6 258:17 259:7,10 268:17 271:6,10 275:6 276:11 280:2,11 288:5,5 288:6,7 289:2 291:1 294:12,18 296:12 300:17 301:21 303:9 304:4 308:1 312:22 315:17 322:14,15 334:13 351:7,8 353:5,15 354:1,4,12 366:19 371:6 372:10 375:7 377:3 381:1 381:5 388:15 410:13 412:4 417:15 418:1,8,15 423:6,12 424:22 426:15 430:19 441:4 447:8 455:22 456:4 460:21 464:12,22 465:6 471:4 473:13 478:3 486:12,19 487:2 488:15 494:20 495:17,22 499:5,7 499:17 501:16 502:17 504:5 505:16 514:6 516:20 518:16,18 519:18
rights 129:3 130:22 131:22 135:5 212:21 215:3,8,12 215:22 216:7,20 217:17 223:4 265:13 424:17,18
rigidity 62:1
Riley 219:11
ripples 406:16
risk 118:9 154:3 155:2,3 167:10,16 167:18 168:15,18 168:19 171:11,20 400:11
river 32:2,3
road 265:15 443:7
rob 116:21
robbed 59:3
robberies 22:9 203:6
robbery 230:3 264:11,17
Robert 2:12 121:6
robs 512:10
robust 171:16
Rochester 59:4
rocket 367:3
rocks 73:18
Rogers 21:20
role 135:20 139:22 151:14 159:14,21 336:12,12,14 363:21 373:20 381:4,12
roles 101:18 126:19 135:3 382:2 383:12
rolled 238:18
room 1:12 46:10,11 46:18,22 56:16 61:12 71:22 75:20 75:21 81:9 247:4 364:7 368:7 379:2 396:1 413:9 474:3
roommate 502:18 502:18
rooms 413:9 441:12 491:11,12
Ross 7:3 506:22 507:1,1,3,4 515:14
roster 227:20
Rota 244:12
rotate 297:9
rotating 297:9
rough 108:6
roughly 231:21 232:1,2 248:9 264:9
rounded 169:10
route 152:16
ruin 71:21
rule 166:16 212:6 415:8
rules 44:11 247:15 515:6
run 62:3 203:20 207:16 212:8 253:22 286:18 302:11 428:8
running 77:8 121:14 242:22 316:14,15 350:12
runs 344:18
rush 277:18
Russ 3:7 156:19 204:8 207:8 208:19 209:15 210:5,13,16 211:8 234:6 235:13 237:22 238:1,8 277:9 287:19 297:16 357:2 364:1 398:12 403:3 411:19,22 412:5,13 419:21 420:5
Russell 14:6 25:7
Ryan 3:4 120:15

S

sabotaged 403:19 406:21
sad 53:10 396:6
safe 145:11 283:5 287:3 309:4 318:5 486:21 503:11 513:8 515:12
safety 424:14
said-she 51:3
Sally 42:22
Sam 287:17
same-sex 84:18
sample 373:12 471:11 474:14,16
samples 373:5 440:8
San 1:12 148:12 153:11 187:18 273:11 356:17 384:10 385:6 388:18 391:6 393:16 394:2 395:12 396:19 399:18 400:5 405:5 408:1 422:12 427:5 465:16,22 466:22
Sanchez 79:9
sanction 391:13
SANE 113:11 143:12,14,19 144:8 285:18 468:20
SANE's 273:14 282:3
sanitizing 280:4
SAPRO 123:4 137:5 237:22
SARC 88:11 89:9 498:11 504:21
SARCs 298:4,20
SARRT 281:20 302:22 306:1,4,14 306:14,21 505:2
SARRT's 143:10 221:4
SART 259:17 393:17
sat 497:6
satisfaction 293:3 465:12,13 466:18 469:11
Saulter 26:4
save 317:4
saw 89:10 213:12

271:8 292:11 293:1 413:3 422:3 491:7 496:13,14
saying 34:13 51:19 71:18 92:7 105:9 117:10 119:17,18 208:14 217:12 281:9 294:9 307:5 337:2 340:20 351:6 356:4 362:13 378:22 393:8 398:1 407:7 415:13,14 416:17 433:3,7 447:13 459:21 460:14 486:15 491:1
says 18:12,21 19:11 26:4 38:2 45:22 46:1,2 114:11 141:19 218:9 322:7 340:5 343:22 344:2 352:8 364:8,9,9 398:13 416:1 426:11 446:18,19 452:14 472:4 479:16 510:7,8
scale 26:3,19 358:14 440:7,9
Scalzo 420:3
scarce 174:20
scary 47:17
scenario 512:15
scenarios 343:21
scene 99:10 197:22 208:2,6 211:18 259:19 275:19 309:19,20 349:19 349:20
scheduled 195:17 280:16
schedules 14:18
school 2:11 3:8 8:11,14 14:9 16:1 18:3 43:17 57:9 75:8 157:13 163:2 163:7 175:11 182:15 207:19,20 247:11 248:17 311:8 325:2 395:14 422:13,13 422:15 426:5 434:3 435:9 476:15 507:7
schools 28:20 48:10 88:9 310:8 422:11 422:15 435:14 436:2
science 40:22 113:20,21,22 312:18 367:3 436:7
Sciences 3:7 14:7
scientific 377:5 415:16 466:4
scientist 435:1 459:18
scientists 387:18 435:19 454:2
scope 437:11 443:17 490:19
score 241:20,21
scored 386:20 387:5
scores 36:5
scream 41:22 62:2 62:2 72:3
screaming 425:12
screen 115:19 311:21 473:2 477:19
screening 115:20 478:15
screw 411:3,4
scrub 161:11
sea 91:22
seamless 127:7
search 325:14 468:9
searches 325:8
seasoned 196:15 452:11 453:6
seats 120:9 191:15
SECNAV 184:21
second 18:15 41:18 42:1,6 101:11 120:19 130:14 232:9 301:1 319:17 320:16 331:17 353:3 356:18 446:22 474:2 479:21,22 511:11
second-chaired 176:7
secondly 126:1 236:15 348:19 446:22
Secretaries 133:17
Secretary 2:19 5:19 5:22 120:18 121:1 123:2 161:19 199:20 212:7 517:21
section 4:4 123:18 263:21 264:18
sector 475:10
Secure 259:13,19
security 117:5 132:7 255:8,12,22 256:6 502:16
see 13:11 15:17,18 18:6 19:12 26:13 28:18 29:11 45:2 45:12,12,20 46:13 46:14,15 47:20 50:14 55:20,21 76:14 79:12,12,13 79:17 83:14 97:19 102:9 103:1 107:11 145:19,20 178:5 180:19 228:7 247:22 253:20 254:16 256:18 267:15 273:16 277:13 279:1 280:12 281:8 283:10,12 283:16 284:13,18 285:4 288:9,16 289:4 292:4,9,15 294:2 296:1 301:1 303:1 305:7 319:6 325:2,11 338:15 338:16,19 355:19 360:15 364:14,17 386:15 388:20 390:5 392:5 398:11 403:10 406:19 410:4,21 415:1 422:19 424:5,8 439:18,19 446:20 447:5 448:5 449:20 454:14 461:13 464:18 476:9 484:17,17 487:17 492:19 493:9,17 494:12 504:14 516:10,19 517:5
seeing 34:18 47:22 90:22 178:18 255:17 270:11 273:12 282:5 283:4 284:2 286:22 287:22 293:1 311:6 327:22 335:2 338:11,21 359:2 375:10 387:9 491:1 512:20
seek 198:2 498:1
seeking 35:16,19,22
seen 42:20 47:5 62:9 90:5 118:8 153:19 218:12,15 284:19 327:14 333:19 334:20 393:10 394:14 402:7 403:22,22 404:8 410:12 422:7 424:3 426:14 463:22 473:20
sees 46:16 117:2 503:2
segment 31:8
seldom 53:9
select 20:12 21:4
selected 5:22 6:5 130:5 149:7 155:4 155:7 161:10 165:7 488:14
selecting 132:20 134:9
selection 129:10,21 149:8 172:6,10 175:15 178:13
self 25:16 34:3 35:1 46:3
sell 378:21
Senate 6:3
send 86:20 180:11 188:20 196:4 325:20,22 383:10 388:4 392:19 414:9
sending 24:14 208:22 275:4 332:5
senior 79:10 85:6 88:13 124:10 148:7,14 149:17 150:10 155:22 156:18,18 157:3 158:2,6,8,10 159:5,13,16 166:3 166:4 167:5 173:7 193:4 201:2 211:16 212:2,7
sensations 58:1,18
sense 56:7,11,14,15 57:3 72:17,22 79:21 87:11 100:6 100:20 224:10 228:11 271:1,4 284:12 292:18 293:3,4 302:12 363:11 365:9 371:5 375:10 376:4,11 416:9 475:20 476:20 480:21
sensitive 131:4 134:8 172:11

196:17 220:12 402:13 410:17 425:21
sensitivities 131:18
sensitize 204:14
sent 150:10 247:20 285:5 326:12 387:2 432:6
sentence 316:22
sentences 390:15
separate 124:7 138:4,5,11,17 150:14 157:10 263:19 431:6
separated 264:1
separately 369:5
separating 250:21
sequence 59:1,17
Sergeant 2:13 257:16,19,21 269:21,22 278:19 279:1 284:10 285:18 290:4 291:19 292:6 294:3,6,10,13,19 294:22 296:3,7,10 297:15 298:13 300:21 302:15 303:5,9 305:13,14 306:12 307:11,14 307:18,20 308:1,4 309:1,12,16 313:18,22 314:9 315:2,18 335:6 341:7 348:14 349:10,17 353:7 355:10 356:15 367:14 384:10 386:5 487:15 488:5
serial 47:6 67:3,5,9 264:16 323:21 324:2 326:8 328:4 330:11 332:2 335:19 353:5
series 59:8 65:3 193:4 248:8 303:1 317:13 393:15,20
serious 123:22 142:7,8 264:14 307:6 351:13 402:18
seriously 66:20 116:11,19 117:13 379:13 401:9 484:13 513:9
seriousness 290:10
serve 126:3 134:10 201:8 264:8
served 192:11 316:21 436:14 468:22 496:8
serves 448:13 492:18
service 1:1 2:17 3:2 20:15,16 88:17 122:17 126:22 129:1 130:19 133:22 136:13 139:3 140:11 141:11 144:20 148:5 159:3 167:11 172:13 175:7 183:12,13 183:21 185:1 189:22 191:16 193:4 198:14 215:21 221:6,6 241:8 295:17 298:16 451:6 487:15 492:2 496:13 500:20 503:22
services 6:3 11:17 85:1,5 88:3,9,13 88:15 89:3 92:18 93:1 106:14 107:13 114:22 125:2,16 127:1 129:16,20 132:3 132:12 133:5 136:14 138:9 140:8 141:8,16,22 142:11 144:18 145:18 165:19 167:13 172:2 175:1 177:8 190:3 192:9,18,21 210:20 215:15 227:7 245:16 249:1 305:18 335:9 349:3 365:16 437:3,11 438:15 443:22 445:3 448:14 451:7 453:14,17 462:14 472:15 517:18
serving 192:13 194:1
session 11:2 197:4 197:5 199:5
set 80:4 82:11 158:11,11 159:17 173:5 204:15 326:21 379:3 405:1 438:18
sets 85:8 185:1 203:11
setting 158:7 196:14 305:10 310:1 421:12
settled 113:19
seven 162:16 171:14 194:1 396:21
severely 347:9,10
sex 2:13 15:16 17:9 17:18 19:14 20:9 20:11,19,20,21 24:22 25:3,4,13 25:13,15 28:17,18 28:19 29:10,12 31:8 36:4,18 37:3 37:5,11 38:18 39:17 41:3,4 46:1 48:2,18,22 67:4,5 67:8 80:20,21 81:17 83:1,5 115:14 117:6 181:14 199:17,18 203:18,21 255:7 257:17 261:12 270:1,4,7,10,19 270:20,22 271:13 272:5 276:5 278:5 278:6 279:2,3,4 281:11 282:14 285:8,12 288:15 291:7 296:22 301:3 349:18 370:4 384:18 385:1 390:7,18 396:20 402:10 403:12 419:13,17 465:18,20 478:8
sexism 450:16,18
sexual 1:3,7 2:7 4:3 4:9 5:13 8:16 9:12 10:1,9,19 11:6,7 11:12 12:8,20 13:12 15:2 19:18 20:3 22:15 24:6 26:10 27:16,22 28:15 30:16,17,18 30:19 31:6,12 32:14,16,19 33:19 34:5 35:7,11 36:3 36:12 37:1,9 39:11 43:8,9,10 43:11 44:3 46:6 50:20 51:2,14,17 51:20 52:1 53:14 54:19 55:8 56:12 58:22 62:14,19 63:16 66:20 67:2 68:16 69:21 73:9 80:17 81:11,13 82:13 84:10,11,13 84:14,18 85:9,15 85:17 86:14 90:17 91:2 95:6 98:19 106:10 107:15 116:2,3,4,10,10 116:11,16,17 117:6 118:19 119:3 122:1 123:3 124:1,12 126:7,9 126:11 129:4 131:13 132:5 135:19 136:4,8,8 137:1,5,10 138:19 142:7 144:9 145:8 150:4,8 157:12 176:2,6,7,13 184:18 186:5,6,8 186:19,20 187:1,3 187:4 188:7 189:9 189:9 190:6,12 192:19 194:10,13 194:21 195:6,10 196:20,21 197:7 197:13,17 198:7 199:10,22 200:5 203:7,15,21 205:17 206:22 208:1,6,20 210:4 211:2 212:5 213:4 214:11,14 216:14 218:3 221:10 224:21 232:12 233:4 234:7 239:3 243:3 244:19 253:3,22 255:1,3 255:5,6,15 256:12 256:14 259:3,6,15 259:17 261:4,20 264:5,5,10,14,16 264:16,18 265:2,5 265:19,21 267:1 267:16 268:1 269:2 270:16 271:3 272:3 274:12,12,19 279:12,16 281:20 282:1,10 284:1 285:11,20,22 287:12 288:19 291:4,6 292:20 293:4,11,18 296:21 300:20 302:16 304:17,17 305:16 306:6 307:6 308:13 309:3 311:14

313:9,19 316:1,4 317:11,13,17,22 318:13,17,21 319:9,12 320:4 325:10 326:8 327:5,6 328:17 329:14,20,22 330:21 331:20,22 332:1,6 338:16 341:13 344:3 349:1,7 350:10 351:2 354:10 357:11,14 358:15 359:6,20 360:5 362:6,18 363:6 364:12 365:7 368:6 371:11 374:16 375:13 376:1,7,21 384:12 386:10 387:1 390:2,13,20 392:10 393:15 394:14 397:17 400:21 401:16 402:20 409:13 413:21 423:19 424:13 425:8 426:21 427:17 429:8,17,21 430:5 430:17 434:11 435:2,7,11 436:21 437:3,19 439:13 440:13 441:2,11 442:18 443:9,12 443:21 444:5 445:15 447:14 449:15,16 450:2 450:12,19,22 451:4,12 455:9,12 455:17,19 456:16 461:14 462:10,12 475:12 476:4 479:6 482:21 484:6 488:1,14 496:16 498:2 503:22 504:8 507:8,17 508:10 508:16 509:1,9,10 510:1,2,17 511:4 511:9,22 512:16 512:18,21 513:6,8 513:14 514:2,4,14 514:15
sexuality 80:19
sexually 31:13 33:3 53:8 216:11 219:9 219:17 369:22 370:9,16 401:18 431:19 474:4,7 483:11,14,17 484:3,20 486:15 508:5 510:8 514:18,19
shades 360:10
shame 331:5
shape 97:20
share 80:7 83:5 247:18 304:11 306:22 387:8 397:11 445:11 468:6 478:14 496:10
shared 135:8 364:4 434:18 493:22 496:21 516:6
sharing 104:7 364:1 411:13 497:1 516:6
SHARP 88:11,17
she'll 218:10
sheep 16:16,18,20 16:21 17:2,4,5 342:18 484:5
sheepdog 16:17,18 16:21 17:7
sheepdogs 17:1
sheer 233:20 364:16
sheet 89:6
shepard 130:2
shepherd 16:20
sheriff's 447:9 465:19
sheriffs 414:9,14,18
shift 112:16 410:8 455:14
shifting 456:18
shifts 454:17
ships 398:22
shirt 45:16,18,20 46:9,11,12,14,15 46:16
shocked 419:3
shook 74:21
shoot 98:12,16
shooting 56:15,17 56:17 356:1
shootings 98:4,22 414:12 415:11 418:6
shopping 50:18
shops 148:6
shore 484:20 485:5
short 82:7 209:4 495:11
shorten 457:14
shortening 457:7
shorter 458:20 459:6
shortly 123:15 124:22
shorts 45:5
shot 98:16
should've 62:11
shoulder 498:16
show 23:19 287:14 292:3 387:13 411:1 412:9 464:4
showed 25:8 388:16 422:21
shower 416:14
showers 39:14,14
showing 23:16 46:21
shown 32:15
shows 26:13 211:3 326:5 439:20 445:14
shut 111:7 114:2 364:10
sick 429:1 497:7,10
side 91:19 149:21 149:22 150:2,7 214:6 216:5 284:16 366:3
sides 95:12 176:20
sights 63:10
sign 78:10
signal 186:12 516:8
signed 306:18
significant 31:17 32:13 37:4 51:16 52:6 86:4,15 88:14 90:8,10 93:15 188:3 196:2 199:12 273:19 274:8 294:15 309:19 323:19 327:14
significantly 35:15 36:18 37:2 74:9 82:4 84:21 91:7 406:4
similar 27:19 35:12 140:7 177:22 180:5 181:3,10 204:21 299:22 335:7,22 360:17 446:17
similarities 508:14
similarly 147:20 185:8
simple 57:19 66:13 460:10 491:13
simply 133:21 513:21
simulator 88:10
sincerely 49:3
single 42:3 63:1 79:11 82:13,22 83:1 86:7 350:19 357:11 364:17 368:17 483:16
singularly 174:16 174:18
sir 92:17 99:13 106:4 346:8,8
sisters 488:21
sit 91:8 168:15 283:7 302:21 306:1,21 322:2 459:8 488:13
site 211:6
sits 302:15 306:3
sitting 14:12 168:10 398:9 517:12
situation 73:16 99:4 221:12 333:12 341:19 345:20 370:2 425:3 499:11 505:5
situations 198:9 343:11 370:4 485:16 514:16
six 31:3 171:14 195:15 204:2 254:8 409:11 425:17 451:22 457:19 490:1
sixteen 489:5
sixth 393:20
size 40:20 55:5 168:9 169:20 181:15 372:7 448:15
SJA 129:16 132:18 227:20
skill 105:16 154:14 168:4,6 170:7,8 170:14 171:4 211:11 239:18,19 402:6 405:1 411:2
skilled 123:20 135:9
skillful 122:8
skills 41:6 132:2,22 169:10 171:11 194:20
skin 39:15
skull 97:8
slate 339:7
sleep 97:8
sleeves 46:20

slice 358:17
slicing 372:2
slide 15:8 58:21 100:21 357:2 361:12 363:3 375:16 398:8 404:12 422:21 457:6
slides 206:7 355:11 406:1
slight 261:10
slightly 348:15
slips 90:7
slur 80:14
small 33:19 68:1 137:20 172:20,21 172:22 230:21 248:15 347:4 410:5 474:16 516:16
smaller 187:22 372:7,7 428:6 440:8
smart 396:4 411:5 413:9
smart-phone 188:20
smartphone 188:18
smell 69:13
smells 58:11 63:11
smile 168:13
smiling 180:19
snake 56:1 58:9 60:20
snakes 55:17
snippets 279:22
snorted 230:1
sober 20:14
social 2:11 8:11,14 22:10,21 39:8 104:3,4,19 364:20 365:16 377:5 387:17 434:4,22 435:3,9,14,18,19 435:22 436:1,3,7 436:12 437:20 493:14
socialization 85:10
socialized 53:1,3
societal 443:20
society 4:3 13:13 17:19 21:5 22:1 22:17 28:14,16 30:12 47:2 68:3 74:12 77:10 79:8 281:5 318:7 361:21 402:19 437:21 450:2 454:20 456:6,13
society's 449:21
sodomy 260:21
soft 113:22
soldier 478:3 499:14 502:6
soldiers 314:2,12 505:4
sole 391:8
solely 187:1 309:9
solid 94:3 102:15 114:5 237:20 490:3
Solomon 8:17
solution 102:21 256:19 493:16
solutions 442:4
solve 262:13 441:10 444:14 454:13
solved 266:11,15
solvers 332:12
somebody 16:5 23:11 40:15 47:7 50:9,12 80:16 81:9,10,10 98:12 98:16 117:2,3 119:17 144:2 155:2 167:2 207:7 210:22 215:7 217:9 220:13 299:6 301:12,19 333:7,8 334:10 339:20 385:22 390:11 399:7 413:1 424:6 426:9 430:21 458:10 475:18 478:1 479:17 484:11 485:22 486:2 493:12 510:7
someone's 366:7
somewhat 100:14 381:12
son's 71:22
sons 31:4,15
soon 90:6 125:6 212:12 216:18 221:14 225:7 226:17 310:15 459:13
sophisticated 39:2 115:22
sorry 164:22 214:16,19 254:10 254:19 263:11 266:4 267:3 294:1 300:22 307:14 342:7 350:20 361:7 404:11 415:18 508:12 519:6
sort 165:21 252:20 291:15 343:3 363:7 364:11 365:8 366:8 371:1 373:5 376:12 377:21 384:15 422:8 448:3 456:1 456:14 458:17 459:14 462:6 469:8 476:14,17 483:6 512:1
sorts 174:3 222:13 392:18 393:10 478:5
sound 56:9 97:7 174:1 177:11 354:8
sounds 58:1,13 63:10,22 217:17 375:4 405:17,18 481:6
sources 349:12
Spain 244:12
Spanish 401:5,6
spark 448:21
speak 106:12 172:13 175:4 192:17 260:4 269:7 287:20 496:6 507:21
SPEAKERS 2:3
speaking 90:3,4 176:15 210:6 251:21 274:21 315:3 401:5,6 429:16 450:8
speaks 94:19
special 3:1,7 4:4 9:20 10:2,6 18:5 70:2 73:1 120:4 120:14 121:19 122:10 127:16 128:12 130:17 135:2 141:5 142:15,16 148:8 158:8,15 159:19 161:6,8 162:10 164:3,3,22 165:6 165:20 172:15,19 174:13 178:6 180:6,11 183:14 184:11,19 185:12 185:17 186:1,4,13 186:16 190:18 192:7,13 193:11 193:15,22 194:3 194:15,19,22 195:7,12,13,19 196:9,10 197:11 198:11 199:14,21 200:2,6 201:2,6 208:21 217:5,19 217:20 218:6,9 219:6,10,14 220:20 221:15 224:17 225:4 228:1 238:10 252:6 253:3 263:21 302:11 347:22 458:1 478:1,16
specialist 149:10,10 167:11,13
specialists 195:9
specialities 171:17
specialize 32:1 232:21
specialized 10:7 126:19 174:8,9 232:14 403:7 404:20 405:1
specializes 12:7
specializing 44:3,4
specially 16:19 71:4 128:19 138:13 142:2,10 158:22 161:17 173:8 251:7
specific 85:8 96:8 105:16 125:10 134:7 138:18 157:11 162:1,14 171:5 185:19 195:3 207:22 228:20 231:3 232:10 235:14 265:5 368:21 397:18 504:9
specifically 9:18 11:11 90:17 106:5 108:2 113:17 128:6 162:21 169:20 190:2 208:19 234:12 270:16 274:3 299:10 301:18 309:8 318:15 322:4 326:22 429:16 430:8,16 461:12 474:21 509:20
specifics 95:17
specify 155:16
specifying 150:19
spectrum 161:12 439:10,21 504:18

speed 237:18 244:14,18 405:12 418:13
spelling 517:9
spend 149:13 179:4 271:17 318:11 323:19 357:3 377:4 444:8
spending 26:6 498:7
spent 179:20 206:9 270:2 384:9
spikes 292:12
Spohn 12:6
Spohn's 392:10
spoke 79:9 178:1 278:11 323:3 335:8 499:21 504:12
spoken 278:2 515:8
sponsored 187:3
sports 17:14,15
spot 487:14
spots 154:18
spouse 462:5
Sprance 2:2 5:3,4 5:10
spread 185:12 207:11 210:21
spreading 415:1
SSA 235:13
staff 2:1,2 5:8,14,16 89:9 126:13 130:14 151:4 152:4,12,17 153:5 164:7,10,14 169:11,12 178:12 194:15 197:1 295:1 329:6 404:4 404:7 422:6 434:2 515:21 516:18 519:7
stage 127:7 440:12
stages 125:5 130:13 139:22
stagnate 163:14
stake 282:5
stakeholders 440:12
stand 14:11 71:6,7 71:7 94:11 110:11 504:2 508:5
Stand's 173:10 210:13,16
standard 22:16,17 80:4,5 144:14 246:2 369:17 421:7 467:18,21
standardization 125:20 175:2
standards 79:7 126:12 129:11,18 132:17 247:22 248:1 263:20 421:12
standing 6:6 482:1
standpoint 203:16 233:20
star 89:12 155:22
Stars 155:22
start 15:16 17:8 21:9 22:5,20 32:7 32:8,9 40:8 59:2 59:13,18 123:1 183:16 204:13 216:19 220:5 258:7 259:4,10 289:21 299:14 333:1 339:6,7 352:15,17 370:15 373:9 402:21 423:10 433:19 439:21 443:16 445:17,18 461:10 489:7,16 490:6 491:5,16 509:13 512:19,20
started 25:2 59:7 62:21 65:3 70:20 72:6,10 75:15,15 83:2 88:1,4 97:6 115:13 120:10 157:5 158:4 180:2 218:13 229:22 230:1,2 235:21 243:21 291:20 292:6 312:16 316:10 373:14 384:19 402:21 465:18 484:5 488:7 497:10 503:15 504:20
starting 15:5 33:14 53:12 85:3 88:19 162:11 398:14 399:8 402:8
starts 291:8
stat 387:14 425:17
state 53:22 178:6 185:8 194:17 203:2 219:12 340:12 341:2 421:10 426:19 428:9 444:4,6 445:21 504:21,21 511:17
state-side 197:19
stated 80:7
statement 98:6 206:7,14 223:13 321:6,6 337:16 499:6
statements 50:1 57:4
states 1:1 26:15 27:3 28:10 29:3 52:14 93:20 207:13,20 247:10 247:14 385:2 421:5 427:1 428:14 488:7,8
station 77:20,21 78:11 142:19
stationary 518:22 519:1
stationed 144:3 201:3
stations 264:7,8
statistics 27:19 107:11 117:17 199:9 292:3,9 294:5 315:16 358:18 369:11 490:10 509:16 510:2
stats 294:7 338:13
status 450:21 451:2 455:2,18,22 456:3 456:7,11
statute 185:9 323:16
statutes 11:8
statutory 11:5 155:15
stay 155:3 180:21 341:11,22 366:5 379:15 403:12,13 482:14 492:22 493:4
stays 214:6
STC 158:12
STC-SVU 159:7
steak 14:1
steering 454:7,12
step 130:4 176:4 342:2 374:22 375:7 508:4
steps 167:9,17
stick 153:22 490:10
stigma 453:22 472:4,5 481:3,4 512:20
stigmatized 476:5
stood 178:3
stop 59:18 76:18 102:14 142:20 253:19 500:1
stopped 285:7 500:6
stories 209:16
story 230:4 347:17 364:2,5 365:13 481:1 496:10,15 496:16 497:2 504:22
straight 19:3
straight-up 177:2,3
straining 250:2
Strand 3:7 14:6,6 14:10,15 34:16 35:1,5 44:22 84:7 84:15 86:21 87:21 90:2 91:16,18 92:16 96:4 99:1 99:13 102:1 106:12 107:15,20 108:2,7,16,18 109:1,6,9,13,17 110:21 111:4,8 112:11,19 113:1 113:10 115:2,17 117:22 118:6 120:1 150:12 156:7,22 208:19 210:5 217:11 323:3 364:1 405:7 420:5
Strand's 156:19 204:8 211:8 237:22 238:1 342:19 517:13
strange 270:19
stranger 43:8,10 95:18 96:3 270:16 270:22 271:3 272:5 274:2 283:12 288:22 310:5 393:15 424:13
strangers 413:1
strategies 262:4 324:22 358:7 436:22
strategize 451:8,10
strategy 176:3 262:9 367:20
streams 250:22
street 1:13 274:18
strength 199:7
strengthen 133:4 475:17
strengths 377:9
stress 54:21
stressful 53:16
stretched 252:19

strict 316:18
strides 407:5
strike 152:16
strikes 101:17
Stringer 36:17
strive 448:22
strong 334:1 336:7 339:17 351:17
stronger 51:15 332:7
strongly 58:10,11
structure 141:7 176:12 181:3 199:8 231:21 399:6 429:7 446:15
structures 435:20 436:1 451:15
struggle 408:5
struggled 232:16
struggling 173:11 239:1
stuck 110:22 224:1
student 20:13 311:10 423:14
students 51:22 52:1 52:4 200:5 203:22 305:8,15,21 310:13
studied 368:20
studies 32:15 33:21 100:5 204:5 360:3 360:4,17 366:20 369:8 371:20 377:6,10,21 440:7 440:9 441:20
study 27:7 31:10 33:9,15 34:1,2 360:16 371:10,11 371:17 385:18 461:13 494:5
studying 179:7 369:9 372:5 473:5 494:4
stuff 21:21 39:9 46:8 51:4 54:3 65:10 93:4 208:15 274:2
stupid 78:14
style 196:14 205:2 205:11
sub-parts 368:18
subconscious 514:10
subdural 401:11
subject 114:19 115:16 167:1 185:21 325:21 393:3 405:13 434:1
subjects 475:22
submit 6:15 188:19 516:17
submitted 7:1 231:6 321:18 515:22 518:9
subsequently 127:22
substance 122:21 125:9 518:5,13
substantial 117:20 347:12 475:10
substantiated 500:14 503:22
substantive 518:14
success 44:18 262:3 276:13 372:16,17 387:19,22 504:14
successful 88:7 289:7,14 291:5
succinctly 161:5
sudden 292:13
suddenly 92:10
sue 400:11 508:9
sued 414:16,21
suffer 406:12
sufficiency 256:9
sufficient 90:3,11 245:2
sufficiently 113:5
suggest 239:15 269:10 351:18
suggest-ability 205:6
suggested 458:10 518:20
suggesting 415:6,7 477:2 485:4
suggestion 220:10 457:18
suicide 52:3 67:20 85:14,18 504:7
summarize 515:21
summary 258:13
summer 186:5 304:7
Sunday 43:16
sunshine 6:10
Superdomes 25:18
superior 96:15 97:11 98:1
superiors 513:7
supervised 384:11
supervises 517:14 517:15
supervising 130:6 384:18
supervision 256:8
supervisor 270:15 271:12 384:22 427:15 502:12
supervisors 243:7 288:6
support 10:3 121:22 124:5 125:4 126:18 127:1,7 128:7,10 128:15,21 130:8 130:10,14 132:13 133:5,10 134:13 134:13 147:9,12 186:17 190:18,19 193:7 260:2 276:7 276:22 329:3,4,5 335:9 338:9 345:7 348:11 351:21 366:5,11 367:21 379:20 382:11 408:14 416:13 419:20 451:15
supported 128:13 272:21 327:21 388:5 412:14 501:17 504:11
supporting 130:3 131:21 309:2 327:21
supportive 305:21 330:4 380:14,17
supports 193:6 440:3
suppose 481:14 487:21
supposed 141:9 218:5 219:4,7 253:10 271:14 497:18
suppression 253:2
supreme 401:8
sure 24:14 46:19,20 65:7 81:6 82:12 82:12 89:3 104:20 113:16 118:16 119:19 134:15 140:5 142:5 143:22 158:17,21 159:4,12 160:5,17 172:6 173:21 175:5 206:7 211:12 213:17 214:3 215:14 233:10 235:19 260:10 262:1 264:21 309:18 310:18,21 312:20 313:4 327:7 343:7 352:3 354:6 370:18,21 379:1 386:13 399:10 415:6 428:17 472:20 484:22 495:12 504:13 516:17
surge 187:7,21 210:22
surging 198:6
Surian 3:9 206:2,3 206:4 214:20 215:11,14,19 216:4,9 217:15,22 218:17 227:13,17 228:21 229:4,15 230:5,14 231:13 231:19 232:6 234:6 236:17 237:1,6,14,19,21 243:18 244:2 247:9 249:10 250:14,17 252:22 253:10
surprised 308:19
surprising 474:15 474:16
surprisingly 467:4
surrounded 412:17 416:15
surrounding 287:12
survey 25:8 27:20 31:18 34:19 362:2 369:16 370:10 371:14,16 474:12 495:1
surveys 25:11 369:18,19 440:7 441:15 466:18
survival 60:7
survive 426:3
survivor 435:2
survivorhood 293:15
survivors 359:11 361:5,5 363:18 457:12
Susan 8:9
susceptible 475:15
suspect 22:5 57:3 67:1 215:22 263:6 263:7,8,12 266:12 266:18 316:20 321:9 324:5 325:6 326:11 336:1
suspect's 324:11
suspected 215:8
suspects 83:18,21

262:11 321:16 324:16,22
suspended 344:3,6
suspicious 291:2
sustainability 400:14
sustained 465:3
SVC 121:20 122:5 122:5,12,17,19,22 123:6,17,18 124:6 124:17,19 125:12 125:14,21 126:1,6 126:14,20,21 127:10,14,18,22 128:18,22 129:13 129:21,22 130:5 130:14,20 131:12 131:16 132:3,16 132:21 133:3,8,15 134:3,8,10,16 135:21,22 137:8 139:20 175:3
SVU 167:5 210:10 211:10,16 212:2,8 213:13 234:8 236:19 399:3
SVU's 158:13 159:17
SVUIC 195:16
swamp 32:3,5
swath 99:22
switching 142:21
symptom 409:14
synergy 162:19
system 12:4 13:3 22:7,18 24:15 50:9,10 63:3 106:10 129:8 135:12 137:7,13 172:1,15,21 176:10 178:20 179:16 181:18 202:16 221:22 227:5 276:7,18 277:1 279:18 293:7 295:6 304:16 319:7 338:2 341:22 360:20 366:2,4,5 366:16 367:7,22 368:9 369:15 372:16 374:11,14 374:22 379:10,15 379:16 380:12 381:11,15,22 383:8 425:15 436:16 438:18 440:17 446:14 448:17,18 450:11 482:9 492:7 496:17 499:22 501:21 503:1 513:5
system-wide 174:13
systemic 438:1
systems 1:3,6 5:5,9 5:12 9:10,14,15 82:15 282:3 366:11 385:20 407:18 435:20 436:2,21 438:3 442:4,17 443:9 463:17 468:20 492:16

T

t-shirts 45:5
table 4:1 45:4 78:11 109:16 110:7,18 110:19 168:11 209:9 345:7 406:4
tackling 367:11
take 14:18,21 32:4 45:13 49:7 60:3 66:19 73:16 83:6 83:7 100:13 112:14 114:15 116:9,19 117:12 120:3,9 140:17,19 144:2 167:17 179:2,4 222:3 232:19 243:8 244:4 271:11 279:22 290:12,19 294:16 299:18,20 303:22 305:16 315:1,5 316:3 323:15 328:12 338:19 340:1,7,15 349:11 353:18 367:14 372:4 375:7 379:13 386:1 421:15 446:9 453:10 459:3 467:4 479:18,19 495:11 497:14 518:17
taken 65:15 82:14 98:6 167:9 211:8 230:7 299:21 321:6 412:6 414:21 416:14 421:8 450:10 453:3 464:3,7 484:12 511:20
taker 99:5
takers 401:13
takes 23:11 45:21 54:22 56:21 242:20 281:15,16 281:16 288:2,2,3 288:3,4 290:20 307:6 330:7,8,16 434:16 464:5 499:14
talented 161:12 170:1,22
talk 11:10 14:22 15:4 16:7 42:22 43:8 49:1 50:6 51:9 119:18 167:22 223:3 233:7,8,9 264:3 271:5 287:14 317:11 318:15 322:2 324:3 345:5 358:10,14 363:16 366:22 368:1 373:8 374:6 375:1 375:13 388:22 392:11 395:14 399:17 401:14 405:7 411:18 413:4 415:20 427:20,22 428:1,1 430:11,22 436:17 443:2,3 446:21 448:10 464:13 476:5 489:10,17 489:18 505:1
talked 86:2,4 115:4 115:15 143:10 173:19,20 174:5 214:22 235:12 331:2 373:2 385:22 387:10 394:2 398:9,19 403:3 405:9 408:11 411:17,19 411:21 416:4 429:15 441:3 451:17 455:1 458:19 471:8 472:7 489:8 499:21 504:22 514:1 517:14,22
talking 15:16 16:4 17:9 43:15 71:5 74:6,7 85:6 100:1 107:13,15 108:22 119:2 122:21 139:8 156:7 218:14 242:17 251:10 278:21 296:18 299:22 300:20 318:11 334:18 351:2 357:7 364:20 368:5 377:1 384:5 385:5 392:9 394:7 397:5 402:14 407:17 412:22 430:8,16 432:20 452:17 457:20 459:12 469:10,14 470:10 472:15 475:18 476:2 488:5 509:19 517:12
talks 113:18 168:14 318:13 412:19
tall 60:15
tap 216:13
taped 275:21
tapped 111:9
taps 429:5
target 459:21 484:15
targeted 457:3
task 9:9 14:18
tasked 123:3
tasks 9:7
taught 57:10 73:20 73:22 180:22 191:14
TCAP 156:15 164:1 181:4
teach 157:13 202:16 482:16
teacher 43:17
teaches 209:15 234:6
teaching 73:21 88:10,10 214:12 399:20
team 122:15 125:15 136:12 166:5 180:21 181:9 186:22 187:6 188:1 209:21 213:13,21 244:10 247:19 259:18 281:21 282:9 302:16,22 327:5 380:19 395:22 412:6 417:19 440:20
teams 128:11 133:9 146:17 186:4,21 187:13,14,16 198:6 212:8 244:21,22 253:2,4 451:14 489:6
tears 86:9

tease 24:20 67:4
technical 132:2 356:12 420:12 432:3,20
technique 65:2 71:5 89:21 93:21 94:8 96:5 99:8 102:11 107:2,5,14 108:9 113:8 205:15 209:14 236:14 239:18,19
techniques 64:11 65:6 69:20 73:12 73:13,21 83:20 94:5,9 100:9 101:4 102:12 105:2 106:6 111:14,20,20 114:7,12 131:17 204:6,22 348:1
telephone 369:18
television 393:20
tell 13:20 40:14 69:11,11 70:14,18 71:13,16 72:1,5,7 75:5 76:9 77:15 78:14,21 87:6 92:7 104:6 118:2 145:19 212:15 215:16 217:12,13 261:6 271:22 288:11 317:6 319:21 320:1,21 347:7 352:21 363:19 364:22 396:9 407:17 408:2 418:14 422:5,12 425:9 427:18 431:16,18 444:5,8,13 451:9 452:16 458:8 464:18 477:22 479:12 480:5 501:12 502:5,17 507:14 515:2
telling 83:22 87:5 156:9 234:19 317:18 364:7 431:8
tells 62:16 360:1
temporary 91:11
ten 52:4 53:19 120:3 288:21 384:19 388:17 396:21
ten-minute 99:9
tenacity 438:14
tend 30:15 84:11 267:14 361:2 363:14 369:18 381:10
tends 212:21
tens 30:7
tension 36:19 50:13 50:19 119:12
tenuously 174:11
Teresa 420:3
term 58:20 91:11 166:13 185:9 338:15 354:7 403:10 441:5 460:5 463:21
terms 89:22 113:7 118:2 163:12 165:2 167:19 195:6 236:9 259:8 260:7 261:3,22 262:5 263:13 264:22 265:10 266:14,16 267:7 268:6,12,13,18,20 268:22 269:6 299:15 300:1 308:12 310:12 312:15,15,19 336:10,14 339:4 339:15 344:9,21 351:10 354:5 356:3,13 357:16 358:18 359:12 362:6,20 366:10 367:5 372:12 373:11 375:10 381:15 383:4 389:1 403:20 404:20 415:8 443:3 456:3 469:2 469:15 473:4 478:22 487:11 506:1 514:4
terrible 347:14
terrific 145:4 382:6 494:5 495:4 515:21
terror 63:21
test 115:18,19 143:15 504:17
testified 242:2
testify 97:13 137:3 431:10
testimonial 95:4
testimony 106:4 137:2 217:2 228:8 404:19 431:12 438:9 506:17 517:13
testing 451:20 452:9 468:17 493:2,8
Texas 1:12,13 2:12 5:17 7:18 8:3 10:12 11:1 64:21 64:22 302:4 325:20,22 434:3 442:7,14 444:4,6 445:22 496:7,8 507:6 509:20
text 58:6 188:10,12 188:12,15,15
thank 5:10,17 7:15 7:17 8:7,18 14:2 14:10,16 84:5,6 86:10,18 87:1 99:12,17 106:1,3 119:21,22 121:12 135:13,14 137:21 145:3 156:1 157:18,21 179:18 183:5,6 191:22 192:1,16 198:17 206:3 214:16,18 229:8 231:17 245:12 249:15 257:1,16 258:8,9 261:15 269:19,20 295:20 312:22 317:8 332:9,10 347:17 353:15,17 354:13,15,16 363:1,22 364:2 372:9 383:16,17 433:21 454:21,22 492:3 493:19 495:4,6 496:4,5 506:10,16,19,20 515:12,13 519:16 519:16
thankful 418:2
thanks 14:9 91:15 140:22 146:6 182:2 206:1 293:22 383:15 433:2 495:13 519:18
thefts 22:9
theme 358:3
theoretically 449:17
theorize 455:7
theory 41:9 42:12 44:15 83:10 450:20 455:10,15 468:11
therapeutic 103:16 103:20,21 105:22
therapist 104:1,2
therapy 103:17,19 104:1,5,12 105:22
they'd 227:10 405:10
thin 252:19
thing 13:21 15:15 16:12 19:21 20:6 21:9 39:5 40:11 52:7 55:4 58:13 62:20 66:5 67:22 113:2,3 117:5 145:9 148:11 149:21 150:7,15 174:12 208:21 221:16 236:3 239:5 308:12 319:17 320:10 326:4 328:3,9 331:11 334:8 338:10 347:14 348:12 361:11 362:13 379:5 385:1,11,18 396:3 399:4 400:20 417:15 423:1 426:15 427:13 428:21 431:1 458:17 460:22 470:5,21 472:1 473:8 474:5 475:6 476:14 489:10 499:17 503:13,17 504:15 508:4 511:11 512:13 515:10,11
things 19:5 20:6 21:15,16 22:13 28:20 29:21,22 30:10 32:10 34:11 39:8,13 44:5 45:6 45:11 46:6,12 47:22 50:17,19 54:6,12 56:13,18 57:10 58:9 60:12 60:15 61:14 63:20 72:19 73:18,22 82:2,9,11 83:9 89:11 94:5 95:5 97:11 117:8 118:14 136:19 208:12 209:8 213:10 214:8,15 224:7 228:3 267:9 267:13 269:9 271:5 275:14 284:2 287:1,13 297:5 310:17 319:12 322:4 323:17 328:20

329:17 330:9 331:10 332:14 335:1 342:22 355:19 362:3,5 367:2 370:11 372:1 373:8 376:3 377:13 381:21 391:2 392:16 393:1,18 401:22 405:18,21 406:1 407:2,4 416:15 418:22 419:18,19 430:4,13 436:5 438:21 450:5 453:19 457:5 460:7,14,15,16 461:12,18 464:8 465:7 471:8 473:18 474:15 475:7 476:3,13,15 477:15 483:10 486:18 491:2 501:4 503:8 505:9 505:11 508:10 514:6 517:7,10,20
think 13:9,15 14:4 19:20 23:15 36:7 38:17 39:1,1 43:3 43:12 46:13,14 60:14 72:10 77:14 78:18,18,19 80:7 85:2,20,21 86:11 86:13 88:18 93:6 99:20 102:6,20 103:18 104:8,10 106:14 110:3,12 115:9,21 116:19 117:12,19 119:11 144:16 150:16 153:20 154:10,16 156:14 161:5 166:18 168:13,20 169:19 171:3 174:19 176:22 177:10 178:7,11 181:5,18,19 182:5 183:7 205:14 209:22 213:11,19 221:16,16,18 224:16 225:21 232:9 234:2 236:2 239:11 240:11 241:16 242:8,19 249:17 250:7 251:10 253:14 256:16 258:15 267:9,20 270:8 272:14 275:13 277:6 280:5,8 284:12,13 286:7 287:20 288:4 289:3,8 290:2 291:5 292:8,11,16 292:22 296:10 297:2,13 298:9,13 298:18,20 299:5 299:19 301:12,14 301:19 304:10 305:3,11 310:3 311:6 313:2 317:6 326:11,11 327:16 330:20 334:14 338:17 341:10,20 345:1,3,6 348:3 348:20 354:2 355:3,3,7,12,14 355:18,22 356:13 356:19 357:4,8,14 358:22 359:13 361:1,3,21 365:17 365:19,20,20 371:10 373:1,18 374:2,9,20 375:15 376:3,5,13 378:15 378:19 380:7,11 381:8 384:13 388:11 391:2,14 392:16 393:1 395:8 396:15 400:20 401:1 403:2 404:9,16 406:6 407:11 408:6,15,19 409:19 410:2 412:4,5,12,13 418:5,22 420:4 422:19 424:1,19 425:3 428:18 429:7,18,19 430:4 430:7 431:11,14 433:18 440:2 442:9 445:5,6 449:7,17 450:22 451:8 452:16 453:10,13,15 455:10 456:2,8 457:5 458:15,22 460:3,10,12 461:4 461:10,12,18 462:9,15 464:7 467:8 469:20 470:4,6 471:9 472:1,13 474:11 474:18,19,19 475:1 476:1,3,9 476:16,18 478:15 480:11,18 481:3 481:22 482:20 483:5,8 484:1 486:6,9,18 487:2 487:3,13,14,20 488:22 489:14 495:21 497:19 498:17 500:2 501:9,14 502:14 502:21 503:12 504:6 505:9,13,18 509:13 510:15 511:11 512:3 514:3 515:1,9,22 517:10 518:11,17 519:12,17
thinking 54:9,12 69:3 71:13 72:11 97:22 110:4 114:10 146:4,9 362:20 372:14 381:15 449:14 455:5 464:2 473:16 506:1 509:15
thinks 396:7 510:1
third 41:9 42:2,7,8 44:15 45:15 46:4 46:7 72:17 83:11 126:6 130:19 320:18 321:1
thorny 438:8
thorough 187:9
thought 44:2,9 56:19 64:14 69:4 71:20 75:9 84:9 145:15 271:1 279:9 317:19 394:12 401:7 404:19 413:15 456:15 497:15
thoughtful 506:11
thoughts 55:7 58:2 63:11 110:3 206:17 256:13 470:19
thousand 506:5
thousands 30:8
threat 15:17,18 16:2,3,7
threats 15:19,20 16:8 189:14 191:2
three 25:6,21 41:10 65:19 72:12 81:18 128:17 148:12 149:9 153:3,9 155:22 161:16 162:22 163:3 164:21 165:1 166:16 167:4 174:1 177:11 180:10,15 184:17 194:1 237:15 245:9 268:14 313:8 320:15 327:14 330:6 332:12 337:1 338:19 344:3,6 377:14,22 419:7 444:17 501:20,22
three-dimensional 65:15,22 66:1,2 69:16
threshold 474:1
thrive 41:3,4
throat 43:18
throw 345:12
tied 65:10,11 172:9 251:14
tiers 149:9
ties 208:5
Tim 54:2
time 9:1 14:12,17 14:21 18:8 20:3 23:10 45:21 46:17 47:5 55:17 57:8 59:9 61:4,9,9,10 65:1 69:14,15 70:8 73:3 74:14 76:4,5 79:1,17,17 82:7 83:16 87:20 96:17 97:15,22 98:11 99:9 103:9 109:15 110:7,18 110:19 116:22 122:16 144:22 146:9 152:21 154:13 174:20 177:12 179:5 191:22 199:4 205:4 214:17 218:9 219:17,19 219:20 222:21 229:9 236:11,15 241:3,4 242:10,11 243:8 244:17,18 255:20 257:3 269:4 271:17 273:22 274:7,8,11 276:10 277:19 295:13 316:8,13 316:15 318:11 319:4 322:12,14 322:14,17 323:19 326:12 330:7,8,11 330:14,16 334:7 335:2 357:4 358:9 358:13,20 372:2,6 373:7 374:22

375:7 377:4 379:6 397:4,12 398:22 402:14 417:22 418:16 419:3,19 420:1 429:4,5 438:2 439:16 445:1 457:8,12,14 459:20 463:3 464:15,18 472:1 483:5 492:9 493:12 500:6 515:17 518:17
timeliness 186:19 188:3,6
timely 87:3 124:4 128:20 134:8 226:6 227:1
times 20:4 22:4,18 22:20 23:1 24:6 27:9 32:5 46:5 49:5 52:2,4 53:5,7 56:12 59:11 92:18 104:20 126:5 134:6 173:12 253:18 298:3 301:3 304:1 327:8 334:1 372:12 395:1,7 396:13 404:4 458:20 459:6 467:9 473:1 490:1
tiny 491:7
tip 188:10,12,12,17 188:19 189:3
tips 189:9
tipster 188:14,19 189:6
tipsters 188:22
title 159:19 202:2 202:10 303:15,16 304:2,6,12,15 305:2 354:8,19 511:13,14,14
titled 136:4
TJAGS 129:15 132:18
today 7:4,6,13 8:20 9:15 10:6,18 44:19,21 58:4,4 87:2 100:10 121:18 122:3 125:9 192:17 212:12 231:15 295:15 296:6 318:11 323:4 324:1 327:9 330:18 331:2,2 354:5,12 356:22 358:4,9 372:12 373:3,10 394:18 398:2 404:17,19 405:19 406:3 435:3 436:18 439:8 440:21 442:5 445:8 472:16 485:13 488:17 496:6 507:13,21 515:9 516:4,7
today's 196:12
told 70:14,14 75:5 76:13 77:3 298:6 315:8 322:9 333:21 432:2 477:21 478:4 493:10 496:16 502:11,12
tomorrow 11:20 12:6,14 147:21 156:14 392:11
Tomorrow's 11:2
tonic 49:16 61:22 62:7,17 72:16
tons 209:15
tool 243:6 439:4 469:1 481:19
tools 436:22 478:15 481:20
top 57:22 167:15 202:17 434:6 475:3
topic 234:1
topics 205:22 507:12 509:17 516:3
tortured 394:3
total 108:20 110:19 112:16 206:22 243:1
totality 340:16 341:4
totally 44:7,12 74:8 74:8 114:19 138:4 373:21
touch 39:15 90:15 379:6 392:20 492:22
touched 165:1 498:15,20
touching 54:19 255:6 349:4 350:2 350:10 351:3,5
tough 100:2 318:3 329:17 330:16 334:8 402:1
tougher 235:6
tour 146:20 151:19 152:12,16,16,22 166:17 180:8
tours 149:3 152:21 161:14
towel 345:12
town 303:14 381:6
track 11:18 148:21 149:12 150:22 151:8,14 153:8 168:8 169:22 170:21 171:14 174:4 177:2,3 316:5
tracking 389:19
tracks 169:1 179:1
traditional 64:10 69:22 73:19 94:8 102:10,12 105:1 111:19 114:6 260:20 317:16 319:3,4 325:7
traditionalist 73:20
traditionally 55:10 65:15 68:8 83:21 93:9 95:3 105:10
traffic 50:16 180:3
tragedy 64:8
train 83:5 84:16 87:13 89:17 92:19 92:22 108:9 112:8 112:12,13 113:5 191:17 203:7 204:6 207:19 209:6 240:17 247:2,11,12 248:17 299:6 326:18 412:9 418:11 461:20
trained 16:18,19 17:1 35:17 66:7 69:20 71:4 87:12 103:12 107:4,21 108:1,4,21 110:16 112:18 114:21 128:19 134:12 137:1,11 138:13 142:2,10 156:10 158:21 161:17 173:8 185:12 201:10 205:13 210:5,7,13,17 211:6 236:14,18 237:10 238:10,11 238:20 243:20,21 251:7 270:13 271:2 287:17,18 301:13 385:2 423:7 519:13
trainers 113:4 238:5
training 2:7,7 3:8 10:8 12:16 14:8 55:11 68:22 69:7 73:10 78:4 84:16 84:22 85:2,4,5 87:4,7,22 88:1,5 88:16,17,18,20,21 92:17 93:8 95:11 100:13 101:22 104:14 105:14 106:22,22 108:7 110:18,21 111:3 111:12,13 113:11 115:5 126:19 129:3,11 130:7,20 131:5,6,9,10,11 131:14,20 136:9 136:17 137:3 139:17 140:7 142:15 144:10 150:1 154:10 156:5,11 163:22 164:1 167:19 170:2,21 176:9 180:11 185:18,19 186:2 187:3,5 191:10,12,13 195:2,3,4,16,20 196:2,3,5,6,8 197:17 199:2,16 200:1,3,5 201:17 201:19,21,22 202:20 203:13,14 203:15,18,19,21 204:10 208:3,16 208:21 212:13 231:4 232:10,22 233:22 234:18 235:5,12,22 236:10 237:4 238:12 240:15,21 241:1,5 242:3,4,5 242:10 243:19 244:3 245:1,14,15 245:21 246:4,6,15 246:17,22 247:5 247:14 248:3,19 264:4 265:8,10 270:15 274:1,10 297:13,21 299:19 300:7 302:8 304:6 356:8,11 377:4 378:10,11,14,16 394:17 395:20 396:16 397:2,3,7 397:15 398:1,4,17 399:3 405:8,11 406:14 413:8,20

415:22 416:1 420:18 421:3,3,5 421:7,10 444:20 460:3 471:13,18 481:13,14,16 485:12 486:4 498:14 504:4,5,7 504:8,19 505:2 517:14,16
traits 34:9 36:11
trajectory 443:11 446:6,7
Trans 184:19
transfer 165:20 244:9 384:16
transferred 399:2 400:18
transfers 400:8
transformation 270:7
transiency 173:16
transient 466:16
transit 185:16
transition 165:14 373:4
translatablility 442:12
translate 395:2
transparency 503:12
transpired 277:17 296:20
transpiring 284:17
transport 259:15
trauma 50:2,3,3 51:16,18 53:21 54:5 55:14 59:20 63:9 65:12 73:9 73:11 131:17 144:4 277:10 323:2 363:14 411:20 412:22 416:22 417:12,13 417:16 420:19,20
traumatic 50:14 53:16 58:18 98:13 99:2 359:16 506:13
travel 143:13,16
travels 439:11
Travis 285:15,20 308:5
treat 491:3
treated 134:5 290:11 293:5,8 419:7 492:1 513:9
treatment 25:21 136:8 137:17 419:5 438:4 444:12
trembling 62:1 64:1
tremendous 25:15 26:11 66:15,16 84:11 279:14 493:20 494:14
tremendously 83:12 88:7
trend 166:19
trial 92:17 97:14 129:22 130:3,7,12 131:7 132:13,21 142:17,21 146:17 148:7,14 149:17 150:10,11 151:5,8 151:13 153:12 156:18 157:3,4 158:6,8,10 159:5 159:13,16 163:1 163:17,22 164:10 166:4,5,5 167:5 176:5 178:2 179:13 180:17 181:4 187:5 226:13,17 400:3 488:15
trials 61:4 400:9
triangle 357:9,21 358:10 365:20 367:12
tried 33:4 158:2 168:16 213:11 256:18 460:17 466:7,12,13
tries 176:1
trigger 57:20
troop 162:4,7
troops 85:5
trouble 20:14 359:21 378:4 476:15
troubled 476:13
troubling 268:6,10
trucks 317:2,2
true 105:18 117:19 284:18 348:21 391:11 412:4 426:8,9 427:14 433:4 462:18 469:10 474:9 475:9,16 476:2 482:8 499:6 511:12
Truisms 100:8
truly 7:20 297:5 354:17 380:12
trust 16:19 50:9,12 65:10 78:16 96:13 411:4 492:9 500:21 501:13 502:5 503:6
trusted 41:4 43:21 65:9 75:12
trusting 328:15
truth 63:3,8,9 262:16 310:20 387:21 388:2 390:9 439:19
try 13:22 38:14 47:2,4 91:4 117:4 142:20 144:19 145:1 155:6 168:11 171:1 172:20 174:11 205:6 226:2 227:18 234:11 235:9,15 290:7 323:8 324:10,14 326:3,6 331:10 346:9,14,17 353:4 362:7 409:6 412:9 478:12
trying 29:21 40:3,6 40:7 64:2 80:2 89:3,15 105:21 116:6 175:3 181:14 221:13 226:6,21 244:15 256:21 275:10 277:17 323:20 330:10 351:9 363:11,12 369:13 378:20 406:12 414:17 415:21 421:16 426:3,3,4 429:9 449:17 455:6 458:15 460:6 463:21 464:4,13 478:22 506:4
Tucson 423:13,13 423:19
Tulsa 180:2
tune 471:4
tunnel 98:14
turn 5:7 11:15,18 23:13 54:21 244:3 244:13 245:8,10 363:14
turned 46:20 314:6
turning 201:17 517:9
turnover 163:13 180:15
turns 23:1 53:5 493:17 506:13
twice 169:15 422:14,16
two 6:22 19:2 59:4 72:16 81:18 89:12 95:2 97:12 99:16 100:4 102:1 146:19 149:10 156:19 160:2,10 161:5 162:2,3,6 162:17,21 163:6 169:4,9 179:13,20 197:3 201:13 208:20 209:6,13 211:3,17 239:4 258:10 268:14 281:9 299:5 319:11 323:17 356:19 364:15 366:21 376:7 381:8 388:17 389:14 434:22 438:21 443:19 445:11 463:18 465:4 466:12 471:1 473:15 479:15 480:3 495:9 498:14 517:9
two-thirds 249:7
two-week 88:4
two-year 166:13
type 55:11 94:20 160:20 173:13 188:16 245:6,22 280:7 300:4,5 330:7 349:13 471:10 478:3 479:11 481:12 495:1 505:7
types 27:9 48:18 102:17 142:17 203:11 256:12 278:8 301:7,9 305:5 334:18 377:14 413:1 518:12
typical 383:4 396:17
typically 32:1 33:9 159:6 270:20 272:4 277:3 382:3 491:10
typos 516:16

U

U.S 2:10,13,20 3:1 3:3,5,7,8,9 121:6 121:9 123:11 178:6 183:12,13

183:14 187:2 191:12 387:13 420:2 425:17 450:12
UCMJ 185:7 202:14 215:20
UCR 388:21
ultimate 454:15
ultimately 140:1 155:6 378:17 382:1 437:16
Um-hum 429:10 431:21
unafraid 181:12
unattended 67:10
unbecoming 392:4
under-age 223:10 224:21
under-compensa... 118:13
under-reported 232:13 268:2
under-reporting 318:17
Under-resourced 438:15
underestimate 444:7
undergrad 507:7
underlying 437:18 437:19
undermined 481:2
Undersecretary 3:5
understand 15:5 19:20 31:21 32:13 34:12 44:7,15 47:17 50:22 51:1 52:21,22 54:5,6 55:13 62:21 64:2 66:14 69:9 71:8 72:20 73:4,8,15 79:7 81:14 83:12 86:12,16 93:11,12 101:8 104:14 107:11 118:8,21 119:8 160:18 215:20 216:21 217:9,22 218:3 234:20 236:22 245:11 265:16 280:22 296:19,21 312:6 330:20 364:12 387:15 389:15 400:21 402:17 414:18 418:5 422:22 423:22 424:2 434:9 436:5 441:22 443:17 446:11 448:2 456:21 459:18 472:19 499:11
understandably 94:14
understanding 17:18 20:9 21:10 63:13 92:15 104:2 119:11 130:22 144:18 203:9 284:1 285:10 289:11 291:4 304:15 306:18 340:8 362:18 387:4 388:9,14 409:1 416:20 437:10 453:21 454:11 473:1 494:18,20 509:14 516:9
understands 47:4 81:7 92:11 98:11 288:7 301:16 338:1
understood 58:15 66:11 83:10 430:10
undertake 439:16
undertaking 9:16 439:17
underway 198:7
undetected 32:21 32:22
undetermined 316:4
undoing 450:17
undone 450:16
unfair 482:20,22 483:5,21 485:14
unfold 222:2
unfolds 363:7,10
unfortunately 328:11 466:2
unfounded 389:20
uniform 11:4 45:9 79:13,20 260:13
uninhibited 42:13
union 24:1
unique 125:17 129:3 131:12 159:2 197:10 310:10 462:7
uniquely 438:3
unit 2:14 124:7 127:3 158:8 159:19 164:2 195:14 201:6 208:21 238:10 253:3 257:18 263:3 270:2,5,7 270:12,14 271:13 271:22 272:17 276:6 282:15 285:9,13 288:15 309:20,22 349:8 427:15 451:22 465:19,20 492:18 497:9 498:5
United 1:1 26:15 27:3 28:9 29:3 52:14 207:13,20 247:10,13 488:8
units 162:4 190:19 196:10 197:19 198:8 244:21 288:14,16
unity 122:8
universal 368:20
universally 13:11 329:6
universe 108:17,20 112:22 115:8
universities 66:10 112:1 305:4 308:14,19 310:11 312:12 410:4 434:7
university 1:12 2:11 5:17 7:18 8:3 8:5 11:1 53:22 54:2,4 302:4,5 303:15,18 304:4,5 304:16,19,19,22 305:10,15 307:7 307:10,12,16 310:1 325:20,22 423:14,20 428:7 434:3,16 507:6
University's 303:8
unlocks 512:8
unpack 369:4
unprepared 373:22
unregistered 29:12
unreported 318:18 328:7
unrequested 447:20
unrestricted 11:12 127:11 175:8 194:9 214:4 332:17,19 333:1 338:3,4 427:11 430:9 457:22 458:5,12 502:1,7 505:21
unspoken 439:15
unstated 80:8
untapped 53:11
untested 441:1,9,12 447:21
updated 136:6 260:14
updates 136:11,15
uploaded 345:10
upmost 511:10
upset 96:21 99:7 105:3 423:4
upside 454:5
upstairs 70:6
upsurge 449:15 455:5 456:19 494:6
upwards 174:6
urge 449:2 459:16
USAMPS 207:21 208:18
use 15:13,13 50:18 54:3 69:8 93:21 94:7 96:5 99:1 102:13 106:18 181:4 188:14,22 193:13 202:12 204:20 210:1,2 233:3,4 239:22 245:17,18 246:2 251:15,21 253:1,2 280:1 309:12 323:1 326:8 337:16 347:22 381:10 386:16 388:21,22 394:14 395:12 407:16 412:3 435:21 454:2 469:1 481:20
useful 355:13 448:20,21
user 20:12 286:13
uses 262:18
USN 190:21
usually 98:15 104:17 153:4 207:17 223:19,22 226:9,17 227:20 248:22 259:16 428:6 488:1
UT 305:18,20 434:6
utilization 73:11
utilize 106:10 251:9 256:5 309:4,20 320:3 324:21 349:12,21 350:6
utilized 205:16
utilizing 278:3 408:3 496:17
utmost 290:10

UTPD 302:15 303:2 309:9

V

vacancies 163:11
vagina 261:11 279:5
vaginally 70:11
valid 386:3
validate 239:10 505:11 506:4
validated 163:10 170:3 239:12
validation 438:4
valuable 9:4 329:13 331:19
value 80:5,6 173:22 178:18 290:13,20 434:18 445:9 481:14
valued 298:21
values 80:8 434:8
values-based 83:7
Van 25:20
vantage 296:5
variable 483:16
variables 372:3 473:21
variance 279:8
variety 28:5,6 38:22 53:2 204:6 243:9 357:12,22 362:22 374:5
various 298:3 360:10 380:2 487:17
varying 419:12
vast 19:19,21 25:9 30:11 33:10 34:7 35:8,10 40:16,17 49:17 52:10,11 62:12 63:15 68:2 102:12 103:7 249:13
vastly 55:9
vastness 448:16
vector 343:3
vehicles 143:15,17
venue 7:21 196:12
veracity 481:1
verbal 61:22
verify 134:11
versa 92:20 314:15
versed 283:22
versus 111:19 200:21 263:17 279:9 337:22 372:4 389:7,20 390:2,18 392:8 405:4 421:12 424:17 425:8 427:10 430:5
vertical 445:2
vertically 261:19
vested 283:3
vet 308:6
Veteran's 470:16
veterans 56:19 436:9
vetted 93:21
vice 1:16 92:20 119:1 267:11 314:14
victim 4:4 9:20 10:2,2,6 20:10 22:5 23:1 24:5 46:5,14,16 47:3 50:3,8 55:1 60:13 61:6,8,10 62:10 62:14 63:1 64:20 66:22 68:2,9 69:1 69:21 81:11,13,16 81:16 82:13 85:15 88:12,16 89:4 96:14 97:20 98:9 117:17 118:10 120:4,15 121:19 121:22 122:10 126:17 127:1,16 128:3,12,14 130:1 130:17 132:6,10 133:4,6 135:1,2 137:6 138:3,6,14 138:19 143:14 145:10 148:8 161:6,9 162:10 164:3 180:7 187:11 194:14,15 194:17 195:14 196:7,8,10,16,22 197:22 199:14,17 200:2,6 201:2,6 204:17 208:21 211:2 213:1,6,8 214:1,3 215:2 216:19 217:14,19 217:20 218:4,5,6 218:8,9 219:6,7 219:10,13,14,21 220:11,20 221:5 221:11,15 223:18 225:4 228:1,3 229:11 230:6 233:6,8,12 234:16 235:1,14 238:10 253:3 259:4,15 260:1,2,3,6,9,10 261:14 262:10 263:12 269:4 274:20 275:12 276:4,15 280:14 280:16,21 283:13 283:19 286:12 289:11,14 296:11 301:14 303:20 304:18 306:10,17 310:16 312:1 315:22 316:7,14 318:20,21 320:3,7 320:7,19 321:3,5 321:6,8,10,13,22 322:5,8,10,17,21 323:5,13 324:6,11 326:14 327:2 330:12,14 331:14 331:15,16,17 332:22 333:10,10 333:13,21 334:6 334:22 335:10,15 335:20 336:4,13 336:16,17 337:2,5 337:8,11,12,15 340:3,5,21 341:9 341:11,21 342:4,9 343:11,14 345:2 345:18 346:9 347:1,5,6 348:2,7 348:10,18 351:16 352:1,5,7,21,22 353:4 361:20 366:6 380:21 381:11,11,21 382:9,10,14,22 383:6,13 393:19 403:21 404:2 406:21 408:21 409:4,5 410:14,17 410:18 423:4 426:20 427:19 431:1,4 437:7 438:13 440:18 443:20 445:9,10 445:16 452:4 453:18 465:12,13 466:18,20 467:21 468:16,21 469:11 470:12 475:6 486:1 492:22 499:4 501:6 502:13,16,19 510:8,15 514:7
victim's 54:20 60:21 96:14 129:14 132:7 133:15 228:19 323:10 330:14 337:12 410:10 467:2 468:13 501:21 502:22 505:13
victim/witness 381:19
victimization 118:5 119:20 189:20 234:20 284:2 293:14 296:22 359:17 363:6 374:17 445:16 448:7 476:18,21 481:17
victimize 501:1
victimized 117:21 475:13 483:14 503:5
victimizing 318:7
victims 10:4 13:8 13:10,12 21:3,4 22:22 25:10,14,22 26:1,9 27:6,21 28:4 31:11 33:18 34:14 35:4 44:1 50:20 52:13,17,18 52:19 54:17 55:8 55:14 56:13 58:22 60:16 61:17 62:5 63:5 64:9,22 66:18 68:5,10,16 73:14 75:1 83:11 83:17 84:1 85:18 94:7 95:21 96:2 98:18 104:18,18 107:16 114:9 117:20 128:16 129:3,7 130:3,21 131:3,22 134:4 135:5,12 136:20 137:9 138:12 141:5 142:15 145:8,11 158:8,15 159:19 164:22 165:7,21 172:19 174:14 197:16 204:13 205:7,17 205:17 209:17,18 212:20 213:2 214:8 215:1 217:5 217:9 221:17 223:3 224:6,17 228:10 232:15 233:18,19 234:21 234:21 236:4 265:12 269:1 271:3 272:9 273:21 274:6,9,21 275:8 276:18

277:2,8,11 279:16 281:3,6,8 282:11 286:10 287:7 290:6,8 291:13 292:20 293:4,11 293:12,18 295:18 298:5 300:3 312:16 317:18 318:1 319:5,9 320:12 322:12 323:6 325:5 327:18,20,22 328:7,10,14,15 329:15 330:21,22 331:9 332:4 336:6 336:10 338:11,21 341:16 346:11,18 360:5,13 362:6 363:5 366:20 367:6,9 368:9 371:12 372:4,5,14 374:7,10,13 375:8 375:16 379:19 380:13 389:12,21 393:14 394:20,21 395:4,7 396:9 402:20 408:13,22 411:3,5 412:21 416:10 418:7 423:2 424:9,11,22 425:5,11,15,16,18 425:22 426:12 427:13 429:11,15 430:12,21 431:7,9 437:4,15 438:5 441:13,17,18 442:19 443:10 451:13 457:12 458:2 460:11 461:11 464:9,15 465:5 466:2,3,14 466:16 475:12,13 475:15 476:9,10 476:11,12 480:13 480:16,17 482:8,9 482:16,17 487:16 488:2 489:12,18 489:21 490:10,13 490:13,17 491:10 492:5 493:9 494:18 500:1 506:18 507:8 508:16 512:3 513:3 514:2,3,13 514:14

victories 458:1

video 23:3,5 24:12 41:1 42:16 43:15 48:5 61:11 66:6 259:21 290:3 291:22

video-tape 279:20 280:10

video-taped 279:19

videos 89:17 111:16

videotape 107:5,7

view 23:8,9 24:16 28:15 117:17 219:13 337:19 339:22 351:12 361:17,20,21 442:15 460:1,7 463:6,21

viewed 38:18

viewpoint 339:11

viewpoints 436:17

views 39:11 338:9

VII 511:13,14,14

violated 464:21

violation 200:16 203:10 304:21

violations 203:11 391:22 392:2,3,7 392:19 425:8

violence 2:6,21 8:15 31:22 99:2 122:2 124:1 126:9 129:6 131:13 132:11 133:8 142:8 184:18 186:9 187:4,4 195:10 211:21 265:16 271:9 273:4 288:12 305:19 347:8 356:6 373:13 390:20,22 397:9 397:10 402:2,4 409:16 420:10 427:17 432:2 434:21 435:10 437:17 450:13 466:6 509:1

violence/child 29:17

violent 36:21 59:1 184:18 191:4 202:20,22 203:1 205:17 438:17

Virginia 187:16

vision 56:8 98:14 288:4

visit 186:17 190:5

visited 64:20

visiting 512:7

visits 249:22

voice 134:5 468:13

voices 293:13 305:18 435:4

Voller 33:13,22

volume 162:1,4 196:17 198:10

volunteer 298:8 380:4 381:6

voyeurs 31:5,9,10

vulnerabilities 21:1 49:7 116:7 118:11 119:14,16

vulnerability 23:12 23:13 484:15

vulnerable 20:21 324:6 472:12 476:17 484:9,10 514:12,13

VWAP 126:17

W

wait 38:9 210:22 333:16 334:6 408:20

waiting 399:1

wake 71:16,18 72:15 73:2

wakes 512:11

waking 71:12,17

walk 20:5,7 24:17 24:21 39:5 46:21 53:18 57:5 110:13 117:2 217:16 258:15,20 270:6 358:9 366:8 396:1 401:14 509:5,6,7

walked 498:15

walking 116:20 512:6,8

walks 48:17

wall 413:10,10,10 413:13 491:15

wane 90:5

want 5:17 8:18 23:20 24:21 33:16 33:17 41:15 43:3 46:12 51:12 52:7 71:19 77:15 88:20 88:21,22 97:13 107:7 108:14 110:11 112:12 115:11 121:12 134:15 140:5 146:5 157:3 159:15 161:4 206:15 207:4 225:18 226:9 235:20 236:13 259:12 260:4 263:16 264:3 269:4 272:12 275:1,8,13 277:13 281:6 300:13,15 300:16 301:6,13 303:18 305:4 309:17 310:19 311:9 316:2 318:10,15 319:6 322:2 324:3 327:19 331:15 332:12 335:5,11 335:16,19 336:3 338:12,22 340:5 340:21 341:16 342:1 345:16 346:19 347:20 351:16 352:9 370:5 373:4 380:9 382:7 388:20 389:11 397:10 399:17 404:5 408:12,21 411:18 424:20 427:20,22 443:2,4 445:11 450:19,20 454:1 455:11 458:21 459:2 460:9 462:19 467:3,9 472:5 478:10 481:13 482:6,11 483:13 484:5,19 484:21 485:20 490:12,14 493:19 495:7 499:12,17 501:7 503:3 504:2 505:16 507:13,18 507:20 508:6 509:5,6 515:19

wanted 77:16,17 78:3 89:12 154:3 170:13 171:10 233:6,8 272:19,19 276:7 284:13 287:14,14 289:9 290:7 317:19 319:13,14,15,17 320:21 328:1 330:6 394:1 420:1 442:17 455:14 459:22 478:14 496:6 500:4 506:10 516:17

wanting 220:13 300:1 335:3 484:3

wants 214:3,5 218:9 262:1 316:8 320:19 323:13 337:5,11 409:5

warm 5:18 104:21
warrant 146:21 249:13
Warrior 7:8
Washington 1:1 160:9 187:18 396:2 405:4 466:8
wasn't 16:6 47:7 78:15 115:9 271:8 311:16 347:8 414:11 460:21
watch 159:8 179:6 485:20
watched 421:14
watching 416:18 485:15 486:2
wave 439:11
way 14:12 21:20 23:21 42:9 44:20 53:13 55:15 57:8 59:20,20 60:4,5 61:19 63:7 67:17 68:7 69:22 72:21 74:12,21 77:2,3 79:5,6 84:2 89:18 90:21 92:4 95:1 96:15 97:19 112:16 114:7 115:14,21 119:5 130:4 147:4 149:19 152:5,8,10 154:1 180:3 206:9 218:2 226:6 227:22 232:10 234:4 270:9 272:2 272:8,9 275:15 278:10,11 279:21 283:19,20,21 287:21 291:6 293:5,7,10,21 306:10 310:6,14 318:21 319:19 326:7,18 330:22 334:1 337:20 338:6,8 342:17 343:1 349:5,7,9 350:17 351:10 356:10 358:19 362:9,10 364:9 369:21 379:11,14 383:11 384:19 387:12 420:3 434:20 440:3 448:20 449:9,10 452:5 454:10,12 454:12 456:12,13 457:8,10 464:8 467:7 482:4 487:22 490:17 491:20 493:7 494:20 497:1 505:4 506:11 514:12
ways 66:16 68:11 77:13 100:15 101:7 118:3 252:1 275:14 378:3 391:14 449:22 450:6 451:10 465:21 501:20 518:7
we'll 14:4 27:15 120:3,14 145:17 212:11 236:20 238:19 240:12 242:8,11,12 256:20 261:2,3 286:6 303:22 315:5 322:2 323:10 324:12,16 325:20,21 326:3,6 327:2 352:21 353:2,4,18 441:5 452:1 480:11 491:2,3 493:16 518:19
we're 12:5,18 13:1 13:17 15:5,7 16:4 16:6 17:8 18:5,6 21:8,9,11,16,20 28:10 30:6,6,11 31:17,18 32:13,18 38:2,10,16 39:20 40:3,6,7 41:19,21 44:22 47:1,20 51:9 53:12 61:18 62:22 63:3,8,20 65:21,21 67:13 68:4,5,6,9,10,22 69:6 73:17 74:6,7 74:11 77:7,10 80:2,2,5,17 81:2,6 82:2,9,17,21 83:19 84:21 85:1 85:2,6,7 86:15 88:18,19 89:1,2 89:15 90:15,22 91:11 93:22 94:19 94:21 95:11 96:9 96:9 101:19 102:4 102:4,8,13,21 103:3,3,14,22 104:4,13,14,17 105:19,20 106:13 107:13,15 109:9 110:21,22 111:8 111:21 112:4 113:10,20 114:12 115:7 119:2 120:9 121:13 145:9 159:12 163:10 166:15 168:9,11 175:7 181:19,20 191:5 210:9 212:10,11,11 217:2 220:1 221:12 222:18,22 223:7 224:19,22 225:4 226:9,18 232:12 234:4 235:5,6 236:9,10 237:15 238:12 239:1,1,13 242:17 243:22 244:1,15 245:10 247:2 250:17,17,21 251:2,10 252:22 253:22 254:16 255:17 256:9 260:16 268:2 272:1 275:3,4,9 275:21 280:4 281:14 286:17 289:19 290:21 291:6 300:19 301:17 303:13 304:4,9 306:7 311:6,19 312:19 316:10 327:22 329:14,19,20 330:18 332:5 335:1,2,16 338:4 338:10 339:5 340:13 342:19 344:8,14 346:15 349:14 351:2 354:2 355:22 356:2 357:7 358:13,15 364:19 365:21 368:5 371:9 372:5,13,13 374:10 375:6,10 376:5,9 387:3 390:14 392:9 395:8 396:4 397:21 398:13 410:17,18 417:9 428:3 432:3,19 441:1 446:8 447:6 447:11,12,15,16 452:9 458:8 459:12 463:22 464:8,9 470:10,13 471:17 472:20 473:16 480:6 488:18 491:1 493:8 495:22 504:5,15 519:14
we've 8:4,5 29:20 29:21 30:10 33:9 38:18 51:13 55:10 55:13 58:15 61:11 64:4 65:14,14,15 77:12 82:8 86:16 87:22 88:8 89:6 91:5,9 92:17 95:4 95:9 96:6,13,14 103:6,11 105:10 108:7,8,11 111:22 112:19 113:16 114:3 121:10 147:4 150:3,10,16 152:8,21 154:12 163:8 166:12 167:19 172:1 182:18 204:7 205:3,15 208:22 210:9 211:8,9,14 212:5,9 213:10,21 214:9,9,10 217:3 217:4 220:20 228:14,18 232:15 233:18 238:18 239:8 240:20 247:20 251:16 252:3,5 254:5 255:14,22 265:20 266:11,15 267:5,6 268:14 269:11 280:16 289:4 298:3 303:21 306:18 314:10,19 328:3,6,15 331:1 345:9,10,21 350:8 355:4 358:22 367:7 372:11 373:2 374:5 397:13 410:12 423:22 431:11 432:20 440:11 441:14 452:12 458:22 460:15,16 460:17 464:7 471:8 472:16 480:12 487:12 490:2 492:5 504:9 505:10,22 511:1,4
weakly 58:12
weakness 116:7
weaknesses 377:9
weapon 60:19 98:9
wear 79:20
wearing 45:16,20 59:11 280:4
weather 198:1

web 188:22
web-based 196:8
website 7:10 189:1 291:7 321:1 416:4 496:16
WEDNESDAY 1:9
week 156:20 182:17 201:20 202:8 203:12,13 207:19 208:20 209:3,13 211:17 211:19 213:12 246:8,13 256:4 398:15,15
weekly 200:14
weeks 195:1,2 209:6 395:15 396:12
weeping 105:3
weighing 200:20
welcome 5:11,18 8:4 91:16 99:13 434:4 491:2 496:3
welcomed 392:22
welcoming 379:10
welfare 132:7 325:10
well-prepared 281:2
went 28:8 29:22 59:6 70:3,6 72:16 72:18 75:17 76:1 76:11 77:19 120:6 161:20 162:22 163:1,2,4,6,7,7 171:15 179:3 181:1 213:11 257:6 272:7 273:22 274:2 295:9 304:6 315:5 325:2 329:18 330:3 346:2 347:16 386:8 393:19 395:22 415:22 417:1 418:16 466:12 477:18 480:18 495:15,16 498:10 499:1
weren't 64:13 171:20 182:8 287:1 389:8 402:10
West 112:3
white 401:5
Whitley 397:13 398:20
who've 412:21
widely 197:20
wider 199:6
wife 42:18 70:1 99:6
wife's 43:1
wiggling 55:21,22
William 2:2 7:7 8:2
willing 301:20 319:5 403:15
willingness 228:10 506:17
window 42:20 502:9
windows 472:10
wisdom 452:19,22 488:16,18
wise 52:18
wish 341:10 342:1 346:5 415:2 515:2 515:16
withdraw 425:18 426:13
withdraws 342:5,9 345:19
withstanding 173:17
witness 126:17 128:14 130:1 135:1 138:14 321:9 400:17,17 505:7
witnesses 225:9,10 259:20,21 321:16 324:10,15 325:5
wits 512:12
woke 70:9,20 71:20
wolf 16:13 17:7
woman 20:15,15 70:1,9 71:11 233:9 347:9 507:18 512:6
women 2:6,21 23:8 23:9 25:9,10 26:9 26:16 31:16 53:1 53:2 80:20,22 126:3 231:8 271:9 273:5 350:10 356:6 373:13 397:9,10 401:18 420:11 432:2 450:13,21 451:2 455:3,18,22 456:4 456:7,11 466:7 479:1
women's 2:17 52:8 80:19 120:20 360:2
wonder 100:12 101:5 137:22 145:17 371:4
wondered 101:21 174:15 232:18 449:22
wonderful 7:21 18:10 39:4 381:21
wondering 457:17
Wood 156:20 195:15 287:19 393:6 399:4
word 79:21 278:10 289:15 403:21 417:16 480:8 488:17 494:11
worded 360:16 362:2
words 7:17 58:5 59:21 164:14 311:22 349:2 429:9 488:1
work 2:11 8:11,14 9:4 15:9,14 20:22 41:14 67:16 71:7 82:8 99:19 103:1 106:5 114:1 122:15 123:21 126:22 128:19 133:9 152:10 173:2 178:7 179:10 194:12 198:14 199:22 200:7 202:4,21 204:4 219:18 220:2 226:16 227:18 234:5 235:10 243:8 247:20 252:1,16 254:3 256:7,21 261:16 262:3,10 263:14 265:7 272:12,13,17,18 273:18 280:20 282:1,9 288:2 289:17 292:21 297:16,20 298:21 300:3,5,8,10,12 300:13 301:6,9 302:10,18,19 303:2 304:3 308:15 318:20,22 327:3,4,13 330:10 337:20 346:10 356:5 359:11 382:1 393:3 397:18 399:5 401:14,17 409:8 416:3 418:3 419:22 420:5 423:3 426:4 428:15 434:4 435:9,14,18,19 443:9 453:2,8,9 456:9 461:5 464:6 471:10,15 474:18 478:9 487:6 493:14,21 497:17 508:14,15 511:12 516:8
Workaholic 18:21
worked 99:4 107:1 109:20 180:3 220:21 224:8,11 240:20 286:11 290:9 314:1,5,11 314:12 368:19 402:5 403:5 407:19 434:20 494:19
worker 104:3 435:3
workers 104:4,19 436:13
working 29:15 64:17 66:15 81:2 81:6 88:9,11 106:13 108:8 109:9 112:4 113:10,17 114:2,3 123:5,7,15 125:2 128:8 136:14 137:15 138:13 139:21 144:17,19 155:21 158:16 165:13 178:14,15 200:9 201:15 202:20 205:3 214:7 220:1 222:21,22 224:5 226:13 227:10 228:17 235:5 238:17 276:12 279:12 286:5,22 287:1 295:13 312:19 323:6 327:11 336:16 349:14 384:20 390:13 393:17 394:9 395:2,3 401:5,11 411:7 435:5 440:19 442:17 444:22 451:18 460:11,12 460:18,18 461:11 471:1,18 472:17 483:19
works 59:20,21 60:6 94:18 176:22 201:5 228:4 337:8 366:19 371:7

381:17,18 493:9
workshops 131:8 196:21 197:14
world 13:11 14:20 15:3 24:16 74:5 74:22 82:10 158:12 169:15 207:12 210:21 297:21 345:22 378:15,16 398:21 412:3 434:7 450:4
worldwide 124:4
worried 29:9 342:20
worry 18:15 269:7 457:10
worse 51:19 68:21
worst 387:22 410:11
would've 47:9
wouldn't 16:5 62:13,13 138:22 327:9,10 348:16 396:20 412:3 414:2 459:11 467:1 473:8
wound 293:15
wow 293:16
write 85:15
writing 86:20 141:18
written 7:6 278:2 313:20
wrong 76:15 215:6 408:10 411:11 497:11 498:18
wrongful 54:19 255:5
wrote 272:9 394:16
Wyk 25:20

X

X 410:19 488:2
XO's 148:7

Y

yeah 464:19
year 4:5 21:18,19 26:16 27:2,6 52:3 52:5 82:5 86:2 87:9 108:10 110:22 112:12,13 147:15 150:9 152:17 157:6,6 159:6 175:22 176:11,11 177:12 180:10,16 185:10 195:18 198:5 206:19,20 213:11 222:18 238:19 239:4 240:19 244:1 254:6 265:9 265:17,17,19 268:3,3,13 269:17 390:12 422:14,15 422:16 427:17 444:6 461:15 468:10 469:17 471:1,14 497:22 498:7
years 53:19 74:1 75:7 76:5 88:14 89:7,15 92:22 95:2 102:22 150:3 153:3,9 154:15 158:3 161:16 164:21 165:2 166:16 167:4 169:4,6,9 171:15 174:1,5,6 177:11 179:13,21 192:13 201:4 205:5 237:16 239:4,12 240:14 241:6 242:17,20 243:13 243:14,15 245:9 267:7 268:14 270:3 272:10 276:21 327:14 338:19 344:3,6 384:9,17,19 388:18 395:21 396:13,21 402:8 413:7 416:8 419:8 420:14 423:6 435:1 436:11 440:6 441:17 463:18 465:4 466:12 471:2 476:6 477:14 480:10 507:22
yell 41:21 62:3
yellow 418:18
yesterday 143:9 206:9,11 332:15 346:3
Yokosuka 187:19
yonder 42:9
York 59:4
young 19:7,7 69:19 205:7 401:2 496:15
youngest 74:19

Z

Zayas 8:10
zero 250:14 421:2
zero-one 363:7
zoned 72:9,18

0

0.2 29:5,6
0.4 29:4
0.52 29:5
0.7 28:8
0.9 28:7
04 148:14
05 146:18 148:7,14 151:10
05's 153:16
06 148:6 151:10
06's 153:16

1

1 220:3 260:20 398:12,14
1,000 112:13 185:12
1,200 108:10
1,800 170:4
1,830-some-odd 207:3
1.3 26:13 27:6 28:6
1.8 112:11
1:10 257:4
1:37 257:7
10 31:15 109:3 158:12 176:11 270:3 353:18 480:9
10,000 384:11
10:28 120:6
10:40 120:7
100 29:2 210:9,12 219:5 244:15,16 244:17 245:3 394:4,6 399:13 427:8 474:4 498:7
1000 427:16
105 193:21
106 193:22
11 1:9 31:6 201:19 203:13 246:8 395:15
12,500 206:20
12.6 28:3
12:41 257:6
120 4:5 11:4 186:13 190:8 243:20 244:1 286:2
120-some-odd 208:2
1200 440:8 480:18
126 238:20
14 4:3 31:2 440:6
140 185:12
143,900 27:21
148 193:22
15 161:11 195:7 207:19 231:10,11 435:1 507:22
150 435:16
16 158:10 207:22
17 44:1 201:4
175 26:1
18 31:5,13 146:10 161:10 166:6 202:2,10 204:2 248:13 447:5,10 479:13
18.9 28:1
1811 193:4 202:1 248:8
1811's 248:14 249:12
183 4:6
1871 26:15
188,380 27:7
195,000 25:14
1971 158:4
1975 77:4,5
1981 163:16
1990's 186:3
1992 360:3
19th 26:21
1st 218:13 254:13 420:11

2

2 260:21
2,000 112:13
2,500-some-odd 206:22
2.5 25:17
2.8 29:6
20 2:13 29:3 71:2 99:11 109:4 110:15 174:5 175:22 176:11 177:12 192:13 231:10,11 459:20 476:6 480:9 507:22 512:17,18
200 208:3 399:13
2000 25:8 163:21
2002 270:2,10,13 292:6 296:2
2002/2003 271:11
2003 163:21 181:8
2005 88:3 163:20 163:21 181:8 291:22 497:6
2006 36:17 88:3
2007 88:3 149:1 192:12 397:8 398:11 399:12,15
2008 189:12 208:9

398:19
2009 88:4,6 108:8 161:8 162:12,15 208:8 290:1 292:7 327:17 432:21
2010 27:2 33:22 88:6 108:9,10 178:3 290:2 292:7
2012 123:1 146:11 190:14 203:17,17 327:17
2013 1:9 4:5 5:21 9:8 136:2 186:5 220:21 254:22 394:18 398:12,14 399:16
2014 190:5 195:18
2017 191:14
21 264:7
214 219:16
21st 1:12
22 26:9 196:4 212:3 212:4
23 25:20 161:21 199:21 265:20 267:2 384:9
24 31:3 127:15 166:6,7 185:21 189:10 199:21 203:22 226:17 238:10 276:2
24/7 410:8
25 239:12 264:12 424:8 434:6
25,000 86:3 87:15
250,000 264:9
257 4:8
26 31:12
27 266:20
274637 188:16
28 31:4
28th 136:2,6
29 123:1 395:22

3

3.8 26:10
3:03 353:21
3:21 353:21
30 174:6 175:22 177:12 212:4,4 239:15 249:12 480:10 504:6
300 210:15 243:2
300,000 264:9
309 1:12
30th 265:18 267:5
31 215:20
33 32:15
35 424:8
354 4:9
36,000 442:15 460:1,7
360 501:15
365 410:8
37 31:16
39 194:2

4

4 446:20
4,000 109:2
40 143:14 144:2 158:3 265:4 327:16 422:4 424:3 455:6 475:11 480:13 514:2
400 108:10
42 238:20
44 30:21 62:18
46 185:19
47 267:15
48 98:7 127:20 226:18 277:3,7,14 385:2 413:18 415:7,7,9 416:18
495 4:10

5

5 29:3 71:2
5,000 109:3
5.0 29:4
5.95 34:4
5:29 495:15
5:37 495:16
50 33:2 186:11 190:14 195:12 239:15 292:14 394:4,6 423:5
500 110:22 111:6 112:12
515 4:11
52 31:10
5430.107 184:21
55 265:22
5505 251:5
5505.18 190:11 254:7
56 185:17 195:17
561 25:13,15
573 4:4 123:18
591 265:18

6

6:00 497:7
6:07 519:22
60 185:13 211:20 311:13 504:6
60-some-odd 211:19
63 266:1
65 186:6
66 32:15 33:2
683,000 26:16

7

7 4:2
7.29 34:1
70 238:14,14 510:10
700-some-odd 207:5
71 207:11 219:5 465:19
74 77:4
747 207:6,8 210:14 249:10
75 237:10 238:14 238:14 243:22
774 265:20
78 26:15

8

8:00 1:13
8:49 5:2
80 244:17 423:2 458:11 459:19,20 489:11 510:10
800 108:16
80s 25:2 384:20 394:13 401:3 402:8
82 32:22 445:22 480:4
83 264:4
84 25:8 189:8
85,593 27:4

9

9 398:19
90 185:22 271:19
903 398:16 399:10
90s 393:18 395:22 402:15 406:2 432:15
911 313:13,16 362:15 497:13
95 19:16 248:13 271:19
97,000 26:17
99 49:11

C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the foregoing transcript

In the matter of: Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes Panel Meeting

Before: US DOD

Date: 12-11-13

Place: Austin, Texas

was duly recorded and accurately transcribed under my direction; further, that said transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Neal R Gross

Court Reporter